ML20039C478

Forwards Response to NRC 801222 Ltr Requesting Review Re Controls for Handling Heavy Loads at Facility

ML20039C478
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	12/22/1981
From:	Daltroff S, Daltroff S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8112290391
Download: ML20039C478 (129)

Text

___

t PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COM PANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 1881 -1981 PHILADELPHI A. PA.19101 SHIELDS L D ALTROFF

.JOc"/.*JL'U,.. December 22, 1981 Re: Docket flos. 50-277 50-278 c-Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director p g ED Division of Licensing ,

b $

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission O' DEC28 Washington, DC 20555 Taa M

py

%~

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

This letter is in response to your letter of Decembe 1980, which requested that a review be undertaken with respect to the controls for handling of heavy loads at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station to determine the extent to which the guidelines of Enclosure 1 to your letter are presently satisfied, and to identify the changes and modifications that would be required in order to fully satisfy these guidelines. Your letter also required that certain information be provided. The requirements are restated below followed by our responses.

Submit a report documenting the results of your review and the required changes and modifications. This report should include the information identified in Section 2.1 through 2.4 of Enclosure 3, on how the guidelines of NUREG 0612 will be satisfied. This report should be submitte.1 in two parts according to the following schedule:

Submit the Section 2.1 information within sir months from the date of this letter.

Response

The requested information was forwarded to you on June 18, 1981 (S. L. Daltroff to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC).

$9\

8112290391 811222 PDR ADOCK 05000277 P PDR

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _. - l

74- <

s Mr. D. G. Eisenhut Page 2 Submit the Section 2.2 and 2.3 information within nine months.

Response

Our letter of September 11, 1981 (J. W. Gallagher to D G.

Eisenhut) informed you that we were unable to provide appropriate information within the nine month time frame.

The attached report, while not complete, addresses the bulk of the Section 2.2 and 2.3 concerns. We shall forward the remaining information to you as soon as we have received and reviewed the repc ts. The information in question concarns those few items provided by our Nuclear Steam System Supplier (GECo) and data requested from the manufacturer of the auxiliary hoists on the Reactor Building Cranes (20H01 and 30H01).

If you have any questions or require additional information, do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours,

/#) /

/ / A g ,

7 Attachment

INDEX Response to Section 2.2 - Specific requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Reactor Building.

Response to Section 2.3 - Specific requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing

• Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling.

Table 1 - Load / Impact Area Matrix Table 2 - PBAPS Special, Lif ting Devices - Reactor Building Crane Attachment 1 " Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems" Information requested in Attachment 1 of NRC letter dated December 22, 1980 Attachment 2 - Point by Point Comparison of the Reactor Building Crane for each Section of NUREG 0554.

Attachment 3 - Analysis of Plant Structures.

-i- December, 1981 P-169(a)/4

e 2.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE REACTOR BUILDING NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.4, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of spent fuel in the reactor vessel or Jr. storage.

Information provided in response to this section demon-strates that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that either the likelih;od of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III.

2.2.1 Ide.itify by name, type , capac ity , and equipment dr.signator , any cranes physically capable (i.e.,

ignor ing interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel.

Response :

1. Reactor Building Crane

a. The Reac tor Building (RB) Crane, with its auxiliary hoist, is capable of carrying heavy loads over spent fuel in the storage fuel pool (FP) or in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV).

b. Type - Overhead Bridge Crane

c. Capacity Design Rated Maximum Load Critical Load Main Hoist 125 tons 110 tons Auxiliary Hoist 5 tons ( la ter )

d. Equipment designator Unit 2 - 20H01 l Unit 3 - 30H01 We are contacting Whiting Corporation, the Reactor Building ( RB) Crane supplier, to de te rmine , in accordance with the guidelines of NUREG 0612 and ANSI N14.6-1978, the Maximum Critical Load rating of the RB Crane Auxiliary Hoist. The rating of the RB Crane Auxiliary Hoist will be provided later.

De ce mber , 1981 1

P-110/1

2.2.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of heavy loads over stored fuel or into any location where, following any failure, such load may drop into the reactor vessel or spent fuel storage pool.

Response

Because the RB crane is required to lift heavy loads over fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) or fuel pool (PP), its exclusion by permanently preventing its movement is not applicable.

2.2.3 Identify any cranes listed 2.2-1, above , which you have evaluated as having design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e. , complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supple- ,

mented by suitable alternatives or additional design features.) For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combina-tion) information specified in Attachment 1.

Response

1 1 Peach Bottom's FSAR Supplement #1, Question 4.9.4-C l describes the features added to the Reactor Building i Crane so that no credible postulated failure of any l crane component will result in dropping of the load.

The information requested in Attachment 1 of the December 22, 1980 letter is contained in Attachment 1 of this report. Attachment 2 of this report is a point by point comparison of the Reactor Building Crane design with NUREG 0554 " Single-Failure-Proof Cranes" supplemented by the requirements of Appendix C to NUREG 0612 " Modification of Existing. Cranes -

Implementation of NUREG 0554 for Operating Plants."

The results of the NUREG 0554 comparison shows that the Reactor Building Crane is in 3eneral compliance with the requirements.- However, items where com-t pliance cannot be verified applies to items related to quality assurance documentation. These documents would be available in the crane manufacturer's files.

The Reactor Building Crane has design features to make the likelihood of any load drop caused by P-110/1 December , 19 81

its failure extremely low. The Reactor Building Crane design has been evaluated and found to have sufficient redundancy and design features to satisfy one intent of the requirements of single-failure-proof cranes as defined by NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 supplemented by either suitable alternatives or additional design features as discussed in Appendix C of NUREG 0612 and are identified in Attachment 2.

Section 5.1.6 of NUREG 0612 requires the upgrading of lifting devices for critical lifts to meet ANSI N14.6-1978. The spent fuel shipping cask yoke is designed to have dual load paths. The design of spent fuel shipping cask yoke will be reviewed for compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978 on a case by case basis.

The structural design of RPV-drywell head strong-back has been reviewed and found to be capable of supporting the load if one of the cross arms break.

The hook box has sufficient carrying capability to

• retain the load if either the hook or lifting eye fails. The strongback does not comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978. General Electric, who is the supplier of RPV-Drywell head strongback to Peach Bottom, has been requested to review the design of the strongback for compliance to the re-quirements of NUREG-0612 and the design of the lift-ing points of the RPV head. GE has been requested to review the lifting devices and lifting points of equipment provided by them which has been de-fined as critical lifts. The results of GE's review is expected in the first quarter of 1982.

Bechtel has reviewed the lifting points of the dry-well head. The lifting points have a safety factor of 4.5 based on the ultimate strength. This does not comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978.

Physical examination prior to lifting will be done to insure soundness of lifting points.

The lifting device and the interface lifting points for the following heavy loads have been reviewed to determine if compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI B30.9-1971 for slings, is possible. These items are considered critical loads because they can be moved over the open reactor pressure vessel.

1. Dryer-Separator Pool Plugs

2. Fuel Pool Slot Plugs

3. Refueling Channel Shield

4. Fuel Pool Gates

5. Steam Dryer P-110/1 Decembe r , 19 81

m.

6. Steam Separator

7. Personnel Basket

8. Service Platform

9. Head Stud Nut &

Washer Rack The resdits of Bechtel's review of the lifting devices for the items not provided by GE are included in Attachment 1 of the report.

The following loads may be deleted from requiring single-failure-proof loads handling if the analysis requested from GE shows that the con-sequences of the load drop of these items are acceptable.

1. Steam Dryer ,

2. RPV head

3. Steam Separator

4. Service Platform Based on the results of analyses for other BWR plants, we do not expect that these loads will result in fuel damage or unacceptable leakage from the vessel.

j 2.2.4 For cranes identified in 2. 2-1, above , not cate-gorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied.

Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated i in response to Section 2.4 of this request. With re spec t to Criteria I through III, provide a dis-cussion of your evaluation of crane operation in

! the Reactor Building and your determination of compliance. This response should include the fol-lowing information for each crane:

Response

The criteria of the NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 to .

establish the consequences of a load drop are acceptable is as follows:

I. Releases of r2dior.ctive material that may l

l result from damage to spent fuel based on calculations involving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load produce doses l

that are well within 10 CFR Part 100 limits of 300 rem thyroid, 25 rem /whole body (analyses should show that doses are equal to or less than 1/4 of Part 100 limits);

l

! December , 1981 P-110/1

II. Dar. age to fuel and fuel storage racks based on calculations involving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load does not result in a configuration of the fuel such the kegg is larger than 0.95; III. Damage to the reactor vessel or the spent fuel pool based on calculations of damage following accidental of a postulated heavy load is limited so as not to result in water leakage that could uncover the fuel; IV. Damage to equipment in redundant or dual safe shutdown paths, based on calculations assuming the accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load, will be limited so as not to result in loss of required safe shutdown functions.

Not all lifts on the~ refueling-floor will be made single-failure-proof as evaluated in Sec-tion 2.2.3 of this report. The heavy loads identified in Section 2.2.3 are the loads that have the potential for dropping into the open reactor vessel, or the spent fuel storage pool. The other refueling, floor heavy loads will be addressed in the response to Section 2.3.

2.2.4.a Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circumstant es under which these pro-tective devices can be removed or bypassed and the

• administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action . Discuss any related or proposed technical specifications concerning the bypass of such interlocks.

Response :

The Reactor Building Crane is inhibited by an elec-trical interlock on the crane from traveling over an area of the refueling floor defined by excerpts of drawings 6280-M-18, Rev. 8 and 6280-M-32 Rev. 3, covering the spent fuel pool. The crane operator can override the interlock by use of a key but the operator must follow specific written procedures contained in crane operating procedures in M17.2 to do so.

December , 1981 P-110/1 1

4 Such interlocks are in addition to the definition i of safe load paths. These intericcks need not be single-failure-proof, as a failure of these would have to be accompanied by operator error in failing to follow the prescribed load path and a concurrent failure of the handling system when over the spent fuel.

i 2.2.4.b Where reliance is placed on the operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System, discuss present and/

or proposed technical. specifications and adminis-trative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.

Response

Credit for the operation of the Standby Gas Treat-ment System (SGTS) during the. refueling. accident

to reduce the consequences of the radiological i releases to the environs is addressed by PBAPS FSAR Section 14.6.4.5. A load drop on the refueling floor could only damage the ductwork used to supply .

the SGTS. The SGTS is located in the Radwaste Building. A load drop on the refueling floor which could cause a radiological release cannot simulca-neously damage the SGTS ductwork servicing the refueling floor. The refueling floor hatch would be open when heavy loads capable of damaging the HVAC ducts for the SGTS below the refueling floor are moved. The refueling floor hatch provides communication with the lower floor of the Reactor 4 Building. This will permit air from the refueling j floor to be treated by SGTS drawn in at a lower floor if the SGTS supply duct from the refueling floor is damaged.

2.2.4.c Where reliance is placed on other site-specific con-l siderations (e.g., refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed technical specifications, and discuss administrative or physical controls pro- ,

vided to ensure the validity of such considerations.

Response

There are no additional site-specific considerations

~

to those discussed in other sections of this report.

4 2.2.4.d Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with

• Criteria I through III should conform to the guide-lines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide P-110/1 December , 1981 l

- - _ - _ _ _ . __ _ ______ - -_ - ____ ---__-___.___-_ __- _ _____ _ _____ - -._-_-___- __.-_---__-._-____- - -.--___ _ = -_ _.___ - _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _

the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed.

Response

As previously mentioned in the response to Section 2.2.3, General Electric has been requested to perform an analysis of the consequences of the drop to the RPV head on the RPV, Steam Dryer and Steam Separator inside the vessel. The consequences of a drop of a fuel bundle has been addressed in the PBAPS FSAR Section 14.6.4.2 and was found to be acceptable. Dropping the flange protector segments will cause no greater damage to irradiated fuel than the drop of a fuel bundle into the open reactor vessel. The weight of each segment does not e.xceed the weight of a fuel bundle. (200 lbs. for each segment compared to 680 lbs. for the fuel bundle.) The lift of the segments will be limited by procedure to prevent more than 3 segments being lifted over the reactor vessel at a time. .

By review of the anticipated failure mode of the hydrolazer handling system,the damage caused by the drop of the hydrolazer will be less severe than the damage caused by a fuel bundle drop.

Although the weight of the hydrolazer exceeds the weight of the fuel bundle by approximately 30%,

the hydrolazer load would be distributed over a much larger area. This assumes the four lifting points on the hydrolazer fail simultaneously. If one or two of the lifting points fail, it is expected that the hydrolazer would become stuck on the side of the reactor vessel preventing impact with the irradiated fuel.

December , 1981 P-110/1

2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERA-TING IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which  ;

might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued

, decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to 4

such equipment from load drops will be limited in order i not to result in the loss of these safety-related functions.

, Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been 4

previously identified in your response to Section 2.1-1, and their loads in ycur response to 2.1-3c.

2.3.1 Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above , wnich you have evaluated as having sufficient design

• features to make the likelihood of a load drop 4 extremely small for all loads to be carried, and the basis for this evaluation (i.e. complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alter-native or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated , provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment I.

Response

Tha Reactor Building Crane is the only crane

- identified in Section 2.1.1 that meets the require-ments of this Section. The Reactor Building Crane has sufficient design features to be considered single-failure-proof by satisfying the requirements of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 " Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems" and Attachment 1 " Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems" to the December 22, 1980 letter from the NRC to all licensees.

Only the lifts identified in Section 2.2.3 are cone' " red single-failure-proof to prevent a load dro, a the spent fuel pool.or oper reactor vessel. For other loads moved on the refueling floor, the defense in depth approach to prevent damage to safety-related equipment below the refueling floor includes crane operating procedures December, 1981 P-110/1

- - . . . - + . , -_m.,-,e, ,-.._n, .,,.._,-__n,n.,w ,_,n.,,e ,c. , - . , , , . _ . , . , , , , , . ,---.,r ,. ,-n,- -. g -

1 and technical specifications.

3 4 An analysis of the consequences of a load drop upon 4

safety-related equipment identified in Section 2.1.1 is contained in Section 2.3.2.b.

2.3.2 For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.3-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes

] the following information:

1 2.3.2.a The presentation in a matrix format of all i heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross reference to information provided in Section 2.1-3-c. Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant

• general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical matrix.

j Response:

Table 1 is a list of heavy Load / Impact Area Matrix format for each crane or hoist identi-fled in 2.1 -1 including the potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Building column locations and floor elevations are included for identi-a fication of location.

2.3.2.b For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combi-nations can be eliminated because of sepa-ration and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considerations. Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned consi-derations should be supplemented by the following specific information:

l (1) For load / target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equip-ment, discuss the basis for deter-mining that load drops will not t

I December, 1981 P-110/1

, --- . e---w,,,,c--,-,,n,-m~m,--n--n_-,w.rwn-,,v-,,,-v w.-,,rnw,w~r,- m-, e n, , -,c,-r--r-- - ,--r w-- - - - , -

af fect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function).

Response

The following is the list and discuss-ions of each overhead handling system carrying heavy loads that might affect safety-related systems if the load is dropped. The cranes which can he eliminated because of sepa-ration and/or redundancy of safety-related system or equipment are as follows:

1. Reactor Building Crane - 20H01, 30H01

2. Recirculation Pump Motor Hoist-2AH03, 2BH03, 3AH03, 33H03

3. CRD Removal Platform Winch /

Hoist-20H20, 30H2O

4. CRD Removal Hoist-20H05, 30H05

5. Equipment Access Lock Removal Hoist-20H04, 30H04

6. Torus Equipment Removal Hoist-00H37

7. Emergency Cooling Tower Hoist and Jib Crane-00H49 and 00H48

8. Precoat Material Handling Hoist-20H54, 30H54

9. CRD Transport Jib Crane

10. CRD Maintenance Bridge Crane P-110/1 December, 1981

l e

Reactor Building Crane i Item No. 1 Equipment No. 20H01, 301101 l Dpscription The Reactor Building Crane is a 125 ton bridge crane with a five ton auxiliary hoist located in the Reactor Building on the refueling floor El. 234'-0". The purpose of the crane is to service the reactor, fuel pool, and to lif t the new fuel and spent fuel cask to the refueling floor from a flatbed .

l truck at El. 135'-0".

The Reactor Building Crane has been shown to have suf ficient design features to be considered single-failure-proof in Section 2.2. However, e a.y the specific lif ts identified in Section 2.2.3 will be made single-failure-proof. The other lifts made by the Reactor Building Crane do not need to be made single-failure-proof because the consequences of load drops causing damage will not prevent safe shutdown of the plant or prohibit continued decay heat removal.

Major Safety-Related Items in the Load Path i

The safety-related items on the refueling floor are the following:

Fuel Pool Fuel Pool Surge Tank Vent Stack Radiation Monitor Control Panels 2AC185,-2BC185 for Unit 2 and 3AC185, 3BC185 for Units 3.

Open Reactor Pressure Vessel There is no safety-related item in the access hatchway for the l refueling floor from El. 135'-0".

Major Safety-Related Items on the Next Lower Floor Elevation Safety-related items below the ref ueling floor at El.195'-0" .

Standby Liquid Control System pumps, valves , and piping ,

controls, instruments and 'ascociated wiring Standby Gas Treatment ductwork Fuel Pool cooling water return lines i

P-110/2 December , 1981 l

Major safety-related items below the oecess hatchway for the refueling floor at El. 135'-0".

Core Spray System loops A&C (Unit 2), Loops B&D (Unit 3)

Torus Core Spray System Instrument Panel - 2AC61 Major Safety-related items on El 135'-0" adjacent to access hatchway for the refueling floor.

Reactor Building Emergency Auxiliaries MCC-20B38 (Unit 2 only)

Ef fect of a Load Drop on Safe Shutdown or Decay Heat Removal Capability Lif ting procedures and the Reactor Building Crane area travel limit switch interlock prevent movement of heavy loads over the fuel pool to minimize the likelihood of a load drop causing damage to the fuel pool.

The mos severe physical damage to the fuel pool is assumed to be caused by the load drop of the heaviest load carried over .

the fuel pool. The spent fuel cask is the heaviest load

~

carried over the spent fuel pool.

Damage to the fuel pool from the drop of the spent fuel cask is precluded by lifting the spent fuel cask with a single-failure-proof handling system. (Reference PBAPS FSAR Supplement 1 Question 4.9.4(a)). Other lifts over the fuel pool are being reviewed for compliance with the requirements of NUREG 0612.

The spent fuel pool skimmer surge tanks' adjacent to the spedt fuel pool could be damaged by a load drQp. .There are two pool s skimmer surge tanks. There is sufficient separation such that only one skimmer surge tank could be damaged by a load drop. s It is expected that the cooling for thd fuel, pool would still bef .

available through the undamaged fuel pool s*Rigmer;O . ' ,, -_

ci , .g. ,

~~

Even if the damage caused by the load dr'9p was suf ficient L) . ~

prevent water from the fuel pool overflowin'g' i,.gto the ' skimmer surge tank to allow the water to circulate f.hrough the ,fugl ,; s ' - -

pool cooling system, fuel pool cooling could'L3saccomplished -

by the flooding the fuel PBAPS FSAR pool with Supplement the make,up 1 Question 4.9.4(b)-. systems,identij}

, -. 3 '

led ini1

,  % \ , ,

^ N' '

A load drop damaging the fuel pool sk,immer s;irgo, tank c.0 bid , _

cause damage to the fuel pool. Howev6,r thy _dama,ge w ul,d be

~

J *. g ..

w

' s -

g_

4 "he .

> \ssDecembe r , 1981' P-110/2 $. y -.

e . ,- (

4 limited and would not cause the fuel pool to drain at a rate faster than makeup water could be added to the pool from the sources identified in PBAPS FSAR Supplement 1 Question 4.9.4(b).

The Vent Stack Radiation Monitor Control panels are used to

~

monitor the pla'nt radioactive releases through the Reactor Building and Turbine Building ventilation stack. However the vent stack radiation monitoring system is not required to safely shutdown the reactor.

A structural analysis of the refueling flo'or was done to determine the capability of the concrete slab to retain a heavy load if drop ped . The results of the analysis showed that the refueling floor could not accept any load drops of items in excess of 3500# from a height of one foot without causing concrete spalling.

The analysis 'also showed that drops in excess of 5.5 tons from one foot are expected to cause extensive spalling with permanent

deflection of floor beams. For very large loads there is a possibility of.a shear cone being punched out of the slab.

Refer to Attachment 3 for the summary of assumptions and depeription of the method used in the structural analysis. ,

^

, lThe Standby Liquid Control System is required to be operable by plant' Technical. Specifications 3.4 when more than one control rod

is withdrayn. During refueling, all control rods are inserted.

Therefore damage to the Standby Liquid Control system caused by a' load drop on the refueling floor would be acceptable.

~

During' normal ? plant operation, a load drop on the refueling

., floor over the' Standby Liquid Control System is assumed to render the Standby Liquid Control System inoperable. The plant would be placed in safe shutdown condition by using the coptrbl rod 2Eives to control reactivity. There is sufficient separation te prevent simultaneous damage to the Control Rod s 'Ddive Systh'm and the Standby ' Liquid Control System. Therefore, a-load drop on the refueling floor which could damage the Stan'oby-Liqui'd Control System during either normal plant operation or refueling does not prevent safe shutdown or decay s heat removal:-

l _

l .

See Section,2.2.4.b for the discussion of the Standby Gas Treatment'ductw7rk at El. 195'-0".

[

The fuel pool cooling return lines used to return the water to 3 the fuel pool could'be damaged by a load drop on the refueling r floor. There are, redundant fuel pool cooling return linrs on the other side of the fuel pool which perform the same function.

T The fuel pool cooling is not considered safety-related because

~,' -

, T e

~ ~

December , 1981

[' P-110/2 s t ..

there is the capability to provide makeup water as mentioned previously.

The drop of the spent fuel cask would be precluded if the cask is lifted with the single-failure-proof handling system. The 1 drop of the spent fuel cask from the refueling floor at El.

234'-0" impacting the slab at El. 135'-0" would cause damage to loops A&C of the Core Spray system (refer to PBAPS FSAR Supplement 1, Question 4.9.4). There is sufficient separation from the damaged Core Spray loops so that the two remaining Core Spray loops will not be damaged.

The load drop of the fuel cask may also cause damage to the torus located below the El. 135'-0" slab. Flooding of compartments adjacent to the torus compartment, containing equipment required for safe shutdown, is prevented by watertight doors. Damage to the torus due to the fuel cask drop was determined not to prevent safe shutdown of the plant.

A load fall could damage the Reactor Building Emergency Auxiliaries Motor Control Center (MCC), 20B38 at El. 135'-0".

This MCC is the control center for the RHR pump "C" and Core '

Spray pump "A" valves and drywell coolers. The damage to MCC 20B38 will not jeopardize the safety function of the redundant systems because MCC's 20B36 for loop " A", 20B37 for loop "B", and 20B39 for loop "D" will be operational to perform their safety-related function. There is sufficient physical separation that a load drop by the Reactor Building Crane could not damage the redundant Emergency MCC's.

Conclusion Reactor Building Crane load drops are either precluded from occurring for the lifts identified in Section 2.2.3 or the consequences will not prevent the plant from being safely shut-down or prevent decay heat removal.

4.

December , 1981 P-110/2

- -.S ,, -- , , , . - - _,, . . _ _ , , , _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Recirculation Pumo Motor Holst Item No. 7 Equipment No. 2AH03, 2BH03, 3AH03, 3RH03 Description The Recirculation Pumo Motor hoists are twenty-four ton monorail

. hoists hoists are usedlocated to service the the inside reactor recirculation drywell at El. numos. The 135'-0".

Major Safetv-Related Items in the Load Path Recirculation Pump Casing Reactor Pressure Vessel Major rafety-related items that could be imoacted by a load drop on the side of load path on the next floor elevation Recirculation Pining Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Piping Main Steam Pipina Main Steam Relief Valve (MSRV) Discharge Pinino Core Spray Piping Reactor Pressure Vessel Effect of a caoability load dron on safe shutdown or decav heat removal The operation of the hoist would not ieooardize safe shutdown because these pumps cannot be serviced unless the plant is in safe shutdown. The primarv safety concern is the removal of decay heat.

The reactor vessel is protected from damage by the sacrificial i

I concrete shielding surrounding the vessel. A drop of the recirculation line break bypumo eithermotor direct could cause the recirculation piping impact of the motor with the recircu-lation pump casing steel platform at El. 135'-0".

or the motor, causing the collapse of the The core cannot become uncovered by a break of the recirculation line because the design of the reactor internals prevents this.

The recirculation line break could disrupt the normal shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system because "A" loop the RHR piping for shutdown cooling connects with the recirculation line.

between the damaged recirculation line and the redundant RHR There is sufficient seoaration piping or Core Soray System piping to insure that the redundant RHR intended or Core Spray safety Systems would be available to perform their function. A decay heat removal loon can be established by drawing water from the torus and pumoing it over the core by the Core Spray System. Hot water heated by the P-110/3 ,

December, 1981

core would return to the torus through the broken recirculation line.- Heat from the torus would be removed by the RHR system.

This is the decay heat removal method for a recirculation line break LOCA described in PBAPS FSAR 14.6.3.3.2.

A load drop analysis on the steel platform demonstrates that the ef fect on the platform would be very localized and -would af fect only one fourtt of the platform. There are two Core Spray system loops. If one Core Spray loop is damaged by the falling platform, there is sufficient separation so that the second loop.would not be damaged by the collapsing quarter of the platform.

Damage to the main steam relief valve discharge piping by the collapsing steel platform does not affect the plant's ability to remain in a safe shutdown condition, because these lines are not normally used af ter the reactor is depressurized.

If the recirculation pump motor while raised above the El.

135'-0" platform were to fall, the toppling motor could impact one of the following:

RHR return piping to the reactor .

Core Spray piping Main Steam line piping The Core Spray System has redundant loops with sufficient separation to preclude damage to both loops simultaneously with one load drop. Therefore tha Core Spray system is still avail-able to perform its function for decay heat removal if required.

The toppling motor impacting the RHR return line would also cause the collapse of the steel platform causing damage to the recir-culation line. As previously discussed this accident does not prevent decay heat removal.

Damage to the main steam lines does not affect decay heat removal because the reactor is already depressurized when the plant is in a safe shutdown condition.

Conclusion The consequences of a load drop by the Recirculation Pump Motor Hoist does not prevent decay heat removal. The review of safety-related equipment potentially af fected by a load drop does not indicate that any f ailure by the Recirculation Pump Motor Hoist would prevent the plant from remaining in a safe shutdown condition. -

P-110/3 December , 1981

CRD Removal Platform Winch-Hoist Item No. 13 Equipment No. 20H20, 30H2O Descriotion The'CRD (Control Rod Drive) Removal Platform Winch-Hoist is a one ton winch locate <i 'in the drywell .at El. 135'-0". The winch is_used to raise and lower the CRD leveling trav. This is to permit transporting of the CRD in and out of the primary containment on the CRD transfer cart. The drop of the winch is-6'-6".

Major safetv-related items in the load path None Major safety-related items on the next lower floow elevation None Effect of a load drop on safe shutdown or decav heat removal capability The plant is in safe shutdown when the CRD's are serviced. The transfer cart is held on the leveling tray by the CR0 Transfer Cart Removal Winch-Hoist while the-1cveling tray is moved to 4 the horizontal cosition. Failurelof the CRD Removal Platform

. Winch-Hoist could cause the failure of the CRD Transfer Cart Hoist. allowing the CRD transfer cart to roll back onto the CRD platform. The CRD transfer cart would not damage any equipment which would make the plant unsafe. The CRD's are locked in a control rod inserted position when the plant is in safe shutdown and cannot.be unlocked without following a specific unlocking sequence. There is no safety-related equipment or piping in the area below the leveling tray that could be imoacted by the transfer cart.

Conclusion The load drop of the CRD Removal Platform Winch-Hoist does not prevent safe shutdown or decay heat removal in the olant.

P-110/3 December, 1981

.,,,,.,.,,,,___,,,,,,,,,_y.,_,,,y, , , , , , . _ , _ , , , , __

.s v,-..- ,..wy- w..m-. ,.,,--,,-..-.77....m.,,,,_,,,,vy.., --y.m-7,,,,,_,,.,-.%,,,,,_.,,.,m.,w,mm_,_

CRD' Removal Hoist Item No. 16 Equipment No. 20H05, 30H05 1

Description The CRD Removal Hoist is one-half ton hoist located on the CRD handling tool in the drywell. The hoist is used to raise and

- lower-the CRD when they are installed in the reactor.

Major safety-related items-in the load path i

None.

i Major safety-related items on the next lower floor elevation-i None

' Effect of a Load Droo on Safe Shutdown on Decay Heat Removal ,

Caoability The plant is in safe shutdown when the CRD's are removed. There

'is no equipment below the CRD removal platform that-is required for decay heat removal.

i.

Conclusion The load drop by the CRD Removal Hoist does not. affect safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

1 f

i k

l l

i n

P-110/3 December, 1981

- nn-,, -n,.ny .,.,n,-,,,,,,,--.,-.w,n.,,n-_.nwm,wn,.n,,,, .,..,.,-nem,wma, ,w.,-.,._,,,,,,,,a.nn-,,-e,-e-m-,..m...w . , . ,,,e-.-,--mw,-

Equipment Access Lock Removal Hoist Item No. 17 Equipment No. 20H04, 30H04 i

Description ,

i The Equipment Access Inck Removal Hoist is a twelve ton hoist located inside the drywell at El. 135'-0" to move the equipment access lock hatch. The plant is in safe shutdown.when the hatch is moved.

Major safety-related items in the loath path -

None Major safety-related items on the next lower floor elevation Recirculation Pump and Piping Main Steam Relief Valve Discharge Lines RHR Piping Core Spray Piping ,

Effect of r. load drop on a safe shutdown or decay heat removal capabiliti The primary safety concern is the removal of decay heat.

There is no safety-related equipment in the path of the hatch.

A drop of the hatch could not damage the reactor vessel or shielding because of the distance from the hatchway to the vessel. The drop by the Equipment Access Lock Removal Hoist would damage the platform on El. 135'-0". Based on a structural analysis (refer to Attachment 3 for description of the structural analysis),

one. fourth of the grating would fall and damage the recirculation line. The core cannot become uncovered by a break of the recircu-lation line because the reactor internals prevent this. The recirculation line break could disrupt the normal shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system because the RHR piping for shutdown cooling connects with the "A" loop recirculation line. This is the decay heat removal method described in PBAPS, FSAR 14.6.3.3.2 for a recirculation line break LOCA. A decay heat removal loop can be established by drawing water from the torus and pumping it over the core by the Core Spray System. Hot water heated by the core would return to the torus through the broken recirculation line. Heat from the torus would be removed by the RHR system. The collapse of the platform at El. 135'-0" would be localized. There is sufficient separation between the two recirculation lines with the RHR piping connection and Core Spray Piping so no damage is expected to occur to the

. P-200/b/13 December, 1981 i

a a a-w...

d redundant RHR systen or Core Spray System piping. The RHR and Core Spray System could still perform their safety related i function.

The main steam relief valve discharge piping is not required when the plant is in safe shutdown.

Conclusion The RHR and Core Spray Systems have redundant loops. Damage j to one loop does not affect the operation of the other. The undamaged loop can still perform its safety-related function.

The consequences of a load drop does not jeopardize the ability of the plant to remain in a safe shutdown condition or prevent decay heat removal.

t

}

i r

i t

I P-200/b/13 December , 1981 i

Torus Equipment Removal Hoist Item No. 25 Equipment No. 00H37

- Description The Torus ' Equipment Removal Hoist is a three ton portable hook hoist used to remove and replace the access hatches in the El.

135'-0" floor of the Reactor Building to the torus compartment-and to lif t equipment from the torus compartment.

Major safety-related items in the load path

. Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control System Torus Major safety-related items on the next lower floor elevation RHR Piping Core Spray Piping Electrical Cable Trays Main Steam drain line (Unit 3 only).

Control Rod Drive Water Supply Piping (Unit 3 Only)

CRD Hydraulic Units i

Effect of a load drop on safe, shutdown or decay heat removal capability The plant is in normally safe shutdown and in normal decay heat removal mode when maintenance is done in the torus compartment.

A portion of the Control Rod Drives Hydraulic Control System is located approximately 3 feet east of ' the hatch loc;ted at columns 8-10 and B-C from the hatch for Unit 2. A 3 ton load carried by the Torus Equipment Removal Hoist, if dropped, i could conceivably damage the CRD Hydraulic Control System.

Damage to the CRD Hydraulic Control System will not cause the i

control rod to withdraw.

Even if damage occurred during normal operation, the plant could be safely shutdown. Only a few of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic units would be damaged by a load drop. The Control Rod ' Hydraulic System is split to prevent an accident from damaging the entire CRD Hydraulic Control System. One half of the CRD Hydraulic Control System would be unaf fected by the load drop because there is suf ficient sepbration of the impact area and the undamaged half of the CRD Hydraulic Control System, .

P-200/b/13 December , 1981

The Standby Liquid Control system is designed to shutdown the plant from full power without control rods. The Standby Liquid Control Sys tem is located on El . 195 '-0" . The load drop in ,

El.135'-0" by the Torus Equipment Removal Hoist cannot affect the Standby Liquid Control system.

The Core Spray System has two redundant loops. Damage to the core spray piping near the Torus access hatch between columns J-H, 15-17 for Unit 2 is limited to only one core spray loop.-

There is suf ficient separation between the two core spray loops to preclude damage to both core spray loops by load dr.op from the Torus Equipment Removal Hoist.

The RHR line is located approximately 10 feet from the hatch.

There is no chance of a load drop by the Torus Equipment Removal Hoist directly impacting the RHR line. Limiting the drop height of a 3 ton load to four feet will preclude any potential damage to concrete spalling.

A load drop by the Torus Equipment Removal Hoist could damage the torus below. Damage to the torus could permit water to flood the torus compartment. Flooding of other safety-related equipment is prevented by water tight doors.

Since the plant is in safe shutdown and in normal decay heat removal mode which does not require the torus, damage to the torus does not af fect decay heat removal. Decay heat removal is done by drawing water from the reactor through the recircula-tion loop "A" suction line and returns to the reactor through either the recirculation " A" or "B" loop discharge line.

The main steam drain line is not required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

Loss of Control Rod Drive water supply piping does not prevent safe shutdown of the plant because the CRD accumulators can provide water to the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic system.

Conclusion A load drop by the Torus Equipment Removal Hoist on safety-related system will not make the plant unsafe. Damage to the P-200/b/13 December , 19 81

CRD Hydraulic Control Unit will not cause the rods to withdraw.

If there were damage to one loop of the RHR piping or Core Spray piping, the redundant RHR loop or redundant Core Spray loop, respectively, could operate to perform its safety-related function. The load drop by the Torus Equipment Removal Hoist does not prevent safe shutdown decay heat removal.

December, 1981 P-200/b/13

Emergency Cooling Tower Jib Crane and Hoist Item No. 33 Equipment No. 00H48, 00H49 De scription The Emergency Cooling Tower Jib Crane 00H48 is a one-half ton jib boom with a one-half ton hoist (00H49) used to lif t tools to the roof for servicing equipment in the Emergency Cooling Tower.

Major safety-related items in the load path Emergency Cooling Tower Pump Major safety-related items on the next lower floor elevation Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water lines in the valve pit.

Effect of a load drop on safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability The emergency cooling tower floor slab at El. 153'-0" can with-stand, with some spalling, a drop of 1000 lbs from a height of 25 feet based on a load drop analysis. Refer to Attachment 3 for the assumptions and description of the methodology for the load drop analysis. The hoist has a maximum lif ting height of 10 feet above El. 153'-0". Damage to the Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water lines is prevented by the concre te slab.

The Jib Crane boom could swing the load into a 2 feet thick concrete wall at column D where safety-related Emergency Service Water pump is located. The Emergency Cooling Tower is a Class I s truc ture . The impact of the swinging load will be no greater than the ef fect of a 4 inch thick x 12 inches wide x 12 feet long missile traveling at 300 MPH for which the building is designed. (Reference PBAPS FSAR Appendix C Section C.2.4)

I i Conclusion A load drop by the Emergency Cooling Tower Jib Crane and Hoist cannot prevent safe shutdown or decay heat removal based on c physical separation to prevent damage to safe ty-related sys tem.

I l

l l

l P-200(b)l3 December , 1981 l

l l

Precoat Material Handling Hoist Item No. 34 Equipmerit No. 20H54, 30H54 De scr iption The Precoat Material Handling Hoist is a one-half ton chain hoist used to lif t precoat materials to a storage platform at El. 180'-0" in the Reactor Building. The Precoat Material Handling Hoist is mounted-in a fixed position. The load path is a vertical lif t underneath the hoist.

Major safety-related items in the load path Reactor Building Emergency Auxiliaries Motor Control Center -

20B36 (Unit 2 only on El. 165'-0")

Major safety-related items on the next lower floor elevation -

Electrical cable trays and electrical conduits Effect of a Load Drop on Safe -Shutdown or Decay Heat Removal

• Capability Next to the operating area for the hoist is the Reactor Water Cleanup rack. This is not required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

A postulated load swing and fall could damage the Reactor Building Emergency Auxiliaries Motor Control Center (MCC), 20B36.

This MCC is the control center for the RHR pump "A" and Core Spray Pump "A" valves and drywell coolers. The damage to MCC 20B36 will not jeopardize the safety function of the redundant systems because MCC's 20B37 for loop B, 20B38 for loop C and 20B39 for loop D will be operational to perform their safety function.

The results of a structural analysis of the EL 165'-0" slab showed the slab could withstand a 1000 lbs load drop without causing significant damage to the s' lab from a height of 18 feet. The maximum lift of this crane is less than 18 ft. There would be no damage to equipment on the floor below.

Conclusion Damage to one Reactor Building Emergency Auxiliaries Motor Control Center does not af fect the operation of the redundant MCC's.

Therefore, safe shutdown and decay heat removal is not af fected by a load drop from this hoist.

P-200(b)l3 December , 1981

CRD Transport Jib Crane Item No. 42 Equipment No. None Description The CRD Transport Jib Crane is a 3 ton, wall mounted jib crane located adjacent to the main access hatchway in the Reactor Building at El. 195'-0". The CRD Transport Jib Crane is used to lift the CRD and shielding cask cart from El. 135'-0" to .

El. 165'-0".for Unit 2 to permit inplant transfer to Unit 3.

For Unit 3 the CRD Transport Jib Crane is used to lift Unit 3 CRD shielding cask cart from El. 135'-0" to El. 195'-0" where l the CRD Maintenance Shop is located. The Unit 3 Jib Crane also lifts the Unit 2 CRD's from El. 165'-0" to El. 195'-0".

Major Safety-Related Items in the Load path, Reactor Building Emergency Auxiliaries MCC 20B38 El. 135'-0" (Unit 2 only)

Major Safety-Related Items on the Next Lower Floor Elevation Core Spray System (Loops A&C for Unit 2 and loops B&D for Unit 3) .

Electrical Cable trays and conduits Ef fect of a Load Drop on Safe Shutdown or Decay Heat Removal Capability Any load drop from El. 195'-0" to El. 135'-0" is assumed to damage the floor and the safety-related systems below. The consequences of this drop will be no worse than the consequence-of a drop of the 100 ton fuel cask discussed in PBAPS FSAR Supplement 1, Question 4.9.4 which were found to be acceptable.

A load fall could damage the Reactor Building Emergency Auxi-liaries Motor Control Center (MCC), 20B38. This MCC is the control center for the RHR pump "C" and Core Spray pump "A" valves and drywell coolers. The damage to MCC 20B38 will not jeopardize the safety function of the redundant systems because MCC's 20B36 for loop "A", 20B37 for loop "B", and 20B39 for loop

" D" will be operational to perform their safety function. There is sufficient physical separation that a load drop by the CRD Transport Jib Crane could not damage the redundant Emergency MCC's.

P-200(b)l4 December, 1981

Conclusion The damage to the floor and the safety-related systems below is acceptable beccase the redundant Core Spray loops can still operate and continue to operate. Damage to the emergency MCC does not prevent safe shutdown or decay heat removal because of redundancy. The load drop by the CRD Transport Jib Crane does not prevent safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

l l

l l

P-200(b)l4 December, 1981

A l

CRD Maintenance Bridge Crane

Item No. 44 Equipment No. None Description The CRD Maintenance Bridge Crane is a one ton Bridge Crane used to move the CRD's in and out of the decontamination tanks located in Unit 3 at El. 195'-0".

Major safety-related items in the load path

, Standby Liquid Control electrical conduits along the wall at Column B, El. 195'-0" Fuel Pool Cooling Lines, Columns C and 24, El. 195'-0" Major Safety-Related items on the next lower floor elevation Electrical Conduits Cable Trays T

Ef fect of a Load Drop on Safe Shutdown or Decay Heat Removal Capability The safety-related electrical conduits along the wall at Column B for the Standby Liquid Control system will be relocated beyond the reach of the CRD Maintenance Bridge Crane.

The fuel pool lines are used to return the water to the fuel

-pool. There are redundant fuel pool cooling return lines on the other side of the fuel pool which performs the same function. Fuel pool cooling is not considered safety-related because there is the capability to provide makeup water to the fuel pool from alternate sources.

1 Conclusion I

Since the electrical conduits close to the path of the CRD Maintenance Bridge Crane will be relocated beyond the reach of the crane, there will be no damage to the electrical conduits.

The Standby Liquid Control systems can operate to satisfy their safety function. Damage to the fuel pool cooling system is acceptable since there is makeup water available from alternate sources to provide cooling for the spent fuel. Therefore, a load drop by the CRD Maintenance Bridge would not prevent safe shutdown or decay heat removal ~at the plan. .

, P-200(b)l4' December, 1981

2.3.2.b (2) Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited.

Additionally, provide a discussion concerning the procedures that are to be used-for authorizing the

. bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are - functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability af ter operations which require bypassing have been completed.

Response :

The overhead handling systems that are eliminated' oy the use of mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are the:

1. Turbine Building Crane - OAH09, OBH09 .

2. Diesel Generating Cranes - OAHll, OBHll, OCHil, ODHll

3. Circulating Water Pump Structure (Gantry) Crane - ODH16 4 The load path drawings of the cranes were previously submitted.

i i

l i

4 4

P-110/7 December , 1981

Turbine Building Crane Item No. 2 Equipment No. 0AH09,.0BH09 Description The Turbine Building Crane is 110 ton bridge crane with a fif teen ton auxiliary hoist that is located in the main turbine generator bay of Units 2 and 3 at El. 165'-0". The Turbine Building Crane is used to maintain the main turbine generator and accessories which are accessible through the turbine operating floor.

When lifting any load heavier than 110 tons, the two cranes will be used to carry the load in tandem. A lifting beam between both cranes would be used.

Access to the turbine generator bay of Units 2 and 3 is through the turbine hatchway between columns 20-21 and N-P-Q.

Major Safety related items in the load path None Major safety related items on the next lower floor elevation Main Steam Stop and Control Valves Turbine Bypass valves and piping ESW piping and HPSW piping contained in a pipe tunnel below the floor at El. 116'-0" directly in line with the turbine hatchway.

Effect of a load drop on safe shutdown or decay heat removal capa-bility A unit is in a safe shutdown condition when maintenance is done on main turbine and main steam stop valves. The primary safety concern is decay heat removal.

A load drop on the operating floor hatches located between Cols. 6-7 and 34-35 could damage the main steam lines, main steam stop and control valves, turbine bypass valves, and the associated piping just below El. 165'-0" which are Q-listed.

A load drop on the turbine deck will not prevent the unit from remaining in a safe shutdown condition. The turbine or main steam lines or turbine bypass valves are not used for normal decay heat removal af ter the reactor is isolated.

The drop of a load in excess of 2,500 lbs. in the hatch from El. 165'-0" impacting the El. 116'-0" slab could damage the Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water piping located in a pipe trench between columns 20-20.5 and N-P-Q.

P-133b/4 December , 1981 1

Damage to the Emergency Service Water piping in the pipe trench is acceptable because there is a redundant Emergency Service Water line located in another area of the yard. A load drop by the Turbine Building Crane could not damage the redundant Emergency Service Water line. Plant safe shutdown or decay heat removal would not be af fected by damage to the Emergency Service Water line by the Turbine Building Crane.

Damage to the High Pressure Service Water Piping is not acceptable because there is no alternate path to provide High Pressure Service Water to the RHR heat exchangers for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

Ta prevent damage . to the High Pressure Service Water line the fol-lowing actions will be taken.

1) Interim administrative procedures are being draf ted to prevent

'the travel of heavy loads on the turbine deck over the area of the pipe tunnel in the hatchway.

2) Administrative procedures are being draf ted to prevent loads in-excess of 2500 lbs. from being lowered directly over the pipe tunnel in the hatchway. The results of a structural analysis of the concrete slab covering the pipe - tunnel showed the slab can withstand a load drop from the turbine deck at El. 165'-0" .

of 2500 lbs. without damage to the High Pressure Service Water piping. Heavy loads in excess of 2500 lbs. would be raised or lowered only in the portion of hatchway adjacant to the pipe tunnel. The results of the same structural analysis showed that a load of 25 tons could be dropped from eight feet with spalling and permament deflection of the slab but is not expected to penetrate through the slab or damage the piping below.

3) As a permanent modification to replace the interim administra-tive procedure, the Turbine Building Cranes will be modified.

An area travel limit switch with a key override will be added to prevent travel of the Turbine Building Crane hooks over the area of the access hatchway. Operating procedures will be draf ted controlling the overriding of the travel limit switch.

Conclusion A load drop on the El. 165'-0" slab does not affect safe shutdown or decay heat removal because the unit is in safe shutdown when the Turbine Building Crane is used in the areas over safety related equipment.

, The potential for a load drop on the Emergency Service Water and High pressure Service Water piping located in the pipe tunnel below El. 116'-0" is minimized by the addition of administrative procedures and area travel limit switch to restrict and control the movement of heavy loads directly over the pipe tunnel. The

adoption of administrative procedures and modifications to the Tur-

! bine Building Crane complies with the intent of NUREG 0612 to reduce

, the hazard of heavy load drops.

l 1

P-133b/4 Dec ember , 1981 1

l Diesel Generator Crane l Item No. 4 Equipment No. OAHil, OBHll, OCHll, ODHil Description Each Diesel Generator Crane is a fifteen ton bridge crane located in the Diesel Generator Building El. 127'-0".

Each Diesel Generator Crane services only one diesel generator and cannot travel over another diesel generator.

The diesel generators are the plant's emergency AC power supply in the event of loss of offsite power. The diesel generators are safety-related and are required for safe shutdown and decay heat removal if there is a loss of offsite power.

Major Safety-related items in the load path Starting air compressor and reservoir and air lines Auxiliary lubricating oil pump '

Jacket water pump Excitation cubicle and D/G control panel Diesel Engine and Generator Diesel fuel lines Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Unit heaters Motor Control Center and Instrumentation Major Safety-related items on the next lower elevation Emergency Service Water valves and piping below the pipe trench steel cover Effect of a load drop on safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability The Diesel Generator Crane is used to service only one Diesel Generator or its associated accessories. Damage by a load drop on components identified directly in the load path could only affect the diesel generator being serviced.

The diesel generators are in individual compartments which are separated by concrete walls to prevent the failure of the other diesel generators in the event of a fire or damage to one diesel generator. _

The mechanical and electrical systems are designed so that a single failure affects the operation of only a single diesel-generator. The plant technical specifications permit operation of the plant with one diesel generator set inoperable if P-200(b)l5 Decembe r , 1981

I offsite power is available. Plant safe shutdown or decay heat removal would not be affected.

PBAPS FSAR Section 8.5.2 states, as design basis, the three re-maining standby diesel generator units have sufficient power available to-provide power for the required engineered safeguard systems at one reactor unit and the shutting down of the other unit, in the event of loss of off-site power.

Any heavy load carried by the Diesel Generator Crane, if dropped over the a 3/4" thick steel covered pipe trench, could damage the Dmergency Service Water piping and valves in the trench. Damage to the ESW piping will interrupt the flow of cooiing water to the other diesel generators, preventing'the diesel generators from supplying emergency power during loss of off-site power.

The addition of mechanical stops without any bypass will be provided. Design of the Mechanical stops will be in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976, Section 2.1.8. The mechanical stops that will prevent any crane movement over the steel covered pipe trench.containing the ESW piping and. valves will be added to the Diesel Generator Crane rails. .

Conclusions Damage to safety related components in the load path of the Diesel Generator Crane will make the diesel generator being se rviced inope rable . This does not affect the plant's ability to achieve a safe shutdown condition or decay heat removal.

The addition of mechanical stops to prevent crane travel over the steel covered pipe trench will preclude damage to the ESW piping. The ESW system can operate to perform its safety function by supplying cooling water to the diesel generators.

The diesel generators, in turn, can operate to perform their safety related function by supplying emergency power to safety related systems during loss of of f-site power.

December, 1981 P-200(b)l5 ,

Circulating Water: Pump Structure Crane Item No. 6 Equipment No. 00H16 Descr iption The Pump Structure Crane is a thirty-five ton gantry crane with a twelve ton auxiliary hoist, located at the Circulating Water (CW)

Pump Structure at El. 112'-0". The Pump Structure Crane services -

the circulating water pumps, the high pressure service water pumps, the service water pumps, the emergency service water pumps, the diesel driven and motor driven fire pumps, and traveling screens for Units 2 and 3. Each pump is removed through a separate hatch in the Circulating Water Pump Structure roof.

A dynamic analysis of the crane structure by the crane manufacturer was made to verify that its design complies with the Seismic Class I requirements. A concrete slab at grade level has been provided on the extreme north for laydown. The gantry crane is parked over this laydown area when not in use, and is provided with a tie-down anchors in this location for tornado protection. The .

crane has sufficient design features to prevent the collapse of the crane on the Class I portion of the Circulating Water Pump Structure in the event of an earthquake or' tornado.

Major Safety Related Items in the load path None Major Safety Related Items on the next lower floor elevation Emergency Service Water pumps and associated piping, valves and instruments High Pressure Service Water Pumps and associated piping valves, and instruments Pump Structure MCC's HVAC system for safety-related pu , rooms.

Electrical cables and miscellaneous instrumentation.

Ef fect of a load drop on safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability The safety related items are located in a portion of the Cir-culating Water Pump Structure designed to the Seismic Class I criteria defined in Appendix C of the PBAPS FSAR.

A load drop analysis showed that a circulating water pump impacting on the Non-Seismic Class I sections of the Circulating Pump Struc-ture will not af fect the safety related equipment required for safe P-133b/4 December , 1981 e

shutdown or deca; heat removal. (Refer to Attachment 3 for the assumptions and description of the methodology of the load drop analysis). A load drop of the circulating water pump on the Seismic Class I portion of the Circulating Water Pump Structure would damage the safety related equipment. For the interim, administrative procedures are being drafted to prevent the travel of equipment over the Seismic Class I portion of the Pump Structure to the extent practical. To replace the interim administrative procedure, crane travel limit switches with a key override will be installed to prevent the movement of heavy loads over the safety related equipment in the Circulating Water Pump Structure.

The travel limit switch will be bypassed only when the crane is needed to service the safety related equipment. Administrative procedures will be drafted to control the override of the travel limit switch.

A load drop on the roof of the Seismic Class I portion of the Circulating Water Pump Structure equal to a weight of 7.25 tons from a height of 6 inches will not damage the roof thus preventing damage to the other safety equipment located below. If the load is reduced to 3.75 tons, the maximum allowable drop height is one foot. Administrative procedures are being drafted to limit .

the lifting height to no greater than six inches where practical.

Also included in the administrative procedures are instructions to prevent the movemen'. of heavy loads of Unit 2 safety related equipment over Unit 3 safety related equipment as appropriate.

Conclusion The CW Pump Structure Crane complies with the intent of NUREG 0612 by reducing the potential for a load drop causing damage to safety related equipment required for plant safe shutdown or decay heat removal. This is accomplished by modifications to the crane to prevent travel of the crane over safety related equipment and operating procedures to restrict lifting heights and define load paths.

P-133b/4 De cembe r , 1981 l

- 2.3.4.b (3) Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other, site-specific considerations (e.g., maintenance sequencing), provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative procedures or physical i constraints invoked to ensure the validity of such Considerations.

Response :

The overhead handling systems that are eliminated on the basis of site specific considerations are.

l. Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator Hoist - 20H06, 30H06,

2. Personnel Lock Hoist - 20H22, 30H22 t

3. 15 Ton Yard Crane - 00H56.

4 i

i i

i i

J December , 19 81 P-110/7 4

i

• e i

I

= umw w m t- . sew---e<=<me-- e-*-+a-nr-wwc,+-#-+>+,.m+em,,--,-ee wye ,%-,--w %wy,-=y-ww,-ww,-n,-g-ww,,-eesww+ vw e ,wy -g t y t w cm, m 3 g w " ~ T< -***-*v"~- t-*' "* 'w

Recirculation Pump Motor - Generator Hoist Item No. 5 Equipment No. 20H06, 30H06 Description The Motor-Generator (M-G) Hoist is a twenty-five ton monorail used to maintain the M-G Sets. The M-G Hoist is located in the Radwaste Building at El. 135'-0". The M-G set is not safety-related and is not required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

Major safety-related items in the load path None Major safety-related items on the next lower floor elevation Emergency Service Water Piping High Pressure Service Water Piping Reactor Building Emergency Auxiliaries Motor Control Center - 20B39, 30B36 .

Reactor and HPCI System MCC - 20D12, 30Dll Cable Trays SGTS Ductwork Below Hatch inside RHR Room Instrument Racks - 2BC96, 3AC96 RHR Heat Exchanger - 2DE24, 3AE24 Room Coolers - 2GV25, 2HV24, 3AV25, 3BV25 RHR Pumps - 2DP35,3 AP3 5 Effect of a load drop on safe shutdown or decay heat removal Capability The plant is in safe shutdown when the MG Sets are maintained.

The plant safety concern is decay heat removal. There is no safety related equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal in the MG Set Room.

A load drop by the Recirculation Pump MG Hoist could damage the floor causing damage to safety-related MCC's located below the EL. 135'-0" slab. There are redundant MCC's which are located in other areas of the plant. There is sufficient separation to protect the redundant MCC's from damage by a load drop in the MG set room. The redundant MCC's can operate redundant safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown and decay heat removal. A load drop by the Recirculation Pump M-G Hoist could Decembe r , 1981 P-133b/5 4 . - - ,_

also damage the High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) and Emergoncy Service Water (ESW) lines located below the El. 135'-0" slab.

The two independent lines of the HPSW are located next to each other in the room below the MG set room. Both HPSW lines could be damaged by a load drop in the MG set room. These lines provide cooling water to the RHR heat exchangers. The intertie of the two independent ESW lines is also located in the room below the MG set room. The ESW provides cooling water to the safety-related room unit coolers. Damage to the ESW line would prevent operation of the safety-related room unit coolers.

Damage to the HPSW or ESW by a load drop in the MG Set Room is unacceptable. To prevent damage to these lines, crane operating procedures are being draf ted to limit the load and lif ting heights of the monorail. A load drop analysis has shown the El. 135'-0" slab can withstand the drop of 17.5 ton load from a height of three feet. The same analysis showed a 7.5 ton load from twelve feet would be acceptable. Neither drop could cause complete failure of the slab nor would penetrate the slab. (Refer to Attachment 3 for the assumptions and summary of the nethod of analysis.) In both load drop analyses, heavy spalling is expected.

However, the spalling is not expected to damage the HPSW or ESW .

lines.

Equipment removal access for the MG Set Room is through the re-movable siding at Column B. The equipment laydown area is on the El. 135'-0" slab and equipment access hatches over the RHR heat exchanger and pump room.

A load drop on the equipment access hatches or slab over the RHR room would damage one of the four RHR loops per unit. Two of the RHR loops are located at the opposite end of the unit precluding damage to the RHR loops. The third RER loop is separated from the damaged RHR room by three foot thick concrete wall. The undamaged RHR systems are capable of removing the decay heat.

Conclusions Damage to the safety-related MCC's and RHR system is acceptable because there is redundant equipment which will not be damaged by a load drop in the MG set room.

Damage to the HPSW and ESW is precluded by crane operating pro-cedures which limit load and lifting heights so a load drop will not damage the piping.

P-133b/5 December, 1981

Personnel Lock Hoist Item No. 18 Equipment No. 20H22, 30H22 De scription The Personnel Lock Hoist is a twenty-four ton monorail used to remove the personnel lock, he.tch to provide access to the drywell from the Reactor Building at El. 135'-0".

Mrjor Safety-related items in the load path None Major safety-related items on the lower floor elevation RHR Piping Core Spray Piping RCIC System Piping HPCI Piping ESW Piping

• Torus Condensate piping from condensate storage tank Electrical conduits & cable trays Ef fect of a load drop on safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability The plant is in a safe shutdown condition when the personnel lock is removed by the Personnel Lock Hoist. The main safety concern-is decay heat removal.

A load drop of the 24 ton personnel lock from a height greater-than nine inches could cause damage to the torus, piping for HPCI, RCIC, RHR, ESW, core spray, and condensate from the conden-sate storage tank. However due to height constraints, the Per-sonnnel Lock can not be lifted higher than six inches. Refer to attachment 3 for assumptions and a description of the methodology of the load drop analysis.

Damage to the safety related items will be prevented by admin-istrative procedures limiting the lifting height of loads carried by the Personnel Lock Hoist.

Conclusion

• ~

Any heavy load lif ted by the Personnel Lock Hoist carried six inches or less, if dropped, could impact on the floor but could not cause .

spalling of the floor. Administrative procedures will be drafted P-133b/4 December , 1981 w

Conclusion (Continued) to limit the lif ting height of the Personnel Lock Hoist. No damage to any safety related system below the floor will occur.

With the restriction of a maximum lif ting height, the Personnel Lock Hoist complies with the intent of NUREG 0612 to reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment. Any load drop from this height does not cause spalling of the floor below, preventing the potential damage to safety related system located below the floor.

2 s'

,\ ,

P-133b/4  : December , 1981

• i ._j'

.w

^

s 15 Ton Yard Crane Item No. 31 Equipment No. 00H56

~

'Descr1ption ,

y ,

. .. s The, Fif teen. . Ton Yard Crane is a self-propelled boom

' .s crane, used ~

toelif t various loads in the yard area.

.,. ~-- ..

ss

, ,N Major.sdfety relate'd\ items in the load path O- .-  %^

~

. Emergency Coolingq Toker' '-

Entergency -Auxiliary Tyansfo'rmers Torus +v s_

pg, Majos*iafety-rel_ated itiems Gn'the next lower floor elevation

. e ,

Underground DieselsOil Storage tanks-OAT 38, OBT38, OCT38, ODT38 Emergepcy Auxiligry Transformers-OAX04, OBX04

. Emergency Cooling 'Itwer and Reservoir and Emergency Cooling Water Pump-00P186 .

Area bighind Reactor Building (RB), below El. 135'-0"

' a. Torus \

' ,~\' ,

b. "RHR pumps

c. RHR. heat exc'-"cers

d. Miscellane- a valves, piping, heaters, wiring, and instrument _a.

~!e. High Pressure. Service Water (HPSW) and Emergency Service Water'(ESW) valves and piping.

Buried ESW piping in the yard ESW and HPSW discharge valve box Turbine Building - below El. 116'-0" in alignment with the TB hatchway.

a. 'ESW Piping ,

-b. HPSW piping ,

w Below Diesel Generator Building roof L. a. Diesel-Generator sets - OAG12, OBG12, OCG12, ODG12 and

- related auxiliaries, valves and piping

'- b. ESW and HPSW valves and piping

[ . c.. ESW booster pumps - OAP163, OBP163 i

$e - ,

December, 1981

^

P-200(b)/13~

i -

. s .

s

, . e hw __ _,_ 1. _ ._ _ _ . _. _ ._ , _ _ _ _

i a

f 4 d. Unit Heaters, HVAC blowers and ducts  :

e. Miscellaneous wiring and instrumentations f.- MCC's Circulating Water Pump Structure between columns 5-7 and A-B,

, , Below El. 127'-0"

, s.

a. HPSW pumps

b. ESW Pumps

, c. Pump Structure MCC's - 00B61, 00862, 00B64 and 00B65

d. Unit heaters, HVAC blowers and ducts

e. Miscellaneous wiring and instrumentation Effect of a load drop on safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability The use of 15 ton yard crane could damage safety related equip-ment or piping in the following areas:

Underground Diesel Oil Storage Tanks Emergency Auxiliary Transformer Area Emergency Cooling Tower and Reservoir Area behind Reactor Building, El. 135'-0"

a. Between Columns 7-20 and 21-34, A-B

. b. Torus and RHR Hatches Buried Emergency Service Water lines between Turbine Building and Diesel Generator Building in the yard High Pressure and Emergency Service Water discharge valves Turbine Building (TB)- El. 116'-0" Diesel Generator Building RoGI p Circulating Water (CW) Pump Structure between columns 5-7 and A-B.

Underground Diesel Oil Storage Tanks The diesel fuel storage tanks are the fuel sources for the stand-by Diesel-Generators. The fuel storage tanks are buried and separated from each other by a minimum of eight feet of earth.

5 This is adequate separation to prevent damage to more than one fuel storage tank by a single load drop of the 15 Ton Yard Crane.

A heavy load drop to the storage tank access hatch may damage the fuel supply piping and the fuel storage tank below.

P-207(b)l3 December , 1981

Damage to one fuel storage tank does not prevent the operation of the diesel generators. The fuel lines from all tanks have cross connections to permit the operation of the diesel generators with fuel from any fuel storage tank.

The inoperability of one diesel generator will not prevent the plant from safely shutting down.

Operation of the plant with one diesel generator inoperable is permissible for seven days. (Refer to Technical Specification 3.5.F)

Therefore, a load drop by the 15 Ton Yard Crane on the fuel oil storage tank does not prevent plant safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

Emergency Auxiliary Transformer Area A load drop by the 15 Ton Yard Crane in the emergency auxiliary transformer area behind the Reactor Building could damage these transformers. A load drop would result in loss of offsite power for the safety related equipment. The plant can be placed in a safe shutdown condition with the standby Diesel Generators.

( Refer to PBAPS FSAR Section 8.4.6. )

Emergency Cooling Tower and Reservoir The 15 Ton Yard Crane may be used to maintain the Emergency Cooling Tower. A load drop of more than 1000 lbs. from the 15 Ton Yard Crane onto the Emergency Cooling Tower roof may cause concrete spalling which could damage safety related piping and equipment of the High Pressure Service Water and Emergency Service Water system. The Emergency Cooling Tower is required to operate when the normal heat sink (Conowingo Pond) is not available.

Damage to the Emergency Cooling Tower by a load drop does not prevent safe shutdown because the normal heat sink (Conowingo Pond) would be available.

Area Behind the Reactor Building - El. 135'-0" Between Columns 7-20 and 21-34, A-B The 15 Ton Yard Crane could make lif ts on the EL 135'-0" concrete slab behind the Reactor Building between columns 7-20 and 21-34, A-B. This slab covers the torus and the RHR compartments. The following discussions address the consequences of load drops in the area behind the Reactor Building upon safety-related equip-ment. .

P-200(b)l3 Dec ember , 1981

1. RHR Compartment Slab columns 7-10, 17-19, 22-24, 31-34, A-U at E1. 1Jb'-U" i

A load drop by the 15 Ton Yard Crane on the slab over the RHR compartments could damage two RHR subsystems which comprises ,

an LPCI loop.

Operation of the plant with one LPCI loop inoperable is permis-

! sible by plant Tech Specs 3.5. A.3. as long as the Core Spray System are operable and the remaining LPCI loop is operable.

There is suf ficient separation between the two LPCI loops to i preclude damage to both loops by a load drop. The plant can be safely shutdown using core spray and the remaining undamaged RHR equipment. Decay heat removal chn be done by the remaining available RHR systems.

! 2. Torus Compartment Slab columns 10-17. 24-31 A & B-El at 135'-0" ,

A load drop on the concrete slab over the torus compartment

could result in damage to RHR cooling water lines, High Pressure Service Water lines and the torus itself.

Damage to the torus would not prevent normal shutdown of the ,

plant because the torus is not required for normal shutdown.

Flooding of the torus compartment does not damage other safety related equipment because flooding of other compartments is

! prevented by water tight doors.

t Loss of the RHR cooling lines does not . prevent normal decay heat removal. The RHR system is not needed for normal shut-down until the condenser can not act as a heat sink.

The High Pressure Service Water lines that could be damaged by a load drop from the 15 Ton Yard Crane would render one LPCI loop inoperable. The other LPCI loop would be unaf fected.

There is a three feet thick concrete wall separating the torus compartment and the RHR compartment. This is considered jo sufficient to prevent damage to the RHR system due to a l drop over the torus compartment.

A load drop on the torus slab could damage the RHR pump suction i line from the torus for either the B or C pump. The remaining.

RHR pumps would be capable of drawing water from the torus.

Simultaneous damage to the High pressure Service Water, Torus and RHR system lines could jeopardize plant safe shutdown or prevent decay heat removal. _

P-200(b)l3 December , 1981

7 To prevent damage to these systems in the torus compartment, administrative procedures are being drafted to limit the lifting height of a 15 ton load to a maximum of one foot. Load drop analysis shows that a 15 ton load can be dropped on the torus compartment slab from a height of 2.5 feet with concrete spalling. It is assun.ed the spalling could damage the to ru s . A 15 ton load drop from one foot would not cause any spalling. See attachment 3 for the load drop parameters and discussion of the methodology of the load drop analysis.

3. Torus & RHR Hatches A load drop on the hatches over the RHR Compartments would damage only one of four RHR systems. Technical Specification 3.5.A.4 allows operation of the plant with one RHR System inoperable provided the other RHR Systems are operable and both Core Spray Systems are operable. Safe shutdown and decay heat removal can be accomplished with the remaining operable RHR systems.

A load drop on the torus compartment access hatches at .

El. 135'-0" between Cols. 10-17 and A&B Unit 2 and between Col. 24-34 and A&B Unit 3 would not cause any more damage than an uncontrolled heavy load drop on the torus compart-ment slab.

Administrative procedures are being drafted to prevent the movement of heavy londs over the RHR and torus access hatches.

Buried Emergency Service Water lines in the yard A load drop by the 15 Ton Yard Crane over the buried Emergency Service Water piping between the Turbine Building and Diesel Generator Building or other buried Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service Water piping in the yard will not damage the piping. There is sufficient ground cover to absorb the energy of the load drop to prevent damage to the piping.

High Pressure and Emergency Cooling Water Discharge Valves If a 15 ton load is dropped on the HPSW-ESW valve box, damage could occur to the locked open discharge valves and piping.

The load drop would not prevent the normal operation of the ESW and HPSW systems. The locked open valves are only used to isolate the lines to the discharge canal when there is a loss of the Conowingo Pond and the Emergency Cooling Tower is needed and if the motor operated valves failed to '

isolate. The motor operated valves are located in the Diesel Generator Building which is away from the valve box.

P-200(b)l3 December, 1981

.. . _,. . _ _ _ _ _ =_ _ _ _ .. . . _ _ _ - - . . . _ _. ,_

4 Turbine Building EL-116'-0" in Alignment with Turbine Building Hatch Way Use of the 15 Ton Yard crane in the Turbine Building at ,

EL 116'-0" be tween columns 20-20.5, N-P.Q , could damage the High Pressure Service Water lines and Emergency Service Water line in a pipe tunnel below.the EL 116'-0" slab. A load drop analysis shows the EL 116'-0" slab can withstand , with some spalling , a 15 ton drop from 8 feet without damage to the piping below. A lifting height restriction of 8 feet above the slab would prevent damage to the piping below for a 15 ton load. Administrative

- procedure for the use of the 15 Ton Yard Crane will include ,

height restrictions when used inside the Turbine Building. j Diesel Generator Building Roo f A load drop by the 15 Ton Yard Crane on the Diesel Generator Building roof could damage more than one Diesel Generator.

The Diesel Generators are not needed for safe shutdown or decay heat removal if there is offsite power available.

A structural analysis shows the 2.5 foot thick concrete slab of the Diesel Generator Building roof can withstand a five ton drop from three feet with no concrete spalling. An eight ton drop from three feet would cause spalling but may not penetrate through the slab.

Operating procedures will be draf ted to prevent loads in excess of 5 tons being lif ted higher than 3 feet over the Diesel Generator roof. ,

CW Pump Structure (between Columns 5-7 and A-B)

A load drop by the 15 Ton Yard Crane on the Circulating Water Pumphouse could damage the High Pressure Service Water pumps or the Emergency Service Water Pumps, if the load was dropped on the roof.

A structual analysis of the roof for the Circulating Water Pumphouse showed the roof can withstand a 7.25 ton drop from six inches.

Operating procedures limiting the load to 7.25 tons with a maximum lif ting height of six inches over the roof will be drafted.

December, 19 81 P-70^'5)l3

' " ~ " ' ~ ~ ~ ~

1 J __ 1

~ ~l. _

Conclusions For the following areas, load drops by the 15 Ton Yard Crane were found to be acceptable because of redundancy and separation of equipment required for plant safe shutdown i or decay heat removal.

1. The buried, underground Diesel Fuel Storage Tanks i 2. Emergency Auxiliary Transformers

3. Emergency Service Water piping between the Turbine Building and Diesel Generator Building.

4

4. Emergency Cooling Tower and Reservoir  ;

a Damage caused by a load drop to the Emergency Cooling l Tower and reserv ir can not prevent safe shutdown

of the plant. The normal heat sink, which is the

! Conowingo Pond, is available to supply cooling water i

for the safe shutdown of the plant.

5. Buried high pressure service water and Emergency Service Water piping in the yard cannot be damaged by a load drop of the 15 ton yard crane.

The High Pressure and Emergency Service Water valve box was found not to be needed for safe shutdown or j_ decay heat removal. '

The following areas will have administrative procedures to control the use of the 15 ton Yard Crane to prevent damage to safety related equipment.

1 1. Turbine Building El. 116'-0"

2. Area behind the Reactor Building at El. 135'-0"

3. Diesel Generator Building Roof 3

4. Circulating Water Pump Structure.

1 i

P-200(b)l3 December, 1981

_ _ . - . ~ , , _ , - - _ - , ~ , _ _ - - - . _ _ . , _ . ,,--r.__. .,_,, . _ -

_ . . - , > . , = , , -

2.3.2.c For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.3-2-b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the. likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or

additional design features). For each so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e. , crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

Response

Refer to our response to Section 2.3.1, which has identi-cal requirements.

2.3.2.d For interactions not eliminated in 2.3-2-b or 2.3-2-c ,

above, demonstrate using appropriate analysis that damage I

would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV) .

For each analysis so conducted the following information should be provided.

(1) An indication of whether or not, for the specific .

load being investigated, the overhead crane-handling system is designed and constructed such that the hoisting system will retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

(2) The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A.-

Response

The overhead handling systems in plant areas containing equipment' required for reactor shutdown, decay heat removal, or spent fuel pool cooling had been eliminated by our response to Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.b, subsections 1, 2, and/ or 3.

i P-200(b)l5 - December, 1981 I

. . - . , , - , , , , . - , - . - - , - , , _ . - . , , . - . . - , - - . , - . - - , - . . . , . . - , . - . - - , - - - . , , - . , - - - - , - . - ~ . - .-

2.3.2.d (3) The information requested in Attachment 4.

Response

The overhead handling systems in plant areas containing equipment required for reactor shutdown, decay heat removal, or spent fuel pool cooling had been eliminated under response to Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.b, subsections 1,2, and/or 3.

However, we have included the information requested in Attachment 4 " Analysis of Plant Structures" in Attachment 3 of this report.

P-110/7 December, 1981

TABLES 1 & 2 l

TABLE 1 -

LOAD IMPACT AREA MATRIX .

l l TABLE 2 -

PBAPS SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES P-100(c)/3 December 1981

TABLE 1 LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX P-100(c)/3 -i- December 1981

~, , , - - , - - -

Table 1 LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Reactor Building Crane - 20H01, 30H01 1 a-g Turbine Building Crane - OAH09, OBH09 2 a-f Diesel Generator Crane - OAHll, OBHll, OCHil, 3 a-d ODHil Recirculation Pump Motor - Generator Hoist 4 a-c 20H06, 30H06 ,

CW Pump Structure Crane - OOH 16 5 a-d Recirculation Pump Motor Hoist - 2AH03, 2BH03 3AH03, 3BH03 6 CRD Removal Platform Winch - 20H20, 30H2O 7 CRD Removal Hoist - 20H05, 30H05 8 Equipment Access Lock Removal Hoist - 20H04, 30H04 9 Personnel Lock Hoist - 20H22, 30H22 10 a-b Torus Equipment Removal Hoist - 00H37 11 15 Ton Yard Crane - 00H56 12 a-c Precoat Materials Handling - 20H54, 30H54 13 Emergency Cooling Tower Hoist - OOH 49 14 CRD Transport Jib Crane 15 CRD Maintenance Bridge Crane 16 P-100(c)/3 -ii- December 1981

The following are the definitions of symbols used in the

" Load / Impact Area Matrix" - Table 1.

Hazard Elimination Categories

a. Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.

b. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.

c. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load / equipment combination.

d. Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e. Section 5.1.6 NUREG 0612 satis-fied). .

e. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment.

-iii- December 1981 P-100(c)/3

TABLE 1 PEACil ICT'Im A'IMIC POWFR STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Toad / Impact Area Matrix CRANE /II0IST: Reactor Buildino Crane - 20fl01, 301101 1 I I I Incation i Reactor Buildinq l l l Refuelino Floor i Hatchway l l Impact l Unit 2 - Colunns 18, B-J l Unit 2 - Columns 10,li-J l l Area l Unit 3 - Columns 33, 9-J l Unit 3 - Columns 33, II-J l l l l Safe-Shutdown lIlazard l l Rafe-Shutdown 1 Ilazard l l Ioads l Elevation l Fquipment i Elimination l Elevation l Equiment l Elimination!

l l l l Category l l l Category l l l l l l l l l l 1. Shield Pluq l 234'-0" l Irradiated Puel I d l l l l l (95 tons ea.) l l l l l l l l l l l l l I l l l Shield Plug i l l l l l l l Slinc l Below l Stdby. Liq. Cont. I b l l l l l l 234'-0" l Syst. I l l l l l l l l l l l l l 2. nt,/er-Separator l l l l l l l l Pool Pluq l l Irradiated Fuel l d - Type 1 l l l l l Type 1 (40 Tons ea.)l l 1 d - Type 2 l l l l IType 2 (63 Tons) l l l l l l l l Riqqing l l l l l l l l l l Stdbv. Lie, Cont. I b - Type 1 l l l l l l l Syst. , FP Coolim I b 'INVe 2 l l l l l l l l l l l l l i i l i I I I l 3. (FP) Slot Pluq l 1 -

l l l l l l l (5.5 tons ea.) 1 I l d l l l l l l l l l l l l l i l l I I I I I l l Slot Plug Slinq l l l b l l l l l l v l v i  !  !  !  ! l

• Later. Evaluation not complete Page la P-100(c)/1 December, 1981 I

Table 1 PFACH IV7P104 A'Ir1MIC POWER STATI(N - UNITg 2 & 3 Inad/Imoact Area Matrix CRANE /llOIST:

Reactor Buildinq Crane - 20H01, 30110L l

i l l Reactor Ittilding l Iocation l i Hatchway i l Refue1ing Floor l

Impact 1 Unit 2 - Colunns 18, B-J l Unit 2 - Coltsnns 10, H-O I I

i Unit 3 - Column <; 33, B-J l Unit 3 - Coltzmn 33, H-J l I Area Safe-Shutdown i 11azard i

.- l 3 Oafe-Shutdown l Ilazard l l l

Fquipment i Elimination l Elevation l Equipment i Eliminationi l loads l Elevat' san l l Category l l Cateoorv l I

l l l l l l l l l l l

• l l l 4. Drywell 11ead i 234'-0" l' Irradiated Puel l I l I l l I I l (65 Tons) I l l l l l l l l l l l l l l I Drywell-RPV ileadi Below l i I l Strong back l 234'-0" l FP Cooling i b l I

l I I i 1 l (13.5 Tons) i I I I i 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I l I

I l l l l I 5. Reactor Pressurel I

• I I I I l vessel Head l I I I I I l I I (96.5 Tons) l I I I I l I

o l I I

I I I I

l Drvwell-RPV 11eadl l h I I l i I l I Stronaback I Y Y l l 1' l l l l (13.5 Tons) I l 1 I I I I I I

• l l l 6. steam Dryer i 234'-0" l Irridated Fuel l l l l l-l I l l (31 Tuns) I l I I I I I 1 I I l l l l l

l Dryer-Separator l~ Below l l l Sling i 234'-0" l None l N/A l l l I I l l i I 1 (0.9 Tons) I I I I I l I I I

• Later. Evaluation not complete Page 1b_

P-100(c)/1 ,,

n % r, 1981

n i

o t y a

dnn ri ame zit al a HEC 1 8

9 1

1 c r J I e

J- n e H bn l H , w e b ot e a ,3 dn g c e

T 03 t e a D 1 - ut i

P 1 hp 83 Si

- - equ fE ss a 3 nn mm S

& uu ll 2 boC

(

S y- - n T a o I

N w23 i t

U 1 h 0 ctt a x H tii v i 0 ann e N r 3 l

f UU l C t E

I a ,

T M 1 A 0 n T a H o

S e 0 i r 2 t y A R A ar /

• E -

• N

• b e M t: dno ri g t C e ame e P w p n zit l a al a p C m r l EC m I I 4

C l o

/ c 0

1 a d g n J t A o i g J - o 4

I d n B g n l

u i i B .n n u d ,

n ti n B l ,3 wt l e

l e nl i o

u i 83 on u u bo B r u 1 - de 3 t m F F ( o t a

o B I

t r

82 up hi d d .C l u

D c a o - - Su e e e qP iF f a A - q t n t I v E b t c ss feE a b a L , E P

I a

b ruu nn nm Sa i

d t i d

a yt I a r bs oll r r t y r oob I r I SS t e

lC( a F

L g- -

n n

• i i

o l23 "0 e t "0 f T

utt a - w-o' I S fii v '4 l4 I bnh e 3 e3 O I Ut l B2 H E 2

/

F N r r A o o e e t

R t C t a

t a a a ta r r G ) G )

ce ar a a ) s s n*

p) p s l n l pA es e n o b o b l m Sn s b o 7 o 7 /

n I b T P1 P2#5 )

i o m7 rg #5 l 2 c s a en9 l 2 (

t e e 0 a d a

e2 yi u 3 u 3 0 c

o t5 S( rl0 S( F ( F (

1 o I I

I . .

9 P

7 8

4 l ' . * ,J

- Table 1 PFACH BOI'ICM A'ICMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Inad/ Impact Area Matrix CRANF/IlOIST: Ibactor Building Crane - 2 0110 1 , 3 0110 1 Iocation Ibactor Building Refueliry Floor llatchway Impact thit 2 - (blumns 18, IFJ thit 2 - (bltanns 10, H-J Area imit 3 - (bltanns 33, IFJ thit 3 - Chltanns 33,li-J Safe-Shutdown llazard Safe-Shutdown llazan]

.-Ioads Elevation Bquipment Elimination Elevation EX]uipnent Elimination Category Category

10. Ibfuelirg Chan- 234'-0" Irradiated Fuel

• 135'-0" Bnergency MCCs b nel Shield (Cattle chute)

(9 'Ibns) Delow (bre Spray Systen Below Stdby. Liq. (bnt. b 135'-0" 'Ibrus b Liftirg Rig 234'-0" Syst. , FP Coolirg Slab

11. Personnel Bas-ket (4 Tons)

Sliry b V V .

12. New Fuel Crates 234'-0" tbne WA 135'-0" Bnergency MCC's b (4.5 'Ibns)

(Fron El.135'-

0" to El-234'- Below (bre Spray Systen FP Cooliry b 135'-0" 'Ibrus b l O') Below 234'-0" Slab ,

• Later. Evaluation not conplete l

Page ld December, 1981 P-100(c)/l ..

j l

n i

o t y 1

ar dno ri g *

• d d l

e ame zit b al a a

l l EC T '

1 8

9 1

J n n JI- n e e e ,

t l r i

I w t s s e l

ot s s y C y bn s n

,3 l C C S 03 t e C S M e e 1 - hp un M y y g a

c 83 1

Si y a y c

a r P n I

-u I c

n r

p n S

p

- - eX e S e s fE s g ss Sa j t

eu r eu 3 nn r rr e rr mn uu e

n bb O n bb

( I

& ll O ( '1 '

2 CC oo S 1 y- - n I

I 0 a o "0 N

1 0 w23 i "0 "0 "0 lwb h t -

U 3 -

lwb ctt a '5 o o'5 a

- x , tii v '5 a '5 i 1 ahh e 3 3 e3l N r 0 l

l l tt l E

1 E3l I 1 s 1 D1S 3

( t f I 1 0 T R l

2 A n T a - o S e i r e ty R A n ar E a r dno d d e H t ri g

• b

• b t C c C ame e P a zit l p g al a p C m n l EC u I I i l o

i U da

/ d l c

. I i t A p u J B J- o i

I B .g n u r g B , ti r

n o n n l i

r t i ,3 wt e nl o f c d 83 on b E

boo

(

i t

- h a l 1 - l e a

I l e i u 82up 3 tz n d qP

.C y u

_ i C

f B hi e l A - - Su t iF q a

_ E r - q a L ,

D

/

_ P o ss feE i y.

t nn a mn d

a bt

_ c

_ a ruu S r r

ds t y r b oo oll I SS e I

lF C (b t a

I g-r n

• i i

o "0 l23 "0 y

e t a

w-T utt '4 o' 3 S fii v l4 I bhh l e 3 2 e3 O

l I tt E B2 I

_ /F

_ N

_ A R

_ C ta 1 t-ce a ar 7 l P kc )s pA k3 s ) eon l e nl b

- m ar s /

n I c n a B 'I r

)

o c

_ i C o )s e i

vmI b s r Cd2 (

t s l0n e0b k rr' i a 0 a d a u1'I o eo4 l S

Bo7 RI( 0 c F( Y Sf( 1 o o -

L I 5

P 3 4

' 1 1 1

n i

o ty a

dny ri ame zit al a 1

HEC e

l b 1 a J 8 T J- 9

- H n f 1 H , w i ot ,

03

,3 dn r 1 - hp t

uT e e

- 1 hn 83 Si e

- ]u g ss a eX fE S

a P e 3 mn zz n

& t t ll 2 oo CC S

T y- - n I a o N w23 i t

U h a

ctt v

- x tii i ann e N r 1 HUU l O t 0 E I a 1 1

T M 0 A 3 n

T a o S e ,

i r 1 ty R A 0 a

E f A A W

O c t

f 0

2 dny ri * . * *

• W W e P a p

ame zir t

e

- l C m al a p I I e HEC m M / n c C d a . c I a -

t N n Q J s t I J -

- B y o M g g n C n g n

B , n .n S. .g I

i wt l ti l t l t n n I d i ,3 on nl n e ni o O l d 83 1 - de m 3 o m b u ol i B i l F 0o F ( F Co t u i - 3 t m up o a i

O B B

u 82 hi d qP

.C d e

.g qn d e q.C l u

A r - Su

- q e i F t ii t iP a E o r o ss feE t

a L a Ll a L F, E v

P t , i o i c t i yo y.

a a c

ruu mnm Sa d a

y.

bt d

a bC d

a bt b oll r ds r d r ds .

I b ooo I r t y r t P SF I r t y SS r

e lCC I SS I t

F a g- L n n

• i i

o l23

e t "0 "0 T utt a w-S I

fii enn v

e

'4 o'

l4 e3 9

O f UU l 3 B2 l

I E 2

/

F N ,

A R k C c ta a R

d nk e ce ar ) n aca) pA ds o) tRs

. m un dis at n u b l n I tb eab Nrl /

o S'I g Hl I e )

c i

t s d5 r u' dh0 as0

(

a d a i Vs0 ea7 0 c a e1 l Pn1 0 o n H( S RI( HW( 1 L I . -

8 P 6 7 1 1 1

, * !  !  ; I j] i! 11 1iII1 ijl  !'

n i

o ty ar dnorig ame zit al a

. HEC 1 '

e 1 8

l b J 9 a J - 91 T l

- H n 1 I w ot r

,3 dn e 03 t e b 1 - hp

- 1 um ee m

83 Si gc

- u e]

an PI fD ss a 3 nn S

& ma ut ll 2 oo CC S

T y- - n I 1 a o N 0 w23 i t

U 1 1 h 0 ctt a

- x 3 tii v i ann e N r , 1 1 UU l O t 1 E I a 0

" M 1 1

A 0 n

T a 2 S e o r - i R A ty E e ar A A W t n dno A A

• O c a rig W W W W P a p r C

ame zit C m al a I I g l l EC M / n C d a

i I d N D l g J I i J -

4 u n B u B i B n .n g

d ,

n r l ,3 wt l ti K

i t

o i u

83 1 - de on e u

nl oo I

I c

a B

82 3 tup m F Cb(

O A I b r o - - Su hi d e qP E t - q t iF c ss feE a L P

a nn a i y.

V I

b rutma S d a bt oll r ds oob r t y lO( I SS F

g- -

n n i

l23 i o

e t "0 "0 T

S t tt fii a

v '

- w-o' V I

bhn U e 4 l4 O

l I t l E

3 2 b32 I

I

/F N

A R

C t a ce r) r/)

ar pA e .

zs ost .

m ab tbn l n I ll ecl ge e /

o o g n nt0g m )

i r0 c t s d0 i ao0e (

a d a l y9 l S

l r2S FP( 0 c I (

0 I

n I o . . 1 0 -

9 2 P 1

' ,i  ! !  ! iI

}  ! 1

. Table 1 PEACl1 TOT'IOM A'IDMIC 10WER STATION - INITS 2 & 3 Tyoical Load /Imoact Matrix CRANE: Turbine Buildim Crane - ON109, 0BI109 e

l l INDICATE ' DIE DUILDIE(S) QRRESPONDIE 'TU 'IYlR IMPACT AREA (S) EXAMPLE: REACTOR RJIIJ)Im, I l l AUXILIARY TUILDIE l

, I I I I Incation l Turbine Buildinq l I

I I I l l Unit 2 - Columns 36; M-Q l -

1 Impact Area l l l l Unit 3 - Coltrnns 36: M-O I

'I I I I I I

! I I l Safety Related i flazard Elimi- l l I Ioads l Elevation I Equipment. I nation Category l l l l l l l l l

l l l l l l l 1. Generator wound i I l l l l l 165'-0" l None i N/A l l 1 lbtor (205 Tons) l l l l l l l l l l l l Lifting Beam l Below I PC Stop Valves i d l I l l l Turb. Bypass I l l I Tandem) (12 Tons) I 165'-0" l Valves, CIV I I i l l l l l l l l Below l ESW piping 1 a l i I I i 11Psw piping i l l l l 116'-0" l l l l l l l l l I I I I I I l-l l l l l l l

l 2. Generator outer I i i I i i l I  ! I I I Fnd Section l l l l l l l l l 1 l l (44 Tons) l I I I I I I I I I I I 3. Trunnion (Gen.) l I I I I l (e m s) l v l v l v i  !

Page 2a

• • De h r, 1981 l P-100(b)/3

I IIi lIIlI1 ilI Il1 ilI IIlIll1II III IIlIl C

t 1 I D

L 1 e I b 8 l ]

2 9 1

b E 1 a R ,

T O r T e C b A m E e e R g c a e

P D E

L P

M A

X E

3 )

9

(

& IlIi I ll1 llII IlIl IlII III1 Il Ii 9

A P

2 0 R y a 9 l A r 2 n

f T

I O

' N T

G o N ix CI i g e U ,

AD me i t c

a r 9 P L l a p A A

- t 0 MI ] P / /

a 1 I i

EC n N N N M 4 F 1 O 0 E dn i I t I

Y ro s T c A a

- PRA ai zt A

• T p e O I. aa S m n I Hn I a U Il1l Il II Il Il IIII III l II II R / r ) IiII E d a

C EU I A N g D C

P n I n N i O d C l d P e tt a I a l S E an 2 M lc i Q-O o u R O- l e en e I B R Rp g N v ) M M M

)

T e n

0

) 6 6

yu t q i a p V it i

b S 3 3 eE i n

r r ( - - f a

O u 5 5 S s T T mI - - A H D g s s C L A I J

n n n

n n Ilil IilI IlII IIIl IIII IlI lIIII i

F N u s .

P E d l t

l t

a l

E i o o 2 l

u C C e n

' B n g a

E e o A

T n 2 3 i t

p V C

i b t t a n I r i i ve i D u n n s N T U U l E A

_  : I

_ E il I l Il !i I ill IlII Ii1l l iII IiI lIlli N l lIl

. A

- R C

_ r a r r e e e ) e )

r n r t r t u e n n A s u e p O w ) I -

o d a O p

)

s o s i t r U n r l n r t c o o o o ( o o 3 a a I (

t t t )

n /

- c cn t a d t

a d a r

d o )

o I r l 3 r l e

8 e

l e t b I

e e e n (

n i 0 n i 0 e

i 0

e h 1 e h 1 G

h S

1

( 0 G S ( G S ( 1 S

6 P 4

l lII llI IIl -

IIi llIII1 IIl 1Il llI III IIl ll 9

{j) lIll)Iil' ll ll 1

)

1lIIII lIIilIIlIlII ii1IlI IIIIIlIIl lII G

N I

1 D L 1 e I 8

l U I

c 9 b 2 1 a R ,

T OI r C M A -

E e u R g c

a e E P D L

P M

A X

E 3 )

S

& (

Il II llII A I li1 liIl IIlI 1 ilI IlII 2 9 E 0 R sI' 1 I A vr R G I 0 'I N o a N x U i , CID i me q 2 r 9 i

PI i t e

- t 0 MI l a a a

a 1 IU EC N M 1

A I n r O 0 E dn n I t I I Y ro 3 T c - TR ai i A a A zt aa s

• T p e OIL n A S m n I l

I I a I I1 Il llII R / r i fI X I iIl llI1 II II l IlI I[iI E d C W a O n a iM f

D P I n N i O d e

C l d P I a l S tt an M c i u

E a T

1 i

p R O- 9 l e em 2

I B R -

A' y O M M R p e g

T e C yu i

a 4 n  ;  ;

t q p P

• u i b

)

S 6

3 6

3 eF 9 n r ( - - f n K

i u G 5 5 a i T N S 5

I - - s l

D A i

C I g s s A I n n n

n n llII IllI IIIl lllI F U i s r IlIl ll1l II II P E d t l

t a

l l E i o o 2 l

l u C C e I B

~ - n g E e o a p P T n 2 3 i

• A i t n

1 C b t ' ti a _

I r i ve i D u n n s

N T U U l E A I

E liIl IliIIi1l l!1I N lIIl Il liIlll ll1l Il II A ) )

R r r C l a e e p

i n q n

w o p a m i l u e r h ( (

r e s u

e' n

e n

n A s T B

)

s l l i

o t d

a r n i

b l

e )

i b

l e )

t c o o v b r h s r h s a a I t i I u S n u S n c o a l

/

T o T o 3

/

o m r w 3 r t r t I I e ) e ) e )

b n x 0 P t u

8 P t 2 e o 1 I I 6 I I u 7 (

G B ( ( o ( ( O ( 0 0

1 7 8 9 P lIlIIi l' lIllll1llII IIl IlliIllIi 1lllIl fl llllll!

Table 1 PFJCH TK7PTDM A'ITNIC POWFR STATION - INITS 2 & 3 Imi/Irinact area Matrix CRANE: Turbine Buildirn Crane - oaf 109, ORH09 I l INDICATE mlE BUILDING (R) 07RRPSPCNDIVI 'IO TIE IMPACT' ARFA(S) EXAMPLE: REACIOR IUILDING, I I I AUXILIARY AUILDING I I Is l I Incation l Turbine Buildina l I l l

l Impact Area l Unit 2 - Colums 36: M-O l I I l

l l Unit 3 - Colums 36: M-O I I I I I I

. -I I I I Safety Related l Hazard Elimi- 1 I I Ioads l Elevation I Fquipnent I nation Category l l l l l 1 I l

I I l l I I

I 10. (HP) Turbine 1 As in page 2a l As in Page 2a l As in pyle 2a l I I I I I I I

mtor I I I I I I

I I I I I I

I I (64 tons) l I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I

' I I I I l l

l I 11. (LP) Turbine i I I I I I I I I I

Exhaust Hood' l l l l l I

l l l l I l

I.

1 (63 tons) l l 1 I I I I I I I

I I I I I I

I I I I I I l

i 12. (LP) Turbine / I l l l I I I I 1 i l Inner casing i i i I i I I I I l I

I I (60 tons) l I l ,

I I

I i 1f l I 9f l I 1P I

I I I

, I Page 2d December, 1981 P-100(b)/3

I lllIIl l IIlIl ll1IlI IiiIIllII III III l G 1 1 N 1 8 9

e w 1 l I J

b V e ,

a I 2 r T R e O

I b

C m A i e g ce F

R Pa eD E

L P

M A

X E

3 )

S

& ( IlII l lII III I II i 9

AP I1II I lll II I I 2

0 R y S

1 1 A r I n G o a I' 0 TN i o 2 N x CI me U i ,

AD i t e r 9 PL l a l t 0 MI v N M O

a 1 1

A O

I U E

B EC dn ro a

n v

I t HY i T c - TR ai zt ,

A a A aa s T

S I

mn e a

DI I L

' I t

i n A II1 I IiII l l1I III I II l R / r GX II II I lll E d C NU W a q I A O o P r i

n d CI M

l a

c l

i d

u 6.

F R O O-e tt an l e 2 a

r i t p B R - em Rp e N y M M g e W v

i T n  :  : yu a M

fi i ) 6 6 t q P b S 3 3 f

eF n r r ( - -

i u i 5 5 a i Y

I T M S s

I - -

l D A i

C L q s s A I n n n m II1I IIII lliI III I IIl F U i u z IllI Illl P B d t t a

l l l E i o o 2 l

l u C C e I

' R n g o a E

T A

C i

b e

n 2 t

3 t

i t

a p

n v

I r i i v i D u n n e s N T U U l A

I E E I Ill 1l l l II lII lll IIll IIIll III IiI l IIl N

A R ) ) )

C s r s s n a n n o b o t o

a t g

. t e e n e 9 e 3 r 4 n n 5 n A s n 4 i t i 4

1 i 1 o t d

a i

b 1

( f b ( b (

i ca r i r r t , o u r ) u r u r a I T o l

r T o T o 3 c

o vn t r e t t o

/

)

I ) o o t ) o )

P R b I

P R t a P R (

L o l L F L -

( A- H ( ( I

( c 0 0

1 3 4 5 P 1 1 1

I Ill1lI IIlllIllI1ll IIl IIl11IIiI IIIl

f IIIi1lllIIIII1IlIlI!IIIIIIIIIIII1III 1 G N

e I l

b D

I 1 8

a I 9

T U I f 1 2

R ,

D r I

C A

E R

e g

a

+ce

P D E

I P

M A

X E

3 )

S

& (

A -

I1II Illl Il1I IIII IIII IIII IIII 2 9 E 0 R S H A y T B G r I O TN - o a N x CI i g 2

( i 9

AD PI me i t e

r. 0 MI l a g t

a 1 IU EC a p I N M O

N O

B dn ' "

I t E T Y ro n T c - I R ai i A a ' A zt aa s T p e OI A S n n I' L Hn I a I R /t r GX IiII IlllII1IIIIlIIIIIIII IIII E c C NU W a g I A D

O n P I n N i O d C l d P e I a l S tt a M c i E an 2 C p i u R O- O l e I

A' y B R O M M

- em Rp e

g T e C i a P M n  ;  ; yu p 1 6 6 t q O

I i

b

)

S 3 3 eE n P r ( - - f i O u G 5 5 a T N S s

_. I I - - A G D I g s s

_ A I n n n IIII IIII E U i n m IllI IIlIIIll IIIl I 1, II

_ P E d u u l l l a

_ E i o o 2

_ 1 1 u C C

_ 1 B e

- - n g

_ E e o a p P T n 2 3 i ,b' 9

A i t a n C b t t I r i i v i D u n n e s N T U U l

I E A

. E IIIIIIII N IIIl 1l ll 1llIIill IllI IIIi IIII A

R

_ C r

a e

r e

- n A s n i

o t d

a i

b m 3 t c o r g ) /

a a I u a s )

b c p T r n n I n )

hp t

o (

0 I

P a 0 1

L i 6 -

( D (

P

- 6

. 1 IIIliIilIIIIIilI1llIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

PFACH ICI'!OM NITNIC FWFR STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Tvolcal Load /Imoact Matrix TARLE 1 CRANE: Diesel Generator Crane - OAH11, ORHil, OCHil, ODR11 l l INDICATE THE IUILDIE(S) CORRESPONDINr; 'IO 'tHE IMPACP AREA (S) 50(AMPLE: REACIOR MJILDIE, I l l AUXILIARY BUILDIE l

l. l I I Incation l Diesel Generator Building l l- I l l Imoact Area l Comon - Columns - 1.5 - 3.5 l l l l

l 1 l

l l l l l l

l l l Safety Related. l Hazard Elimi- l l l Ioads l Elevation l Equitwnent l nation Category l l l l l l l l

l l l 1. Diesel Engine &Generatori l l l 1. Generator Rotor l l 2. Air Comoressor & l l l l l l reservoir i b l l l (8.15 tons) l 127'-0" l 3. Auxiliary Lube oil pumps l l l l 1 l 4. Jacket Water Pumos l l l l l 5. Cooling Water Heat Ex. l l l l

l l l 6. Unit Heaters l l l l l l 7. D/G Control Panel l l l l l Excitation l l l l

l l l 8. Motor Control Centers i l l l l 9. Electrical Wiring & l l l l

l l l10. Instrumentation l l l l l l l 1 l

l- l l l I l

I I I I I I

l l Below I ESW valves & pioing l a l Below pipe trench l l l 127'-0" l Misc. oil plainq l l steel cover l l l l l 1 l

I l l l l 1

l l 2. Generator Stator l l l l II I l (6.5 tons) i I Page 3a P-100(b)/3 December, 1981

PEACH EDI'KN A'IOMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Typical Ioad/ Impact Itatrix Table 1, CRANE: Diesel Generator Crane - OAHll, OBHll, OCHil, ODHil

)

1 I INDICATE THE BUILDING (S) CORRESPONDDG 'IO THE IMPACT AREA (S) EXAMPL.E: REACIUR BUILDING, I l l AUXILIARY BUILDING l 1 1 I I I Incation l Diesel Generator Building I I l I j l l Unit 2 - Columns - 1.5 - 3.5 l j l Impact Area l I I I Unit 3 - Columns 5 - 3.5 l l l' I I I I I

!  ! I I Safety Related i Hazard Elimi- 1 I 4

I Ioads l Elevation l Equipment I nation Category I I I I I I l l

! I I I I I I

] l 3. Crank Shaft I I I l l l l l As in page 3a l As in page 3a l As in page 3a l I j l (Diesel Engine) l I l l l t I I I I I I 4

I (1.4 tons) l I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I i l i I I i 1 I 4. Exhaust Silencer i l I ^

-l 'e i

' I I I I I I l (1.83 tons) I l l l -

'. I -

4 I I l i I y , if

, I I I 1 , _

l

( ...' ,'

i l I i I l 1 I s

(

I I I , I I I f d j,i

. I I I i -

3, 1 l I S. Compressed Air l I I I 1.'!. /

f ;; g1-1 1 I I l l , i i j i Cylinder I I i I I

! I I I s - I I I .

j i (0.75 tons) I qy I y l y i I

1 I . 1. . '

/)- -l I t

I I l- 1 'I I - l

e n ,,

4

.e .-

Page *  !

A

p. 36_ , ,

P-100(b)/3 i Dw W , 14S1 .

w?

., >: + .. -- - - -

._ __ __ - _ _ /

i

\,  : . ., '

r h ,

y

. ,}  ;.. ., '  ;* ,,

'rEACil BOI'KM A'IMIC POWtm STATION - UNI'IS c2 I 3 ,

Typical Ioad/ Impact Matrix Table.,1 T

~

g . / _;((

y.

CRANE: Diesel GenAcator Crane - OMill, 001111, 'OClill, 00 fill +

Vl D 4 1 'l INDICATE 'IllE IUILDING(S) (DRRESPONDING 'IO 'IllE IMPAC'T AREA (S) EXAMPLE: REACIOR DUILDIPG, 1

I I i AUXILIARY BUILDING ' I I I > I i l Incation l Diesel Geneiator Building. ,

l I I I

]

{ l Impact Area l Unit 2 - Oolumns - 1.5 - 3.5 l l l x 1

/

, I. I Unit 3 - Columns 5 - 3.5 l

I I I I . I I l l l - Safety Related i Ilazard Elimi- , l , , l I Ioarls i Elevation l Equipaent 3

, I nation Category ! ,

I 1 i 1 ~

1 I I 4 I I I ~ i i I j l 6. Lube Oil Pump I i ~!- I . n ,, I I I As in page 3a 1 As in page 3a o l As in page 3a l ,,

^4 l I and Motor l l / l l ~~ l I I I l .I < l l (l.2 tons) l l l r

~'

It i

! I I I , I I - l

~

! I I I I l l

I I I I '. i i I 7. Cooling Water lleat i  ! l l < l l I I I I I j i Exchanger I I l l l

I I I I I I i I (1.61 tons) l I l l l i l i l l I I i i l i I i I 4 I i l l I l I 8. Lube oil lieat i I I l l I I I I I I

! l Exchanger l l l l l I I I I I I l (1.61 tons) 5y y y i I l l 1 I I l Page 3c

- December, 1981 2

P-100/3

IlIlIlIiIIIIIlIlIlIIIlIlllllllIlllI 1 G N .

I 1 .

l e D L 8 -

9 b I 1 a U d T B 3 ,

r R e O b I

m C e e A g e E a M R P T E

L P

M l A i X H E D

3 O )

S

& , (

1 A I1II IlI lII IlII IIllIlIl Il I 2 1 E 1

R S 0 A y a

T 0 G r I PN - o 3 N x ,

CI i g U i r

l i

AD PL me i t e

g

- t H MI l a a N M C

I t a B O

IU 8

1 1

B Y

EC dn ro i p

n v T c l 1R ai A a i A zt s T p H OI aa A S m A TLI Hn I O R / GX IlII IlIlIlIIIlII IIll IlIl Ill E d - NU W a IA O n e D P I n N a O d C l r P e I a C S tt a M c E R

an 3 O p i r 5 5 l e T

A y o

O R em Rp e

g M

C T

t a

r e

C

) i g

n 3

3

- yu tq i a p v I

' n S d 5 5 eE n I e ( l - f i O G G i 1 1 a B N u S s l I B - - A H e D C s L r s s e i o n n J

" i U t m m iliI IlIi Il1IIl1IlIlI 1IIl Ill P D B a u u r l l a E e o o 3 H n C C T e e G - n g v

E o a p

T l 2 3 i A e t C s t t a n I e i i v i D i n n e N D U U l s

I E A E

N llIl Ii Il lllI IlIi Il1I Illl lIl ' IIl lll A

R C

a e

r t n A s a e

o d r r ) )

i t a e r ) e H r s k n t c o t o s l e n n a o 3 a a I r a

s n o t n g o t /

c p s o o r t T )

n m t e t C a a 3 b I I S g 7 l l 9 l 7 (

r o d e 0 r n i o x 1 u 0 0 i u 0 A C E ( F ( 1 A C (

. . P

. 0 1

~ 9 1 1 llIlIl1IIlIIIl1llIlIIIlIllll1I1Illl

PEACH IYJI'IDM AKNIC POWER STATION - UtilTS 2 & 3 Tyoical Load / Impact Matrix TABLE 1 CRANE: Recirculation Pumo Motor - Generator Hoist - 20H06, 30H06 l l INDICATE THE IUILDING(S) (DRRESMNDING W 'I5TE IMPACT' AREA (S) EXAMA,E: REACIOR MJILDIW;, l

.I I AUXILIARY rdIILDING I I I I i l Incation l Radwaste Ruildino l l 1 l ,

l l Unit 2 - Columns 19; B ,1 I I Imoact Area l l l l Unit 3 - Columns 23; B ,7 I I I I I I I l l l 9afety Related l Ilazard Elimi- 1 l l Ioads i Elevation l Fauinnent l nation Cateqory l l l 1 1 I I I I I I I I i l 1. Motor - Rotor I l l i l l l 135'-0" l None l N/A l l l (7.63 tons) l l l l l 1 l l 1. HPSW pioing & valves l I l l l Below l 2. ESW piping & valves l l l

.l l 135'-0" l 3. Reactor Motor Operated I e l l.

l l l Valves and ventilation l l l l l l McC's l l l l l I 4. IIPCI & Reactor MCC's l l l l l 1 5. RilR Inst. Rack & Heat l I I l l l Exch. l l l  ;

I l -l 6. Unit Coolers /fleaters l l l l l l 7. INAC ducts l l l l l l 8. Electrical Cable Trays l l 1-1 I I & conduits l I I l l l 9. Miscellaneous Instru- l l ~l l l l mentation l l l l l l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l l 2. Generator Ibtor I i i l I l (7.9 tons) l l l lI I Pace 4a P-100(b)/3 ,.

December, 1981

lIIiIlIlIIlI'llllllIlIlIlllIIIlIIIIIl G

1 N I

E D L L B I A U b

T B 4 '

R O

I C e g

A a E

R P 6 E 0 L H P 0 M 3 A X

, E 6

3 01 )

1 S

& 0 (

2 A I1iI Illl llIl IlIl llIIIlIl II II 2 E

- R S A y T t G r I s '

1N - o a N x l CI i g 4 U i r H o AD PL me i t e

- t MI l a g a r IU EC a P N M o E B

dn P

O t n

I t a HY ro

• T c r TR ai i A a e A zt aa s T p n OI S m e I' L l I n A I G I R / GX lii1 Ilil llI IIl llII IlIl I1II E d - NU W a r IA D

O o P I o N t O d C l o P e a

I a M S tt M c p E J J an 4 O i R - - l e I p m R B B Rp en e A' y u O g a

T P C  ;  ;

yu i

P 4 9 3 P u n ) 1 2 t q n 1 n i o S

( 8 2

f eE i

u t G 1 2 a B a N S s l I - - A l

u D g i

C cr L n s n

s n

A I i E i U d m m lll1 Illl llIlIIIlll11Il1I IIII P c B l u u a e E i

u l

o l

o R 4 l

B C C e

i T

e - - n g a

E t o P P

T s 2 3 i 1

A a t n

C w t t a I d i i v i D a n n e N R U U l s

I E A E IIII N lIll il ll Illl lilI ll1l I 11l ll111l1l A

R C t e

W a

e r c n A s t e ) e o d e v s v i t a r i n i )

t c o o , ) r o D r s n 3 a a I t g s D t c p a n n o /

n m r i o d 5 d t )

b I I e r t i i u

n a u y 7 1 (

e e 2 l F D r 1 l F

2 0 0

G B ( ( (

1 3 4 5 P lIliilIl1l1lllllllllIl1IlllllIllIIII

PEACII BCTPItJM A'ItJMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Typical Load / Impact Matrix TABLE 1 i CRANE: Recirculation Pump Motor - Generator Hoist - 201106, 30H06 '

i i

l i INDICATE 'ITIE BUIUJIPU(S) CORRESPONDING 'IO TIIE IMPACT AREA (S) EXAMPLE: REACIOR BUILDING, 1 l 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING I I I I

I Incation l IWlwaste Building i I i l I I Unit 2 - Columns 19; B-J l l l Impact Area l I l l Unit 3 - Columns 23; B-J l

I- 1 I I I I l l l Safety Related l Ilazard Elimi- 1 i I Ioads l Elevation i Equipment I nation Category I l

I I I I i

. I I I I I

} I 6. Exciter I I I I I I l As in page 4a l As in page 4a l As in page 4a l i I (2 tons) l l l l l 4 I I I I I I 2

I I I I I I 4 1. I I I I I i i l I I i

! I I I I I I

I 7. Motor Bearing, etc.I I I I I

! I I I I I I I (2 tons) l I I I I I l i i i l i I I I I if I P l 1 P l l l l l l l l

l I 1 1 I I

! I I I I I I

! I I I I I I I I I I I I I i  ! l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 4

I Page 4c P-100(b)/3 December, 1981

__ _ . _ _ - - . _ _ - . _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ . _ __ m ..

i PEACH TYJT'ITN A'IYNIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Tyoical toad /Imoact Matrix TABLE 1 l

CRANE: CW Pumo Structure Crane'- 005116 l l INDICATE 'mE BUILDICs(S) MRRFSPCNDING 'ID Tile IMPACP ARPA(S) EXAMPLE: RF.ACTDR IVJILDIW,, I I I NJY.ILIARY BUILDIT, I l l l l Location i Circulating Water (CW) Pump Structure l I I l l Unit 2 - Columns 6: A-C l l l Impact Area 1 I l l Unit 3 - Columns 7; A-C i 1 1 I I -1 I I I I Safety Related I Hazard Elimi- 1 I l Loads l Elevation i Equipment I nation Category l Remarks l l l 1 I I I I I I l l  !-

l 1. High Pressure 1 130'-0" l None i N/A I l 1 I I I I I l Service Water Pump l i l l i I I I I I I I (3.5 tons) I 112'-0" l 1. ESW system I l l l l l 2. HPSW system I a, c l l l l l 3. INAC fans & unit heatersl l l l l l 4. Pumo Structure Emer- 1 I I I I I cencv McC's l I I l l l S. Electrical Cables l l l l l l 6. 011scellaneous Instru- l l l l l l mentation l l l l 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l l 2. High Pressure SW l l I l l I I I I I I l Motor (3.75 tons) l l 4

I I I I I l l l l 3. Hiqh Pressure SW l I l l l 1 I gr I i 1 l i Pumo Base (2 tons) l I

Y I l l Page 5a .

December,'1981 P-100(b)/3 ,

__ __ _ _ _. ___ _. ._ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . = _ . . __

PEACH FOI'IOM A70MIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Tvoical Loa'l/ Impact Matrix TABLE 1 CRANE: Cw Pumo 9tructure Crane - Ofy116 l

l INDICATE 'IllE RJILDING(S) O)RRESPONDI?C 'ID TIE IMPACT AREA (9) EXAMPLE: RFJCIOR MIILDIW,, I I l AUXII.IARY RUILDING I I I I

l Incation l Circulatinq Water Pumo Structure 1 l l

l Unit 2 - Columns 6; A-C l 1

Impact Area l l l

I I Unit 3 - Columns 7 A-C I.

l l l l l l

l 1 l Safety Related I.Ilazard Elimi- 1 I l Ioads l Elevation i Equipment I nation Category 1 l 1 I I I I 1

I I I I I I

I 4. Emergency sw I I I l As in page Sa i l l l As in page Sa i As in page Sa l l Pump l l l l l l

l l l l l l

I l (2.75 tons) i I I I I I I I I i l l I I I i

I I I I I I

I 5. Emergency sw. I I I I I I I I I l I

I Pumo Motor l l l l l I I I I I l

I (1.5 tons) l I I I I I I I I I I

I I V I V I T I I I I I I I I

I 6. service water I 112'-0" i I I I I Pump and l l None I N/A i l l mtor I i i l i I (7.6 tons) l I I e l I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I l l l V I V I T I l Page Sb P-100(b)3 December, 1981 i

III i Il lIlI IIIII lIIIII llIl II lllllllIl 1 EI R D L L R I A U 1 T I 8 9

R 1 O

I c ,

C S r A e; E i R i e

g cu E a e L P D P

M A

X F

3 )

9

& 6 (

1 A I 1II III l IIII I llI lII Ill ll llil 2 1 F E O R S O A y T r I

x

- TE CI i g o

N I

i e AD me r n PL i t

- t a MI l a a r IU EC A N M O

C E

R dn

/

N y

I t e r HY R ro T c T

' ai A a u A zt T p t OI aa S m c 'I L Hn -

I u I R / r GX I lII IiI l IIII I llI IIIlll ll l lII E d t NU W a S I A D

O n P I o N m O e d C l u P r e I a P S u tt N ic E t an K py W R c u C l e en C R C A' U r - - Ro e n

i T

E C

)

t S

A A

yu t q i

N o '

V N S p 6 7 eF n A ( m - - f R u 5 6 a Y>

I C m I

P S

l D r i

C I e s s A I t n n F U a m m I llI III l 1III IlIi III llIlIl III P I W l u l u

E g o o l

i n C C T i t - - n 0" E a o -

T A

l u

2 3 i t

2 V C c t t a 1 I r i i v 1 D i n n e N C U U l I E III l lIIIIl1l 1I1 l llli l llI IlI l Il ll I 1lI l

r e a o s e t e r o >

i n A s ) M D )

o t d

a p s n p

)

s p s i

t c o m o m n m n a a I u t u o u o c p P P t P t 2 n m 5 e /

I I e 1 e 6 e v 6 )

c r r r i i 1 i 0 i r 1 (

F ( F ( F D ( 0 0

1 7 8 9 P III IlIllI lIIIiI IlIIII l1I 11l lll lIlllI

_ _ _ . . . _ . _ . . . _ _ __ ~.

PFJCII ICI'IOM A'IOMIC POWFR STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Typical Load /Incact Matrix TABLE 1 CRANE: CW Pump Structure Crane - 005116 I I INDICATE TilR IMJIIDIN3(S) CORRESPONDING 'IO ' DIE IMPACP AREA (S) EXAMPLE: PSACIOR ENJIIDING, I I l AUXILIARY HUILDING l l I l I Location l Circulating Water Pump Structure l I I I I I Unit 2 - Columns 5; A-C I l Impact Area i I l l Unit 3 - Columns 11: A-C I

'I I I I I I l l l Safety Related I slazard Elimi- I l i Ioads l Elevation l Equipment l' nation Cateqory I l I I I I I I I I I I I i l 10. Circulating Water l 112'-0" l None I N/A l l

' I l l l I l Pumps l l l l l l l l l l 1 l

I (17 tons) l l l l l l 1 I l l l l l l l l l l I I I  ! I i 11. Circulating water I I i l l l l l 1 I I l Pump Motor l l l l l l l l l l (18.8 tons) l I I l l l l v i v l v l l

! I I I I I I l 1 I I I I I l l l l l l l l l l 1 I I I l I I I I I I I l I I I

, I I I I I I I I I I I l Page 5d

~

P-100(c)/2 December, 1981

PFACH ICI'KN A'TYIMIC POWFR RTATICN - INIT9 2 & 3 Typical Ioad/Imoact Matrix TABLE 1 CRANE: Recirculation Pumo Motor Hoist - 2AH03, 2m03, 3AH03, 3RH03 I I INDICATE THE IUILDIW(S) CURRFSPONDIVI 'K) 'IHE IMPACT AREA (R) EXAMPLE: RFAC' TOR BUILDIm, I I l AUXILIARY BUILDIE I l l I I Incation l Reactor Building i i i l i Impact Area l Unit 2 - Columns 15: B-G I I I I I l Unit 3 - Columns 29; B-G l

'I I I I I i 1- l I Safety Related l Hazard Elimi- l I I Loads l Elevation I Equipment I nation Category l 1 1 I I I I _I I I I I I I I 1. Recirculation Pumo l 135'-0" l 1. RPV l b l l l l l 2. Recirculation Pumo l l l 1 l l Casing l l l l Motor l I l i I I I I I I I l l Relow l 1. RPV l l l l (21.5 tons ea.) I 135'-0" l 2. Recirculation Pumo l l l l l .1 Casing l I I l l l l 3. Main Steam Pioinq l b l l

l. l l l4 RHR pioinq l I l I I l 5. Core Soray Piping i l i l I 'l I l l I I I I I .I I I I I I I I I I I I I l 2. Recirculation Pump I I I l l l l l l l l l (13.6 tors ea.) l l l. l l l l I I I I i 1 l l I l l  ! v l v  ! v i l Page 6_

P-100(c)/2

i\I :

%8 1_ C

?

I 1 E D A I T a

B I l

A U T B ,

t

. r U

I e

C 7 __bm A

E R

e e 9

a c

P en E

I P

M A

M I

3 )

S

& 0 (

2 1

A P

2 1 0 R y S 3 A r T

I , P C t

iJ

- o N x 0 CI mry U i 2 AD i t r  !

f PL l a A

- t 0 MI EC /

2 I U N u f

E B it n N .

O t - I Y t o I

T c h TRA ai zt A n c aan T i n DIL l S Im i I l

W I R /

m GX U

, d. d a r t

I A b o o D I l f N d t O e C l a P tt I a l P

S E C C an M ic R l e E p l R F I B Mm I

' p A y a 0  ;

I i E T v 0 ,

yu N i o 7 1

1 3 t l O u m o

)

S - -

f eB N n

r P ( 3 1

8 2 a B

u D Ct S

R I - -

l C D s l

C I g s s A I n n n

nn E  : U i u u P E B d l t

l t

N l A E i o o R I u C C C T B

- - n "0 E r o -

T o 2 3 i t '5 A t a

CI ca i t t i v 3

1 D b n n e N I U U l E

I

)

a n e t o

r s n A 1 i

o t d

a (

t c a

o o 2

~ a p I

t /

c )

n I m p c I

u (

0 s 0 1

d a F I

o

--. = _. . - _ = . . -. _ . , - . -. . . . - . - . . . ._

I r

PEACII BCTIOM A'IOMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 r. 3 Typical Ioad/ Impact Matrix TABLE 1 CRANE: CRD Removal lloist - 20!!05, 30!!05 1 'l INDICATE VIE IUIIDIFC(S) ODRRESPONDIm 'IO PIE IMPACP AREA (S) EXAMPLE: REACIOR IVIILDING, I l l I AUXILIARY BUILDING I i I I l i Incation l Reactor Building I l l l l 1 Impact Area l Unit 2 - Columns 15, C-G I j 2

l I I

,I l Unit 3 - Columns 29: C-G I  !

I I I I I I l l l Safety Related l Ilazard Elimi- l l '

I foads l Elevation i Fquipnent I nation Cateqory l Remarks ]

I I I I I I I I I I I I l l 1. CRD Transport -l 116'-0" I NONE l N/A l l l l Cart i I l l l.

l (500 lbs) l l l l l l l l l l l l 1 l i I I .t i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

• I I I I l' I I I I I I l l l l l 1 l

I I I I I I l 1 I I I I l

I I I I I l I I I I I I l l I I 1 l l l l l l l 1 l

! I I I I I i l l l l 1 l l

! I I I I I I I I I I I I i i i I I i I Pace 8 P-100(c)/2 ,

. Decembor, 1981

- .. _ .-. - . - - . -. . - . - - - .. -~. .-. - . - . - . - - - - -. --- . - . , - .. -. -- -

i 2

3 PFACH BC7T'IOM A'IOMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Typical Toad / Impact Matrix TABLE 1

}

l CRANE: Equipment Access Lock Removal Hoist - 20H04, 30H04 l

I I INDICATE THE BUILDING (S) CORRESPONDING 'IU 'lHE IMPACT AREA (S) EXAMPLE: RFACIOR IUILDING, I i l l AUXILIARY BUILDING l I I

! I j j Incation l Reactor Building l' 1 I l l

I Imoact Area l Onit 2 - Columns 13; B-F l l l

! I

I l Unit 3 - Columns 28; B-F ]

i 'l l I I I l I

i l l Safety Related I Hazard Elimi- l l j l . Loads l Elevation I Fquipment ..l nation Cateqory l I I I I I I

! l i I I i l l i

i l 1. Hatch Cover i 135'-0" l None -l N/A I I l 1 I I I l l

j i (3.5 tons) l I I l l l l Below l 1. RHR piping l l l

I i 135'-0" l 2. MSRV Pioing i b l l j i l l 3. Recirculation piping I .l l l l l l 4. Core Spray Piping l l l

' I I I I I I I

l' I I I I I i i i l 1 l i

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l I I I I I I 7

I I I j ~l I I

. l i I l i I

! I I I I I l l I I I I I

{

i i Page 9 December, 1981 1

j P-100(c)/2

PEACH TUI'IOM A'IOMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 &' 3 Tvoical Ioad/Imoact Matrix TABLE 1 CRANE: Personnel Lock Hoist - 20H22, 30f122-l INDICATE THE BUILDIFG(S) O)RRESPONDING 'IO 'IHE IMPACT AREA (S) EXAMPLE: REACIOR RJILDIFC, I l

l AUXILIARY BUILDING I l

l l 1 l

I Location l Reactor Ruildinq l

i I l

l l Unit 2 - Columns 17: A-J l  ;

l Impact Area l I

l Unit 3 - Columns 31; A J l j l i I  !

i l i '

l l l Cafety Related i Hazard Elimi- l l Loads l Elevation i Eauioment I nation Category l I I

I I I 1 I I I i I i f I i I  !

l 1. Recirculation Pump I 135'-0" l None i N/A l l I I I I I I l l l I Pbtor l l

1. l l l Below l Torus l l 135'-0" 2. RHR oiping l e i I l (21.5 tons) l l RCIC piping 1 l l l 3. l l l l l i 4. HPCI ciping I l I

! l l 5. FSW piping i I I r

L l l l 6. Core Spray oiping & l l l l i I I Inst. Rack l l l l l l 7. Condensate Piping i I l l l 1 Prom Cond. Stor. l l l

]

t Tank l l l I I I l l l 8. Cable Travs & Con- l l l )

duits l I l l l l I I I l 1 1 I I l I I I l l l 2. Recirculation Pumo l l l l

I l 1 l

. I l l

, I (13.6 tons) l l l I l I I I I

I I I i I I i l Y Y

)

Page 10a

~

1. ' 1901 P-100(c)/2 ]

a

IIl ill III IlI Ill lII IIIl1IlII IIl G

1 N I

E D 1 L L B I 8 A 9 a T U I b 1 0 0 1 R 1 ,

O r I e C b g

e A E e m

e a R g c P a e

P D E

L P

M A

X I 1l I Ill l II II I I1I III III E

3 ) y S r _a

& ( o 0 A i g 1 2 E R

me i t e S A, l a o T 2 EC I

x 2

H PT CI . dn m

N I

i 0 AD ro n r 2 PL ai zt i

- t MI a ,

IU aa s N M 2 B l I n A C 2 E I t H l l Y I iII Ill l II II I IlI III III T c 0 I

' R A a 2 A ,

T o DIL S m - I I ' I R / t CX E d s t U W a i IA O o o D N

P L H a O d e 0 C l k P I a c S tt an 1

M ic n E 7, 7, e O I R l e I' p R A A en Rp g

a A y l O p T e C  :  ;

yu i

A n 7 1 n

n n ) 1 3 tq r o S - - eE i s ( 3 4 f i r 1 2 a A s

a e Ts S P I - -

H D -

C L g s s A I n n n E J i m m I l I 1 IIl a lIIIII IlIIII III P I I d u u 0 l l l

E i u

o o 1 E ll C C e N I B A

- - n g R E r o a p

C T o 2 3 i A t t n

C c t t a I a i i v i D e n n e s N R U U l I E A IIl l Il lI I ll1 IIl l1I II I IlI II1 III a

e '

r -

n A s i

o t d

a t c o k )

n a a L c o

c p L

o t I

o I m 2 r 4 /

)

i 2 c A (

(

0

. 0 1

3 -

III lllIIIlIl Ill IlI III IlI IiI III P

PFACII BOPIOM NICMIC POWER STATION - rJNI'IS 2 & 3 Typical-Ioad/ Impact Itatrix TABLE 1 CRNJE: '1brus Illuipnent Ibmoval Ibist - 0 01137 INDICATE Tile LXJILDIt0(S) GDRRESPONDIt0 'IO TIIE IMPACP ARFA(S) EXAMPLE: RFACIOR DUILDIPU, AUXILIARY BUILDItC Iocation Ibactor Building Impact Area Unit 2 - (bltunns 10 & 15-17, B-C &'J-!!

. Unit 3 - (bltznns 24 & 29-30,11-C & J-II Safety Related llazatti Elimi-Ioads Elevation Blui lment nation Category 1.- Miscellaneous 135'-0" tbne t{/A '

Ioads Up 'Ib (3 tons)

Delow 1. '1brus 135'-0" 2. CRD !!ytlraulic Units b l 3. RIIR piping

4. Core spray pipiry

5. Cable tray

6. Main Steam Drainline l

(thit 3 only) l 7. CRD Supply thter l Pipiry (Unit 3 only)

Page 11

.Deconber,1981 P-100(c)/2

PEACil IUPIOM NIDMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & '3 Typical Ioad/Imoact Matrix TABLE 1 CRANE: 15 Ton Yard Crane - 00H56 1

1. INDICATE ' DIE BUILDING (S) CORRESPONDItC 'IO THE IMPACP AREA (S) EXAMPLE: REACIDR IUILDING, I l l AUXILIARY ICILDING -l I N I I

l Location , l Plant Yard l I

I I

l Impact Area l Unit 2 ) Crane moves around the plant l I ) i l

) I I l Unit 3 I I I

'l I I l l l Safety Related lIlazard Elimi- 1 l l Loads l Elevation l Fouipment I nation Category l Remarks 1.

I I l l l I

1 I I I I l

i 1. Miscellenous Ioads I i 1. Diesel Fuel Storage l b l l l uo to a maximum i 135'-0" l Tanks - Underground l l l l of 15 tons 1 1 I l' l l l l l l l l l 135'-0" l 2. Emergency Auxiliary I b l l l l l Transformers l l l l 1. I l- 1 I l l 1 3. Fmergency Cooling l I I i l l l Water Pump and I b l l I

l l 1 Fmergency Cooling I I l l l Tower Reservoir i l 1 -l I

l l I I I l I I. I l 4. Area Behind RB l l l l l l Below 135'-0" l a. Torus I b,c l l l l l l b. ESW, HPSW piping i l 1 -l l l c. RilR Pumos, IIx , i I l l

l l l & piping -l l l l l I d. Electrical wiring l l 1 1 I l & conduits l l l i l l l e. Instrumentation i l l  !

I I I I l i I 1 i l i I I l

I I I I I 1

l Paqe 12a P-100(c)/2 ,

necember, 1981

-- . - .- .- - - . -- . =. . _ - . . - - . .

t PEACil BOPIOM A'IOMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 -

Typical Ioad/Imtuct Matrix TABLE l_

CRANE: 15 'Ibn Yard Crane - 00f156 i

INDICATE 'IllE BUILDI!G(S) CORRESEONDING 'IO Tile IMPACP AREA (S) EXAMPLE: RFACIOR BUILDING, ,

AUXILIARY DUILDING Incation Plant Yard l l

Impact Area Unit 2 ) Crane moves around the plant i

)

Unit 3 )

i

) o Safety Iblated Ilazard Elimi-l Ioads Elevation EXIuipnent nation Category i

1. Miscellaneous Below 135'-0" 5. Buried ESW Piping e l

Ioads

6. HPSW - ESW (continued) Below 116'-0" discharge valve box b (Underground)

7. 'IB below hatchway -

Below 116'-0" a. ESW piping c

b. HPSW piping Below 8. Diesel Generator 160'-0" Building Ibof c

a. Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries

b. ESW & IIPSW pipes

& valves

c. Electrical Wiring

& Instrumentation

d. ESW Booster Pumps

e. Diesel / Gen. Control ,

(bn:. col Page 12b P-100(c)/2 -

Incenber, 1981

PFJOi TUTTOM A'IO4TC POWER STATION - UNIT 9 2 & 3 Typical. Load /Imoact Matrix TARLE 1 .

l CRANE: 15 Ton Yard Crane - 001156  :

l l INDICATE TIIR IUILDI?C(S) WRRP.SPONDIE 'IO 'IHE IMP /CP ARRA(S) EXAMDLE: RPJCTOR RJILDIE, I l l l AUXILIARY RUILDING I I I l l Iocation l Plant Yard I I I l <

! l Imoact Area l Unit 2 ) Crane moves around the plant l l l ) l l l Unit 3 ) l I I I I I I

, I l l Safety Related l Hazard Elimi- l l

[ l' Loads l Elevation i Equipment I nation Category I I l l l l l l l l l l .

I I I i 1. Miscellenous i Below I 2. CW Pump Structure i l 1 I I 130'-0" I a. 11PSW System I l l l Inads l l b. ESW System I c l l l l l c. Electrical wiring i l l l (continued) l l & instrumentation l I l I l l d. MCCS I l l l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l l l l 1 I I .I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l l l l l l l l l I I I I I I I I l.

I I I I I I I I I I

.P-100(c)/2 Page'12e December, 1981

- __ - . -. -. .- . - . .- .- - _ .. .- . .- ~ . .. -

1 PEACH IDFTOM A'ICMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 i Typical Inad/Imoact Matrix TABLE 1-CRANE:- Precoat Materials 11andling - 201154 , 3 01154 I

I I INDICATE Tile MJILDING(S) CORRESPONDING W TIIE IMPACT AREA (S) EXAMPLE: REACTOR RIILDING, l 3

I I AUXILIARY BUILDING l .

i l I I

! I Incation l Reactor Building 1 1 I I j- l l Unit 2 - Columns 10: G-il l

I Impact Area l I

. I I Unit 3 - ColtJnns 33:G-il I 1 l i I I I I l . I l l Safety Related l Ilazard Elimi- l l j

l Loads l Elevation l Equipment I nation Category i I I I I I I l I I I I I I l 1. Miscellaneous l l l l l

} l .

I 180'-0" l None i N/A I I i i loads up to I i i l l l l l 1 1 I I

1 1/2 ton i I l l l

i I I a. Emergency MCC- l I i 1 I I I (Unit 2 only) I b l l 1

l l 165'-0" i I I I I I I I I I l I I I I I l l l a. Cable Trays & I I -l

I I Below l Conduits I b l l I i 135'-0" I b. Drywell O2 analyzer l I I

! I l l l l l I I I I I I 1 '

1 I I I I I I f' I I I I I I I I I I I I 'I

, I I I I I I I I I I I I I I . I I I . I f 1 I I I I I

! I I I I I ~l' Page 13 December,'1981 l P-100(c)/2 ,

llllIll' l(l;l j i 4I}l zll -

III1 IlIlIIIIIllI llI lll lli llIIIIllIII 1

8 9

, 1 G

1 N r I

E D 4 e L L 1 d

B I e

A T

U B g cw a e R P D O

I C

A E

R E

9 L '

4 P H M O A O X E

I1lI IIIl IlIl llll I IlI III I lI II d y 3 n )

a S r

& ( - o 8 A i g 2 4 H

E R

me i t S 0 A l a T 0 G EC A I .

TN / e N x - CI dn N I i r t AD PL ro ai

- t s MI zt a i I U aa N M o R i f n O t H E T Y I 1iI l ll ll IIlI III I l I II I II II I lIl T c d I R A a n ' A T p a OI S n TL I

• I e R / n GX E d a NU W a r I A O o C D P I N

_ b O d C l i P e I a J S tt M c r E

R an l e g O

i i

p e R D D em ng A' y w O - - Rp e i n T o C C C i n pi 4 T yu o i p u )  ;  ;

teF Q N Pi g S 2 2 P n n ( - - f W

> i G 1 1 a SW R l N R PS o I - -

I I E H o D s s C C L A I n n E y J e m m Il lI IiI i 1Il l l l ll 1 IlI 1II I llII P c R r u u n u l l

_ e g

E t o o H c C C r T u "

e r - - n 0" 0 m E t o - w-o' E T S 2 3 i '

A p t 3 l3 C t t a 5 e5

I m i i v 1 B1 E D u n n e N N P U U l A I E R

C I IIl Ii 1 l Il lI IlII lll l ll ll1 1lI 1iIIllII a

e s r u n A s o o i

o t d

a e

n t

)

t a

c c

a p

m I

o l l

a e

son s

t o I c 2 2 l

i s.M /-

1

/

)

M M (

(

c 0

. 0 1 1 l III IIl I1l ll1 Ill ll1 lll lll 1lI lli IllII P lf illllllll ll l

.. _ . - - . . ~ . . . - - .- - - . - . .. . . - - _-_ .. . . - - - - .

i PEACH BCFI'IOM A'IOMIC POWER STATION - UNITS 2 & 3 Tvolcal Ioad/Imact Matrix TABLE 1 CRANE: CRD Transoort Jib Crane l l INDICATE 'IllE BUILDING (S) CORRESPONDING 'IO 'lHE IMPACT AREA (S) EXNPLE: REACTOR ICILDIfC, -l l l AUXILIARY MJILDING l l 1 - 1 I Iocation l Reactor Buildina l I l- l l l Unit 2 - Columns 10; II,I l l Impact Area l l

.l l Unit 3 - Columns 33; H-J l

- 1 I I I I I l l l l Safety Related I flazard Elimi- 1 I l 1 Ioads l Elevation l Equipment I nation Categorv .l l l l 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I 1. Miscellaneous i 195'-0" l None I N/A l. I

.I l l l 1 l i

i l Ioads un to i l l l l l 'l -Below I None l l l l l (3 tons) l 195'-0" l l N/A l l l l l l l l l l l 1 I l l l

l l Below. I Bnergency MCC's l b l l l

l l 165'-0" l (Unit 2) l  ! l

I I I I I I I I I I I I

! l l l1. Core Spray pioino I I l l l l Below 12. Core Soray Inst. Rack i b I I l l 135'-0" l3. Cable Trays & I l l l l l Conduits l l l 1 1 I I I I I I I .I I I I I I I I I I l l I -l l I I I I I l l 1 1 I I I I I I l l l l l l l l l 1 1 I I I I P-100(c)/2 Pace 15 December, 1981

PFACII IV7I'IOM A'IOMIC POWPR STATI(N - INI'Is 2 & ' 3 Typical load /Imoact Matrix 'PARLF, 1 CRANE: CRD Maintenance Bridae Crane i I INDICATR TilR IUIIDIT;(S) CORRESPONDING 'IU 'NIR IMPACP ARRA(S) RXAMPLE: REACIOR TYJITDINF,, I I I AUXILIAIN BUIIDING l I I l

Iocation l Reactor Building l I

I o i I l Impact Area l Unit 2 - Columns - None l 1

i 1 l l Unit Columns 26 B-C I l l I I l l .

l l l Safety Related l Ilazard Elimi- l l Fouipment.

l Ioads l Elevation l I nation Category l I I I I I I I

1. Fuel Pool Cooling 1- 1 I I- l l l

-195'-0" b,e l 1. Miscellaneous 1 I piping I l l l l 2. Electrical Conduit l l l l loads up to~ l l l -l l I I I I l l l l (1.0 ton) I nelow I. 1. Cable trays and I b I I l

l l- l 195'-0" I conduits l I I I I I I i I

I I I I 1 I l

I I I .I I I

.I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I i l I

I I I I l I I I I I I I I I I l I I Page 16 P-100(c)/2 December, 1981

Table 2 PBAPS SPECIAL LIPTING DEVICES i

P-100(c)/3 -i-

Table 2 PBAPS SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES, ,

Reactor Building Crane De s ign *

• Safety Load Factor Compliance Special Lif ting Devices Weight Lifting with ANSI Item Tons Device N14.6 - 1978 Shield Plug Sling 95 3x(W+0.25W) No 1.

40 5x(W+0.15W) Yes 2a. Dryer-Separator Type 1 Pool Plug Sling

b. Dryer-Separator Type 2 Pool 63 5x(W+0.25W) (Later)

Plug Sling 5.5 6x(W+25%) No

3. (Fuel Pool) Slot Plug Sling

4. Reactor Vessel Head & Drywell 96.5 (Later - By GE) (Later)

Strongback

5. Steam Dryer Sling 31 (Later - By GE) (Later)

6. Steam Separator Sling 52 (Later - By GE) (Later)

7. FP Gates #1 & #2 3.75 (Later - By GE) (Later)'

8. Refueling Channel Shield 9 3x(W+0.25W) (Later)

Lifting Rig (Cattle Chute)

9. Personnel Basket Lift Rig 4 (Later) (Later)

Fuel Cask Yoke 100 or (Later - By Vendor) (Later) 10.

37.1 Service Platform Sling 2 (Later) (Later) 11.

Strongback 900 lbs - N/A*

12. Hydrolazer l

Head Stud, Nut,and Washer 700 lbs -

N/A*

13.

Rack Sling 4

4.5 (Lated No

14. New Fuel Crate Lifting Device

• Not applicable. Not a heavy load.

• • Load plus input impact allowance _

P-133b/4

- 1-J

- - ,,-,-,,e w,- -,,,,---,,--.ge-se -

u-ec ,--s_,ev.,.--.--~--...--r----.--n- .,w-.n-a ,,p.n...e , . . , - - ,aw-., . - - - -- ,-, , - , , - - - - - , , - , . , , , -

Attachments

1. " Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems"

2. NUREG 0554 " Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Plants" ,

3. Analysis of Plant Structures December, 1981 P-110/7

l 1

Attachment 1 l SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF HANDLING SYSTE?.S l

P-110/7 #1-i December 1981 r

I.._._.- . . __ _ . _ _ . -

,. _ _ . . , _ , . . . . , _ _,__..,,__,.,.-,._,_,_,,.,or_ _ , . . _ . _ _ , , _ , _ _

Attcchment 1

" SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOP HANDLING SYSTEMS"

.The following is in response to the information requested in Attachment 1 to the NRC letter dated December 22, 1980.

1. Provide the name of the manufacturer and the design-rated load (DRL). If the. maximum critical load (MCL), as defined in NUREG 0554, is not the same as the DRL, provide this capacity.

Response

a. Whiting Corporation, Harvey, Illinois.

b. Reactor Building Crane DRL MCL Main Hoist 125 Tons 110 Tons Auxiliary Hoist 5 Tons (later)

We have contacted Whiting Corporation, the Reactor Building

( RB) Crane supplier, to determine the Maximum Critical Load ratings of the RB Crane Auxiliary Hoist. The rating of the RB Crane Auxiliary Hoist will be- provided later.

2. Provide a detailed evaluation of the overhead handling system with respect to the features of design, fabri-cation, inspection, testing, and operation as delineated in NUREG 0554 and supplemented by the identified alter-natives specified in NUREG 0612, Appendix C. This evaluation must include a point-by-point comparison for each section of NUREG 0554. If the alternatives of NUREG 0612, Appendix C, are used for certain applications in lieu of complying with the recommendation of NUREG 0554, this should be explicity stated. If an alternative-l to any of those contained in NUREG 0554 or NUREG 0612, Appendix C, is proposed, details must be provided on a proposed alternative to demonstrate its equivalency.

Response

The results of a detailed point-by-point comparison for each section of NUREG 0554 as supplemented by the modification alter-natives in NUREG 0612, Appendix C, is contained in Attachment 2 of .the overhead handling systems review.

P-110/7 1-1 Decembe r , 1981 e

3. With respect to the seismic analysis employed to demonstrate that.the overhead handling system can retain the load during a seismic event equal to a safe shutdown earthquake, provide a description of the method of analysis, the assumptions used , and the mathematical model evaluated -in the analysis.

The description of assumptions should include the basis for selection of trolley and load position.

Response

The design of the crane girders has been checked by calcu-lations performed by the crane manufacturer to withstand hori-zontal and vertical loads of Maximum Credible Earthquake which is comparable to SSE. Static loads, accelerated in horizontal and vertical directions per Specification 6280-M-13B, are simultaneously applied to the girders at such locations as to give maximum flexural stresses. The absolute sum of horizontal and vertical stresses, a conservative value, has an adequate margin of safety with respect to an allowable stress of 36,000

~

psi.

The basis for the selection of the trolley and load position is the. maximum bending moment on the structure which is illustrated on the following page.

S v 1-2 December , 1981 P-110/7 x

0

i)jI j ;- l l

,, ) o

--_ )

n rs a T n p 0 a s f0 p

s . e o 0, l d0 e o an 1

P

. l h o1 n o w L 9 1

i h - ,

/5

'w e d r e h av e

. t a9 bn 1 h D1

. t r 5 e  : m 7 r v r c

e O e

= v , T D

(

O

. O W( "

D ,

k 9 2

N1 kDts\ A O

.

• mJ L L 9 h L .

W A T n I

T 4

v.

A

'f I m 7

A M

6 T I Y N 0 T t

R A A

- 6 i.

P n T C

t i L *

- V O T

" k - R

• n 2 o - T S 3 o s I

- , " V.

t I R t s F F T

8 I '

1 O'

o O 4 F " B.

-' I T

T T N E 6 I  !

T O t C

2 W r v i

1 l  ! i 4 C '

A I T "n

- A E T

- n 4

A " V I

y'= F R

R D

C R E O L F

- 1

- i

.- W Li -

2 3 2 D

A O "

A AI E

S N O

- - / L 5 R I

" N C O T 8 A C 9 I F I

. P I 9 T S 6 T 6 S O

. 6 S A A T F P T S S

. S 1 A 1 B 1

L

= 1 c

J R (tNQkN e

~ ,

a_6 r

ffI f \l!l;l tl l l

4.- Provide an evaluation of the lif ting devices for each single-failure-proof handling ~ system with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6.

Response

General Electric has been requested to provide an evaluation of the lifting devices for:

1. RPV-Drywell Head Strongback

2. Dryer-Separator Sling

3. Service Platform Strongback

4. Fuel Pool Gates Sling An evaluation is underway for the following devices. The results will be forwarded at a later date.

1. Refueling Channel Shield Lif ting Device

2. Personnel Basket Sling

3. Head Stud, Nut, and Washer Rack Lif ting Device The spent fuel cask yoke is provided by the spent fuel cask ,

manufacturer. The design of the spent fuel cask yoke will be reviewed for compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978 on a case by case basis.

The lifting devices that had been evaluated are:

1. RPV-Drywell Head Strongback

2. Type I Dryer-Separator Pool Plug For critical loads on the refueling floor where there is no specific lif ting device, slings will be used. The loads to be lifted with slings are:

1. Shield Plug (Half Moon)

2. Type 2 Dryer-Separator Pool Plug 3.- Fuel Pool Slot Plug Slings for critical loads will be selected in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B 30.9-1971, modified by the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Sections 5.1.l(5) and 5.1.6(1)(b).

P-110/7 1-4 December 1981 -

i' O

Name Reactor Pressure vessel (RPV) - Drywell Head Strongback

Description:

The RPV-Drywell Head Strongback is a two cross-arm lif ting device with a single-failure-proof hook box that fits the RB Crane hooks and lifting eye. The strongback is used for lifting the 65 ton Drywell Head and 96.5 ton Reactor Pressure Vessel

( RPV) head and the RPV Head Insulation.

The structural design of RPV-Drywell Head Strongback has been reviewed and found to be capable of supporting the load if one of the cross arms break. The hook box has sufficient carrying capability to retain the load if either the hook or lifting eye fails. The design of the RPV-Drywell Head Strongback complies with the intent of single failure proof design guidelines at the time it was made. The intent was to prevent the drop of the load due to a failure of a crossarm or pin in the hookbox or lifting eye. A review of the RPV-Drywell Head Strongback shows that the strongback does not comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978. General Electric, who is the supplier of RPV-

• Drywell Head Strongback to Peach Bottom, has been requested to review the design of the strone t ek for compliance with the requirements of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6.

The RPV - Drywell head strongback meets the guidelines of NUREG 0612 and ANSI N14.6-1978 when used to lift the RPV head insulation based on the RPV - Drywell head strongback having a minimum safety factor of 10 (110 ton rating for the RPV-drywell head strongback compared to the RRV Head insulation weight of 10 tons).

Conclusion:

The conclusion concerning compliance with NUREG 0612 for the lifts of the drywell head and RPV head will be made at a later date after receipt of the evaluation requested from GE.

The RPV-Drywell head strongback complies with the requirements of NUREG 0612 and ANSI N14.6-1978 for the lift of the RPV Head*

Insulation.

i s

~

r T,-110/7 1-5 December 1981 l

l

Name:

Type 1 Steam Dryer-Separator Pool Plug lifting device Description The Steam Dryer-Separator Pool- Plugs are remove' 'e and are stacked in four layers. The topmost layer is . Type 2 Pool Plug, the lower three are Type 1 Pool Plugs. These plugs are used as dividing wall between the drywell and the Dryer-Separator pool.

During u refueling outage the 40 Ton Type 1 Dryer-Separator Pool Plugs will be removed to allow transfer of the steam dryer and separator to the pool from the reactor vessel. Laydown crea is on the refueling floor at El. 234'-0". After transfer of the steam dryer and steam separator, the Dryer Separator Pool Plugs may be returned to their original position '_o provide shielding and to allow draining of the RPV. After refueling and maintenance work in the RPV is done, the pool plugs are removed to allow transfer of the steam dryer and steam separator back to the RPV.

The Steam Dryer-Separator Pool Plug lifting device is a rigid

• structure that can be inserted into the Type 1 Pool Plug's four lifting points. Attachment and removal from the lifting points is by actuation of remote controlled air cylinders. The lifting device is suspended by four slings connected to redundant load paths of the Reactor Building Crane load block, i.e. sister hook and lifting eye.

A dropped 40 ton Dryer-Separator Pool Plug could fall into the open RPV. This may cause damage to the fuel and control rods in the RPV.

The Steam Dryer-Separator Pool Plug lifting device is in the

-process of modification and upgrading so that it will be in compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6(1) and ANSI N14.6-1978.

The lifting device for Type 1 Steam Dryer-Separator Pool Plug will be designed to have redundant load paths so that the failure of one path would not cause the uncontrolled lowering of the load.

Conclusion:

The Type 1 Dryer-Separator Pool Plug lifting device would not cause any load to fall because the lifting device is single-failure-proof when the m'odification As completed. It will comply with the requirements of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1 5, ANSI B30.9, 1971, and ANSI N14.6-1978.

h-110/7 1-6 December 1981

5. Provide'an evaluation of the-interfacing lift points with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6.

Response

General Electric was requested to evaluate the lifting points of following GE supplied items. The results of the evaluation of GE is expected in the first quarter of 1982.

1. RPV Head

2. Steam Dryer

3. Steam Seperator

4. Service Platform

5. Fuel-Pool Gates No. 1 and No.2

6. RPV Head Insulation The results of the evaluation of the following items will be provided at a later date.

1. Personnel Basket

2. Head Stud Rack-

3. Head Nut and Washer Rack ~

4. Refueling Channel Shield (Cattle Chute)

The spent fuel cask lif ting points will be reviewed on a case by case basis.

The lifting points of the following loads have been evaluated:

1. Shield Plugs

2. Drywell Head

3. Steam Dryer-Separator Pool Plugs (Type 1 and Type 2)

4. Fuel Pool Slot Plugs The following discussions are the results of the evaluation of lifting points for the following Reactor Building Crane loads:

e t

2 r

1-7 Decembe r , 1981

,P-110/7

4 Name Shield Plug (Half Moon)

Description The shield plugs are used to cover the drywell and provide shielding on the refueling floor during normal plant operation, There are two half moon shaped shield plugs per layer of shield plug. There are three layers of shield plugs over the drywell i

head. Each shield plug weighs 95 tons.

During refueling, the shield plugs must be removed to have an access to the drywell head and reactor pressure vessel (RPV).

Lifting of the shield plug is by the Reactor Building Crane with

~

slings. There are three lifting points on'each shield plug.

The shield plugs are laid down on the refueling floor and stacked in three layers on both sides of the Dryer-Separator pool on EL.

234'-0". .

The shield plugs, if dropped , could damage a part of the refueling floor causing spalling which could affect the-Standby Liquid Control System below at El. 195'-O". Damage to the Standby Liquid Control System does not prevent plant safe shutdown or decay heat removal. Refer to the discussion of the Reactor

+ Building Crane in Section 2.3.2.b.1.

The shield plugs cannot be moved over the fuel pool because the

' Reactor Building crane electrical interlocks prevent this. The fuel pool cooling system is located below the fuel pool on El. 195'-0". Damage to the fuel pool cooling system is precluded

. by the Reactor Building Crane interlocks..

The shield plugs, if dropped, could fall onto the drywell head.

This load drop could damage the drywell head but is expected to be no worse than the drop of the drywell head on the RPV. There-l

' fore the drop of the shield plug would not damage the fuel or

' cause unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel.

The shield plug lifting points had been evaluated and were found that their design safety factor is three based on the ultimate

-strength of the material. This safety As an f actor does not meet alternative to verify the the requirements of NUREG 0612.

' integrity of the lifting points, we propose to perform frequent inspection and physical examination of the lift points,before 4

.g th'e shield plugs are lifted.

1-8 December , 1981 7 P-110/7

! e

i Conclusion Frequent inspection and physical examination of the lift points before the shield plugs are lifted to reduce the potential of a load drop complies with the intent of NUREG 0612.

1-9 December, 1981 P-110/7 a

Name : Drywell Head De scription The weight of the Drywell Head is 65 tons. The Drywell Head

! provides access to the reactor vessel and forms the upper portion of the pressure boundary -for the primary contaiment. The Drywell-RPV head strongback is used for lif ting the Drywell Head. There are four lifting points of the drywell head at the four quadrants of the domed head.

The drywell head is carried over the reactor vessel while the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head and insulation support structure

are in place. Depending on orientation a drop of the drywell head 4- could damage the insulation support structure, rupture the RPV vent and head spray piping, damage the seal plate, and impact the RPV itself. The drywell head weighs 67% less than the RPV and much of its kinetic energy will be absorbed by the insulation support structure and the seal plate. Therefore a drop of drywell head would not cause fuel damage or unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel.

.The Drywell Head cannot be carried over the fuel pool containing fuel because the Reactor Building Crane electrical interlocks preve nt the movement of heavy loads over the fuel-pool.

The Drywell Head , if dropped, along its path to the laydown area, could affect the refueling floor including the fuel pool cooling system located below the floor. An alternate.means of cooling the fuel pool is available, if the . fuel-pool cooling systems is damaged. This is discussed in our response to Section 2.3.2.b of this report.

The lif ting points of the Drywell head has been evaluated and found _that the design safety factor is 4.5 based on ultimate strength of the material. The safety-f actor does not meet the reauirements of NUREG 0612. As an alternative to verify the integrity cf the lif ting points, we propose to perform frequent i inspection and physical examination of the lif ting points before the drywell head is lifted.

i

! Conclusion

- Freque nt inspection and physical examination of the lif ting points before the Drywell Head is lif ted to reduce the potential of a s i load drop complies with tpe, intent of NUREG 0612.

?

1-10 December , 1981 P-110/7 t/

e

Name Steam Dryer-Separator Pool Plug (Type 1 )

Description There are three pieces of the Type 1 Steam Dryer-Separator Pool plug. Each Type 1 Pool Plug weighs 40 tons.

The Type 1 Pool Plug lif ting points have been evaluated and found to have a safety factor of 9 based on the ultimate strength of the material. These points meet the requirements of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 and ANSI N14.6-1978, because each pair of lif ting points is one load path and exceeds the required minimum safety factor for dual load path lif ting pointa.

Conclusion:

The Type 1 Steam Dryer Separator Pool Plugs lif ting points comply with the requirements of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 and ANSI N 14.6-1978.

P-110/7 1-11 December, 1981

f Name Type 2 Steam Dryer-Separator Pool Plug De scription The description and use of the Type 2 Steam . Dryer-Separator -Pool Plug are the same as that of .the Type 1 Steam Dryer-Separator Pool Plug which 't discussed-previously. . Type 2 pool plug weighs 63 tons.

. The Type 2 plug is the topmost layer of the removable wall.

separating the drywell and dryer-separator pool area. There

, is no special Type 2 plug lif ting device. The type 2 plug is connected to the Reactor Building Crane by slings that connects to the four lif ting points of the plug.

4 The Type 2 Pool Plug 'lif ting points have been evaluated and found to have a safety factor of 7.2, based on the ultimate -

strength of the material. The safety f actor does not meet the requirements of NUREG 0612. As an alternative to verify the the integrity of the lif ting points, we propose to perform frequent inspection and physical examination of the lif ting points before lif ting the Type 2 Steam Dryer-Separator Pool 3

Plug.

^

Conclusion Freque nt inspection and physical examination of the lif ting points before lif ting the Type 2 Steam Dryer-Separator Pool Plug to reduce the potential of a load drop complies with the intent of NUREG 0612.

)

r .

~.

i .

r 1-12 Dec ember , 1981 l P-110/7.

} ,.

Name Fuel Pool - Slot Plugs (Type 3 and Type '4 )

= De scription There are four-sections of Fuel Pool (FP) slot plugs, each weighing 5.5 tons. These slot plugs are a removable' dividing wall. They are raised or lowered on one lifting point.

The Fuel Pool Slot Plug cannot be moved over the Fuel Pool because the Reactor Building Crane electrical interlocks prevent this.

A Icad drop of the FP slot plug-from one foot or less above the RB refueling floor , El. 234'-0", is acceptable. A load drop from greater than one foot could damage the refueling ficor and fuel storage pool. Damage to the Standby Liquid

-Control, Euel Pool Cooling Sys' tem heat exchanger and piping below the Reactor Building refueling floor is also possible.

Damaged caused by the drop of the FP Slot Plugs on the ider.tified safety-related equipment does not prevent safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

PBAPS FSAR Figure 10.4.1 shows that the FP Slot plugs would be removed before moving the steam separator out of the RPV and replaced af ter returning the steam separator to the vessel. If the FP slot plug is dropped , it could f all into the open RPV and onto the steam separator . penetrating the steam separator to impac t irradiated fuel.

The Fuel Pool slot plug lif ting points had been evaluated and

' found that the design safety f actor of the single lifting point is 6,, based on the ultimate strength of the material.

This does not ' meet the requirements of NUREG 0612. As an alternative to verify the intergrity of the lif ting point we propose to perform frequent inspection and physical examination of the lif ting point before each Fuel' Pool Slot Plug is lif ted.

Conclusion .

Frequent inspection and physical examination of the lif ting point before lifting each Fuel Pool Slot Plug to reduce the potential of a load drop complies with the intent of NUREG 0612.

P-110/7 1-13 December , 1981 t/

e

AttCchm:nt 2 POINT BY POINT COMPARISON ,

OF THE REACTOR BUILDING CRANE FOR EACH SECTION OF NUREG 0554

'P-212/13 2-1 December 1981 -

The following are point-by-point comparisons for each section of NUREG 0554 as supplemented by identified modification alternatives in NUREG 0612, Appendix C, as required by Attachment 1 of the December 22, 1980 letter from NRC.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

No response required to this paragraph.

2.0 SPECIFICATION AND DESIGN CRITERIA 2.1 Construction and Operating Periods The allowable design stress limits for plant operation do not exceed the values indicated in Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 of CMAA Specification 470 for Category B cranes vith a Class Al service classification.

2.2 Maximum Critical Load The Reactor Building Crane main hoist is designed to handle '

the maximum critical load (MCL) af 110 tons.

The design rated load (DRL) of 125 tons provides an overall increase of 13.6 percent in the crane's load handling ability, to compensate for wear and exposure, above its MCL capacity.

The capacity of the Reactor Building Crane auxiliary hoist to handle a maximum critical load is being evaluated. The results of the evaluation will be provided at ~a later date.

Although not single-failure-proof, the auxiliary hoist is design 3ted to handle a DRL of 5 tons. The auxiliary hoist has a minimum f actor of safety of 5 at DRL. The MCL for the Am:iliary hoist is under review by the Whiting Corpo-ration. The results of their review will be provided later.

2.3 Operating Environmer.t The crane and accessories were designed and constructed for indoor service to operate in ambient temperatures from 65'F to 100*F.

The level of radiation at the crane was estimated to be approximately 10 mrem /hr during operation, normally less than 2.5 mrem /hr during shut-down, and under certain conditions during shut-down the {adiation level may be up to 5 mrem /hr.

The crane was designed 'to make adequate alla.-tance for cor-rosion in terms of material removal and corrosion product

.. ' ' surface buildup where corrosion could not be otherwise prevenLd due to intermittent condensation on the surf aces of the crene under certain conditions.

2-1 December , 1981 P-212/13

,s '

e

The main and auxiliary hoints of this crens cro used to move large and/or fragile objects about in the water pools below.

Maximum working depths of the hocks below water level is fifty (50) feet. All footwalks, walkways and platforms are self-draining to avoid standing water.

2.4 Material Properties The crane is of "all steel construction" consisting of two welded box section girders with full length diaphragms. The girders, end trucks, trolley, bridge and operations cab as-semblies are of welded steel construction, using ASTM A-36 steel. Field connections were made with high strength steel bolts, conforming to ASTM A-325. Welding conforms to AWS D2.0.

Cast iron is not used for any component subject to tension or cyclic stress such as gears, drums and wheels.

As the minimum ambient temperature is 65'F, which exceeds the nil-ductility transition temperature requirement of 60*F in Paragraphs NC-2300 and ND-2300 of Section III of the ASME Code, the coldproof test is considered waived. This is acceptable according to the recommendations of NUREG 0612, Appendix C,

• Implementation of NUREG 0554 for Operating Plants, Item 2.

2.5 Seismic Desian The crane is designed to retain control of and hold the load, and the bridge and trolley are designed to remain in place on their respective runways with their wheels prevented from leaving the tracks during a seismic event comparable to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

2.6 Lamellar Tearing The Reactor Building crane welds were inspected by radiography or other non-der,tructive testing methods to insure soundness of the welded joints. This complies with the intent of the NUREG to assure proper welds.

2.7 Structural Fatigue A structural fatigue analy31s was not part of the design requirements for the Reactor Building crane at the time of f abr ic a tion . The Reactor Building Crane is classified as a low use crane in the guidelines of CMAA 470. Structural f atig ue is not expect,ed to be significant design concern.

2.8 Welding Proced ure ,

., ' Welding on the Reactor Building crane was required to be in conformance with AWS D 2.0. Welding procedures were addressed P-212/13 2-2 December 1981 O

in the manufacturer's. quality assurance manual. The procedures cover welding, welder quality and welder qualification.

Complete information .is available in the manufacturer's proce-dure file which is maintained by the manuf acturer's quality control department.

3.0 SAFETY FEATURES 3.1 General No response required to this paragraph.

3.2 Auxiliary Systems Each hoist has two full capacity independent brakes arranged with no single common component. Main hoist redundancy is provided through the use of two hoist cables, each with ends anchored to a drum assembly and an equalizer bar assembly contained in the upper sheave nest.

3.3 Electric Control Systems The hoist motors for both hooks as well as the bridge and trolley motions are controlled from either the cab or the pendant. The main-and auxiliary hoists are provided with magnetic controls in accordance with NEMA standards. The bridge and trolley are provided with magnetic controllers with not less than five speed points in either direction.

The main hoist is provided with an inching drive in ad-dition to the 5-point hoist control. In case of emergency, the "stop" button in the cab is pressed to arrest all motions of the crane. The pendant is provided with a toggle switch to "stop" all motions of the crane.

3.4 Emergency Repairs Emergency repair procedures will be drafted and implemented.

C s

~.

i. '

P-212/13 2-3 b?cember 1981

4.0 HOISTING MACHINERY 4.1 Reeving System The minimum impact allowance is not less than 15 percent of the rated capacity. The reeving between block and upper sheaves is designed to minimize tilt, swing, and twist of the load and block in case of separation of either rope, and the equalizer bar assembly includes double acting spring absorbers designed to absorb the shock of load transfer between ropes.

The maximum fleet angle from drum to lead sheave in the load block or between individual sheaves does not exceed 0.061 rad (3-1/2 degrees) at any one point during hoisting. Reverse bends are not used in the reeving system.

Main hoist redundancy is provided_through the use of two hoist cables, each with ends anchored to a drum assembly and an equalizer bar assembly contained in the upper sheave nest.

Each rope is reeved through block and upper sheave assemblies so that its eight parts provide two parts in each quadrant of the load block about the vertical axis of the hook. With both ropes ef fective , the load in supported by 16 parts at an

• effective static factor of safety of 7.36. If one rope loses its effectiveness, the load is supported by the 8 parts of the remaining rope at a static factor of safety of 3.68.

Galvanized wire ropes, with independent wire rope center, are 1" diameter, with an ultimate breaking strength of 109,600 lbs each.

4.2 Drum Support The drum assembly with its shafts and bearings is designed at

a. factor of safety not less than 7.5. Safety lugs are provided inside each trolley truck to sustain the drum assembly hubs in the event of drum shaf t f ailure 't either end. Upper sheave shafts and block swivel asseubly are provided with safety retainers and block housing capableFailure of sustaining the of any of load in case of shaft or swivel failure.

these parts can safely sustain the load but will not allow further operation of the hoist.

4.3 Head and Load Blocks Designed at a factor tf safety not less than 7.5, the shafts '

and bearings of the drum assembly, including the head block, is capable of supporting 200 percent _of the MCL. The minimum static factor of 3.68, resultant from effective support of

~.

2-4 December 1981 P-212/13 9

r the MCL by only one wire rope of the dual reeving system indicates adequacy of the rope reeving system to support 200 percent of the MCL. Designed to include safety f actors of 8.0 and 7.36 respectively, the load block and dual load-attaching device are capable of supporting 200 percent of the MCL static load.

4.4 Hoistirg Speed The maximum hoisting speed for the critical load is limited to 4-1/2 FPM and within the limits allowed in the " slow" column of Figure 70-6 of CMAA Specification #70, revised 1975. The rope speed at the auxiliary hoist, at rated load, is 23 FPM.

4.5 Design Against Two-Blocking Each hoist is provided with limit switches to stop the hook in its highest and lowest safe positions. Each limit switch is so wired that the drive motor can be energized in the reverse direction af ter its limit switch has opened. Two limit switches, each of dif ferent designs, and used in series, are used to limit the upward travel of each hoist hook. These are so adjusted that if one f ails to operate ,

the remaining one will shut of f power to the motor and set the brakes. The tripping device is designed so that the cables cannot jump out around the trip thus permitting the hook to raise outside the trip bar. The tripping r<thanism is also designed so that no movement of the hoist and trolley can enable any component of the tripping device or any support bracket to be jammed against any part of the crane structure, rope or sheave blocks. The actuating mechanisms of the limit switch are located so that it will trip the limit switch under all conditions of hoist load and hoist speed in sufficient time to prevent contact of upper and lower blocks. This is acceptable according to the recommen-dations of NUREG 0612, Appendix C, Implementation of NUREG 0554 for Operating Plants, Item 7.

4.6 Lifting Device s Two separate ropes are led from the drum, each being reeved through a set of upper and lower block sheaves and back to an equalizer bar arranged for equal division of the load between the two ropes.' 'With both ropes f unctioning and equalized, the safety' factor of the ropes is 7.36 on a static basis. If one rope f ails, the remaining rope will support

,the load with a residual safety f actor of 3.68 on a static *

, basis. The residual safety f actor , except for the Orywell and RPV Head Strongback, of 3.68 is in excess of the three times the weight of the MCL f actor set forth in Article 6.2.3 of ANSI N14.6-1978.

2-5 December , 1981 P-212/13

All sheaves, both upper and block sheaves, are contained in heavy structural casings which usually carry a negligible load. In the event of a sheave pin failure, the sheaves would rise to the top of the block or drop to the base of the upper sheave housing and stop at those points, and load drop is prepluded. The block assembly contains two 100%

capacity hooks or " load carrying devices". This redundancy in attachment to lifting assembly and in load carrying capability are such that a single f ailure will not cause load drop. Ultrasonic and magnaflux testing for the load block swivel and the sheave shaf ts of the upper assembly provided further assurance that this crane is of a quality suitable for nuclear services. Electrical circuits have been reviewed and it has been determined that no single credible electrical component failare will cause the load to drop.

The attachment of-the cask to the two hooks uses a redundant yoke assembly and redundant attachment to the cask to carry out the same single failure proof concept, i.e., no single ,

failure will cause a load drop), employed in the Reactor Building crane design.

The Drywell and RPV Strongback is to be evaluated by General Electric for compliance with NUREG 0612. Results will be submitted at a later date.

4.7 Wire Rope Protec tion During the periodic ins pec tion , the hoist drums are inspec ted . The main-hoist will be run to its upper limit and ' the ropes are inspected for overlapping on the hoist drums.

The main hoist is provided with unbalanced load light.

Actuation of the red rotating light on the trolley indicates that the main hook is tilted to one side and an impending rope f ailure. The crane load will then be lowered and balanced evenly. The cables will be inspected before further operation.

Procedures M17.1 and .M17.2 describe the test and operation of the hoists for phe protection of the wire ropes from rope overlapping and unba~1anced loading.

^

,J P-212/13 2-6 December 1981

+.

4.8 Machinery Alignment The single hoist motor drives two separate shaf ts. The motor has two centrifugally tripped limit switches, one outboard of each hoist input pinion at each end of the motor shaft assem-bly. These provide an automatic safety shutdown and protection from any control or motor malf unction which might result in a runaway condition of the load. Each motor driven shaf t passes through a 150% capacity solenoid actuated brake. A failure of either the motor shaft, the connecting shafts, or the shaft couplings singly would not result in a load drop as the brakes would be ef fective in holding the load. On loss of power to the motor, both brakes engage. They can also be engaged by the crane operater. Additionally, there is a 90% capacity eddy-current brake to limit the rate of load lowering.

Af ter the brake each motor shaf t enters its own gear reducer.

If a component of one gear case such as gear teeth, shafts, bearings or structural component, should fail, the other gear reducer will hold the load with its brake with a safety factor of 5.

Each gear case is fitted on its output end with an pinion meshing with the drum gear. A failure of a pinion, drum gear, pinion shaft or pinion bearing will result in the load being carried by the other similiar set of parts on the other end of the drum. Again a safety factor of 5 remains in the functioning parts. In each of the main hoist gear cases, there will be a mechanical load brake, with cooling of the gear case oil, to offer additional safety in load handling.

In the event of f ailure of the dt om shaf t, drum bearing , or

~

drum bearing bracket, the drum flange will drop a fraction of an inch onto machined structural seats so located that the drum is supported and the remaining pinion and gear will stay in mesh to restrain the load. A safety factor of 5 will still remain.

4.9 Hoist Braking System The Main and Auxiliary Hoists each have self adjusting solenoid load braking. In addition to the above braking capability, AC eddy-current brakes are provided for each hoist. One of the two holding brakes.is controlled through a time delay relay so that the brake is applied automatically following a slight time delaf from the application of the first holding brake. The torque rating of each brake is not less,than 150%

- of rated full load motor torque. The brakes automatically set when current is cut off from the hoist motor, and are S

equally, effective in both directions of motor rotation.

'I-212/13 2-7 December 1981

The holding brakes are located such that there is no coupling between the brake and the hoist pinion gear shafts. The pinion shaf ts extend beyond the gear case suf ficient to apply the brake to this shafting.  !

5.0 BRIDGE AND TROLLEY 5.1 Braking Capacity The bridge and trolley and hoist brakes are in accordance with Rule 192 of the Pennysivania Crane Code. The bridge has one hydraulically operated foot brake and one magnetic parking brake which automatically sets on loss of power.

The magnetic parking brake is rated at not less than 100% of the drive motor full load torque with which it is associated.

The trolley has two magnetic holding brakec which automatic-ally set on loss of power. Each of the trolley brakes has a torque rating equal to at least 50% of the drive motor full load torque rating. . The bridge and trolley are provided with magnetic co- trollers with at least five speed points in either direction. Resistance is proportioned to give accur-ate speed control. Simultaneous operation of the bridge and trolley motions is provided under any operating condition whether these motions are controlled through the master switches located in the cab or the pendant controls. The main hoist is provided with an inching drive capable of driving any main hook load at a single reversing speed of

< four inches per minute. The inching drive is supplementary 4 to the 5-point hoist control mechanism and provides unlimited slow speed operation without causing overheating of the drive and hoist controls.

52 Safety Stops The crane is provided with bridge spring bumpers with suf fi-cient energy absorbing capacity to stop the crane when at a speed of 40% of full load rated speed. Bumpers are mounted so that there is no direct shear on bolts and that no part can fall from the crane in the event of breakage. Trolley spring bumpers are capable of stopping the trolley, unloaded, when traveling in either direction at 40% of full load rated s peed . Bridge stops are provided for crane runway rails.

Safety cables are provided for the crane to prevent movement of the bridge Jm trollgy during a tornado when in the parked potition. ,

i 2-8 De cember , 1981 P-212/13 i

, - - - -, ,- - ,. _ _ n -,v.,- - - . . , , - . . , . . , , - - - ~ --.,w. -.-r , ,, . - - , .

6.0 DRIVERS AND CONTROLS 6.1 Driver Selec tion All motors are totally enclosed non-ventilated with ball bearing construction, Class B insulation, and rated at 75'C rise, 30 minutes. Motors are 460 volt, 3 phase, 60 Hz wound rotor type of ample capacity for the specified speeds and service requirements. Maximum and normal working ambient temperatures for all motors are 100*F and 75'F, respectively.

All motors are moisture protected. As a minimum this includes non-hygroscopic insulation, space heaters and plating, and/or treating of all critical mechanical components.

i 6.2 Driver Control Systems The hoist motors for both hooks as well as the bridge and trolley motions are controlled from either the cab or the pe ndant. The pendant includes an incoming main power control switch which can cut all incoming power to the crane. The main and auxiliary hoists are provided with magnetic controls in accordance with NEMA standards. Each control panel and

master switch is marked with the name of the motion it controls, and each piece of equipment is marked to indicate its function. There is a separate controller for each crane mocion.

~

+.3 Malfunction Protection The crane is provided with two centrifugally-tripped speed limit switches to provide an automatic safety shutdown and protection from 'any control or motor malf unciton which might result in a runaway condition of the load. A centrifugal limit switch is provided for protection of the clutch and gearmotor of the main heist inching drive. The switch shall prevent engagement of the drive if the main hoist motor shaft speed is greater than that produced by the gearhead motor. The switch also prevents engaging or disengaging of the drive when the hoist is in motion or when the load is not being held by the hoist brakes.

6.4 ' Slow Speed Dr ives Increment drive for the . main hoist is provided by an inching motor drive. Magnetig controllers for the bridge and trolley are provided with not l'ess than five speed points for slow speed operation.

r P-212/13 2-9 December, 1981

s. '

e

6.5 Safety Devices The bridge and trolley are provided with limit switches to prevent over-travel in either direction. Each hoist is provided with limit switches to stop each hook in its highest and lowest safe position. Two limit switches are provided for automatic safety shutdown which might result in a runaway condition of the load. The crane is provided with travel limit switches to preclude passage of the load over the Fuel Pool area.

6.6 Control Stations The operating controls and provisions for emergency controls for the overhead handling system are located in a cab on the bridge. The Crane is equipped with a pendant for remote control of crane movements. There is a switch in the cab which prevent the operation of the crane from pendant and cab simultaneously.

7.0 INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS 7.1 General Installation instructions, together with requirements for installation, testing and preparations for operation were provided by the manufacturer.

7.2 Construction and Operating Periods Pre-operational testing prior to plant operation was done after completion of the construction phase. These tests were to verify the crane complied with the design requirements.

There was no requirement for non-destructive testing at the time the plant was put into commercial operation. The pre-operational testing performed complies with the intent of NUREG 0554 to verify the soundness of the crane for use'during plant operation.

8.0 TESTING AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE 8.1 General The pre-operational testing results demonstrate the proper installation of the crane. The results of these tests are available at the site.-

t 2-10 December 1981 P-212/13

.-/

e

8.2 Static and Dynamic Load Tests USAS B30.2-1967 was in force at the time the Reactor Building crane was provided. The static and dynamic load tests required by USAS B30.2-1967 are identical to those required by ANSI B30.2-1976 currently in force. A static load test at 125 percent of the rated load , or 156.5 tons, and a dynamic load test at the rated load, or 125 tons would have been required. Satisfactory performance of these tests would indicate the crane was exposed to static and dynamic test loads in excess of the comparable MCL loads addressed in Paragraph 8.2 of NUREG-0554.

8.3 Two-Block Test Each hoist is furnished with two independent travel limit switches as allowed by Paragraph 4.5 of NUREG-0554. Veri-fication of the proper functioning of the limit switches meets the intent of NUREG 0554 for the required two block testing. This is acceptable according to the recommendations of NUREG 0612, Appendix C, Implementation of NUREG 0554 for Operating Plants, Items 8 and 9. .

The testing of limit switches is performed monthly or prior to use if longer than 30 days. Procedure M 17.1 describes the requirements of the limit switch test.

8.4 Operational Tests Operational tests of crane systems are performed to verify the proper functioning of all limit switches and other safety Procedure M 17.1 describes the test made on the

~

devices.

Reactor Building Crane prior to use.

8.5 Maintenance Maintenance manuals were provided by the crane manufacturer.

9.0 OPERATING MANUAL Operating manuals were provided by the crane manuf acturer.

10.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE Complete quality ass $rance information relative to manufacture of the crane is avail ~able in the manufacturer's procedure file which is maintained by the manufacturer's quality control

. department.

,P-212/13 2-11 December 1981

Attcchmant 3 ANALYSIS OF PLANT STRUCTURES s

P-100(c)/6 3-1 December 1981

/.

e

Attcchment 3 ANALYSIS OF PLANT STRUCTURES The following are the assumptions and descriptions of the methology used for the load drop analysis in various areas of the plant. The analyses conducted demonstrate compliance with criteria III and IV of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS / ASSUMPTIONS To proceed with the analysis of a load drop of miscellaneous unidentified items on a given slab, the following assumptions were made:

1) Material properties of the falling object:

Assumed to be made of steel.

2) Area of Contact of Impact:

The configuration of the falling object when contact is made with the slab, at the instant impact velocity approaches zero, was assumed to be 100 sq. in, with an -

equivalent diameter at impact of 11.3".

The data requested under this section is shown in the enclosed table to this Attachment on pages 3-3a to 3-3c.

2. METHOD OF ANALYSIS -

For the analysis of floor slabs for heavy load drops, the basic approach has been to assess the impact effects in terms of local damage and structural response.

LocaI damage is checked in terms of perforations through the slab and spalling of concrete. Available empirical

~

formulae are used to assess local damage. Structural response is assessed in terms of deformation limits, strain energy capacity, structural integrity and structural stability.

For each load drop, critical impact location is deter-mined from the load path. Properties of the slab are defined using its geometry, section properties, material strengths, deformation limits, strain energy absorption capacity,. stability characteristics and dynamic response characteristics.

P2100(c)/6 3-1 December 1981

l l

i Structural response of the slab is obtained by using interface forcing functions and resistance & dynamic characteristics of the slab. Analytical, and numerical

' techniques are used to predict the structural response.

4 Alternatively, the mathematical model of the slab J is used to determine the structural response by the application of the principle of conservation of momentum

and energy balance techniques. Due consideration is given for the type of impact (elastic or plastic).

{

It is required to ensure that the local damage and structural response (maximum deformation) will not impair the function of safety related items.

3. CO :CLUSIot:S Refer to the conclusions of the discussions under Section 2.3 for the different overhead handling systems.

i 4

i I-P-100(c)/3 3-2 December 1981

s. '

e

l l ci r r i o t e

l f e .

s e ao t i r l r e s e i r

ees 6 s f a

trpe*n 3 3 0 t oi - 0 k_ 3 t

n art' MP A 0 4

0 6 ~1 e 3

e [ o m f l c e h a  :

c a o u a ns I t P t in f n t dbo + 1 i A ami E 1 v

oot L

b .

s t a

e -:

- f gc s ar u i n ro r o DF t a

s s ) "2 e n /

1 t-r 1

R n i f -

b k - 7 l p 9 a c l i t

F '

- s 1,

( 1 a r S h m T i e x b t t - n m i ct r e d ai f h c erpnn S n n romi w r l t i D a

CFI L y E o r ~

mi t o or .

t n o e T p o l " z Cm i F 0 1

t u t - o R s a g t T n c n '4 s S A

/

o i 3 f -

v L l 2 9 r T s e l u

N n p u .

A o o f 1 n r

L i r e E P t i

D R t

i F d )

c O n t n

• _ o o h I 0 "0 "0 _

l S c pg - - - - e I ol t '

'0 v S l Y

L a

i re Dif P

(

'l l_ 4 L w

A t *t )

"0 " p N i c n 0 e

u i r

A n I

aa pe I.q 9 0 0 v e

4 1 1 t mr _

i t ns I A S( t m s f y

)

S e n i n

P 1 1 1 A

o. aavd I 1 1 / e teoK Nl L ( n r

h t ,

il

. t l

t a i

d ne t c

n vk n o ,

Oat g r

i , i t

p 5

1 5

1 l

as i f .

)

e i 2 2

- i t

i o er l b

r c e 1 1 nm e ra I r 1 i

g s n . ,

a 2

t i

l e a ,

l 1

- r a c g D r C

b C m 3 en t

a e l t n d g -

n n .o a n ( m a n e e t r i i c m isf o r

i o d w w t A t t

.c rc dw m l l t t i i e e o t d u t b 1 at s l e n B  ;

s d e t

s E w

• a r i t d a a em m h As mIr t

t o t

P l o l o r aO P -

t s c t y C y C m - - -

o 6 e*

l o u l n - n B- t e

• E I s R S A D A

• H 1 S

. a b c 1 t 3 4 5 o 1 N

b s llI fi i,  :)!> l i I l

2,,._

ANALYSIS OP PIANT STRUCTt!RES 5 Initini conditions /7ssumntions No . Wt.of Impact Drop Holst and Load Description y Area Height Credit Slab i Drag 1 Drop Location Load Ma ter ial

2. (r.IPS) (Sq . In) (Pt-fr.) Thicknens Forces a- Pr r Wrbine Du11dttv; Crane ~

ot Assurmi Im3 (Pt-in)

2. 5 100;* --

9 p

--60'-0* E1 116'-0* None 3'-0*

As.in Y None E+I Item 1

3. %0 8'-0*

Diesel Cmerator Crarwr inn ** t V

Asstret Im1 3 . o.

4. 4.5_

_utir Diesel Cenerato '

- - - - - V

- hirculation Pury H l.bist Snnee nitbj., E1. 127'- 0a

-- - 3/4" steel Plate 3/4* stml Platb A-F' N Dicht .

g ..

yy

..As in

b. .- _.

Omerator Ritor

5. 15

_ Ny> Structure Crane "bo *

• 12'-0* ~ 7I~ ~

a. IG"M psyp and Fuive 3'-0* ~

~

- ~

~ ~

14.5 Ptry Stncture ~

73 0'-6* El. 130'-6*

b. 2'-0*

HIYN ptmp frotor ortly

6. 7.5 73 Iwaniel lock Holst l'-0# ~ y ~ ~ ~

Persumel Air Inck 2'-0*

7 48 reactor 0163 15 *Rrn Yard Crane 315 0'-9" El. 135'-0*

A W. lond 2 '- 3*

30 100** low tor Bla}.

l 2'-6* El . 135 '-0", "Ibt 1 rs 3'-0*

i

( 6 100**

4'-0* y V -

3'.o*

15 100**

D./_G Did . Rnfi._ _

, 3'-0*- El . 160 '-0* --

1

__.Vi _2'-6* _ ._

_Y_ ._,

V i

j V

L norember, tant P,vy. 3-3b I

j w '

~

l f e rr a o&t i r e ta 1 n

reslr upeec t oien m

1 l Y L

=

w r

I 1

Jnn st l

c artt o s t Ai 3 NP Sc A S -

3 a 1 P ns in +

f l

P dbo E ami oot Lc s

gc e

'v

_ F 1

ar r ro DF e

t _

s n s ) T e n r t n i 'J o * . . a

-

• f I 3 g g b k - 0 t .

a c t

'l - a l - ,

1 l i F l

'2 S h ( '3 p 3 _ ,

T r e

t t - b i ct r s d ais .

e S n e pmr m c E o R i Cr'micI" I L a

t

- _ _.V D e

tf t , . .

T o y ..

C r U u o n a .

l R s i p .

1 t.

T s t "0 a, a r - 4" S A

/ c c '3 @"0 l

B-T 10 9 -

l B _

T s o 5 ng L y t r'5 e N n A o p r

1 rM i Y e 3 t 1 L i w N~l e ibrq* .

P t P d i

D o

r I l

E

%1E p DE n .

n1 T

u O n p o )

c n o _

S c I

pg t

h I "0

0 i

t _ "0 ,

• 0 r .

S l - - -

t a Y -

d Y a oi t '

'0 L i re P 5 2

'4 S 6 '8 d A t DH ( - n N i _

• e A n t )

• _ l I *c n * " _ *

• 0 aa I.q 0 g a 0 0 t

pe 0 0

0 j 0 o n

r r 1 1 g f

y 1 1

o I A S f

(

) 0 f y S 6 o.aa vdP I i 6 8 0 e teoK o 4 6 3 h WHL ( t,

_ e

- k t

a n t t s o t s l o i s l o t t l o H p o t H d i H l a e r s r v e l r i o n c o t o a i

s H er r a e

h m p C f D l p

_ y e v t b e e b v n i

d r ,

o s

t d i o a a

. a i e P n J e r-l o l o r n

I .

C s L D s d t

b d o 1 d_ doa e

( n . i

=a u

e e m,a d

n a q I o t g m t l

a I cc tr.

A e

. g Y

r-a t dn h

T u

2 l

u F c

s d

= r m a

• u e a_

t y r u = T

• s t n s r .

a t a z e t i w t I' t s

• l s r s cr ss o O 5 n o

H h As t

b I

s A M A B W.C I

- 1 A 2

o . . 0 1 n _

N 8 9 1 1 1 i, ,  : . ?l ! !11  : l;! ;lj;]ji! '  ;!1j  : ' ,!: l