ML20248E387

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Requests Results of Util Study Comparing parallel-two-diesel Single Bus Sys in Order to Complete Evaluation,Per 700924 Meeting Re Design Criteria for Pipe Whip Protection & Proposed Onsite Emergency Power Sys
ML20248E387
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/19/1970
From: Morris P
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: Andrea George
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
Shared Package
ML20248A375 List:
References
NUDOCS 8910050211
Download: ML20248E387 (2)


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-Docket No. 50-333 I

Power Authority of the State of Ucw York NITN: Mr. Asa George 10 Columbus Circle J5, 2A. 3 ' / (

New York, Ucw York 10019

- Centioment

' At a aceting held on September 24, 1970 concerning the status of certain matters to be resolved during the construction of the FitzPatrick Nucicar Power Plant, we discussed the design criteria under consideration with regt,rd to pipe whip protection and the proposed on-site cacrgency power system.

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2 fyar#( You indicated that ycur criteria for pice whip protection were ctated in (fL# _ Supplement 13 to your application and include a statencnt that the mini-1 Eus acEcyttrble core cooling uould consist of either a single core spray systen or two of four low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pumps. We

~s noted that the adecuacy of the core coolinn provided by only two LPCI pu:aps has uat haua deususLtated Lv uut nutisfaction. U ud'upin infut-h mation that we have considered in previous reviews, we conclude that the combination of a partial LPCI system (consisting of two pumps) and 1 core spray system is acceptable, but that two LPCI pumps alone would

not be adequate. .

.i Unless the results of a rigorous analysis, including appropriate experi-mental justification, can be provided to support your statement, Lour; i proposed criteria for pipe whip protection for engineered safety. featuresi; s2Tould be revised with regard to the emergency core cooling systems whicl are ' to'be protected from the. effects of pipe whip.

l 7 You indicated at the meeting that you had completed a study of the advan-tages and disadvantages of the two diesel singic bus system and the one diesel single bus systen. To complete our evaluation of the acceptability t

of the parallel-two-diesel single bus system, we need the results of your study comparing the two systems. Your diccussion should include considera-tion of the need for synchauule.ution. Fu t Lhe t- um uuted lu ihe leitet f a u,,,

the Advisory Conmittee on Reactor Safegua:ds, dated January 27, 1970, regarding testing, describe your picns to demonstrate ".. . rigorous, realirric i

8910050211 890921

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PDR ADDCK 05000333 O PDR y

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54 Power Authority of the State of

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t preoperational and inservice trsting program [to] be undertaken on the l l diesel system which is adopted." A discussion of suitabic alternatives

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j should bo deceribed that may have to be considered in the event the system a selected does not meet design requirements.

i Picase contact us should you wish to set up a meeting to discuss the fore-going matters further.

Sincerely,

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Peter A. Morris, Director -

! Division of Reactor Licensing

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