ML20151M825
| ML20151M825 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1988 |
| From: | Taylor J DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| LAC-12544, NUDOCS 8804250135 | |
| Download: ML20151M825 (6) | |
Text
i l
D DA/RYLAND
[B/h[M[COOPERATlVE
- 2615 EAST AVE SO
- PO BOX 817
- LAC (608) 788-4000 JAMES W. TAYLOR General Manager April 15, 1988 In reply, please I refer to LAC-12544 l
DOCKET No. 50-409 l Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) ,
Provisional License No. DPR-45 l Emergency Plan Revision
REFERENCES:
(1) Letter, J. Taylor to Document Control Desk, LAC-12377, dated September 29, 1988.
(2) Telephone discussion between R. Meck and R. Christians of January 28, 1988.
(3) Letter, L. Rubenstein to J. Taylor, dated February 19, 1988.
In your letter of February 19 (Reference 3) and telephone conversation of January 28 (Reference 2) you requested additional infori,ation to answer questions raised in your evaluation of the LACBWR Emergency Plan Revision submitted in September, 1987 (Reference 1). The responses to the questions raised are as follows: j NRC ITEM 1 Provide a neore specific definition of the LACBWR Faergency Plan Zone.
DPC RESPONSE A map of the LACBWR site defining the EPZ will be added to the Emergency Plan as Figure A-2 on page A-15. Also a reference to this figure will be added to the introduction on page 1.
PCl-50 II 8804250135 880415 pDR ADOCK0500g9
Document Control Desk LAC-12544 Page 2 April 15, 1988 NRC ITEM 2 The timing of offsite notification should be specified.
DPC RESPONSE Item 1.2.b on page A-6 will be amended to read, "Initially notifying offsite authorities as appropriate, and within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />." The last sentence of paragraph 1 ef item 3.2 on page A-12 will be amended to read, "DPC contacts with the NRC should be coordinated by the Emergency Response Director, and they should be made as soon as possible following notification of state and local authorities, but no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />."
Item 3.9 on Page D-12 already specified a one hour notification time i
limit.
NRC ITEM 3 Responsibility for exercises and drills should be assigned in the plan.
DPC RESPONSE The person responsible for assuring that exercises and drills are scheduled and completed is the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator. This responsibility is already stated in Section A and E in items 1.2.5.c (page A-8) and item 2.1 (page E-3).
I NRC ITEM 4 Who manages the exposure program onsite during an emergency?
DPC RESPONSE Under the responsibilities of various personnel in Section A, two new headings will be added as follows:
1.2.3 Health Physics Department Representative 1.2.4 On Shift Personnel (Operations & Security Personnel) j Under the heading of 1.2.3 of Section A, the Health Physics Personnel duties will include monitoring Emergency Response. Personnel exposure and dosimetry.
Also part 3.1.6 of Section A describes responsibilities of personnel in regard to exposure control.
s PCI-50
1 J
Document Control Desk LAC-12544 Page 3 April 15, 1988 NRC ITEM S List the frequency of notification updates. j DPC RESPONSE
)
In Emergency Preparedness Procedure EPP-2, a step will be included to require information updates to state, local and federal agencies at least once per hour, and whenever important new information becomes available, for the duration of the emergency.
NRC ITEM 6 Where will site personnel assemble?
DPC RESPONSE LACBWR personnel will be instructed to assemble in the Administration Building on the first floor, north end. They will be instructed to do so whenever they hear the stack siren or hear a message to that effect over the public address (P.A.) system.
The personnel at the fossil fueled plant and the warehouse personnel will be instructed to remain indoors at their facilities when they hear the s.'.ren or P.A. message.
NRC ITEM 7 l
1 Describe the method (s) of accountability for the personnel onsite during l an emergency.
DPC RESPONSE 1 I
The Emergency Preparedness Procedure (EPP-2) currently in use that i discusses site evacuation, contains methods of accountability. This same l
procedure will continue to delineate the accountability methods to be employed following implementation of the revised Emergency Plan.
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Document Centrol Dask LAC-12544
.Page 4 April 15, 1988 NRC ITEM 8 Provide information on how the public would be provided information in the event of an accident.
DPC RESPONSE l As was discussed in Reference 1, there is no potential for an emergency at LACBWR that would cause a radiological release of such a magnitude that any Protective Action Guidelines would be exceeded offsite. Also, at the Alert Emergency Action level, the current IACBWR Emergency Preparedness procedures do not require any notification of the public. Local law enforcement officials have been contacted, however, and have agreed to provide whatever local alerting or announcements deemed necessary by LACBWR radiological protection personnel during an emergency. Also any public information releases concerning emergencies at the plant will be coordinated through the Information and Marketing Department of Dairyland as has been the past policy.
Notifications to the Local Law Enforcement and/or Dairyland Information and Marketing Department will be made as needed and as specified in EPP-2.
l NRC ITEM 9 Describe normal versus Emergency staffing.
DPC RESPONSE The normal staffing at mi.ifmum consists of one supervisor, one operator, three security personnel and one other person from any of the following areas:
- 1. Security
- 2. Operations
- 3. Instrument and Electrical
- 4. Maintenance
- 5. Administrative The revised Technical Specification submittal for minimum crew size states that, "at least one additional Operator and one Health Physics Technician shall be onsite when spent fuel or spent fuel shipping cask is being handled or when any evolutions are being conducted in or above the Fnel Element Storage Well." Therefore, when evolutions are being conducted that could possibly lead to an immediate release, (dropped fuel shipping cask or damaged fuel element) at least two extra personnel will be onsite, one of whom will be a qualified Health Physics Technician. At other times, there would be no need for a qualified Health Physics Technician to be available immediately because the other accidents analyzed that could lead t) significant PCl-50
Document Control Desk LAC-12544 Page 5 April 15, 1988 radiological releases are those in which hours elapse before fuel damage can occur. (Loss of Fuel Element Storage Well cooling capability.) Dairyland has committed to calling at least one extra person to the site at the ALERT emergency action level to provide assistance in communications. Also a Health Physics Technician will be called to the site if an event occurs that involves radiological releases. Extra personnel can, of course, he called in at any point during an emergency at the discretion of the Emergency Response Director.
Normal and Emergency staffing is explained in Section A of the plan on pages A-1 through A-5 and as shown on page A-14.
NRC ITEM 10 Provide some statement in the plan that no one offsite would receive doses in excess of Protective Action Guidelines.
DPC RESPONSE A statement to this effect is included on page i of the Plan. This statement is based on a study done at LACBWR and submitted to the NRC for review along with the letter of Reference 1.
NRC ITEM 11 How would visitors be alerted to an emergency?
DPC RESPONSE Visitors to the LACBWR site would be alerted to a problem much the same as before in that they receive a visitor card at the front gate showing site facilities and where to go if a siren sounds and a P.A. announcement of an emergency follows. If, in the future, access to the site is no longer controlled with a guard, the gate will be normally kept closed and access controlled by the Security Department. A sign will be posted on the front gate with instructions, similar to those on the visitor cards currently in use. It should be pointed out that the site is very small, with the distance from the Reactor Building to the front gate measuring approximately 100 yards.
Therefore, site sirens and P.A. announcements are easily heard by site visitors.
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Document Control Desk LAC-12544 Page 6 April 15, 1988 NRC ITEM 12 Provide a technical basis for not requiring Site Area and General Emergency classifications.
DPC RESPONSE A Technical Report (LAC-TR-134) has been prepared that includes radiation exposure data for various points onsite during the worst case accident scenario. This exposure data shows that sheltering personnel in the Administrative Building or Turbine Building will be adequate to protect against any possibility of overexposure during the worst case accident. The Technical Report is attached to this letter.
In addition to the changes required to answer the above questions, some other suggestions from the telephone conference of Reference 2 were incorporated as minor changes. All changes are noted by change lines in the right hand margin. The entire Emergency Plan has been recopied and submitted for your convenience.
If you have any questions, please contact us.
Sincerely, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE James W. Taylor General Manager JWT: REC:sks Attachment cc: Mr. A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Mr. Peter B. Erickson, LACBWR Project Manager Division of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Ken Ridgway, NRC Resident Inspector PCl-50
t DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE DOCKET NO. 50-409 EMERGENCY PLAN FOR LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REAC10R (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR) l POST OFFICE BOX 275 !
GENOA, WISCONSIN 54632 i
REVISION 10 SEPTEMBER 1987 i
@ oO'7$79'r p,,.,, ,
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LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 INTRODUCTION The La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) is owned by Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC). In the event of a nuclear incident or other emergency situation at LACBWR which requires the plant operating staff to seek offsite assistance, DPC will fully commit the Company's resources to assist the plant operating staff and emergency preparedness agencies in mitigating the consequences of the situation, protecting the public health and safety and recovering from the accident condition.
The La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBhTl) was a 50 MWe, nuclear-fueled l electric power generating station located on the Mississippi River in Vernon County, about one mile south of Genoa, Wisconsin. The station is designed around a boiling water reactor and steam supply system by Allis-Chalmers.
The reactor has been shut down and defuelled. Spent fuel from previous operations is stored in the storage pool adjacent to the Reactor Vessel in the Containment Building.
The probability of a radiological release to the environs which could seriously affect the health and safety of station employees or the public is minimal. Ilowever, contingency plans, as described in the station emergency operating procedures and in the LACBWR Emergency Plan, are in effect to minimize the onsite and offsite impact should radiological releases occur.
The LACDWR Emergency Plan has been prepared to achieve the following objectives in the event of a fuel accident which potentially could result in a radiological release:
- a. Coordinate the emergency activities within LACBWR and with all organizations having response or recovery responsibilities,
- b. Conduct an assessment of actual and potential radiological consequences, both onsite and offsite.
- c. Maintain a state of emergency preparedness, both onsite and offsite.
l The LACBWR e' urgency response organization is structured to respond to a radiological emergency on a continuous basis. Cooperative, state and county emergency response organizations are also structured to provide emergency response on a continuous basis. Emergency control and coordination facilities are established to ensure that required information is gathered, assessed, and acted upon in a timely and effect isc manner.
An emergency planning zone has been established around LACBhTt consisting of the effluent release boundary as defined by Technical Specifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix I (see Figure A-2). The ERB as the planning zone boundary was determined to be acceptable based on evaluations !
3 of the worst case postulated SAFSTOR accident. These evaluations show the j maximum projected dose at the ERB boundary is significantly less than that '
allowed by 10 CFR 100 and is below the U.S. EPA Protective Action Guides l
which require sheltering or evacuatien.
l i !
E-PLAN Sept. 1987 l
l I
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10
]
I i
l The emergency activities associated with this planning zone are described in the j LACBWR Emergency Plan and the emergency response plans for Vernon County and the State of Wisconsin. l The LACBWR Emergency Plan defines what constitutes an emergency and provides a classification system of Emergency Action Levels representing plant problems of varying severity. The LACBWH Emergency Plan is structured such that a declaration of a particular Emergency Action Level initiates a series of predetermined actions.
The LACBWR Emergency Plan is implemented through detailed Emergency Plan )
Procedures (EPP's), which are listed in Appendix 3. The procedures cover major aspects of a potential emergency situation and describe the actions to be taken by DPC personnel.
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l ii E-PLAN Sept. 1987
LACIlWR EbiERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 AUTIIORIZATION I hereby approve and issue these pages to the LACBWR Emergency Plan.
ames W. Taylor, neral Flanager (Date)
DairylandPowerL[ooperative iii E-PLAN Sept. 1987
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION i AUT110RIZATION iii SECTIONS:
A. ORGANIZATION CONTROL A-1 1.0 DPC Emergency Response Organization and A-1 Responsibilities 2.0 Responsibilities of Federal, State and Local A-8 Governments and Private Agencies 3.0 Command and Control A-ll B. CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES B-1 1.0 Dairyland Power Cooperative B-1 C. FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT C-1 1.0 Emergency Facilities C-1 2.0 Equipment C-1 D. RESPONSE AND RECOVERY OPERATION D-1 1.0 Emergency Action Levels D-1 2.0 Notification D-9 3.0 Assessment and Protective Response D-9 3.0 Emergency Measures D-12 5.0 Recovery and Re-entry D-15 i
iv E-PLAN Sept. 1987 i
LACDWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)
PAGE E. MAINTENANCE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS E-1 1.0 Training E1 2.0 Drills and Exereires E-3 3.0 Plans and Procedures E-4 4.0 Facilities and Equipment E-6 APPCNTICES.
- 1. LC 'ers of Agreement Al-1
- 2. Emergency Enulpment/ Kits A2-1
- 3. Listing of Emergency Procedures A3-1 y
sad Sept. 1987
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rsv. 10 TABLES: PAGE A-1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES A-3 C-1 COPMUNICATION LINKS WITH PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE CONTACTS C-7 D-1 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS D-3 D-2 EMERGENCY EXPOSURR CRITERIA D-18 E-1 COPNUNICATIONS TESTINC FREQUENCY E-7 1
i vi E-PLAN Sept. 1987 il
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rsv. 10 FIGURES: PAGE A-1 DPC EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION A-14 A-2 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE BOUNDARY A-15 C-1 CONTROL ROOM COM4UNICATIONS C-8 C-2 LACBWR EMERGENCY ENVIR0!NENTAL SURVEY AND DOSE ASSESSMENT LOCATIONS C-9 D-1 SITE 10 0FFSITE INTERRELATIONSHIPS AND NOTIFICATION SCHEME D-19 D-2 GENERAL GUIDELINES R)R EMERGENCY CARE D-20 1
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E-PLAN Sept. 1987
LACBWR D4ERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 A. ORGANIZATION CONTROL 1.0 DPC EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBIL? TIES 1.1 Organization The following considerations have been used as a basis for structuring thn Dairyland Power Cooperetive and LACBWR Emergency Response Organization identified in Figure A-1 and assigning responsibilities to its members,
- a. An assessment of the tasks necesaary to meet DPC's responsibilities in the event of an accident.
- b. An assessment of the Cooperative's and LACBWR's normal operating organization and available resources.
- c. An evaluation of how to best a;Tly these resources to succerafully accomplish the tasks.
The emergency response organization is intended te provide immediate response to an emergency conditioa at LACBWR and to promptly notify offsite authorities of the situation and its potential ramifications. Provisions have been made to augment the organization with additional personnel who possess appropriate techr.ical capabilities, as well as government agency support groups which can provide assistance in engineering and radiological dose assessment activities. The resources from within DPC will be sufficient to enable contingency response over the long term. These resources ensure 24-hour per day operation capability for an ext ended period of time.
LACBWR emergency organization personnel will initiate radiological monitoring activitica and assist in returning the plant to a stable condition.
Radiological monitoring and control for the protection of the public will be performed by site emergency personnel.
Whenever the LACBWR Emergency Plan is activated, the actual response to the emergency will be directed by the Shif t Supervisor in the control Room. The Shift Supervisor acts as Emergency Response Director with the authority and responsibility for declaring and mitigating an emergency condition. If the Shift supervisor is incapacitated. his/her responsibilities will be filled by LACBWR per onnel per LACBWR Administrative Control Procedures ACP-02.1, "Authorities and Responsibilities for LACBWR Operation and Snutdown."
Specified on-shift plant personnel will assume positions in the LACBWR emergency organization and will be augmented by additional members of the plant as they become available. The innt's normal work staff consists of supervisory, engineering and support e. toff, the shitt operating crew; and shift security force. The normal night 1hift operating crew consists of one Shift Supervisor (SS) and one Operator. Operators have been traire d io l
E-PLAN A-1 Sept. 1987
LACBhTl EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 perform surveys and can be used for shift augmentation if necessary. The normal night shift security crew consists of a security supervisor and ,
guards.
Table A-1, "Emergency Response Capability" provides a detailed matrix of emergency support tasks and available augmentation personnel.
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I LACfWR EMEFGEt.CY PLAN Rev. 10 TABLE /-i EVERGENCY RESPONSE QPABILITIES (1)~
- : : : REMAINING PERSONNEL INITIAL RESPONSE :
MAJOR : : : : RESIDING NEAR PLANT : TEAM DURING ANY :
! FUNCTIONAL : : NOFotAL : : : EMERGENCY :
- AREA : TASKS : POSITION : ON-SRTFT : 30' : GO' '
TOTAL : 30' : 60' : TOTAL :
- Plant System : Technical Support : Plant Sup't : : 3 : 4 : 7 : Called in as needed -
Engineering, : : and Staff : : : : : : :
. Re. pair and : : Supervisors and : : : : ! : : :
.7orrective Engineecs : : : : : :
- Actions : l : : : : : : ,
- : Repair and : Operators and :(See Plant : 5 : 2: 7 : Called in as needed :
j l l Corrective : Shift Supervisor :Oper) : : : : : :
- : Actions : Mech. Maint. : : : : : : : :
- : : Supervisor, : ! : : : :
- : : Maintenance : : : : : : :
l Mechanics, Inst. : : : : : : : :
- : : ' Technicians, : : : : : : ;
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- Firefigh',ing : : Fire : Local : ; ; : : :
- : : Brigade : Support : : ': .
- . : lper Tech. : : : : : : :
- : : Spec. ! : : : : :
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LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 1.2 Responsibilities The primary rolen of the LACBWR emergency response organization is to bring the plant to ano maintain it at a safe and stable condition. The organization also carries out related essential activities including:
- a. Stopping or mitigating the radiological effects of the emergency,
- b. Initially notifying offsite authorities as appropriate, and within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />,
- c. Initially providing updated information at regular intervals to officials and agencies.
The duties and responsibilities of key emergency response personnel are as follows:
1.2.1 Cooperative Management The General Manager is the cooperative's de=;ignated senior officer to whom the Emergency Response Director is responsible. In that capacity, the General Manager will provide on overview of the emergency response effort undertaken by DPC. In his absence, his alternate, the DPC Assistant General Manger for Operations will assume his responsibilities.
The prime responsibility of DPC management is to make available to the I Emergency Response Director the resources which will insure that requisite !
activities can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public.
Communications with offsite authorities are the responsibility of the Emergency Response Director. He/she will insure such officials are fully informed as to the status of the event, activities in progress, and potential effects upon the public.
l The LACBWR Plant Superintendent is responsible for recommending approval of the LACBWR Emergency Response Plan to the General Manager who will exercise final approval authority. Requisite procedures which implement the requirements and guidance contained within the plan will be approved by the Plant Superintendent.
During an emergency, the Emergency Response Directe: has the authority to approve major actions (other than routine administrative practices) that deviate from DPC's standard policy. Such actions could include quality 1 assurance and control requirenents, safety engineering review requirements, administrative review requirements, and other applicable Cooperative policies and procedures. Normal cooperative practices, policies, and procedures should be reinstated when practical and as the situation warrants.
3.2.2 Emergency Response Director (ERD 1 The role of Emergency Response Director will be assumed by the Shift Supervisor until and unless be/she is relieved. The Emergency Response E-PLAN A-6 Sept. 1987
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 Director is responsible for the overall direction and control of the integrated emergency response and recovery effort. He has the full authority and responsibility to make commitments for DPC related to LACBWR emergency response and recovery efforts in the event of declaration of an emergency.
(Emergency Action Levels, see Table D-1). TIIE ERD WILL NOT ASSIGN TIIE ULTIMATE DECISION OF: (1) APPROVAL TO USE EMERGENCY DOSE GUIDELINES FOR SITE EMERGENCY WORKERS, NOR (2) CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY, MR (3)
INITIATION OF RE-ENTRY / RECOVERY OPERATIONS W1IEN THE PLANT IS IN A SAFE STABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER UNPLANNED RADIOACTIVE RELEASES TO TIIE ENVIRONMENT ARE EXPECTED. The Emergency Response Director's specific responsibilities include the following:
- a. Declaration of the appropriate Emergency. l
- b. Activating the DPC Emergency Response Organization,
- c. Ensuring local and state authorities are notified.
- d. Ensuring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is notified.
b
- e. Assuring that the emergency response organization is staffed by qualified personnel who are capable for providing sufficient support.
- f. Authorizing the procerement of equipment, materials, and resources, as necessary, to effectively respond, control, recover from an accident condition at LACBWR, and re-entry into the plant.
- g. Authorizing the use of emergency dose guidelines by onsite emergency i workers.
- h. Implementing the LACBWR Emergency Response Plan and Procedures,
- i. Ensuring accountability of all onsite personnel.
1.2.3 Healt h Physics Departanent Represent at ive The responsibilities of the IIcalth Physics Department Representative may I include but are not limited to:
- a. Performing onsite and nearsite radiological surveys.
- b. Personnel dosimetry control.
- c. Radiological release determinations.
- d. Containment fluilding atmosphere and stack gas samples and analyses,
- e. Other activities as directed by the ERD.
E-PLAN ^~7 Sept. 1987
_~ . __ __ _ _
i LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10
' l.2.4 On-Shift Personnel (Operations and Security Personne_ll l The responsibilities of the On-Shift Personnel will be as directed by the ERD and may include:
- a. Commumication.
- b. Accident assessment.
1.2.5 Emergency Preparedness Coordinator The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator is responsible for the preparation and maintenance of the Emerrency Plan for the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, lle/she reports directly to the LACDWR Plant Superintendent.
The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator's responsibilities include:
- a. Coordinating anu reviewing all emergency plan and procedure modifications, assigning plan and procedure changes to the appropriate LACBWR and DPC headquarters staff.
- b. Annually reviewing the emergency plan and procedures to !
determine if revisions are necessary. i
- c. Coordinating annual exercises and drills necessary to maintain au acceptable 'xnowledge level of emergency plan and procedures.
1.2.6 Di_rgetor of Information and Member Services The Director of Information and Member Services or a designated alternate is responsible for coordinating infi.rmation releases to local news media concerning plant conditions and offsite radiological consequences during and/or following an accident at the plant.
I 2.0 RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE l 4 ACENCIES 2.1 General Responsibilities ,
1 County and state radiological emergency response plans are compatible with
- the LACBWR Emergency Plan and have been developed to govern the emergency response U.ctions of the officials and agencies of Vernon County end the State of Wisconr,in. These plans reflect the division of responsibilities for offsite protective actions and methods of communicating among these local and state agencies and with DPC. Offsite responses are the responsibility of the Wisconsin Director of Emergency Government and the Vernon County Director of Emergency Government. The Wisconsin Director of Emergency Government is responsible for any necessary offsit e response.
Federal agenc.esi are responsible for providing advisory assistance to DPC and j outside agencies.
E-PLAN A-H Sept. 1987
]
7
. . -- . - - _ - = _ . - -. _. --. . --.
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 Private agencies (Tri-State Ambulance for example) are responsible for ~
i responding to an emergency condition at DPC as specified in written ,
agreements (Refer to Appendix 1). l 2.2 Specific Responsib_ilities 2.2.1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatorv Commission The role of the NRC during a radiological emergency is te verify that emergency plans and procedures have been implemented and assure that the public health and safety are protected. The NRC will assist in coordinating federal response resources and will provide DPC, state, and local agencies with advisory assistance associated with assessing and mitigating hazards to the public. L 2.2.2 U. S. Department of Energy The Department of Energy has prepared a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan and an Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan. Under the 3 provisions of these plans, the Department of Energy, upon request from the ,
State of Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government, will dispatch radiological teams to assist local and state agencies with monitoring and provide technical guidance. These teams are intended to be advisory, and l will not assume control from local authorities who are present.
2.2.3 Federal Emergency Management Agency r FEMA plays the lead role in offsite radiological emergency planning and !
response. It is the agency responsible for review and approval of state and l local radiological emergency plans and preparedness for coping with the q offsite effects of radiological emergencies which may occur at commercial nuclear power facilities. Through agreements with federal agencies, FEMA has the primary responsibility for coordinating the overall offsite response in i the event of an emergency, a
2.2.4 State of Wisconsin The Wisconsin Department of Administration, Division of Emergency Government, administers the State of Wisconsin Peacetime Radiological Emergency Response l Plan. The Division of Emergency Government has continuous response i capability. The Emergency Government Administrator at Madison is responsible j for activating the Wisconsin Plan and providing the assistance detsiled j within it. This support includes the following:
1 l a. Alerting appropriate state agencies, i
- b. Providing a radiological response team,
- e. Operating the state emergency communications control center, i
.l 4
E-PLAN A-9 Sept. 1987 l i
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10
- d. Informing appropriate government agencies and adjacent counties and states,
- c. Assisting local authorities through designated state agencies.
2.2.5 Vernon Coun_y t [
The Vernon County Director of Emergency Government administers the Vernon County Nuclear Facility Response Plan and is responsible for activating the plan in consultation with the Vernon County Sheriff's Office. The Vernon County Emergency Government Operations Center is located in the basement of the Sheriff's Office, County Jail in Viroqua, Wisconsin.
2.2.6 Vernon County Sheriff's office 1-The County Sheriff is responsible for providing local emergency assistance.
The Sheriff's office has 24-hour response capability. He is responsible for notifying the following agencies:
- a. Surrounding County Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEA's),
]
j b. Vernon County Director of Emergency Government,
- c. State of Wisconsin Department of Emergency Government,
- d. If necessary, he will notify the Houston Count y, Minnesota Sherlif's Office. j 2.2.7 Genoa Fire Department ;
1 l The Genoa Fire Departrent is resionsible for providing rescue and l l firefighting support to LACDWR during emergencies. Upon request by the Genoa Firc Chief, all fire departments of Vernon County can be coordinated and directed by the Fire Services Director for the Vernon County Civil Defense Organization to support the Genoa Fire Department during on emergency at IACEWR.
2.2.8 La Crosse Lutheran Hospital - La Crosse Arrangements have been made with the La Crosse Lutheran Hospital to provide 4
DPC with medical treatment for radiological and non-radiological injuries
) incurred during an emergency at LACBWR.
l 2.2.9 Tri-State Ambulance An agreement has been made with Tri-State Ambulance located in both Viroqua ,
and La Crosse, Wisconsin to provide Dic with ambulance service and in-route !
i applicable life support treatment for persons with radiological and l t non-radiological injuries resulting from an emergency at LACBWR. I l !
l E-PLAN A-10 Sept. 1967 m
1 LACDWR EMERGENCY PLAN -Rev. 10 4
2.2.10 Rel, copter Notification The DPC helicopter, which is equipped with a siren und n loud speaker, can notify sportspersons and tourists on the Mississippi River and on the Federal r 4
Wildlife Refuge Islands and backwaters outside the EPZ if deemed appropriate by the ERD.
3.0 Cor+1AND AND CONTROL 3.1. Dairyland Power Cooperative a
In the event of a declaration of an emergency action level, the LACDWR
, Emergency Plan will be activated. As an immediate action, the on-shift plant 1 operations staff will man the LACBWR emergency organization. The LACBWR
- Emergency organization will be aupnented with off-shift staff within I hour 1 as necessary.
3.1.1 Command and Control The Emergency Response Director (initially the Shift Supervisor) exercises ;
overall control of DPC emergency response activities. He/she ensures that the overall direction of site and DPC activities is properly focused and that j the necessary resources are available. Ile/she is the primary contact for local, state and federal authorities.
i 3.1.2 Warning / Notification and Communicationy
)
] The Emergency Response Director is responsible for assuring that notifications are made to DPC personnel and offsite agencies in the event of ,
', an emergency situation and for providing support information to aid in initial response. This task can be assumed by a communicator so that the i Shift cu pervisor is free to devote attention to establishing stable plant conditions. Requests to initiate offsite agency responses are initiated from j the Control Room, which is continuously manned. The primary communication .
3 link with the county and state government is the Vernon County Sheriff's I office communication center uhich is continuously manned The Sheriffs' office will notify the involved county and state agencies in accordance with local and state plans.
3.1.3 Accident Assessment The ERD is responsible for assessing the magnitude and potential consequences 2 of an accident and assuring this information is provided when DPC, local, state, and federal officials and agencies are notified. Operations personnel are qualified to perform initial radiological protection activities. A J Health Physics department representative assumes responsibility for !
dispatching appropriate personnel to monitor the environs and assessing the '
results of monitoring activities and making appropriate recommendations for l
- protective actions if needed, i 1
5 i
'E-PLAN A-ll Sept. 1987 t
1
- - - - . , _ . - - - - - . _ - - . - - ~ , - - . - - - . - - , , - - , . ,,--, --mev.~..---r .
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 3.1.4 Public liealth and Protective Response The Emergency Response Director, with the support of the IIcalth Physics ,
department representative, is responsible for coordinating with local officials. He/she is responsible for keeping these officials apprised of changes in the condition of the plant and of celeases, or planned releast.s, to the atmosphere.
3.1.0 Fire, Rescue / Emergency, and Medical Services The Emergency Response Director is responsible for rcquesting and coordinating these services, if needed. Upon arrival at the site, he/she assumes overall responsibility for these functions.
- 3.1.6 Onsite Radiological Exposure Control The Emergency Response Director, assisted by a Health Physics department representative, is responsible for controlling and minimizing the radiological exposure to emergency response personnel. Only the Emergency Response Director can authorize the perfor: nance of activities which would result in exposures in excess of normal limits. The Health Physica department representutive is responsible for related onsite radiological moeitoring activities, decontamination, and record keeping.
3.2 Federal Government Officials and Agencies Initial notification of the Nuclear Regulatory c mmission (NRC) shall be the responsibility of the LACBWH operations staff on duty at the time of an ;
incident. Members of the LACBWR plant staff will be the primary interface
! with the NRC. DpC contacts with the NRC should be coordinated by the Emergency Response Director, and they should be made as soon as possib's following notification of state and local authorities but no later than I hour.
Coordination of DPC activ; ties with the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan. if required, shall be accomplished in accordance with the Wisconsin Radiological Emergency Response Plan.
3.3 State Officials and Agencies The emergency response functions and responsibilities for the State of Wisconsin are addressed in the state emergency response plan.
Initial t anration of an emergency shall be the responsibility of the LACBWR operations staff. The Operations staff will interface with the state.
The Emergency Response Director shall coordinate the response and recovery activities with senior management of state agencies, i
E-PLAN A-12 3ept. 1987
- ~ . - .
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Hov. 10 i t
s The Health Physics department representative will be responsible for the i interfaces with the state government at the working level regarding !
radiological releases and radiological monitoring activities in the vicinity '
of LACBWR. Appropriate meteorological and radiological information will be
- made available to state officials.
The Security Director shall' interface at the working level with law enforcement agencies regarding security assistance. ,
3.4 Local Officials and Agencies Initial notification of and coordination with local support services (i.e. ,
fire, medical, police, etc.) when their support is required shall be the responsibility of the plant staff.
3.5 Authority and Agreements The following identifies the legal state and federal instruments which !
establish authority for local and state agency support for un emergency:
t
- a. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Public Law 920, 81st Congress) signed January 12, 1951, i
- b. Federal Civil Defense Guide, January 1965, as amended.
- c. Civil Preparedness Guide Series.
- d. Disaster Eelief Act of 1974 PL 93-288.
- e. State of Wisconsin Statutes 22.16. I
- f. Vernon County Emergency Government Ordinance.
Agreements have been made with those support organizations having a potential emergency response role outside +he Emergency Planning Zone. These '
agreements establish an understanding of assigned responsibilities and ensure e prcper coordination of activities in the event of an emergency. The agreements with Vernon County and the State of Wisconsin are reflected in the associated county and state emerfency plans Appendix 1 lists the support ;
organizations with which agreements have been reached and provides the Letter of Agreement in effect as of the date of submittal of this plan.
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E-PLAN A-13 Sept. 1987
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LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 B. CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES 1.0 DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE i '
This section describes by function the capabilities and resources available within Dairyland Power Cooperative to support response and recovery efforts in the event of an emergency at LACBWR.
l.1 Radiological Monitoring and_ Analysis c Operations personnel are qualified and may perform initial radiological monitoring and analyses. The LACBWR Health Physics department personnel have -
primary responsibility for performing onsite and offsite monitoring during and following an emergency situation at LACBWR.
1 1.2 Accident Analysis j The LACBWR staff provides technical support functions and personnel augmentation to perform the following:
- a. Communications ;
- b. Safety Evaluationn i c. Support Group Coordination I
- d. procedure Development
- e. Engineering and Design i
j The engineering and design support will take the form of near-term actions
- required to bring the emergency event under control, and to control plant
]
releases. ;
i !
1 4
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3 1
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J I E-PLAN D-1 Sept. 1987
LACSWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 l C. FACILITIES AND EQUIItfENT 1.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES Ac many functions as possible will be assumed by the shift operating crew.
Other personnel will be called in as necessary. Sufficient LACDWR staff and DPC personnel are trained and qualified to mitigate any problem arising at LACBhTt.
1.1 Training Room The Training Room is located in the office area adjacent to the Control P and serven as the alternate to the Control Room in the event the Contro. , ,e is unaccessible. The Training Room has dedicated communications with NRC via ENS and HP Network. Telephone equipment is also available for communicating with both in-plant personnel and outside agencies. DPC vehicles with mobile R1 radios can also be reached from the Training Room.
2.0 EQUTFSfEH 2.1 Communication System The organizations involved, the titles of the majority of Emergency Hesponse personnel and their contact telephone numbers, as well as the method of notification are detailed in EPP-2. The cormnunicat ion systems available for use during an emergency are described below, and their use is discussed in EPP-3. Figure C-1 shown cormnunication links with primary and alternate contacts.
Monthly tests will be conducted to determine the operability of the communications systems. Tests will be performed to test communication links and notificat ion procedures as noted in Table E-1, 2.1.1 Commercial Tehphone Service The commercial telephone service can be accessed via the PABX equipment discussed below.
2.1.2 PABX (provide Automatic Dranch Exchangel Direct two-way voice communications between designated plant spaces and areas is possible by means of telephone tyre PABX (private automatic branch exchange) equipment.
Three-independent PABX stations are assigned to the Control Room.
Station-to-station dialing may be carried out between any of the stations.
Outside numbers can be dialed directly from designated inside phones. This can be used as a backup system to the ENS System for communication with the NTtc.
E-PLAN C -l Sept. 1987
LACDWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 The power supply for the pABX System is the Diesel Building Motor Control Center (MCC) Distribution Panel 1A. The emergency power to this 500 is the IB Emergency Diesel Generator.
2.1.3 Plant page A plant-wide paging system is incorporated into the PABX system. The page channel can be activated from eny plant station to call personnel or to issue plant-wide instructions over the speakers. The Page System is supplied by the same power supply as the PABX equipment.
2.1.4 DPC Mobile O dio System UNP-FM This system has the capability to permit micro-wave / radio /PABX/outside line telephone communications on FCC allocated frequencies between fixed and mobile communication units.
PM mobile radios have been placed in all LACBWH assigned DPC vehicles. These radios have the capability to access the LACBWR Control Room from a vehicle in the field via a direct radio to radio link, to any DPC extension phone via access to the appropriate repeater station. A vehicle, equipped with this portable radio, will be made avnilable for use by offsite monitoring teams, if necessary.
The vehicle radios are energized by the vehicle electrical system. The power supply for the Control room radio is the IC Non-interruptible Bus.
3.1.5 Microwave Tie Trunk I
The microwave tie t runk connects portions of the Dairyland Power Cooperative System. The microwave tie trunk can be accessed from PABX telephones. This system may also be used to call numbers in the La Crosse area.
2.1.6 Emergency Notification Syst em _ (ENS) - Red Phone This is the red phone system which provides automatic connection between LACBWR, the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, Maryland and Region III. The phone system is to be used to provide notification of an uncontrolled or unexpected condition as described by procedure, and operational information.
There are ENS (red) phones located in the Control Room, Shift Supervisor's Office, and the Training Room .
The ENS System is powered offsite from a reliable power supply backed by batteries and a diesel generator located in the Genoa, Wisconsin Station of the Vernon Telephone Cooperative. Equipment onsite is powered by the Turbine Building 120-volt Regulated Bus, which is fed by the 1A 480-volt Essential Bus through the Distribution System. The emergency power supply for the 1A 480-volt Essential Bus is the lA Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG).
l E-PLAN 0-2 Sept. 1987
LACBWR D4ERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 2.1.7 Health Physics Network A dedicated circuit is provided to relay environinental and radiological information during an emergency. It connects the user with the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, Maryland, NRC Region III and other Nuclear Facilities in NRC Region III. Phones are located in the Training Room.
2.1.8 FM_Handi-Talkio At least 5 FN Handi-Talkie portable transceivers, located at various locations in the plant, provide a backup for in plant communication. This system can be used by onsite monitoring teams or rescue and repair teams.
The handi-talkies are battery powered and are normally stored in chargers when not in use so that they are charged when needed. ,
2.1.9 Site Sirens Three sirens are located in strategic areas of the plant. The sounding of all 3 sirens indicates that an emergency condition exists. The sitens are located in the Reactor Building, Turbine Building and outside area and can be activated from the control Room. The Reactor Building siren can also be activated from the Reactor Building. The Reactor Building siren is powered from a lighting cabinet. The outside area stack airen is supplied by the Turbine Building Motor Control Center IE, which is on the 1A 480-volt Bus.
The Turbine Building siren is energize 1 through the IB Non-Interruptible Bus.
The IB EDG provides backup power to the IB Non-Interruptible Bus.
2.2 Radiological Monitoring System 2.2.1 Onsite Systems
- a. Area Radiation Monitors These monitors are located throughout the plant to monitor radiation levels in normally occupied or accessible areas. Area radiation ,
monitors are sensitive to local conditions. They automatically l alarm whenever the area radiation level increases over the associated 1 setpoint.
- b. High-Range Containment Building Area Radiation Monitors These monitors have extended ranges capable of monitoring containment radiation levels up to levels specified for post-accident situations.
Additional onsite evaluation capacity exists to determine the potential magnitude of offnormal events. Sainpling systems which will permit LACBWR to determine the activity of the stack effluent and that of the containment atmosphere are installed.
I l
E-PLAN 0-3 Sept. 1987 1 1
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10
- a. Process Radiation Monitoring System
. Liquid Monitors (1) Component cooling water activity monitor (2) Liquid waste discharge monitor (3) Turbine condenser cooling water discharge monitor
. Air Monitors (1) Containment Building ventilation exhaust monitor (2) Stack gas effluent monitors
- b. Portable dose rate meters and air samplers.
- c. Counting Laboratory Equipment.
. Ge (Li) and HpGo FEAS
. Multi-channel Analyzer ,
. Internal Proportional Counting Systems
. GM Probes with Pulse Ratemeters
. Waste Building GM Counting System
. Liquid Scintillation Counter
- d. Whole Body Counter (HpGe)
- e. Personnel Dosimeters
. Pocket Ionization
. Thermoluminescent/ Film
. Electronic Alarm 2.2.2 Offsite Systems 4
- a. Portable dose rate meters and calibrated air samplers with charcoal
! cartridges powered by 12V DC available from a vehi71e connection.
- b. Personnel Dosimeters
. Pocket fonization l
. Thermoluminescent/Filu ;
- c. Radiological Monitors and Dose Measuring Devices
. Environmental Direct Radiation Monitoring - TLD's At least twelve environnental TLD's with capability of detecting both beta and gamma radiation dose equivalents, ara located at specific locations at distances from LACBWH ranging from 0 to 5 miles. TLD's beyond about one mile are considered to be l
E-PLAN C-4 Sept. 1987
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 background radiation dose equivalent monitors. Refer to Figure
- C-2. These TLD's are normally processed offsite and can be read on an emergency basis by the contracted services. Additional i TLD's are available from this supplier. :
. Air Monitoring Stations At least 3 air monitoring stations are in operation as part of the Environmental Survey Program. Each contains a particulate _;
filter which can be analyzed with portable survey equipment. !
These air samplers are located at different points around LACBWR.
LACBWH has the capability of placing a portable air sampler at a spot within the plume which can then have its media removed to the laboratory for isotopic analysis or analyzed in the field by methods outlined in EPP-8.
2.3 Geophysical phenomena Monitoring _Syst ems (Meteorological, Hydrological, and Seismic Monitoring) i 2 3.1 Onsite Systems i
- a. Meteorological Data The onsite meteorcl.ogical monitoring system provides data on wind speed, wind direction, standard deviation of horizontal wind direction (sigma), temperature, and precipitation detection, at the ten meter height on surface tower. Monitoring instrumentation at ,
the top of the 100-meter stack supplies data for wind speed, wind 1
! direction, standard deviation of the horizontal wind direction (sigma), and differential temperature (100 meter minus 10 meter a
temperatures). !
Various meteorological parameters are monitored in the control Room. l A continuous analog strip chart display is provided for wind speed, i wind direction from 10 meters and 100 meters, surface temperature, and differential temperature,
- b. Hydrological Data - Not available, see 2.3.2.
- c. Seismic Data - Not available. see 2.3.2.
2.3.2 O E site Systems
- a. Hydrologic Data
. Lock and Dam No. 8, one mile north ,f LACBWR
, . Government facilities in La Crosse, 20 miles north af LACDWR I
l l
i I
I E-PLAN C-5 Sept. 1987 l
1 LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 l
l- ';
- b. Seismic Data !
i
. Seismic Data (Triaxial Accelerometers) representative for the !
upper Mississippi River basin can be obtained from Prairie Island NSp (NSP Co.).
2.4 Fire Monitoring System ;
The LACBWR Fire Detection System detectors are located in most plant areas ;
and are capable of detecting visible and/or invisible smoke or other l products of combustion. Most will actuate an alarm in the Control Room. !
2.5 Release Dose Measurement Capability i 2
Assessment of potential releases is based on a determination of the type of release and the dispersion. Calculations are performed manually, or by computer, based on meteorological data and radiologien1 data which are in the Control Room.
i i
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l E-PLAN C-6 Sept. 1987 l
I.ACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 TABLE C-1 COSNUNICATION LINK.c WITII PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE CONTACTS ORG ANIZ AT ION / PAC T I.T TY PRIMARY CONTACT ALTERNATE CONTACT
- 1. DPC/LACPWR l
- n. Control floom Shift Supervisor Operator
- h. Plant Security Security Central Alarm Supervisor / Station Sergeant Security luard
- 2. LOCAL AGENdIES
- a. Vernon County Sherif f's County Sheriff Vernon County Office Dispatcher Emergency Government (EOC) -
Viroqua, WI
- b. Tri-State Ambulance Viroqua - Relay La Crosne Office Service from Vernon Co.
Sheriff
- e. Ia Crosse Lutherar. Emergency Room Relay from llospital Desk Vernon County Sheriff
- d. Genoa Fire Call Directly Relay from Department Vernon County Sheriff
- 3. STATE AGENCIES
- a. Wisconsin Division of Madison DEG Relay from Emergency Government Director Vernon County Sheriff
- 1. FEDERAI, AGENCIES
- a. NRC NRC Region III NRC Operations Office in Center Glen Ellyn, IL Bethesda, MD E -PLAN C --7 Sept. 1987
c C.
l LACBWR EMERGENCY P W Rev. 10 f FIGURE C-l l'
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LACBWR EMEGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 FIGURE C-2 EMERGENCY ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY AND DOSE ASSESSMENT LOCATIONS Il gI g; titee perta Stadeare I I
- 1. West River Bank at Towers (0.5 mile W)
- 2. West River Bank across of G-1 /
(0.5 mile WNW) # ;
- 4. CONTROL (La Crosse Office) $ l (19 miles N) l
- 6. Trailer Court 3
- 7. G-1 h' ark ng Lo (0.5 mile WNW) =
- 8. Gravel Road East of Plant 8c 9.
(0.3 mile SE)
Access Road "
M.. -
(0.3 mile S)
- 10. G-3 Control Room (0.1 mile SSW)
- 12. South Transmission Line (0.5 mile E)
- 15. Lock & Dam No. 8 (1 mile N) = glf
- 16. Gianoli Faru I E (2 miles NNE) @ nos t * ' "
0
- 17. Philip Malin Farm 1 $"n%^,1' (1.1 miles EhT)
- 18. Arnold Pedretti Farm gf;Md*M, Fa" h*f ,
h Att se ,te
- I'*
(1.8 miles SE) p cene. - ) b ")i 1 MSE A88*** mat Locatton U
/, .
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Traiter rack N { r-u 8' fI l- ___g t mie syn e 1 h wer<es E-PLAN C -9 S ep t. . 1987
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 D. RESPONSE AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES 1.0 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 1.1 Emergency Classification Two separate classifications of emergency conditions have been established which are based upon the potential severity and required emergency response actions. The two classes are:
- a. Notification of Unusual Event
- b. Alert
. The classification of emergency conditions provides for the following:
- a. Prompt notification of regulatory authorities when unusual or abnormal plant conditions occur,
- b. A non-technical assessment of the actual or likely implications of the event which can be easily communicated to and understood by various affected parties during the early stages of an event.
- c. Activation of appropriate prearranged emergency response and recovery actions by all involved parties.
The Emergency Action Levels (EAL's) and the EAL initiating conditions will be reviewed annually with state and local governmental authorities.
Each of the emergency classifications is defined and briefly described in the following paragraphs.
1.1.1 Not ificat ion of Unusual Event Characteristics:
- a. Abnormal plant conditions that reflect a potential degradation ir; the level of safety of the plant.
- b. Small releases of radioactive materials may occur but the dispatch of offsite monitoring teams would not be required.
- c. Plant conditions, which if not corrected, could become more serious.
1.1.2 Alert Characteristics:
- a. An actual or potentially substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant.
l E-PLAN D-1 Sept. 1987
LACBWR D4ERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10
- b. Actual or potential limited releases of radioactive material may occur, which may require the dispatch of monitoring teams to the affected areas onsite or offsite.
(. . An unanticipated event at the plant of some significance for which corrective action will be measured in terms of hours rather than minutes.
1.2 Emergency Action Level Initiating Conditions 1.2.1 Table D-1 identifies the specific conditions and associated limits which serve as the basis for initiating the appropriate monitoring, assess-ment, and response actions prescribed in this Plan. As the severity of each situation (or event) identified in the column changes, the event is classi-fied (or reclassified), based upon parnmeters identified in the Emergency plan Procedures being monitored, to assure that appropriate emergency response actions are being taken.
1.2.2 The EAL's specified in Table D-1 are based upon one or more of the following criteria.
- a. System design specifications.
- b. Technical Specification limits.
- c. FSAR and other accident analyses.
- d. 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 requirements.
- e. EPA Protective Action Guides,
- f. NUREG 0654, Revision 1 "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."
Tr. ole D-1 and EpP-1 specify inst ruments, annunciators, parna tet ers , indica-tors, observations and system or equipment status that would provide possible indications to deterrine a particular Emergency Action Level for an emergency event.
The Emergency Action Levels pertaining to radiological releases are not necessarily based upon actual radiological exposures to the population-at-risk, but rat her are based upon the potential exposures or specific plant conditions that may pose a threat to the population-at-risk.
l l
E-PLAN D-2 Sept. 1987
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 TABLE D-1 DfERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UhTSUAL EVENT TYPE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS POSSIBI;E PLANT CONDITIONS EVENT ALERT Radiological SPING 3/4 Alert and High Alarm Airborne effluents greater than X Effluent Annunciator C5 I instantaneous Tech. Spec. limit s.
Releases Channel 5 Low Range Noble Gas (Hi)
(Air) Containment Building Air Exhaust Gaseous Rad (Ri) Annunciator C7-1 Containment Building Air Exhaust Particulate Rad (Hi)
Annunciator C7- 2 SPING 3/4 Alert and High Alarm Airborne effluent greater than 10 times X Annunciator C5-1 Technical Specification instantaneous Channel 5 Low Range Noble Gas (Hi) limits (an instantaneous rate which, if Cha mel 7 Mid Range Noble Gas (Alert) continued over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, would result in Containment Building Air Exhaust about 2 mR/hr at the ERB under adverse Gaseous Rad Monitor (Hi) meteorological conditions).
Annunciator C7-1 Containment Building Air Exhaust Particulate Rad Monitor (Ili)
Annunciator C7-2 Area Radiation Monitor (Hi)
Annunciator C7-4 Radiological Liquid Waste nd Service Water Liquid Discharge Effluents greater than X Effluent Radiation (Hi) CG-3 500 MPCw (168 hr.) (10 CFR 20, App. B).
Releases Turbine Condenser Cooling Water (Water) Monitor (Hi) C8-3 Liquid Discharge Effluents greater than X Sample Analynis 5000 MPCw (168 hr.) (10 CFR 20, App. B).
(Ref. : 10 CFR 20.403 a.2 and b.2)
E-PLAN D-3 Sept. 1987
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LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 TABLE D (cont'd)
EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UNUSUAL EVENT TYPE _ EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS POSSIBLE PI, ANT CONDITIONS EVENT ALERT Natural Personnel Observatic.n Any earthquake felt in plant. X Occurrences Severe earthquake felt in-plant with X sufficient magnitude for suspected structure or equipment damage.
Natural Visual Observation Lock & Dam #8 Mississippi River level at or greater X Occurrences Report than G39 f t . grade level.
Level Indication Mississippi River level at or below X required IIPSW Pump Suction of 615.4 ft.
Natural Windspeed meters Sustained winds greater than 130 mph. X Occurrences NOAA Weather Report Visual Observation "Tornado Warning" advisory, with X NAWAS tornado within 10 miles and heading Public Radio towards the site or tornado onsite.
Security Lock & Dam #8 Personnel Tornado strikes plant buildings. X Dispatcher E-PLAN D-5 Scpt. 1987
1 LACBWR EMEIK;ENCY PLAN Rev. 10 TABLE D (cont'd)
EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL UNUSUAL EVENT TYPE EMERGENCY _ACTIO_N_LEyELS POSSII1LE PLANT CONDITIONS EVENT ALERT Other llazards Security Visual Observation Unexpected unusual aircraft activity X Experienced over facility (e.g. , aircraft flying or Projected multiple passes less than 500 feet above the ground) or crash onsite.
Aircra f t crash or missile impact on X facility.
Visual Observation Security Train derailment onsite. X Visual Observation Security Near or onsite explosion or projected X Sheriff's Radio explosion.
Security Personnel Observation Explosion onsite which causes facility X System Alanns damage affecting plant integrity.
Personnel Observance Near or onsite release of toxic or X Portable Detector s flannnable gases at levels immediately Sheri ff's Radio hazardous to humans.
Uncontrolled entry of toxic or X flammable gases into the facility environs.
N/A Other plant conditions exist that X warrant activation of Emergency Plan.
E-PLAN D-G Sept. 1987
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LACBWH EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 TABLE D (cont'd)
EMERGENCY ACTION 1.EWsL UNUSUAL EVENT TYPE EMERGENCY ACTION _LFJEL_S ._
POSSIllLE PLANT CONDITIONS EVENT ALEHT Situations Security Communications Unauthorized forceable intrusion into a X Hequiring Operations Comm inications Vital Area.
Offsi te Visual Observation Assistance Confirmed on-going sabotage attempt in X (Security a Vital Area.
Threat)
Loss of physical control of the plant.. X Situations Smoke Detectors Fire within the restricted area that X Requiting Fire Alarm cannot be extinguished within Of fs i t e Conrnunications from Fire Brigade 10 minutes by the Fire Brigade.
Assistance Visual Observation (Fire)
E-PLAN D-8 Sept. 1987
LACBWR D4ERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 2.0 NOTIFICATION The Emergency Action Levels and condition classifications are discussed in i Section 1.0. When an emergency is declared, EPP-2 provides a notification !
list of home telephone numbers for those emergency response organization personnel who may be called to respond to each EAL. This procedure also includes the 24-hour telephone nwnbers of the offsite authorities and private sector support agencies who are to be contacted, excluding the NRC, which is notified by a direct-ring hot line, All telephone lists contained ,
in the implementing procedures are reviewed quarterly, and updated if necessary.
2.1 Initial Messages to Offsite Authorities Based upon the condition classification of the event as described in Section E, an initial message commensurate with the type of event will be sent from the site to local and state organizations. Figure D-1 identifies l the interrelationships and notification scheme between the site and offsite organizations. Guidelines for the format and content of the initial messages are as follows:
2.1.1 Unusual Event "This is (caller's identification) calling from the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor. An unusual event has occurred at LACBWR. This call is being made to comply with NRC notification requirements only.
2.1.2 Alert "This is (caller's identification) calling from the La Crosse Boiling Water j Reactor. An alert has occurred at LACBWR. This call is being made to comply I with NRC notification requirements only.
2.2 Followup Messages 2.2.1 Followup messages will be provided on a periodic basis as specified in EPp-2.
3.0 ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE RESPONSE ]
1 3.1 Accident Assessment Capability and Resources 3.1.1 LACBWR has the capability and resources to provide initial values and a continuing assessment throughout the course of an accident involving gaseous and particulate effluents. The methods employed by LACBWR personnel g to deselop dose rates and estimate integrated doses for airborne Kr-85 are I pr ovided in EPP-5. This capability includes post-necident sampling, effluent monitors, and containment monitoring systems. The installed instrumentation is described in Section C.2.2.
E-PLAN D-9 Sept. 1987
)
l LACBUR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 ,
1 3.1 2 LACDWR has two post-accident sampling systems. The installed sampling system for the stack has a filter for particulate detection. The installed i sample system for ihe containment building atmosphere has a removable gas ;
cylinder for Kr-85/ particulate activity detection. Use of the sampling i systems is described in EPP-G.
3.2 Effluent Monitor Readings vs. Exposure and Contamination Levels ]
3.2.1 Relationships between effluent monitor readings and offsite exposures for various meteorological conditions have bean established for the existing high-range effluent monitoring instrumentation and meteorological ins t riunentation. The following methods have been addressed:
- a. Meteorological parameter determination. (EPP-5)
. windspeed
. wind direction
, atmospheric stability
. inoperable instruments
- b. Dose estimates based on effluent monitors. (EPP-5) i
- c. Dose estim9 t es and contamination levels based on field monitoring data. (EPP-8)
- d. Effluent releate estimates when effluent monitors are inoperable or offseale. (EPP-6) From these estimates, offsite dose estimates can be calculated using EPP-5. ,
3.2.2 The Emergency Plen Procedures provide the methodology, the equations and the graphs to relate effluent monitoring doses to offsite doses using i actual meteorological data and actual release values.
5.3 Meteorological Information Acquisition / Accessibility The meteorological information acquisition is discussed in Sections C.2.3.1 and C.2.5.
3.4 Release Rate / Projected Dose Methodology for of fscale or Inoperable Instruments Kr-85 release rates and resulting doses are normally developed using one or l more of the several instrumentation systems (containment radiation 1 monitoring, gaseous effluent monitoring) which are located throughout the !
plant. Should these instruments become inoperable or read offscale for any l significant period of time, release rates and r= wit ing dose rates and j integrated doses may be estimated by baci ;alculatEng from ensite and/or l of fsite radiation surveys.
l E-PLAN D-10 Sept. 1987
i LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 ,
t 3.5 Monitoring Monitoring is performed by LACBWH personnel to determine radiation dose rates and radioactive material contamination in the Emergency Pinnning Zone following an event with release potential. LAC 11WR personnel are capable of assessing radiological hazards through liquid or gaseous release pathways. A continuing monitoring program can be established to-provide updated onsite or i offsite exposure and contamination information until the conclusion of the l event-(EPP-7). Although much of the monitoring will be performed by LACDWR i personnel, offsite support agencies may be contacted to augment the i
! monitoring program if necessary.
3.6 Radiological Dose Assessment l 3.6.1 Offsite Hudiological dose assessment commences with activation of the Emergency Plan for those events with actual or potential releases. -Field monitoring teams are dispatched onsite or offsite, as necessary, to determine j the magnitude and location of contamination and radiation dose rates. )
3.6.2 Field teams usually include one member of the Health and Safety Department and may be composed of both on-shift personnel and off-shift 1 personnel called to the site, 1
3.6.3 Monitoring teams may be dispatched in LACBWH vehicles. The keys to !
these vehicles are available in the Shif t Supervisor's Office. The !
monitoring teams are equipped with 1) a radio as described in Section C, 2) l survey and beta / gamma dose rate instruments, 3) protective clothing and 4) a I respiratory protective device. l 1
l
=
Hesults of monitoring activities are reported by radio to the Control Room.
Initial offsite dose assessment can be performed by a Health & Safety Department member using EPP-5.
I j Monitoring activities offsite also include the collection and sampling of part iculate filters or gas samples at the environs monitoring stations.
3.7 Onsite Notification Personnel on site will be notified of an unusual event or alert by the public address system if a radiological hazard exists. This action will be taken i immediately af ter a declaration is made.
1 A siren alarm system is also available and is capable of being heard over the I Protected Area of the site. The personnel to be notified include:
j
- n. Onsite employees, including those not having emergency assignments. ;
I
- h. Visitors.
E-PLAN D-ll Sept. 1987 1
i
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10
- c. Contractor and construction personnel.
- d. Other persons who may be in the public necess area or passing through the site, or within the DPc owner controlled area.
3.8 Onsite_ Protective Actions 3.8.1 Radiological _ Protection of Onsite Personp_ed Protective measures cre established for the use of protective clothing, and the use of respiratory protection equipment.
Respiratory protective devices may be required in any situation where an airborne radiological condition is potential or existent. In such cases, the air will be monitored and the necessary protective devices specified according to the concentration and type of airborne contaminants present.
Periodic portable air samples are routinely taken in selected areas of the plant. Air samples will oe taken in the Control Room and training room as appropriate, to ensure continued habitability. -
Protective clothing and/or respiratory protection equipment are maintained in the plant. In the event that sufficient equipment is not available, personnel will be relocated to areas where contrunination hazards do not exist.
3.9 Offsite Notificat ion Upon preliminary identification and classification of the event, required notifications will be made within one hour.
4.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES 4.1 Onsite Exposure Guidelines 4.1.1 The decision to authorize radiological exposure beyond the normal occupational limit will be based upon the following categories of risk:
- a. Saving human life.
- b. Minimizing damage to facilities.
4.1.2 To provide the flexibility that may be necessary for eme.gencies, the i ERD will determine the exposure allowed to perform an emergency mission. If authorized by the ERD, volunteers may receive up to 25 Rem exposure for protective or corrective actions to minimize damage to facilities and up to l 75 Rem for life saving actions. Table D-2 summarizes the emergency exposure l criteria for emergency actions. The ERD shall assure that a means is l established to measure and minimize all exposure during emergency missions, j l
I E-PLAN D-12 Sept. 1987
l LACBWR Eb!ERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 I l
l l
4.2 Prot ective ofensures The protective measures required by plant personnel for contamination control l at all times are described in the LACBhTl Operating blanual, Volume X, and l supplemented by various llealth and Safety Procedures. Contamination control outside of the owner controlled areas is described in the State of Wisconsin Emergency Plan which is based on necepted guidelines published by the Environmental Protection Agency.
4.2.1 Decontamination Action Levels Decontamination action levels will be in accordance with those specified in the LACBWR Operating blanual, Health Physics Procedures, Volume X.
4.2.2 Decontamination Facilities Decontamination materials, specialized equipment and supplies, and portable first-aid and decontamination kits are available in the changeroom. Portable IIcalth Physics instruments for personnel monitoring are readily available.
Plant decontamination showers drain to the plant radioactive liquid waste system. Personnel found to be contaminated shall undergo decontamination under the direction of the Health and Safety personnel. Figure D-2, "General Guidelines for Emergency Care," lists guidance for care of injured and/or contaminat ed victims.
4.2.3 Area Access Control Area access will be established and controlled in accordance with the LACBWR Op( . Ming blanual, Volwoe X, Health Physics Procedures.
4.2. Area Return to Normal Use Radiological monitoring of evacuated areas will be accomplished prior to l reentry. The radiological criteria for the rehabilitation of evacuated areas is as described in LACBWR Operating blanual, Volume X, Health Physics Procedures. Reentry and return of an evacuated area to normal use is under the direct ion of the ERD.
4.3 Exposure control Self-reading (secondary) and primary dosimeters will be issued to emergency personnel including those from DPC, NRC, state, and local offices and agencies to determine the doses received by them on a 24-hour per day basis.
Dosimeters will be read at appropriate frequencies and dose records will be maintained for personnel insolved in an accident.
4.4 Decontamination of Relocated personnel Personnel will be decontaminated when possible in the onsite decontamination center in the Turbine Building. Personnel will be taken to the offsite decontamination center at La Crosse Lutheran Hospit al i f onsit e decontamination is not possible. All personnel will be decontaminated prior to release or reassignment to emergency duties.
E-Pl.AN D-13 Sept. 1987 I
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 j i
t 4.5 Onsite First Aid Capabilities !
4.5.1 A first-aid room is located near the plant Locker Room. This room is ,
equipped with a cot and a supply of bandages, splints, and other first-aid !
supplies. Contaminated injured individuals who require first-aid will be ,
taken to the decontamination area. A detailed survey for contamination of a l victim will be conducted, and, if found to be acceptable for secondary or uncontrolled areas, the victim will iimnediately be taken to the first-aid i room for treataent. If found to be contaminated beyond acceptable levels for uncontrolled areas, efforts will first be made to decontaminate the victim at I the decontamination area. Utilizing EPP-11 and the guidance presented in i Figure D-2, the victim will be decontaminated and treated.
4.5.2 If decontamination is required to be performed by uedical pecsonnel, or if decontamination cannot be performed due to the nature of the injury and i hospitalization is required, the victim will be prepared for transfer to ;
La Crossa Lutheran llospital. A member of the Health and safety Department !
shall accompany the victim or meet him at the hospital. Once the victim :
arrives at the hospital, the hospital staff will follow their procedures !
governing cases of this type. The Health and Safety Department member will !
assure contamination control and assure that all hospital equipment is l decontaminated to less than 2000 dpm/ft2, if practical. :
4.5.3 Health and Safety personnel training includes methods and techniques I to be used for decontamination of personnel, considering injuries or open wounds which might exist. A sufficient number of LACBWR employees have also !
received first-aid training and are able on a 24-hour basis to ndminister !
first-aid to injured or ill victims until the arrival of medical personnel. i In cases of severe injury, first-aid shall take precedence over contamination control. The priority of medical treatment is as follows: ,
i
- n. Care of severe physical injuries, j
- b. Decontamination of personnel, i
- c. First-nid to other injuries. ,
- d. Monitor for internal contamination.
- c. Definitive treatment and subsequent therapy as required.
4.5.4 Urinary bioassays or whole-body counts will be performed on all prsons suspected of having received a significant internal deposition of radionuclides. Whole body counts will be performed in accordance with IIcalth and Safety Procedure 13.5; urinary bionssays, if required will be done by a contractor who will be chosen when necessary.
4.6 Medical Transportation Agrecaents exist with Tri-State Ambulance in La Crosse and Viroqua to provide for the transportation of medical and contaminated victims. Plant personnel will arrange for ambulance service, and La Crosse Lutheran Hospital will be E-PLAN D-14 Sept. 1987
, - LACBh'R EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 ;
iaformed that a contaminated victim will be arriving for treatment. Specific ;
instructions for requesting ambulance service and the handling of victima i are detailed in EPP-11. Vehicles and dispatch stations can be reached through two-wsy radio relay with the Vernon County Sheriff's Department. -
4.7 Local Medical Services LACBhH has arranged for medical services through Letters of Agreement with La Crosse Lutheran Hospital. This hospital has agreed to accept and treat injured personnel. It has medical procedures to handle medical and contaminated patients. A kit containing protective clothing and other items necessary for the handling of contaminated patients is available at the i hospital for use by the hospital staff. The content of this kit and others like it onsite is shown in Appendix 2.
4.8 Exposure Records Exposure records will be prepared and maintained in accordance with the LACBh'R Operating Manual, Volume X and the Health and Safety Procedures.
These procedures ensure that self-reading dosimeters and primary doaimeters are distributed to all emergency personnel and volunteers and are read frequently. Separate records will be maintained for DPC, NHC, local, state, contractor and consultant personnel who arrive at the site. A Health Physics department representative will be responsible for insuring that personnel are informed of permissible exposure limits and work time within a controlled zone. Following deactivation of the LACBhm Emergency Plan, each agency participating in onsite recovery activities will be sent the exposure records for their respective personnel. :
i 5.0 R_ECOVERY AND RE-ENTHY 5.1 Responsibilities The ERD will be responsible for the implementation of all recovery actions at LACBhTf.
i !
i 5.2 Specific Recovery Tasks '
- Activities performed during the recovery phase are under the direction of
- the Emergency Response Director and include, but are not limited to, the i following. ,
5.2.1 Logistical.
- a. Organize the Recovery Project Team.
! 5.2.2 Engineering I
i n. Evalunte damage to plant equipment.
i Develop necessary design changes.
b.
1
- c. Manage site constaction and restoration activities.
E-PLAN D-15 Sept. 1987 i
t I.ACDWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 5.3.3 Fadiological !
- n. Control airborne releases.
- b. Manage radiological waste processing.
- c. Control personnel dosimetry and records,
- d. Manage onsite decontamination and assist, as necessary, with offsite decontamination.
- c. Study long-term radiological effects.
5.3 Recoverv. Reentry, and post-Accident Planning 5.3.1 The operations involved in recovery of the plant are divided into three phases:
- a. phase 1 - Accident Response and Recovery This phase includes the immediate actions taken by the emergency !
response organization discussed in Section A to mitigate the I consequences of the accident, and to implement the Emergency Plan
! with all of its support functions both onsite and offsite. ,
- b. phase 2 - Re entry / Assessment This phase commences when the plant is in a stable condition and no further unplanned radioactive releases to the environs are expected. L This phase may include the following activities-l
. Reentering the plant or plant areas to determine the extent of damage. to measure radiation and contamination levels, and to determine access routes to and from the accident area.
. Assessing all data gathered from reentry operations and additional l information developed by the various technical support groups, i i
. Developing a plan of action for returning the plant to a condition l within Technical Specification limits. This may include developing l detailed schedules, requesting additional specialized equipment and personnel, writing specific rccovery procedures for decontamination, processing highly radioactive water, repairing equipment, and purchasing new equipn.ent ,
- c. phase 3 - Repair / Return to Normalcy 1 l
l This pl.ase commences upon the completion of all phase two j l
preparations and continues until the plant is returned to a mode i j within the limits of the Technical Specifications, i
E-PLAN D-lO Sept. 1987 j 1
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- - - - - . _--_-. . . - - - - - - - - . - ,,- ,-_- ..- - -- .i
LACDWR EMERGENCY PLAN 3ev. 10 5.3.2 During phase one, the emergency response organization will expand as dictated by the extent of accident damage under t.he direction of the j Emergency Response Director. Additional-support personnel may be required in order to function effectively in the areas of procedures, research and development, waste disposal, logistics, etc. {
I S.4 Recovery Organization i
Based upon the specific needs identified to effect recovery of LACBWR, the Emetgency Response Director will organize the LACBWR staff, as appreariate, l to ensure that the recovery effort is properly managed.
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l E-PLAN 0-17 Sept. 1987
j i
LACDWH EMERGENCY. PLAN Rev. 10 i TABLE D-2 !
i EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CRITERI A l
Planned exposure (1) to the whole body and/or specific organs should not exceed the following recommendations of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP-39), and U. S. EPA, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for. Nuclear Incidents,"
(FPA-520/1-75-001, Rev. 1).
- ; PROTECTIVE OR : LIFE SAVING :
- ORGAN
~
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS : ACTIONS :
- (including whole : :
- body component) l l
. All reasonable measures must be taken to control contamination and internal exposures, utilizing the best available respiratory protection and protective clothing. Respiratory protection equipment will be selected, issued and used in accordance with Health and Safety ;
Procedure 9.G. l
. Persons performing emergency activities shall be familiar with exposure consequences.
. Women capable of reproduction should not take part in actions requiring l emergency exposures.
. Retrospective doses shall be evaluated on an individual case basis.
. Other things being equal, volunteers above the age of 45 should be selected.
(2) Autherization for volunteers to receive these recommended exposures is a non-delegatable responsibility of the ERD.
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E-PLAN D-18 Sept. 1987 l
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 i
FIGURE D-1 SITE TO OFFSITE INTERRELATIONSIIIPS AND NOTIFICATION SCllEME f
i
- l l EMERGENCY RESPONSE DIRECTOR l l l l !
. j
- : l l l l AMERICAN : l l l l VERNON CO. l 4
- : NUCLEAR : : NRC : : ; SifERIFF !
- : INSURERS l l _.: :
- : (ANI) :
l ; ; STATE OP l l GENOA FIRE : WISCONSIN :
i : l DEPARTMENT l r l i
____l LUTIIERAN/VERNON :
- : 110SPITALS l l____l TRI-STATE :
l AMBULANCE :
I l
' Primary Interfaces ;
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ Secondary or Potential Interfaces l
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i l E-PLAN D-19 Sept. 1987 3
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LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 i FIGURE D-2 GENERAL GUIDELINES PDR _ EMERGENCY CARE
- 1. All suspected persons should be surveyed for radioactive contamination.
- 2. If no monitoring instrument is available, all possible exposed persons should be regarded as contaminated. Wipes from vacious parts of the '
bodies of these persons, including ear canals and r.ostrils, and their clothing should be made with some type of disposable tissue, filter paper, or blotting paper, and the samples placed in separate labeled envelopes for future stuoy.
- 3. Contaminated clothing should be removed carefully and placed in some type of disposable container or bag. If this is not evallable, clothing should be put on sheets of paper to prevent contamination of '
floor and furniture. The clothing and paper can be monitored later to determine the possibility of contamination or the need for disposal.
- 4. If necessary, contaminated persons should be taken to a shower a.,'a for bathing.
- 5. Bathing should be done ander showers and commercially available detergents and soaps can be used. Several separate washinga should be performed. liighly alkaline soaps, abrasives, organic solvents, or cleaners that tend to increase permeability to the skin should not be used. Specini emphasis should be given to cleaning of fingernails, 4
toenails, nostrils, scalp, ears, and body folds.
G. Scrub brushes should be used, but care should be taken that the skin surfaces do not become abraded.
- 7. After the body is well washed, the person should be surveyed with a suitable monitoring instrument and additional smears taken with disposable tissues, cotton tipped applicatars, or filter paper. The ear canals and nostrils should be swabbed for contamination. Smear tests are especially important if alpha survey instruments are not available.
Clothing known not to be contaminated should be put on.
- 8. Small cuts and other breaks in the skin surface should be sought for carefully, since absorption of radionuclides can occur by this route.
Such lesions should bu decontaminated af ter the above washes by repeated 5-minute scrubs after removal of senbs and crusts.
- 9. Suitable syringes, curved basins and appropriate irrigating solutions should be readily available for washing eyes. The used solutions should be saved for counting, preferably in separate labeled bottles marked as to order of collection.
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- E-PLAN D-20 Sept. 1987 l
1
LACBWH EMERGENCY PLAN Hev. 10 -
FIGURE D (cont'd)
- 10. If there is a possibility of alpha contamination, it will be necesst.ry to use circular filter paper discs or other suitable type of filter paper in order that it can be counted in the available type of laboratory alpha
, chamber. Thia detail should be prepared in advance by consultation with the laboratory which will carry out the counting of these wipes.
- 11. General guidelines for Emergency Medical Care of a person with a wound contaminated with radionuclides are as follows:
At the accident site, the following first aid procedures are suggested:
- a. In cases of severe injury, medial treatment should be administered before decontamination efforts are considered.
- b. Wash wounded area with large volumes of water, i f available; spread but edges so as to flush the wound well and stimulate bleeding,
- c. A light tourniquet may be applied to restrict venous return without restricting arterial flow.
- d. Call an ambulance for transportation to the hospital.
- e. Gross decontamination by removal of clothing should be carried out at the accident site and the individual given necessary first aid,
- f. The patient should be transported to the hospital wrapped in a sheet and bit.nket and definitive decontamination should then be done.
It is important that medical treatment facilities be protected from radioactive contamination af ter the care of one or more patients. Medical and ancillary personnel must be able to work safely and effectively without skin or internal contamination to themselves or transmission of cont amination between patients or risk of excessive exposure to external radiation.
Medical personnel and ancillary personnel should be provided with personnel radiation monitoring devices and protective clothing when necessary as determined by radiological surveys.
E-PLAN D-21 Sept. 1987
LACBhR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 i
E. MAINTENANCE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNT.SS i ,
1.0 TRAINING !
1.1 Responsibilities ,
The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator and the LACBh3 Health and Safety Supervisor have concurrent responsibility for the administration and documentation of the Emergency Preparedness Training Program and shall ensure that all LACBhB/DPC personnel and outside support organizations meet the training requirements set forth in this plan and the Rmergency Plan Procedures. 1 i
1.1.1 LACBhT/DPC Personnel New employees whose duties include some component of emergency preparedness shall receive basic information on the emergency plan during their indoctrination training. Applicable portions of the training programs outlined below shall be performed whenever major changes occur. The program shall be repeated on a yearly basis as refresher training to maintain proficiencies. Onsite employees who are not directly involved in the emergency response organization are presently trained in their responsibilities during an annual training seminar given by a Health and Safety department representative.
1 l
1.1.2 Support organizations
, DPC will make training available annually to ensure that training of support personnel is sufficient to prepare them for their expected response role.
1.2 Emergene.y_ Response Organization Traini_ng Each member of the emergency response organization will receive annual general training on the LACBh3 Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures I in the form of lectures and discussions and specific training related to their expected role during an emergency. This training will, as appropriate, include practical drills in which individuals will demonstrate the ability to perform their assigned emergency functione. On-the-spot correction of errors j will be made and proper performance will be demonstrated or discussed by the j instructor.
l 1.3 specialized Training f All specialized t raining for the following individuals or groups shall be 3
conducted as specified in EPP-14.
! 1.3.1 Eme_rgency Response Director 9
This training will be oriented toward the duties, responsibilities and !
authorities of the Emergency Response Director and the basic octivities of j organizations / group departments reporting to him/her. This training it.-
i given to the designated ERD's. I E- PLAN E-1 Sept. 1987 l 3
i
i LACDWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 l i
1.3.2 Radiological Monitoring Tenm This training will include operation of portable radiation survey instruments, i air sampling equipment and techniques, contamination surveys, and radiological exposure determinations. Basic first-nid requirement s and l precautions will be reviewed as well as rescue team operations, including emergency exposure criteria. This training will be given to plant health and safety department personnel. i 1.3.3 Onnte Fire Brigade special training in methods of controlling fires under accident conditions will be provided in accordance with the Fire protection procedures.
1.3.4 First-Aid and Rescue personnel Medical first-aid training is conducted for selected plant personnel.
Instructors in this training are accredited by the American Red Cross. It is the intent of the first-aid training program to have as many plant personnel as possible qualified in medical firnt aid. At least one person on each operating shift will be qualified in first-aid.
1.3.5 1oen1 support Services personnel.
Local support services personnel, including selected staff members of the Vernon County Sheriff's Department and the local fire departw nts, will be offered training in basic indoctrination of the Emergency plan. ;
- 1. 3. fi Medical support personnel M dical support personnel receive annual training during a medical drill on
< their procedures for handling and treating contaminated personnel.
1.3.7 security 'ersonnel site security personnel will be trained in their response during an emergency, including their potentini role as communicator.
l Re air and Damage Control Teams l.3.8 All plant personnel, who do not receive specialized training, receive annual ;
general training on radiation protection and the Emergency plnn. This training, together with their job t. kills, provides the information necessary to part icipate on a repair and damage control team. Briefing on specific tasks to be performed would be provided at the time.
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3 E-ptAN E2 Sept. 1987 l
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i !
LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 !
i 4
2.0 DRILIS _ AND EXERCTSES 2.1 Rzsnonsibilities The Emergency Prepnredness Coordinator, in association with other personnel, 4 is responsible for planning, scheduling, and coordinating Emergency l Preparedness drills and exercises. Ilo/she ensures that drills and exercises i are conducted to test the et,uipment and skills of individuals during an l l
emergency, and that the scenarios are cufficiently difficult and varied to !
- adequately test the organizations, plans, and procedures and of DPC/LACDWR {
personnel. ;
1 1
2.2 Exercises !
j 2.2.1 To ascertain the necessary level of fcueiliarity with the emergency .
- plan and procedures and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the plan, j enercises will be conducted annually to evaluate the overall response and
) emergency capabilities of the LACBWR/DPC organization. These' exercises will
- he coordinated with state and local response organizations to ensure their ,
i capability to communicate between each other and LACBWR/DPC.- The operational i
! and readiness response to any exercise will be evaluated by observers. l 4
2.3 Drills
.! A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing, and j maintaining skills in a particular operation. Drills may be conducted as part of an exercise. Drills will be evaluated as described in Subsection 2.5 l of this section. The types and frequency of drills is as follows: j 2.3.1 Fire D r_i l l_s.
Fire drills will be conducted in accordance with Fire Protection Procedures.
]
2.3.2 Medical Emergency Drills i Medical emergency drills will be conducted annually. These drills wi}.1 4
4 involve agencies of the 1c,:al support servicea and will use simulated. l contaminated individunts. ,
t
- 2.3.3 Iealth l physics Drills llealth physics drills will be conducted annually.
l
- 4 Scenarios i 1
- The conduct of each exercise and drill will be goserned by staged scenarios, i scenarios will generally include the following
I
- a. Danic oh,iective(s) of the drill or exercise and appropriate 5
evaluation criteria.
I j h. Date(s), time period, place (s), and participating organizations.
1 E-PLAN 0-3 Sept. 1987
t LACBh71 EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 ,
i i t 1
Simulated events and time schedules of initiating events. l l c.
1
! d. Narrative sumury describing the conduct of the exercise or drill, i (e.g. , simulated casualties, offsite fire department assistance, ,
i rescue of personnel, use of protective clothing and associated !
equipment, deployment of personnel and radiological teams, and !
public information activities). ;
4 2.4.1 A scenario will be provided to official observers, c 1
i 2.5 Observation and Critlaue j j Oualified personnel will observe and perform a critique of exercises and I drills. Drills will be evaluated and a critique conducted. Overall results will be documented and reported to the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator. i This report will include specific cucments and recommendations to improve the i
- operation as necessary. [
2.6 Managemp,t control ;
- The resul ts of exercise cri+ 49ues, particularly comments on identified areas l 4 which require improvement or reevaluation, will be submitted to the Emergency (
) Prerr *dness Coordinator and the Plant Superintendent for review. The Plant !
i Sup< 4' 'ndent will assign corrective action activities to the responsible j org* on or individual.
l 3.0 PLANS AND PROCEDURES !
f 3.1 Genenil Maintennnce Responsibilities 4
3.1.1 The Dairyland Power Cooperative General Manager has the overall ;
i renponsibility and authority for the operation of LAChhH and, as such, is i L
^
responsible for the overall emergency planning effort. This responsibility is delegated in part to the LACilhil Plant Superintendent, who reports directly ,
to the General Manager. The General Manager, however, has retained finni l approvnl responsibility and has the authority to implement the plan within LACBWR.
I j 3.1.2 Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, i l
i The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator is responsible for the following: l
- n. Developing, reviewing, and updating the LACBhH Emergency Plan and i Procedures for submittal to the Operations Review Committee. I i
- b. Coordinating offsite emergency planning effort in cooperation with l government agencies.
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j E-PLAN E-4 Sept. 1987 J
- ._ _ _ _ m _m_ __m____
LACBhB EVERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 3.2 Qualificat ions of Planning Personnel 3.2.1 The DPC General Manager, the LACBWR Plant Superintendent, and the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator have, collectively, the following training and qualifications:
- a. Knowledge of the applicable regulatory guides, regulations, and licensing requirements.
- b. Knowledge of DPC policies, procedures, organization.
- c. Knowledge of the LACBWR design, organization, facilities, and emergency planning procedures,
- d. Knowledge of nuclear plant operations, in general.
- e. Knowledge of local, state and federal response organizations, and their responsibilities and capabilities to support DPC and LACdWR.
- g. Participation in emergency planning workshops, etc.
3.2.2 The total experience and knowledge levels required for the complete l planning effort is not necessarily vested in any single individual. The individuals responsible for the planning effort are assigned because of the expertise they are able to contribute toward the total effort.
3.3 Raview and Updat e of Emergency Plan and Implement ing Procedures The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator shall ensure that an independent review of the Emergency Plan and Procedures is conducted annually by an internal or external organization not responsible for the Emergency Plan and Procedures. 'ihe review shall include the LACBWR Emergency Plan, procedures and practices, training, readiness testing, equipment, and interfaces with county and state governments. The LACUhR Plant Superintendent shall ensure the evaluation and correction of review findings. A copy of the review finding will be submitted to DPC/LACBWR Management and shall be retained for 5 years. The plan will be updated to reflect changes in DPC, LACBWR, local, state or federal organizations and to reflect relevant changes in licensing requirements or regulatory guides. Changes to the Emergency Plan Procedures (EPP's) will be written, as necessary. Interim changes, spe cial situations, or short-lived situations that may impact en.ergency act ivit ies will be bundled in necordance with the LAC 3WR Administrative Control Procedures (ACP's). Plan changes shall be submitted to the LACDWR Operations Review Committee and approved by the Plant Superintendent prior to implementation.
The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator will be responsible for the annual review of all written support agreements with offsite agencies. New letters of agreement will be executed as required, based upon drill criticues, the development of new capabilities, or revised agency responsibilities.
E-PLAN E-5 Sept. 1987
- . ~ .-
LACBhR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 3.4 Distribution of Emergency Plan and _ Implementing Procedures The plan and procedures shall be forwarded to all organizations and individuals with responsibility for their implementation of the plan and procedures. The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator shall be responsible for maintainiac a distribution list of~all holders of the LACBWR Emergency Plan and supporting agreements. Changes to these documents shall be distributed in accordarce with the appropriate Administrative Control Procedures.
3.5 Outside Supporting Emergenc_y Response Plans Supporting emergency response plans include the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the State of Wisconsin and Vernun County.
3.6 Emergency Plan Procedures The specifics of the LACBWR Emergency Plan are carried out through Emergency Plan Procedures which are coordinated with plant operating, health and unfety and security procedures, es well as the state and county emergency plans.
The EPP's are prepared and controlled by LACBWH Administrative Control Procedures. A listing of EPP's is provided in Appendix 4.
4.0 FACILITIES AND EQUI _PMENT 4.1 General Maintennnce Responsibilities The Health and Safety Supervisor is responsible for implementing the maintenance program for cquipment and supplies.
4.1.1 An on-going program has been established to inspect, inventory, and operationally check, as applicable, emergency equipment and supplies (i.e.,
first-aid and m; dical equipment kits, emergency equipment box, and portable radiation monitoring equipment), a minimum of once each quarter and after each use. The general condition of supplies such as batteries, respirators, and liquid containers will be inspected for signs of leakage or deterioration. Any discrepancy found during the periodic inventory will be brought to the attention of the Health and Safety Supervisor, included in the program are calibration checks of equipment at intervals recommended by the supplier and replacement of such equipment with reserve gear should repair be required.
4.1.2 The Health and Safety Department is responsible for ensuring that communications equipment is maintained through the performnnce of operability tests at the intervals indicated in Table E-1. The method used to document operability tests is detailed in EPP-3.
E-PLAN E-6 Sept. 1987
. _ . _ . . _ __ __ ~ . . ... ._. _ _
LACBhTl EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 TABLE E-1 CObNUNICATIONS TESTING FREQUENCY CO5NUNICATIONS SYSTEM TESTING FREQUENCY RESPONSIDILITY LACBWR PABX STATE, LOCAL (MONTI!LY) DPC FEDERAL (MONTilLY) DPC MICROWAVE NE'IWORK DPC OFFICE (MONTIILY) DPC SIIERIFF'S RADIO LOCAL - VERNON (MONTIILY) DN C0bNTY SifERIFF ENS NRC RED P110NE FEDERAL (MONT11LY) DPC (ALL EXTENSIONS)
NRC IIEALTil PilYSICS FEDERAL (MONTilLY) DPC SITE SIRENS FULL TEST INCLUDING (ANNUAL) DPC VARIOUS AREAS IN ,
PLANT S
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E-PLAN E-7 sept. 1987
LACBWH EMERGENCY PLAN ~ Rev. 10 APPdNDIX 1 LETTERS OF AGREEMENT l
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E-PLAN Al-1 Sept. 1987 I
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. . .-. -. - _ ~ .-
i LACBWR EbfERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 LISTING OF I.ETTERS OF AGREEbfENT
- 1. Burns Security
- 2. Genoa Fire Department
- 3. La Crosse Lutheran Hospital
- 4. Tri State Ambulance Service S. Vernon County Sheriff E-PLAN Al-2 Sept. 1987
. - - . - , - _ - . _ . _ - _ - . .- _ - _ , , - , . , - . . - . . - . - ., . _ - , , . - . ~ .
MCN-87-12 ff'T-"7 BurnsinternationalSecurity8:rvi:es f4 1980 Univsrsity Lana
, Lista, Illinois 60532 .
% T e1: (312) 969-0955 d(k gQ g July 16, 1987 Mr. Roger E. Christians Emergency Preparedness Corrdinator Dairyland Power Cooperative Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor P. O. Box 275 Genoa, WI 54632 Re: LAC-12299
Dear Mr. Christians,
Attached are pages 16 through 24, and 42 showing excerpts from our service contract with Dairyland Power Cooperative which identify, in.part, the guards responsibility to assist in fulfilling certain requirements of the LACBWR Emergency Plan.
Item 3.0.12, page 42 of our contract committs to providing an armed guard for the E.O.F. in the event of a real emergency.
If you have any questions, please call.
Sincerely, ,,
Y q ,/, cu p.c & sc 'gpu' r. ,
J
/, f [f,./ef
/. W - v /
/
/ .
6t . .g
,,v tu Joseph A. French '
[1,t District Manager 312-969-0955 Attachment cb i
. - _ .-. . .. . . . . __ _ __ __ l
- @ (
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! kP l
LLITHERAN HOSPITAL l l
i x o s ', I !
l July 17, 1987 i
Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor ATTN: Roger E. Christians Emergency Preparedness Coordinator P.O. Box 275 Genoa, WI 54632
Dear Mr. Christians:
In accordance with Dairyland Power Cooperative's La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan, Lutheran Hospital La Crosse agrees to provide assistance in the following areas:
- 1. Provide emergency trauma and medical care for non radioactively contaminated patients.
- 2. Provide emergency trauma and medical care for patients who have been accidently exposed to excess quantities of ionizing radiation including skin erythemia due to beta radiation exposure as well a penetrating gamma or neutron radiation exposure.
- 3. Provide emergency trauma and medical care for patients who are injured and radioactively contaminated. This care includes personnel decontamination at our hospital in specific decontamination / isolation facilities. We have the capability of handling up to four patients of this nature at one time. Our staff has been trained in radiation protection and personnel decontamination techniques. It is our understanding that Dairyland Power Cooperative's Radiation Safety personnel will annually retrain our staff personnel in radiation protection, proper decontamination techniques and It is our understanding that emergency medical procedures.
Dairyland Power Cooperative will periodically conduct emergency medical drills with our Trauma and Emergency Staff.
._g
. 4. Provide physicians and medical personnel qualified to handle oat?+I- - G radiation emergencies to respond to the Genoa Site to treat f $g[h patients involved in a Radiological Medical Emergency.
dji,E-3b sy.
l'1hl%uh;M1u l.il w nivi=Nn ) Mil 'r/hd klqhn.c (UlSl 7Xi Oi',ti
l l ,
l Dairyland Power Cooperative July 17, 1987 Page 2 It is our understanding that Dairyland Power Cooperative will provide or arrange transportation for medical personnel to the Genoa Site to treat patients involved in a Radiological Medical Emergency. It is our understanding that Dairyland Power Cooperative's Radiation Safety personnel will annually retrain our staff personnel in radiation protection and proper decontamination procedures.
The physicians listed below are qualified and willing to respond to your facility.
0 l (_;n-v a l M,'k'('f e}-(r .
Rober . I(,r/mbla r . M.D. Emma K. Ledbetter, M.D.
6Lf 4 WO W ,. j 0 ,
La'ery . Lin'desmith, M.D. Benjami'n C. ' We'dfo, M.D.
udson F. 'Viiians, M.D.
~
NA/5'." Y es K. Williams, M.D.
G -
- - Tu v3 Jopn Joseph Pershing, M.D.
Sincerely, L , H PITAL-LA CROSSE
'/
4A e Schwem l
resident ee
4ECLIVt.ij JUL i 71987 July 16, 1987 Mr. Roger E. Christians Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor P. O. Box 275 Genoa, WI 54632
Dear Mr. Christians:
In the event of a nuclear emergency at LACBWR, the Genoa Fire Department would render assistance to the reactor. The Genoa Fire Department is capable of providing rescue and fire-fighting support to LACBWR during emergencies. Upon request by myself, all fire departments of Vernon County can be coordinated and directed by the Fire Services Director for the Vernon County Civil Defense Organization to support the Genoa Fire Department during an emergency at LACBWR.
The Genoa Fire Department's response capabilities include:
- 22 volunteers (a) We meet once per month.
(b) All have had previous-fire-fighting training.
- Our equipment includes; (a) 1 pumper (b) 1 brush buggy (c) I tanker Sincerely, GENOA FIRE DEPARTMENT Russell Phillips, Chief i
RP:ss I
TRISTATE AMBULANCE SERVICE, IN C.
P.o. BOX 224
' LA CROSSE, WI 54601 PHONE:(608) 784 4997 July 17, 1987 Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor P.O. Box 275 Genoa, WI 54632 Attn: Mr. Roger E. Christians Emergency prepardness Coordinator
Dear Mr. Christians:
In accordance with Dairyland Power Cooperative's La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan, Tri-State Ambulance Service, Lacrosse, Wisconsin agrees to provide assistance in the following area:
- 1) Provide ambulance service to transport injured patients who are nonradioactive contaminated to Lacrosse Lutheran Hospital or vernon Memorial Hospital's EM & T Center on a 24-hour basis.
- 2) Provide ambulance service to transport injured and radioactively contaminated patients to Lacrosse Lutheran EM & T Center and De-contamination Ward on a 24-hour basis in accordance with La Crosse Boiling Water Reaction Emergency Prepararedance Procedure and Tri-State Ambulance Service, Standard Operating Procedures.
- 3) Tri-State Ambulance Service since July 1985 also has two units in Lacross manned with Advanced Life Support Personnel (paramedic) and approrpiate LP unced Life Support equipment.
Our personnel have been trained in the aspects of handling injuried and radioactively contaminated patients. It is our understanding that your radiation safery personnel will conduct annual retraining with periodic actual drills simulating handling and transport of injured and radioactively contaminated patients. It is also ort understanding that in the event of an emergency involving radioactively contaminated and injured personnel in need of transport, your radiation safety personnel will provide:
1
l
- 1) Adequate dosimetry to Tri-State Ambulance personnel to monitor external radiation exposure and:
- 2) Assistance in the decontamination of our vehicles, if neessary.
Tri-State Ambulance Service agrees to support Dairyland Power .
Cooperative in medical aspects of the LACBWR power plant emergency. )
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Sincerely, Walter M. Gardner G President Tri-State Ambulance Service Inc., Lacrosse Wi 54601 i
)
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1
- E l
y GEOFFREY BANTA JERRY FREDRICKSON SHE *F F UNO(R$HENF F o
gi YE 4+O RECEIVED MAR 3 01988 O
O 4 SH ERIFF'S OFFICE ,
1 VIROQU A. WIS. 54665 March 25, 1988 Dairyland Power Cooperative P.O. Box 275 Genoa, Wi. 54632 In accordance with Dairyland Power Cooperative's Lacrosse BWR emergency plan, the Vernon County Sheriff's Department agrees to provide assistance in the event of an emergency at LACBWR in the following areas:
- 1. Communicating with plant personnel via radio or tele-phone and communicating with the local law enforcement officials and Emergency Government officials in surrounding counties if necessary.
4
- 2. Providing additional plant security as required under our jurisdiction.
- 3. Providing notification to residents near the site of an emergency at LACBWR if requested by site personnel.
It is our understanding that LACBWR drills will be conducted which may involve our staff and we agree to participate in these drills uoon request.
Sin e ly,
(
Geo f7 iff Vernon Oc - ty _ eriff's Department Viroqua, . 5 665 i
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LACDh'R MIERGENCY PLAN Hev. 10 APPENDIX 2 EMERGENCY EQUTPMENT/ KITS 1
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l E-PLAN A2-1 Sept. 1987
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LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 i 1
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Decontamination Kits i There are two (2) decontamination kits: one (1) at the Change Room and one (1) in the Waste Treatment Building. These kits will be inventoried quarterly and contain the .following items:
Minimum Item Required Applicators, cotton-tipped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I box Cleansing tissues . . .. . . . . . ......... 1 box Cotton balls or rolls ..... . . ......... 1 bag Decon soap . . . . . . ....... ......... 1 bottle Directions for personnel decontamination . . . . . . . I copy Gauze sponges, 2" x 2" . . . . . . . ......... I box Hand brush . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 1 each Hand cream . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 1 jar Hand soap . . . . . . ................ 1 bar Paper cups, 4 ounce . ...... . ......... 10 each Polybags . . . . . . . ................ 5 each Potassium permanganate . . . . . . . ......... 4 bottles Scis7 ors . . . . . . . ....... ......... 1 pair ,
Sodium bisulfite . . . ...... . ......... 4 bottles Spotting shield . . . ...... . ......... 1 each Surgical gloves . . . ... . . . . ......... 10 pair Tongue depressors . . ...... . ...... . . . 10 each Water . . . . . . . . ....... . . . . . . . 1 bottle Wide masking tape . . ...... . ......... 1 roll 4
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0 E-PLAN A2-2 Sept. 1987
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LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10-Ilospital Emergency Supplies
' These supplies are provided for La Crosse Lutheran Ifospital. The supplies will be inventoried at least once per quarter:
110 SPITAL EMERGENCY BOX INVEN1 DRY Minumum Item Required Shoe covers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 pair Disposable coveralls . . . . . . . .. . 5 each Cups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 5 each Surgical gloves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 box Plastic bags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 each Stepoff pads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 each Tape - plain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I roll Tape - radioactive material . . . . .. . I roll Radiation rope or ribbon . . . . . .. . I each Radiation signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 each Plastic sheeting . . . . . . . . . . . . I roll Absorbent paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 roll Water containers . . . . . . .. ... . 1 each Dosimeters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 each Dosimeter charger . . . . . . . . . . . I each Portable GM instrument . . . . . . .. . 1 each l
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- A2-3 Sept. 1987 ;
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LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 Emergency Kit There is one (1) emergency kit. It is located in the Administrative Building. The kit will be inventoried at least once per quarter and contains the following items:
Minimum Item _
Required Poly bags - various sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 cach Paper coveralls . ...... . . . . . . . . . .. . 5 pair Shoe covers . . ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 pair Rubber gloves . ... ......... . . . . . . . 5 pair Hoods or caps . ............ . . . . . . . 5 each Full face respirators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 each Spare respirator cartridges . . . . . . . . . . .. . 12 cach GM survey instrument (Thyac) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 each High range radiation survey meter . . . . . . . . . . I each Pocket dosimeter .......... . . . . . . . . G each Dosimeter charger . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 each Smears . . . . ........... . . . . . . . . 1 box Radiation signs . ........... . . . . . . . G each Radiation rope ........... . . .. . . . . I cach Paper . . . . . ............ . . . . . . . 2 tablets Pen / pencil . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 each Air sampler . . ............ . . . . . . . 1 each Filters for air samplers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 each ,
Tape . . . . . ........... . . . . . . . . I roll )
Plant survey maps ...... . . . . . . . . . .. . 2 sets 1
Decontamination Kit Applicators, cotton-tipped . . . .. . . . . . . . . . I box Cleansing tissues .......... . . . . . . . . I box Cotton balls or rolls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I bag Decon soap . . ............ . . . . . . . . 1 bottle Directions for personnel decontaminatic i . . . . . . . 1 copy Gauze sponges, 2" x 2" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I box Iland brush . . ............ . . . . . . . . 1 each Hand cream . . ......... . . . . .. . . . . . 1 jar Hand soap . . ........ . .. . . . . . . . . . 1 bar Paper cups, 4 ounce .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 each Polybags . . . . ........... . . . . . . . . 5 each Potassium permanganate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 bottles Scissors . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 pair Sodium bisulfite . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 bottles i 1 each Spotting shield ........... . . . . . . . .
Surgical gloves ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 pair Tongue depressors ................. . 10 each Water . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . I bottle i Wide masking tape ...... .. . . . . . . . . . . 1 roll l E-PLAN A2-4 Sept. 1987
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1 LACBWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 l l
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1 EPP-8 Emergency Field Team Kit <
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Location: Administration Building Minimum Item Required Paper coveralls . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 2 each Shoe covers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 pair Hoods / caps . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 2 each Full face respirator . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 2 each Surgical gloves . . . . . . . . ........... I box Thyac/HP210 probe . . . . . . . ......... . . I each '
HP 210 probe stand . . . . . . ........... I each Battery operated air sampler . .. . . . . . . . . . I each Particulate filters . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 3 each Smears . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . I box Tape . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... I roll Flashlight . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 1 each Calculator . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 1 each Stainless steel bucket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I cach Poly bottles . . . . . . . . . ........... 3 each Poly bags (various sizes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 each Pen / pencil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 each '
Marking pen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 each Knife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 each Garden shovel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 each Grass shears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I each Sample lauels . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 12 each Ares map . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 1 each Mobile Radio Operation Instructions . . . . . . . . . I copy-EPP-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . I copy EPP-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 1 copy Tweezer . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 1 each 4
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E-PLAN A2-5 Sept. 1987 i
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LACBhTl EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 APPENDIX 3 LISTING OF EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 4
l j i E-PLAN A3-1 Sept. 1987 i
LACDWR EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 10 The following emergency procedures provide administrative and' technical' guidance to implement the requirements specified in this plan. These emergency procedures are referenced throughout the plan, as necessary to provide an interface between the plan requirements and implementing actions.
SECTION OF EMERG. PLAN FPP NO. TITLE IMPLEMfNTED EPP-1 EMERGENCY CONDITIONS AND RESPONSE E.1.2 EPP-2 ORGANI7.ATION AND OPERATIONS DURING EMERGENCIES A.1.1, A.1.2 A.2.2, A.3,,
E.1.1 EPP-3 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS Table F-1 EPP-5 ESTIMATE OF OFFSITE DOSE E.3.0 ,
EPP-G SAMPLE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS DURING EMERGENCIES E.3.1 EPP-7 ONSITE, PERIMETER, AND NEAR-SITE RADIOLOGICAL E.3.5 i MONITORING SURVEYS E.3.7 EPP-8 0FFSITE RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY C.1.1 C.1.1.1 1 E.3.5 E.3.7 ,
l EPP-ll RADIOLOGICAL MEDICAL EMERGENCIES, FIRST AID, E.4.5, E.4.7, j INITIAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, AND EMERGENCY Fig. E-4 AMBULANCE SERVICE EPP-12 PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURE E.4.2.2 E.4.4 1
EPP-14 EMERGENCY PLAN TRAINING F.1.0 EPP-15 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REVIEW AND UPDATING F.3.0 EPP-17 EXERCISES AND DRILLS P.2.0 EPP-22 HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARDfENT EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIONS A.1.0 A.1.2.9 C.1.1 ,
0.1.1.1 E.3.0 E.4.2 E.4.4 E-PLAN A3-2 Sept. 1987 a
Determination of the Potential Onsite Radiological Consequences from a Fuel Handling Accident at the La Crosse Nuclear Facility l
By:
Paul W. Shafer i
Radiation Protection Engineer LAC-TR-134 April 1988 PCI-54
The Determination of the Potential Onsite Radiological Consequences from a Fuel Handling Accident at the La Crosse Nuclear Facility Introduction )
On April 30, 1987, the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBkR) was shut down permanently. By the end of June 1987, all spent fuel assemblies had been moved into the fuel element storage well (FESW), and the reactor vessel head was replaced on the reactor. The Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) scenarios shifted from an operating reactor with active fuel to events in the FESW in I which the spent fuel fission products have undergone significant decay. By August 1987, LACBWR had received a 10 CFR 50 "Possession Only" license. In subsequent months, technical specification revisions, physical security plan revisions and an emergency plan revision had been submitted to the NRC for review and approval.
In September 1987, a technical report, LAC-TR-132, "Determination of the Potential Radiological Consequences to Members of the Public From A Fuel Handling Accident at the La Crosse Nuclear Facility" (Reference 1) was completed. The LACBbR Decommissioning Plan (Reference 2) which was submitted to the NRC in December 1987, describes the results of this technical report in Section 9. "SAFSTOR Accident Analysis". This study showed that the maximum ~
offsite whole body dose from an accidental release of Krypton-85 was about 186 mrem within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and the corresponding skin dose was about 16 Rem within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. It was concluded that the doses to Members of the Public from an accidental release of Kr-85 would be significantly less than the 10 CFR 100 whole body dose limit of 25 Rem in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and the corresponding skin dose equivalent limit cf 15C Rem in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. It further showed that the whole body dose to Members of the Public would be significantly less than the U.S.
EPA-Protective Action Guide (PAG) limit of 1 Rem. EPA guidance indicates that no planned protective actions are recommended if the PAG is not exceeded, and that previously determined protective actions (such as alert notification, sheltering and/or evacuation) may be reconsidered or terminated (Reference 3).
Since the calculated maximum whole body dose to Members of the Public were less than the 1 Rem PAG and also less than the 500 mrem limit (10 CFR 20.105(a)), it was proposed (Reference 4) t hat the previously determined 5 mile radius plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) be reduced in size to essentially the effluent release boundary (ERB) within the Dairyland Power Cooperative Genoa Site Boundary (OCA). It was also proposed (Reference 4),
that the requirement for the two highest action levels for emergency preparedness; Site Area Emergency and General Emergency, be removed from the Emergency Plan and Procedures.
Since the first study (Reference 1) was concerned about potential offsite doses to Members of the Public from an accidental release of Krypton-85 (the only remaining fission gas in spent fuel assemblies), onsite doses to Dairyland Power Cooperative personnel at LACBWR and neighboring Genoa Station No. 3 fossil fueled steam plant, contractors and visitors were not considered.
Therefore, this study was conducted to determine the potential onsite radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident in the FESW, resulting in damage to fuel cladding with subsequent release of radioactive material to the Containment Building (CB) atmosphere, followed by an accidental release of Kr-85 to the environment.
PC1-54
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LAC-TR-134 Page 2 J Discussion l A fuel handling accident during spent fuel movement or cask loading operations in the FESW could result in a release of a fraction of the fuel fission product inventory to the CB and with a breech of containment ;
integrity, a release to the environment could theoretically become evident. 1 The CB is normally kept open to a release path to the 107 meter plant - ek I through the CB exhaust ventilation system piping and dampers, but CB l atmospheric integrity via CB isolation will be required to be maintained during fuel handling operations. The CB atmosphere will be automatically '
isolated by high CB ventilation exhaust activity detected by an atmospheric monitor, or by low FESW water level detected by a water level sensor.
However, worst case accident scenarios were analyzed to determine the potential onsite doses to personnel to determine the need for onsite notification, sheltering and/or evacuation. This was further evaluated to determine habitability for emergency response personnel and for other personnel onsite, including Genoa Station No. 3 steam plant operations personnel, warehouse personnel, contractors and site visitors. Postulated accidents which were analyzed are described below:
- 1. Cask Drop Accident - This accident conservatively assumes the rupture of all the cladding of all 333 spent fuel assemblies located in the FESW, due to the droppage of a spent fuel cask or other heavy object on top of the two-tiered spent fuel storage racks.
- 2. Fuel Handling Accident - This accident conservatively assumes the cladding rupture of all the fuel rods in the two fuel assemblies located in the FESW which have the highest fission product activity.
Various accidental exposure scenarios for these two types of fuel damage accidents were reviewed. These are listed in decreasing order of probability for occurrence, as follows:
- 1. The fission product activity is released to an isolated CB atmosphere, with direct gamma radiation exposure from the CB surfaces at selected distances from the building surface.
- 2. The resultant fission product activity is released from a non-isolated CB to the environment through the Containment Building exhaust ventilation system to the plant stack in an elevated release pattern.
l 3. The resultant fission product activity is released from a non-isolated CB to the onsite environment at ground level through a 1 meter diameter breech of containment.
a The most significant, although least probable, accident scenario (No. 3) was assumed to be the Cask Drop Accident followed by a ground level release of l
fission product activity through a 1 meter diameter leak in the Containment 1 Building.
PCI-54
l LAC-TR-134 Page 3 Scope The principle fission gas remaining for any potential fuel damage I accident, as of December 1987, is Krypton-85 (Kr-85). The other Krypton and Xenon radioisotopes, which were produced during plant operation, have essentially decayed to stable elements completely, since plant shutdown on April 30, 1987.
Halogen radionuclides, such as radiobromines and radioiodines, including I-131, have also decayed to stable elements, since plant shutdown. Some residual I-129 remains in the spent fuel assemblies. This has been computed to be less than 0.5 Curie total (Reference 5). Using a FESW water decontamination factor of 100, and a 30% release fraction (Reference 6), the amount of I-129 available for a release to the atmosphere would only be about 1.31 mci. This would correspond to a Containment Building concentration of about 1.75 E-7 pCi/ce, and a subsequent stack concentration of up to 1.1 E-8 pCi/cc. With a release rate of 1.82 E-7 C1/sec for a two hour release, this would result in an immeasurable thyroid and whole body dose to onsite personnel and to a Member of the Public, beyond the Effluent Release Boundary.
Other semi-volatile radionuclides within the spent fuel assemblies would be released to the FESW water in the event of a fuel damage accident, but would almost completely remain within the FESW water at ambient temperature, to be removed from solution by the FESW filter /demineralizer system. Pool water decontamination factors of up to a factor of 250 would be evident. Any small fractions of semi-volatile type radionuclides which would be released from the water would rapidly be removed from the CB atmosphere onto CB surfaces or entrapped in CB ventilation duct work or in the CB ventilation filtration system. The release fraction for sem0-volatile type radionuclides from the fuel to the FESW water could be as high as 0.01 with a subsequent release fraction from the FESW water to the CB atmosphere of about 0.004.
This would result in an effective dilution factor of about 25,000. Therefore, approximately 99.9% + of the semi-volatile fission products would remain in '
the FESW water.
As in the case of Reference 1, Krypton-85 is the only remaining fission product which could constitute a significant dose to onsite personnel and to Members of the Public beyond the ERB, due to atmospheric transport within a short time period (up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) after a fuel damage accident. It is therefore the solo radionuclide considered in this analysis.
It has been computed that about 1.19 E5 Curies of Kr-85 remain within the 333 spent fuel assemblies currently stored in the LACBWR FESW (Reference 5).
The fraction of the Kr-85 fission product which had migrated from the ceramic fuel pellet matrices to the gap and plenum regions of the fuel pellet and i stainless steal cladding interfaces during normal operation, followed by j storage in the FESW, would be available for immediate release into the water in the event of fuel cladding damage. The retention of noble gases, including Kr-85, which are chemically inert, by the FESW water is assumed to PC1-54 l
i LAC-TR-134 Page 4 be negligible (i.e., a FESW water decontamination factor of 1). Using the criteria of Reference 6, it is assumed in the case of the Cask Drop Analysis, that 30% of the 1.19 E5 Curies of Kr-85, or 35,760 Curies, is released to the CB atmosphere, and could be subsequently released to the environment at various flow rates, if the CB was not isolated, within two hours after the accident.
It has been computed that about 1.4 E3 Curies of Kr-85 remain within the fuel rods of the two fuel assemblies with the highest fission product activity (i.e. fuel assemblies with the highest peak power density (kW/ft), the highest average burnup (MWD / ton) and the shortest decay time from discharge, all being considered). Using the criteria of Reference 6, it is assumed in the case of the Fuel Handling Accident, that about 431 Caries of Kr-85 is released to the CB atmosphere, and could be subsequently released to the environment.
Calculations of onsite dose were made for both the Cask Drop and Fuel Handling Accident scenarios, for activity contained inside the CB, and ground level and elevated releases from the CB.
Radiological Consequences of Fuel Damaging 'cidents at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) had been previously address 0 (References 7 and 8).
An onsite map, showing various 10m radii from the Containment Building is shown in Figure 1. Site structures are depicted on this map, end dose rates at rarious distances from the Containment Building can be determined by cross referencing to Tables 3 and 4.
Flow rates from the Containment Building through the CB exhaust ventilation system were determined by taking measurements of the inlet air flow rates using a calibrated Kurz air velocity meter. These flow rates were determined at STP to be approximately (Reference 9):
- a. CB exhaust fan operating and 2 stack blowers operating: : 4182.98 1 213.75 cfm (value shown to be 4323 cfm by calculation) l
- b. CB exhaust fan not operating and 2 stack blowers operating: : 1050.03 1 147.03 cfm
- c. CB exhaust fan not operating and stack blowers not operating: : 916.40 1 46.36 cfm i
A CB ventilation schematic is shown on Figure 2.
PCI-54 m-.~ - - ,, yw,- ,,ree.- . - - - - . . _ - - e . ., , ,m - -- -,..---,,,.-,-_--,.r,. -.w- e ._, m.,y%w.,-...-%-..-_..p. ,,ym-e,--.cr.% -n,_w.,-Sy
LAC-TR-134 Page 5 Meteorological parameters used to calculate X/Q's for both ground level and elevated releases followed the Pasquill methodology. The general equations used for both ground level and elevated releases are as follows:
2 a) X= 1 b) X = e'h 2/20, Q upoyga B (ground) Q nooyg where:
X = the short term average centerline value of the ground level concentration (Ci/m3 )
Q = amount of material released (Ci/sec) y = wind speed (m/sec) oy = horizontal standard deviation of the plume spread (m)
Oz = vertical ctandard deviation of the plume spread (m)
B = building wake effect = 3 for 100m or A = 330 m2 which ever is more conservative 2 h = effective release height (m)
For ground level releases, the following conservative assumptions of atmospheric dispersion were used in these calculations in accordance with guidance (References 6 and 10).
(a) wind speed - 1 m/sec in a uniform direction.
(b) Pasquill stability class F (c) release height = Om (grade)
(d) cross wind distance - Om (e) a building turbulent wake atmospheric diffusion reduction - 3 is I assumed (Reference 6). !
I For ground level releases, Reference 6, Figure 1 does not show X/Q values !
less than 200 neters from the point of release. These values were calculated using the appropriate formula. Results of these calculations are found on Table 2.
For elevated releases, a calculated worst case X/Q of 2.3 E-4 sec/m8 at 500m to the East (90*), was used in calcolations of dose rates. This value l was determined using actual meteorological data and represents the point of I plume impaction with the Eastern bluff adjacent to the plant site at which point, the equation for X/Q calculation becomes the ground level release equation (Reference 6).
In the case of direct onsite gamma dose rates due to Kr-85 activity contained in an isolated Containment Building, the right cylindrical volume source and shielding calculation methodology was used. The general equation for this calculation is as follows (Reference 11):
PCl-54
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l LAC-TR-134 l Page 6 l
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General Equations: Cylindrical Source Shielding with slab shield. The gamma j radiation absorbed in a cylindrical source with an infinite slab shield is dependent upon the density thickness of the source and the shield and upon the energy of the photons, y=BSvR 2
[F(0, b i ) + F(0 2, b 23 4 (a + z) 1 When: Angles 01=02 = On then the equation simplifies to:
0 = BSvR' [F( 0 2, b2 2(a+z) 0 = photon flux, cm.2 sec 'l sv = volume source strength, em'8 sec'1
= total source activity , mci Q
. I X = surface exposure rate, mR/hr l R = radius of the source, cm ' h = height of the source, cm V = source volume (n R2 h) cm' l a = distance from the source surface to point of measurement, cm 1 z = effective self absorption distance, em 1 S
= buildup factor of shielding l
Ey = mean gamma energy, MeV Fy = mean # gammas / nuclear transformation 0, et , 02 = angles of measurement t = thickness of shield, cm i p1 = linear attenuation coefficient, cm' = p1 x uni Pi = density, g/cm 3 1 pn = mass attenuation coefficient l ps = linear attenuation of source material, cm'1 PCI-54 l
l LAC-TR-134 I Page 7 I l i l I d (r i s N,s N
+
s ' ti *- N
\ '
l g g 81 h 42 ~ iN As P l ez x
' e !
f ci
/ 2 P
y ./A l /
. 'e2 t U
i 4 CL, > ,
}
l 1 I i l I PCI-54 I i
LAC-TR-134 Page 8 Physical Constants:
- a. R= ') .14 m
- b. h= 35.80m
- c. V= 7480 m3
- d. ti = 9" x 2.54 cm/in. - 22.86 cm and 1.16" x 2.54 cm/in - 2.95 cm
- e. Pi = con. rete siliceous - 2.29 g/cm3 and steel - 7.86 g/cm 8
- f. Radiological constants - Kr-85 Qi = 431.4 Curies of Kr-85 Q2 = 35,760 Curies of Kr-85 Kr-85 Ey YEy spa 0.514 MeV/y 0.0043 y/d 392.57 Ci/g ,
l 1 Structural shielding factors for a ground level release of Kr-85 were taken from SAND-77-1725, and are conservative for Kr-85's gamma energy of 514 , kev. l l Calculations
)
The worst case accident scenario is assumeu to 1.e the Cask Drop Accident. The concentration of Kr-85 inside the CB would bei 119,200 Cueles x 0.3 = 4.781 Ci/m8 7480 m' The immersion dose rates inside the CB would be (Reference 12): 4.781 Ci/m2 x 1.839 Rem /hr = 8.8 Rem /hr (whole body) Ci/m' 4.781 C1/m2 x 1.53 x 102 Rad /hr = 731.5 Rem /hr (skin) Ci/m 3 PC1-54
LAC-TR-134 Page 9 If the CB is 1solated and remains isolated, the gamma dose rate at the surface of the Containment Building would be approximately 1.1 Rem /hr and the maximum dose rate inside the Control Roon and at a distance of 30 meters from the CB surface would be approximately 35 mrem /hr. The dose rate at a distance of 50 meters from the CB surface would be approximately 20 mrem /hr. The dose rate outside the LACBWR Administrative Buildlng would be about 10-20 mrem /hr with a dose rate inside the Administrative Building at the proposed assembly area (80m and 0.2 shielding coefficien+.) would be approximately 2-3 mrem /hr. The dose rates outside the Radiological Restricted Area would renain below 50 mK/hr from direct shine from the CB surface. The dose rate at the 100m site boundary would be below 2 mrem /hr. This would be the most probable radiation e.:posure mechanism after a Cask Drop Accident occurrence. The second most probable exposure mechanism after a Cask Drop accident would be an elevated release of Kr 85 from the plant stack. In this case, the CB would fail to isolate, or the CB would become unisolated with a subsequent release of Kr-85 to the stack with the stack blowers operating. Doses to personnel onsite would be small from this elevated release, since the plume wou d remain elevated above the site. The onsite gamma dose rates from plume shine should remain below 5 mR/hr for the duration of the release. The plume - is assumed to impact at 500m (E) and would result in offsite doses as previously ducermined (Reference 1). This is shown in Table 1. The least probable scenario would involve a Cask Drop Accident with a subsequent ground level release of Kr-85 via diffusion from a breech in the CB or from the stack plenum area where the CB exhaust ventilation flow terminates prior to dilution and dispersion by the stack blowers. In this case, the CB is assumed to fail to isolate or becomes unisolated, and the stack blowers are assumed to be not operating. The release flow rate through an approximate 1 neter diameter leakage point has been conservatively assumed to be about 916 cfm or about 0.55 linear meter /sec. The Kr-85 concentration at the leakage 1oint would be 4.781 Ci/m . The source term or release rate at the leakage 8 point would be: 35,760 Ci = 916 cfm x 0.028 ft 8 x 0.0017 min = 2,07 Ci/sec 7480 m' m' see The stack monitor would not detect this release, but onsite portable radiological protection detectors (such as GM's or personnel monitors) may readily detect the release. The dose rates at the release point should not exceed:
- a. Whole Body Dose Rate:
4.781 Ci/m' x l.839 Rem /hr = 8.792 Rem /hr 1 Ci/m 3
- b. Skin Dose Equivalent:
4.781 C1/m,x 731.493 Fen /hr = 731.493 Rem /hr 8 1 Ci/m 2 l FCl-54
l l l i LAC-TR-134 ! Page 10 1 The concenttation of Kr-85 and the dose rates at the point of release ' will, in reality, differentia 11y decrease with time due to the replacement of I contaminated air by dilution air, which is not contaminated. This is i illustrated as follows: Time After Leakage Point Whole Body ! Leakage Initiates Release Concentration Dose Rate At ! (Cl/m ) 2 Leakage Point 1 i (Rem /hr)
=================================================================
1 0 minute 4.781 8.792 1 minute 4.764 8.761 2 minutes 4.748 8.732 5 minutes 4.698 8.640 10 minutes 4.615 9.487 30 minutes 4.284 7.878 1 hour 3.787 6.964 1 hour 30 minutes 3.290 5.885 2 hours 2.793 5.136 The integrated average concentration and dose rate at the leakage point I would be about 3.8 Ci/m 3 and about 7.0 Rem /hr respectively for the first 2 ! hours after the initiation of the release, i l However, for conservatism, the release concentration and release are { assumed to be a constant 4.8 Ci/mi and 2.1 C1/see for the 2 hour release , duration. I Ground level X/Q values were determined using the criteria of Peference
- 1. These are listed in Table 2. The X/Q at the release point is assumed to be 1.0 sec/m . At about 20 meters from the release point the X/Q would 3
I decrease to about 0.263 sec/m , and at 100m to about 0.012 sec/m3 with a 2 building wake effect factor of 3 taken into account. l Onsite doses from the ground level release were calculated and are listed i on Table 3. Table 4 stows the effects of structural shielding on immersion l dose rates due to the Kr-85. The beta dose equivalent component to skin dose equivalents is assumed to be negligible inside the corresponding onsite j structures. The onsite whole body dose rates, from 30-100 meters from the leakage point, range from 445 mrem /hr to 45 mrem /hr. The corresponding skin dose , equivalents range from 37 Rad /hr to 3.7 Rad /hr. For existing onsite structures within the 30m-100m distance from the leakage point, the whole body dose rates would be decreased by at least a factor of 1.7 and up to a factor of 10. Beyond about 50 meters from the leakage point, a whole body dose of 400 mrem within 2 hours should not be exceeded. Beyond about 20 meters from the leakage point, a whole body dose of 2500 mrem within 2 hours should not be exceeded. PCI-54
l i LAC-TR-134 Page 11 i j i For the Fueling Handling Accident scenario, the concentration of Kr-85 inside the CB would be: 1438 x 0.3 = 5.8 E-2 Ci/m2 1 7480m' l i The immersion dose rates inside the CB would be (Reference 12): 5.8 E-2 Ci/m3 x 1.839 Rem /hr = 0.107 Rem (Whole Body) Ci/m* hr 5.8 E-2 Ci/m8 x 1.5 x 102 Rem /hr = 8.874 Rem (Skin) Ci/m i hr If the CB is isolated and remains isolated, the gamma dose rate at the CB surface would be approximately 14 mrem /hr, and the dose rates in the Control 3 1 Room or at a distance of about 30 meters from the CB surface would be approximately 0.4 mrem /hr. For an elevated release of Kr-85, after a Fuel Handling Accident, the ; onsite dose rates from plume shine would be negligible. { For a ground level release of Kr-85, onsite concentrations and dose rates would be a factor of about 83 times less than the Cask Drop Accident levels. ' Summary i Figures 3 and 4 are flow charts which summarize potential onsite i radiological consequences of a Cask Drop Accident, and a Fuel Handling Accident at the IACBWR facility. ! The following matrix summarizes the potential maximum doses within 2 hours to onsite personnel from the release of Kr-85 for two different accident scenarios, and three types of exposure modes: i i PCI-54
l l LAC-TR-134 Page 12 Accident Release Location Whole Body Skin Scenario Type Dose Dose
====================================2========================================
Cask Drop None 30m froni CB 70 mrem 0 mrem Accident Control Room Elevated Genoa Site 10 nRem 0 mrem Ground 30m from CB 890 mrem 74.1 Rem (Outside (Outside l Structure) Structure) Fuel Handling None 30m from CB < 1 mrem 0 mrem Accident Control Room , Elevated Genoa Site < 1 mrem 0 mrem l l Ground 30m from CB 11 mrem 890 mrem (Outside (Outside Structure) Structure) Conclusion This study conservatively demonstrates that doses to onsite personnel frem the accidental release of Kr-85 from a Fuel Handling Accident should not exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50 General Design Criterion 19, the U.S. EI A PAGs, and 10 CFR 20. In the case of the Cash Drop Accident, the whole body dose and skin dose equivalent limits should not be exceeded by onsite personnel, if precautionary onsite sheltering at a distance out to 80 meters from the Containment Building is undertaken unless there is an elevated release, in which case onsite sheltering would not be necessary. The LACBWR and Genoa 3 Control Rooms vould be accessible and habitable after this accident occurred. Genoa 3 would be able to continue operation. Evacuation of onsite personnel to offsite locations would not be necessary. Existing onsite assembly areas inside existing site structures could be used for sheltering without modification. Building ventilation systen.s could be temporarily turned of f pending futher monitoring and assessment actions. The LACBWR stack siren and the P.A. system could be used at the ALERT declaration to alert and notify site personnel to seek precautionary sheltering. In conclusion, there would be no need to evacuate the site after a fuel damage accident, personnel dose limits should not be exceeded, and the Genoa 3 steam plant could continue operations. LACBWR Control Room and emergency response personnel would be able to respond as necessary. Therefore, a Site Area or General Emergency classification is not necessary. PCI-54
i i LAC-TR-134 Page 13 References
- 1. Shafer, P. W., Technical Report, LAC-TR-132, "Determination of the Potential Radiological Consequences to Members of the Public From a Fuel Handling Accident at the La Crosse Nuclear Facility", September 1987.
- 2. LACBWR Staff, "La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Decommissioning Plan", December 1987.
- 3. Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-520/1-75-001, September 1985 (Revised June 1980).
- 4. Letter DPC to NRC, (Proposed) Emergency Plan Revision, LAC-12377, September 29, 1987.
- 5. DPC Computer Program, FACT-1, (Shafer/Rocca), July 1987.
- 6. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.25 "Assumptions Used for Evaluation The Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactor", March 23, 1972.
- 7. Safety Evaluation Report for the February 4, 1980. Amendment fl18 to License No. DPR-45.
- 8. SEP Topic XV-20. "Radiological Consequences of Fuel Damaging Accidents -
La Crosse BWR", October 14, 1982.
- 9. DPC Technical Memo, Shafer to Decommissioning Plan File, "CB Ventilation Flow Rate Determination", November 17, 1987.
- 10. NUREG-0324, X0QD00 Program for the Meteorological Evaluation of Routine '
Effluent Releases at Nuclear Power Stations, (Draft, August 1977), J. F. Sagendorf and J. T. Goll. (Also NRC Regolatory Guide 1.145).
- 11. Rockwell, Theodore, III, et.al. Reactor Shielding Design Manual, TID-7004, March 1956.
- 12. U. S. NRC Regulatory Guid2 1.109, "Calculations of Annual Doses to Man From Routine Releases of Reactor Ef fluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, kevision 1, October 1977.
l I l i PCl-54
TABLE 1 Worst Case Dose Rate and Doses for a Elevated Release of Krypton-85 at Various Distances From the LACBWR Stack Downwind Distance From Average Activity Whole Body Skin Dose Release Point X/Q Release Rate (I) Concentration Dose Rate Eq. Rate (m) (sec/m') (ci/m 3) (C1/m8) (mR/hr) (mrad /hr) 500 (E) (2) 2.3 E-4 4.467 1.14 E-3 2.10 174.42 1 750 1.2 E-4 4.967 5.56 E-4 1.02 84.72 1000 7.7 E-5 4.967 3.82 E-4 0.70 53.14 , 1500 4.0 E-5 4.961 2.00 E-4 0.37 30.73 2000 2.5 E-5 4.06) 1.24 E-4 0.23 19.10 i 2500 1.8 E-5 4.967 R.94 E-5 0.16 13.29 3000 1.3 E-5 4.967 6.46 E-5 0.12 10.00 2 miles 1.2 E-5 4.967 5.96 E-5 0.11 9.14 3 miles 6.3 E-6 4.967 3.13 E-5 0.06 5.00 4 miles 4.1 E-6 4.967 2.04 E-5 0.04 3.32 5 miles 2.9 E-6 4.967 1.44 E-5 0.03 2.50 (1) Assumes a Cask Drop Accident from which 35,760 Curies of Kr-85 are released to 7480 m 3 of Containment Building free air spaces, and are subsequently released elevated to the environment from the 107 meter stack in 2 hours at a Containment Building flow rate of 1.039 m3 /sec (2,200 cfm).
~
(2) Lowest X/Q value occurs at 500m (E) at point of bluff impact. Effects onsite are insignificant for elevated release. 4
l l l TABLE 2 Critical X/Q Values For a Ground Level Release of Krypton 85 at Varying Distances From tje_LACBWR Containment Building \1l Downwind X (2) X (3) Distance Q QB 8 (m) (Asec/m ) (sec/m8 ) 10
- 3.30 1.10 20 7.88 E-1 2.63 E-1 30 3.50 E-1 1.17 E-1 40 2.00 E-1 6.67 E-2 50 1.29 E-1 4.30 E-2 60 9.12 E-2 3,04 E-2 70 6.82 E-2 2.27 E-2 80 5.31 E-2 1.77 E-2 90 4.26 E-2 1.42 E-2 100 3.51 E-2 1.17 E-2 110 2.95 E-2 9.83 E-3 120 2.51 E-2 8.37 E-3 150 1.68 E-2 5.57 E-3
- Values are too close to leakage point - submersion dose calculations invalid.
(1) Assumptions: Wind Speed: 1 m/sec (2.237 mph) Release Height: 0m Stability Class: Pasquill F Crosswind Distance: 0m Leak Point: < 1 m in diameter (2) Equation for atmospheric diffusion from a ground level point source (no building wake effect): X= 1 Q wpoyoz (3) Equation for atmospheric diffusion from a ground level point source (with building wake effect): X 1 where B = 3 in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.25 Q = npoyoz d l PCI-53 ) I
TABLE 3 Worst Case Onsite Dose Rates and Doses for a Ground Level Release of Krypton-85 at Varying Distances from the LACBWR Containment Building (1) Whole Downwind Average Body Skin Time Time Time Distance From Release Activity Dose Dose to Reach to Reach to Reach Release Point Rate Concentr. Hate Eq. Rate 500 ruRem 2500 mrem 30 Rem t (m) X/Q(B)3) (sec/m (C1/sec) (Ci/m2 ) (R/hr) (Rad /hr) (Whole Body) (Whole Body) (Skin) 10
- 1.10 2.07 2.070 3.807 316.710 7.9 minutes 39.4 minutes 5.7 minutes 20 2.63 E-1 2.07 0.544 1.001 83.232 30.0 minutes > 2.0 hours 21.6 minutes 30 1.17 E-1 2.07 0.242 0.445 37.026 1.1 hour > 2.0 hours 48.6 minutes 40 6.67 E-2 2.07 0.138 0.254 21.114 2.0 hour > 2.0 hours 1.4 hours 50 4.30 E-2 2.07 0.089 0.164 13.617 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours
. 60 3.04 E-2 2.07 0.063 0.116 9.639 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours 70 2.27 E-2 2.07 0.047 0.087 7.191 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours 80 1.77 E-2 2.07 0.037 0.068 5.661 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours 90 1.42 E-2 2.07 0.029 0.055 4.437 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours 100 1.17 E-2 2.07 0.024 0.045 3.672 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours 110 9.83 E-3 2.07 0.020 0.037 3.060 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours 120 8.37 E-3 2.07 0.017 0.031 2.601 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours 150 5.57 E-3 2.07 0.012 0.022 1.836 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours 200 3.33 E-3 2.07 0.007 0.013 1.071 > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours > 2.0 hours
- Too close to release point - submersion dose calculations invalid.
(1) Assumes a cask drop accident from which 35,760 Curies of Kr-85 are released to 7480 m8 of Containment Building free air spaces, and are subsequently leaked ground level to environment through as 1 m diameter leakage point at a measured flow rate of 0.433 m d /sec (916.4 cfm) with no exhaust fan or stack blower in operation.
I l TABLE 4 i Onsite Whole Body Dose Rates for a Ground 1 Level Release of Kr-85 From A Cask Drop Accident Approximately Approximately Location Downwind Average W.B. Structure Average W.B. Distance Dose Rate Shielding Dose Rate (m) Outside Location Coafficient Inside Location (mR/hr) (SAND-77-1725) (mR/hr) South Fence 15 2,100 N/A N/A Between Stack and G-3 Waste Treatment 15-20 1,000-2,100 0.1 100-210 Building Control Room / 20 1,000 0.1 100 Maintenance Shop Turbine Office 30 450 0.6 270 Area East Restricted 30-40 250-460 N/A N/A Area Fence North Restricted 40 250 N/A N/A Area Fence G-3 Parking Lot 40-50 170-250 N/A N/A Turbine Building 50 170 0.6 100 & Old TSC SAS 50-60 120-170 0.2 20-40 G-3 Shop 50-60 120-170 0.6 70-100 G-3 Offices 70 85 0.6 50 LACBWR Annex 70 85 0.6 50
TABLE 4 l Onsite Whole Body Dose Rates for a Ground Level Release of Kr-85 From l A Cask Drop Accident 1 l Approximately Approximately ; Location Downwind Average W.B. Structure Average W.B. Distance Dose Rate Shielding Dose Rate (m) Outside Location Coefficient Inside Location (mR/hr) (SAND-77-1725) (mR/hr) LACBWR Admin. 70 85 0.2 20 Building (Ce.,ter) LACBWR Maintenance 70 85 0.6 50 Lunch Room Genoa Central 80-90 50-70 0.6 30-40 Warehouse LACBWR Admin. 80 70 0.2 15 Building (N) LACBWR Warehouses 90-100 40-50 0.6 25-30 LACBWR Cribhouse 100 40 0.6 20-30 LACBWR Parking 90-100 40-50 N/A N/A Lot Genoa Site 90-120 30-40 N/A N/A Switchyard Genoa Site 110 35 0.6 20 Front Gate G-3 South 120 30 0.2 6 Assembly Area G-1 Control Room 110-120 N/A 0.1 8-10 G-3 Cribhouse 100-110 35-40 0.4 15-16
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CASK DROP ACCIDENT: FIGURE 3 l Fuel Cask Or Other Heavy Object l l Drops Onto The 2 Tiered Fuel Racks l l Fuel Claddin Of 333 Spent Fuel l l Assemblies Damaged l l Kr-85 (119,200 Ci) Available For l l Release Into FESW l v l Kr-85 (35,760 Ci) Released to CB l l Atmosphere l V l CB Exhaust Gas Monitor / Local ! l ARM Alarm l v v l Containment Building l "l CB Fails To Isolate, ' ' CB Fails To Isolate. l l Isolates l l Stack Blowers Operating- '~~!StackBlowersNot l l Forced Elevated Release l ] Operating - Diffusion l s , >l To Ground Level l v v v l Kr-85 Concentration l l CB Release Flow Rate l l CB Release Flow Rate l l In CB - 4.78 pCi/cc l j, Approximate 1v 2,200 cfm l l_ Approximate 1v 916 efmj v v v l Dose Rate At Surface l l Kr-85 Release Rate l l Kr-85 Release Rate l l Of CB - 1.1 R/hr l l - 5.0 Ci/sec l l - 2.1 C1/sec l v v l SPING Channel 5 Fails l l No SPING Alarms l l High, Channel 7 High l l (Portable RP Inst. l l Alarm l l Alarms Possible) l v ___ v l Kr-85 Concentration In l l Kr-85 Concentration l l Stack - 1.6 E-1 pCi/cc l l At Leak Point l l - 4.8 vC1/cc l 4 I v a i l Kr-85 Concentration At j l Kr-85 Concentration l l 500m (E) - 1.1 E-3 pCi/cc l At 30m - 2.5 E-1 pC1/cc
! Kr-85 Dose Rate At l l Kr-85 Dose Rate At l l l 500m (E) - 2.0 mrem /hr l l 30m - 450 mrem /hr l -
l k9 ~85~ Concentration ^^l l l At 70m - 4.8 E-2 pCi/cc l Kr-85 Dose Rate At l l 70m - 87 mrem /hr l PCl-54 1
f PUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT: FIGURE 4 ' l Fuel Assembly Drops Onto l l 2nd Fuel Assembly l j l Fuel Cladding Of Two l l Assemblies Damaged l l Kr-85 (1438 C1) l l Available For Release ; j Into FESW l l Kr-85 (431.4 Ci) l l Released To CB l l Atmosphere l V l CB Exhaust Cas Monitor l l / Local ARM Alarm l v v v l CB Fails To Isolate, j l CB Falls To Isolate, ! l Containment Building Q Stack Blowers Operating -(", Stack Blowers Not l l 1solates l l Forced Elevated Release l l Operating - Diffusion l 1
, , ;.l to Ground Levei <
l v v v l Kr-85 Concentration l l CB Release Flow Rate l l Release Flow Rate l l In CB - 6.0 E-2 uCi/cc l l Approximately 2200 cfm l l Approximate 1v 916 cfm l l Dose Rate At Surface l l Kr-85 Relea e Rate l l Kr-85 Re1 ase Rate ! l Of CB - 14.0 mR/hr l l 6.3 E-2 Ci/sec l l 2.5 E-2 Ci/sec l v v l SPING Channel 5 High j l No SPING Alarms l l Alarms, Channel 7 Alert l l (Portable RP Inst. l l Alarms l l Alarms Possible) l y v l Kr-85 Concentration In l l Kr-85 Concentration ! l l Stack - 2.0 E-3 pCi/cc l l At Leak Point l l - 6.0 E-2 uCi/cc l W \1 l Kr-85 Concentration At l l Kr-85 Concentration l l 500m E - 1.5 E-5 pCi/cc l l At 30m - 3.0 E-3 pC1/ccl l Kr-85 Dose Rate At l l Kr-85 Dose Rate At 30m l l 500m E ' O.003 mrem /hr l l - 5.0 mrem /hr l PCI-54}}