ML20198B453

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Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Insp Resource Planning Meeting on 981110.Historical Listing of Plant Issues Encl
ML20198B453
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/10/1998
From: Rogge J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Michael Colomb
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
References
NUDOCS 9812180168
Download: ML20198B453 (21)


Text

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December 10, 1998' Mr. Michael J. Colomb Site Executive Officer New York Power Authority

' James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Post Office Box 41 Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT:

MID-YEAR INSPECTION RESOURCE PLANNING MEETING

.(IRPM) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK

Dear Mr. Colomb:

On November 10,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting (IRPM). The IRPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region I to adjust inspection schedules, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance, Review cycle in l

May 1999. contains a historicallisting of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during the IRPM process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and the New York Power Authority. The IRPM may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normalissuance of l

NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.

l This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the James A.

FitzPatrick IRPM review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and l

to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 6 months.

I Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

)

We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan, if you have any questions, please contact me at 1-610-337-5146.

Sincerely, Original Signed by:

John F. Rogge, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects j

9912180168 981210 PDR ADOCK 05000333 I

P pon OFFICIAL RECORD COPY AEHO (h' f W

Michael J. Colomb 2

Docket Nos. 50-333

Enclosures:

1) Plant issues Matrix
2) Inspection Plan cc w/encis:

C. D. Rappleyea, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer E. Zeltmann, President and Chief Operating Officer R. Hiney, Executive Vice President for Project Operations J. Knubel, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President H. P. Salmon, Jr., Vice President of Engineering

- W. Josiger, Vice President - Engineering and Project Management J. Kelly, Director - Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering R. Deasy, Vice President - Apprahal and Compliance Services R. Patch, Director - Quality Assurance G. C. Goldstein, Assistant General Counsel C. D. Faison, Director, Nuclear Licensing, NYPA K. Peters, Licensing Manager T. Morra, Executive Chair, Four County Nuclear Safety Committee

~ Supervisor, Town of Scriba C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York G. T. Goering, Consultant, New York Power Authority J. E. Gagliardo, Consultant, New York Pcwer Authority E. S. Beckjord, Consultant, New York P.

mr Authority F. William Valentino, President, New Yoi. Star Energy Research and Developm. int Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

. = _ _.. _ -

l 1

Michael J.'Colomb 3

l Distribution w/encis:

H. Miller, RA/W. Axelson, DRA (1)

C. Heh!, DRP J. Wiggins, DRS R. Crienjak, DRP i

L. Nicholson, DRS DRS Branch Chiefs H. Gray, DRS P. Frechette, DRS 1

D. Silk, DRS

)

J. McFadden, DRS J. Lanning, DRP J.Rogge,DRP P. Kaufman, DRP l

R. Barkley, DRP M. Oprendek, DRP R.Junod,DRP Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector

- Region i Docket Room (with concurrences)

Distribution w/ encl: (VIA E-MAIL)

B. McCabe, RI EDO Coordinator S. Bajwa, NRR J. Williams, NRR M. Campion, RI inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)

R. Correia, NRR DOCDESK DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ BRANCH 2\\lRPM-LTR.FPZ To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE Rl/DRP Og P Rl/DRP l

NAME PKaufmaOyj(( JRogge V DATE 11gA98 lj/p/98 O'FFICIAL RECORD COPY

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 8/23/98 Pcsitive IR 98-04 N

OPS 1A The inspectors observed plant shutdown and startup activities on August 9 and 18, 1998. During control room observations, operator attentiveness, procedure adherence, shift turnovers, log keeping, and control of activities were found to be good. Supervisory oversight and communication were good. In-plant operators were knowledgeable of system and equipment functions.

8/23/98 Negative IR 98-04 S

OPS 1A On July 31,1998, during an operations evolution to collect boundary valve leakage to 3A a 55 gallon drum, the drum overflowed onto a motor control center associated with the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system resulting in the HPCI system becoming inoperable. The cause of the drum overflowing was that operators incorrectly estimated the valve laakage rate and did not monitor the drum status, leaving the drum unattended. Additionally, station procedures do not provide any cautions regarding draining systems.

8/23/98 Positive IR 98-04 N

OPS 18 Operation crew response, including abnormal operating procedure and emergency 3A operating procedure implementation, to the August 3,1998, low reactor water level scram was appropriate.

8/23/98 NCV 1R 98-04 S

OPS 1A On August 3,1998, improper return of the A condensate pump to service following Negative NCV 98-04-01 1C maintenance resulted in a feedwater transient and automatic low rector water level scram. The cause was attributed to a technically incorrect pumo restoration procedure. Additionally, licensee personnel including engineering, operations and management, did not recognize the plant operational risk associated with the pump restoration.

7/12/98 NCV IR 98-03 S

OPS 1A On June 9,1998, with the decay heat removal (DHR) system in service, the spent Negative NCV 98-03-01 1C fuel pool (SFP) water level was lowered to a point at which the DHR pump lost suction. The cause was that the temporary operating procedure referenced incorrect SFP water levels. The licensee's development of a temporary procedure was inadequate in that reference points for controlling spent fuel pool level was based upon assumptions rather than plant drawings.

7/12/98 NCV IR 98-03 S

OPS 1A Operators failed to properly implement the decay heat removal (DHR) operating Negative NCV 98-03-02 3A procedure. Due to poor housekeeping, operators did not complete the DHR operating procedure when the DHR system was placed in service. This resulted in the remote alarm circuit for the DHR system to not be enabled.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 1 of 17 September 30,1998 1

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 7/12/98 Negative IR 98-03 N

OPS 1A Operator performance regarding the troubleshooting and operation of the 3A uninterruptible power supply power source was poor. Operators failed to initially notice the abnormal line-up following the ground isolation procedure. Also, operators demonstrated a lack of questioning attitude and weak system knowledge when the dualindication was discovered on the attemate feed breaker. As a result the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) was lost 7/12/98 Negative IR 98-03 N

OPS 2A The inspector identified that the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system flow controller in the control room was indicating less than the required amount The HPCI system was determined to be operable and the licensee corrective actions to replace the controller were prompt 7/2/98 Positive IR 98-02 N

OPS 1C The annual operating enminations were condacted in a professional manner with thorough and objective documentation and evaluations of each operator and crew performances. The inspector agreed with the evaluators that all observed individuals and crews passed the examinations.

7/2/98 VIO IR 98-02 N

OPS 1C Violations of requirements were identified with respect to the Licansed Operator Negative VIO 98 3B Requalification Training program implementation conceming the inadequate contro!

05&06&O7 of the annual operating examination duplication and the sampling of required content of the examination.

7/2/98 VIO IR 98-02 N

OPS 1C Two plant procedures were not adequate conceming assigned duties of the on-shift Negative VIO 98-02-02&O3 senior nuclear operator and plant operations during degraded core flow conditions.

Specifically, an administrative procedure was not adequate, because it a!! owed the on-shift operator to direct the licensed activities of licensed operators. Also, abnormal operating procedure AOP-8, Loss of Coolant Flow, was not adequate in that a power to flow map was incorrect and inconsistent 7/2/98 VIO IR 98-02 L

OPS 1B On May 1,1998, operators appropriately inserted a manual reactor scram due to Negative VIO 98-02-01 3B alarms indicating a control rod drift condition and operator actions to control reactor pressure vessel water level were acceptable. However, the licensee identified an operator performance issue concerning the use of emergency operating procedures (EOPs). Specifically, operators used an incorrect procedure to verify that all control rods were full-in.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 2 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 4/19/98 VIO IR 98-01 N

OPS 1C The licensee's method of testing secondary containment did not take into account the Negative VIO 98-01-01 4C single train isolation design of the reactor building isolation system. The licensee took prompt corrective actions once the issue was identified by the inspectors. The testing method currently being utilized will assist in identifying potential problems with the reactor building ventilation valves. The inadequate testing was determined to be a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI " Test Control."

4/19/98 Positive IR 98-01 N

OPS 1B Poor recirculation pump reliability resulted in challenges to operators by necessitating the conduct of single loop operations. Operator responses to the transients, use of procedures and the control of single loop operations wece good. Senior licensee management provided additional management oversight during the operations which were conducted.

2/22/98 Negative IR 97-10 N

OPS SB Errors associated with implementing the corrective action program and administration SC of the action commitment tracking system (ACTS) were identified. These errors were administrative in nature and the licensee implemented corrective actions to resolve the discrepancies.

2/22/98 Positive IR 97-10 N

OPS 1B On January 16, a partialloss of control room annunciators was caused by an 3A unexpected electrical short during maintenance activities. Operators demonstrated good use of procedures, including the emergency plan, to respond to the event. The approach to retum the annunciators to service was well developed and appropriate management involvement v.as noted.

2/22/98 VIO IR 97-10 N

OPS 3A During maintenance activities, the licensee disabled one channel of the radiation Negative VIO 97-10-01 1C monitor system and impacted the operable train of the standby gas treatment system (SBGTS) with the other SBGTS out of service. Poor review of Technical Specification (TS) requirements resulted in making inoperable the automatic start function on high radiation in the reactor building below the refuel floor for the SBGTS.

The licensee did not complete the required TS actions to isolate containment and start the SBGTS until the condition was identified by the NRC 1/20/98 Negative IR 97-08 N

OPS SB The quality of the licensee's review of troubleshooting activities for a DC ground was mixed. The licensee's immediate corrective actions were appropriate and the root cause analysis was critical of operations staff but lacked in-depth review of the work control process.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 3 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED -

FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 10/23/97 VIO IR 97-08 S

OPS 3A Operator error while performing an electrical ground isolation abnormal operating Negative VIO 97-08-01 1C procedure. Breakers were operated out of sequence which caused inadvertent automatic operation of high pressure coolant injection valves. The pre-evolution brief was weak.

12/7/97 Positive IR 97-08 N

OPS 1A The shutdown for the December 7,1997 forced outage was safe and well controlled.

Good command and control, communication and procedure adherence were noted.

Reactor startup was safe and prudent.

12/15/97 Negative IR 97-09 N

OPS 3B The quality of the initial submittal of the licensed operator exam was not at the level that met NRC expectations. The final exam was acceptable. The submitted exam was not capable of discriminating between acceptable and unacceptable license candidates. Poor written question distractors, correlation, and lack of balance.

12115/97 Positive IR 97-09 N

OPS 3B All 8 applicants for licensed operators passed the exam. All applicants were well prepared for the exam. On the operating test, examiners noted very good performance regarding team work, use of prints, communication, procedure use, and peer checking. Weak performance was noted related to an attemate path task related to the refueling interlock test.

11/21/97 Negative LER 97-011 S

OPS 3A Invalid ESF actuation and failure to perform technical specification required LER 1C actions while performing troubleshooting activities. Personnel error and procedural deficiencies.

11/17/97 Negative IR 97-07 N

OPS SC An improperly substituted component (tachometer generator brushes) for the recirculation system by a vendor ultimately resulted in plant single loop operation due to recirculation motor generator set oscillations. The licensee generated an action commitment tracking system item to plan replacement of the brushes for the other recirculation loop with a due date of about 1 year past the potential failure date of the brushes based on the due date, this planned corrective action was not prudent and could result in an unplanned plant transient.

7/12/98 Negative IR 98-03 S

MAINT 2A Two scram discharge instrument volume vent and drain valves experienced 2B degraded performance during testing which resulted in commencement of a normal plant shutdown. Maintenance was conducted, the valves were made operable and the plant shutdown was secured. The preventive maintenance program for the valves was considered to be weak as it contributed to the valve's failure.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 4 of 17 Septemter 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 7/12/98 NCV IR 98-03 S

MAINT SA The surveillance testing for the control room ventilation system was not property Negative NCV 98-03-04 4C developed in that the testing did not account for single failure design of the system motor operated valves (MOVs). The licensee had a previous opportunity to correct the test in 1995, but did not consider the additional impact on the control room ventilation system when the power supply for the inlet MOV was changed as the licensee did not recognize the requirement to test for single failure.

7/12/98 Positive IR 98-03 N

MAINT SB The licensee's extent of condition review for a previous violation related to ventilation system testing requirements enabled the licensee to identify a control room ventilation system testing deficiency. The licensee's immediate corrective actions to isolate the control room venti!ation system were timely and the extent of condition review was appropriate.

7/2/98 Negative IR 98-02 S

MAINT 28 Turbine bypass valve degradation was determined to be caused by stem to disc connection degradation. A weak maintenance procedure resulted in improper reassembly of the turbine bypass valves by the licensee. The licensee corrective actions were appropriate.

7/2/98 Positive IR 98-02 N

MAINT 3A The equipment failure evaluation, which was conducted for the failed rod position information system power supply, was thorough and included an industry experience review and an extent of condition review to determine the appropriate preventive maintenance task and frequency for similar systems. Additionally, licensee troubleshooting efforts associated with the rod position information system were well implemented.

7/2/98 Negative IR 98-02 N

MAINT 2B On May 1,1998, the rod position information system power supply failed, resulting in 2A false control rod drift indications, which led operators to insert a manual reactor scram. although the maintenance rule was applied to the rod position information system, appropriate preven'ive maintenance had not been identified and, therefore, not performed. The revie v conducted in 1995 to determine what preventive maintenance tasks were appropriate for the rod position information system power supply was weak, and therefore system reliability was affected.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 5 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 4/19/98 NCV LER 97-08 S

MAINT SC The discharge piping for the standby gas treatment system became obstructed Negative IR 98-01 4A resulting in both trains of the standby gas treatment system being inoperable. The licensee took immediate actions to clear the obstruction and has planned to inspect the common discharge line during the next refueling outage. The licensee's corrective actions for a similar previous event were poorly implemented and not effective in preventing the recurrence of the problem. The failure to preclude repetition of a probtem which resulted in making the standby gas treatment system inoperable is a Violation. However, because the first occurrence of the condition was greater than 2 years ago, the safety consequences were minimal and the current corrective actions appear reasonable, this violation is being treated as a Non-cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

4/19/98 Positive IR 98-01 N

MAINT SC The licensee appropriately addressed the failure of the "B" emergency diesel 28 generator to complete its start sequence. Quality assurance and managerial involvement were evident in the troubleshooting of the problem. Although the licensee was unable to determine the direct cause of the failure, actions to replace suspected components in the start circuitry and increase testing frequency were reasonable. Also, past corrective actions associated with speed indication circuitry were reasonable.

4/19/98 Negative IR 98-01 N

MAINT 2A Poor recirculation pump reliability resulted in challenges to operators by necessitating I

the conduct of single loop operations. Single loop operations, which are normally an l

infrequently performed evolution, were conducted on April 4. April 8, and April 17, 1998.

2/22/98 Negative IR 97-10 N

MAINT 2A A full face gasket on an inspection port degraded because of flow turbulence and resulted in the "B" standby gas treatment system fan being inoperable. There was no guidance for the type of gasket to be installed. The licensee's review of and corrective actions for the problem were of sufficient scope and depth.

2/72 /9 8 Negative IR 97-10 N

MAINT 3A An electrical short unexpectedly occurred during a power supply replacement intended to eliminate control room operator nuisance alarms, resulting in a partial loss of annunciators. Technical manualinformation conceming operation of the annunciator power supply was not fully utilized in the work planning process for annunciator power supply replacement. This resulted in a delay in restoring control room annunciators in order to conduct additional research into how to restore the annunciator function.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 6 of 17 September 30,1998

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK

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Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 12/21/97 Negative LER 97-12 L

MAINT 3A Drywell personnel airlock outer door seals LLRT not property performed. Loss of LER configuration control caused failure to perform LLRT for personnel airlock.

12/21/97 Negative IR 97-08 N

MAINT 2B The licensee's use of junction boxes for temporary storage of parts was considered to be a poor work practice.

10/24/97 Negative IR 97-08 S

MAINT 3A Work control activities associated with troubleshooting to locate a DC ground were VIO 1C unsatisfactory and resulted in an invalid engineered safeguards feature actuation 3C signal for the high pressure coolant injection system. The fact that the primary containment isolation system was inoperable was not recognized and therefore the technical specification limiting condition for operation was not entered.

12/21/97 Positive IR 97-08 N

MAINT 3A Extensive supervisor involvement was noted during emergency diesel generator SC activities. Emergent issues were effectively addressed through good coordination between licensee departments.

1/7/98 Positive IR 97-80 N

MAINT 2B The licensee implemented a very effective, thorough maintenance rule program.

Structures, systems and components, performance criteria, system engineers, and operating experience were appropriate.

10/6/97 Negative LER 97-009 L

MAINT 3C Exceeded quarterly calibration frequency for radwaste building exhaust radiation LER 3A monitor. Missed surveillance was the result of personnel error. Cause of the error was poor work practices.

11/22/97 Negative IR 97-07 N

MAINT 2B Incorrect oil was installed in several pumps. The procedure change program was not VIO 3A sufficiently controlled to ensure that work instructions to perform pump lubrication would be accurate. Additionally, review efforts were not thorough enough to identify the error. The licensee's operability review and corrective actions associated with the pumps were timely and satisfactory.

11/17/97 Negative IR 97-07 N

MAINT 2A Generally, plant material condition was considered to be acceptable. However, there were several specific issues that detracted from the overall appearance and condition of the plant. The licensee adequately addressed the specific items which were noted. Plar.t material condition.

11/17/97 Positive IR 97-07 N

MAINT SC Licensee actions to address the potential for residual heat removal service water system degradation due to strainer gasket deterioration, including the operability review were appropriate.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 7 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK

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Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 11/17/97 Negative IR 97-07 S

MAINT 3A A personnel error that occurred during the installation of a limit switch operating arm 367 3C in the EDG breaker indicate that continued licensee focus on attention to detail is warranted. Personnelerror.

11/17/97 Positive IR 97-07 N

MAINT 3A The work activities associated with the "B" EDG were generally well conducted and 1C had good management as well as supervisory oversight. Emergcnt maintenance issues, including the degraded voltage regulator transformer and contaminated fuel oil were adequately addressed. EDG maintenance activities were well conducted.

8/14/98 Positive IR 98-05 N

ENG 4A The engineering inspection team judged the engineering activities at the 4B FitzPatrick plant to be generally good, including input to modifications, surveillance testing, and post-maintenance testing. The engineering methods and results were generally sound and correct, and engineering backlogs have been at an acceptable level. Overall, vertical slice inspections of RCIC and ADS found acceptable design and licensing bases with adequate operating and testing procedures.

8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG 4B Problems were identified with operability determinations, evaluations, and 5B calculations in that they were frequently narrowly focused, limited in scope, and not thorough, although none of those sampled had reached an incorrect operability conclusion. The operability procedure had been revised just prior to this inspection, and the new revision appeared to address the NRC concems.

8/14/98 Positive IR 98-05 N

ENG 4A The team concluded that NYPA had maintained an accurate design and licensing bases for the ADS and reactor pressure relief systems. The design basis was appropriately derived from the nuclear steam system supply design, and system modifications had maintained congruity with that design. Engineering calculations l

supported critical system parameters and test procedure acceptance criteria.

Safety evaluations were effective during system modifications. Plant operatng procedures, surveillance procedures, and maintenance procedures were accurate and consistent with the design and licensing bases. NYPA personnel were aware of generic industry issues and had taken action to minimize S/RV malfunctioning.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 8 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 8/14/98 Positive IR 96-05 N

ENG 4A Procedures pertaining to the RCIC system specified alignments, operational limits, and alarm responses that were consistent with the existing plant configuration and design bases as described in the UFSAR and design specifications. Test programs provided adequate assurance of system condition and functionality.

Design calculations were consistent with applicable licensing, design, and operations documents. Modifications to the system had implemented vendor recommendations, reflected industry experience, and enhanced system reliability.

NYPA's evaluations of industry information pertaining to motor-operated valve issues were timely and acceptable. High availability and low corrective maintenance backlog evidenced effective maintenance of the system. With minor exceptions, the UFSAR accurately described the design and operation of the RCIC system.

8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG 4A The RCIC system design basis performance margins have been adequately NCV NCV 98-05-01 4C maintained. However, one non-cited violation of NRC design control requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 111 was identified.

8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG SB The team evaluated leakage past the HPCI steam admission valve and concluded that HPCI remained operable. T!ie team's concems regarding valve operation and temperature effects were resolved by NYPA without affecting HPCI operability, but appeared to indicate that prior NYPA reviews had been adequate but not thorough.

8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG SC The team reviewed the planned corrective actions associated with the slow pressurization of the LPCI system and concluded that while these were adequate, previous corrective actions had not resolved the problem over the previous 7 years.

8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG 5A The team concluded that NYPA had been slow to recognize and evaluate the SC effects of an abnormally configured system (long term operation of control room ventilation system in the accident mode) and an offnormal system condition (SLC high room temperature). No actual adverse effects were identified, although NYPA was evaluating further.

8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG 4B NYPA's post-trip review of a September 1996 inadvedent plant trip appeared to SB have missed opportunities to provide better guidance on UPS (uninterruptible power supplies) that could have aided in a 1998 UPS event.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 9 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG 4B Some nuclear safety evaluation analyses were not thorough supporting the conclusions. These observations are similar to a QA audit and the recently completed self-assessment findings in the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation area.

8/14/98 Positive IR 98-05 N

ENG 4B The modifications reviewed by the team were acceptable and indicated high quality engineering work.

8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG 4B The team concluded that NYPA's program to address fuse control issues had been slow in implementation, that engineering work was adequate, and that fuse-i related events were infrequent.

8/14/98 VIO IR 98-05 N

ENG 4A The team found that NYPA had undertaken proactive measures in the Negative VIO 98-05-02 reassessment of their protection approach for containment electrical penetrations.

However, in existing assessments, NYPA had not considered the effects of operation under LOOP +LOCA conditions, and the consequential lower short circuit currents. The fa;!ure to analyze the effects of a LOCA plus LOOP on containment penetration protection degradation due to short circuiting is a Level IV violation of 10 CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion 111 where no written response to NRC is required. Corrective actions were acceptable, including modifications to install fuses and plans for modification during the upcoming outage.

8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG SA Deviation Event Reports (DERs), Problem identification Reports (PIDs), action SC plans and Work Requests (WRs) properly identified, categorized and tracked plant problems. Operability determinations were adequately performed. Engineering support for DERs, PIDs, action plans and WRs was weak in some instances.

8/14/98 Positive IR 98-05 N

ENG SA NYPA OA audits were detailed, comprehensive and resulted in the identification of areas for improvement. Deficiencies were appropriately documented using the DER process, and problem identification was effective. Audit personnel were properly qualified.

8/14/98 Positive IR 98-05 N

ENG 3B Nuclear safety evaluations were being performed by technically qualified individuals who had received training regarding the preparation and review of safety evaluations.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 10 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATIUCK

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Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 8/14/98 Positive IR 98-05 N

ENG 5A The team concluded that there has been improvement in the self-assessment process. The more recent self-assessments were cre.a!, comprehensive and sufficiently broad to identify problems and areas for improvement. Strong management endorsement and employee involvement in this program appeared to exist.

8/14/98 Positive IR 98-05 N

ENG SA The NYPA process for the evaluation and distribution of industry operating 5B experience information was timely, thorough and effective. Information applicable to NYPA was identified, documented and tracked thorough distribution, evaluation, action, and closure.

8/14/98 Negative IR 98-05 N

ENG 3A The team determined that NYPA properly identified and categorized issues related to human performance error. In the past year, NYPA has increased management attention on human performance errors and has a specific action plan to address human performance. Thus far, NYPA's actions have not reduced the level of human performance errors over the long term. Based on the events reviewed, the team determined that the present impact of human error on the safe operation of the unit has been acceptable.

8/14/98 Positive IR 98-05 N

ENG 4B NYPA adequately documented and tracked backlogs of work, including corrective SA maintenance and engineering support to operations. The backlogs appeared to be manageable. The team concluded that the open design engineering items had minimal safety implications and that NYPA was managing the design engineering corrective action bacMog effectively.

7/12/98 Negative IR 98-03 N

ENG 4C Two examples were noted where maintenance rule implementation was weak. The uninterruptible power supply was not appropriately categorized as a maintenance preventible functional failure and the performance criteria for the high pressure coolant injection system was not updated following a reduction in the expected system demands.

7/2/98 Negative IR 98-02 N

ENG 4B The safety issues associated with the use of the reactor building crane to move spent fuel were adequately addressed by the licensee's safety evaluation process.

However, the quality of the original safety evaluation was poor because reference to other licensee documents was necessary to assure that heavy load requirements were met.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 11 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 2/22/98 Positive IR 97-10 N

ENG 3A A previously damaged fuel pin resulted in two loose fuel pellets on the spent fuel pool floor. Actions to recover the fuel pellets were well conducted and procedures were effectively used.

2/22/98 Positive IR 97-10 N

ENG SA The licensee replaced portions of the reactor protection system electrical protection SC assemblies and identified several component discrepancies including loose connections, improper assembly and incorrect bolting configuration. The identification of the loose connections, incorrect hardware and joint configuration were good observations and corrective actions were prompt and thorough.

1/28/98 Negative IR 97-11 N

ENG 4A The disposition of a deviation / event report for replacement of a nonsafety-related 24 48 vdc power supply in the traverse incore probe system was weak. No actions were SC taken to ensure that personnel performing installation must read and understand instructions before starting insta!!ation.

11/4/97 Negative IR 97-08 N

ENG 4C Environrnental qualification (EO) components for the high pressure coolant injection VIO VIO 97-08-03 4A system were erroneously removed from the EQ program. Incorrect assumptions made during a program completed in 1993 led to the erroneous removal of several components from the EQ program.

11/20/97 Negative LER 97-010 L

ENG 4A Survei!!ance testing of the pressure suppression chamber -drywell vacuum breakers LER could have resulted in a partial loss of the primary containment pressure suppression safety function. Technical reviews of procedures which utilize this configuration were inadequate. Accident analysis assumptions did not include a configuration where steam could bypass the suppression pool, via the 20 inch and 24 inch lines, and enter the torus space.

11/17/97 Negative IR 97-07 N

ENG 4A The previous modification to address strainer gasket cover leakage was ineffective in that the potential for the flow turbulence to destroy the gasket was not recognized.

Previous ineffective corrective action.

8/23/98 Negative IR 98-04 N

PS 3A The inspectors identified a violation of NRC requirements in the area of protec'ed VIO VIO 98-04-02 area access control of vehicles. Specifically, a security force member failed to thoroughly search the passenger compartment (cab), undercarriage and engine compartment of the observed vehicle.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 12 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 8/23/98 Positive IR 98-04 N

PS 3A The licensee was conducting security and safeguards activities in a manner that protected public health and safety in the areas of alarm stations, communications, protected area access control of personnel and packages and protected area access control of vehicles. This portion of the program as implemented, rnet the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements. The licensee's security facilities and equipment in the areas of protected area assessment aids, protected area detection aids, and personnel search equipment were determined to be well maintained and reliable and were able to meet the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements.

9/10/98 Positive IR 98-04 N

PS 2A Emergency preparedness (EP) emergency equipment surveillances and 2B communication tests were performed as required and the EP facilities were determined to be in a good state of operational readiness. Emergency response organization members were trained as required. The licensee's emphasis on training, including drill participation, the number of drills conducted, and the maintenance of respirator qualifications, was determined to be a strength. The EP program audits were thorough and the reports were useful for licensee management to assess the effectiveness of the EP program. The resources invested into the audit were indicative of the licensee's commitment to perform an effective assessment of the EP program.

7/12/98 Positive IR 98-03 N

PS 2A The fire protection program was being effectively administered. Fire fighting 2B equipment, fire pumps, fire barrier penetration seals and fixed fire suppression systems were well maintained.

7/2/98 Negative IR 98-02 N

PS SA On April 9,1998, radiological monitoring for ti:e control rod drive relief valve 3B replacement was weak. During the maintenance activity, an unexpected condition occurred which was that steam emitted from the normally cold, radioactive waste system. Mechanics and radiation protection technicians did not demonstrate a questioning attitude when faced with this unexpected condition as the unexpected condition was not fully evaluated nor were radiological surveys taken. There were no radiological consequences as postjob surveys did not show contamination or abnormal airbome radioactivity levels.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 13 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 7/2/98 Positive IR 98-02 N

PS 1C The licensee has implemented an effective as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) program based on declining station exposures and reductions in source term input. The ALARA program has been supported by management through several exposure reduction initiatives including: recirculation system chemical decontaminations, zine injection, and the systematic reduction of cobalt contributors, such as the replacement of non-cobalt containing control rods and valve components.

7/2/98 Positive iR 98-02 N

PS 1C The licensee effectively maintained and implemented the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP). Quality assurance audits were thorough and of sufficient depth to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the REMP and Meteorological Monitoring Program (MMP). The environmental laboratory continued to implement effective Quality Assurance / Quality Control programs for the REMP, and continued to provide effective validation of analytical resuits.

4/19/98 VIO IR 98-01 N

PS 3A Additional problems associated with radiation worker adherence to radiation Negative VIO SC procedures which requ.re that basic radiation worker practices be followed have 98-01-04 continued. These problems which illustrate this are that workers exited the radiological controlled area from an unauthorized exit, a worker entered the radiological controlled area without a thermoluminescent dosimeter and a worker failed to log into a radiation work permit prior to entering the radiological controlled area. Licensee corrective actions have not been sufficiently aggressive to highlight the importance of following radiation procedures. This violation of Technical Specification Radiation Protection Program requirements was determined to be a repeat of a violation issued with NRC inspection report 50-97004.

4/19/98 NCV IR 98-01 L

PS 3A Personnel error resulted in the potential compromise of safeguards informa* ion Negative NCV 98-01-03 through the inadvertent transport of a safeguards cabinet lock combination to an unsecured location. The failure to control a safeguards combination to reduce the probability of compromise of safeguards information is a violation of the Secunty Plan. This violation was identified and corrected by the licensee and is being treated as a Non-cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

4/19/98 NCV IR 98-01 N

PS SC Personnel error resulted in the potential compromise of safeguards information Positive NCV 98-01-03 through the inadvertent transport of a safeguards cabinet lock combination to an unsecured location. The security force responded in a timely manner to the event and immediate corrective actions appeared to be appropriate.

FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 14 of 17 September 30,1998

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ITEMS SORTED BY DATE ENTERED FITZPATRICK

~

l Date TYPE Sources ID SFA Code issue Description 1/22/98 Positive OSRE 97201 N

PS 1C Security force demonstrated an effective contingency response capability.

12/11/97 Positive IR 97-08 N

PS 1A An emergency plan drill demonstrated solid performance of the Emergency Preparedness staff and licensee organization.

1/20/98 Positive IR 97-08 N

PS 1C Solid radioactive waste and transportation program were well managed and effective.

Quality assurance audits were thorough, programmatic and well documented.

Training was appropriate. However, training program was not well administered.

11/17/97 Positive IR 97-07 N

PS 1A Procedures were in place to direct the appropriate response to fires in the control room and control room evacuation in the event of a relay room CO2 system discharge. Operators were knowledgeable of equipment operation and familiar with the associated procedures.

11/17/97 Negative IR 97-07 N

PS 3B Initial operator actions to investigate and respond to a fire protection system alarm SB were appropriate, although it was questionable whether it is necessary to remova an automatic function of a fire water suppression system from service due to the false alarm. Apparently poor coordination and communication between different licensee departments resulted in the fire protection system being isolated for a longer period of time than was necessary.

11/17/97 Positive IR 97-07 N

PS 1C The radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent control programs were well implemented.

2B Good management control and oversight of the radioactive liquid and gaseous 3C effluent control programs was noted. The radiation monitoring system calibration program was well implemented. Reactor Monitor System (RMS) reliability has been generally good. The air cleaning system program area was well-implemented.

Monitoring and trending of air cleaning system performance parameters was a noted strength. The technical depth of quality assurance audits was good and chemistry laboratory quality assurance / quality control was very good.

L FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 15 of 17 September 30,1998

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I GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS

{

Actual date of an event or sagruficant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the information was issaed (such as I

the LER date), or, for inspechon reports, the last date of the inspechon penod Roc #

A counter number used for NRC intemal edsting r

Type The categonzabon of the issue - see the Type item Code table.

j SFA SALP Funchonal Area Codes: OPS for Operabons, MAINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineenng; and PS for Plant Support.

f 1

+

Sources The document that contains the issue informabon: IR for NRC Inspechon Report or LER for Licensee Event Report D

Identrficahon of who discovered issue: N for NRC, L for Licensee; or S for Self identifying (events).

issue Descr$0on Detasis of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Execubve Summanes

[

Codes Template Codes - see table.

TYPE ITEM CODES TEMPLATE CODES i

[

4 EA Escalated Enforcement Action with Chil Penalty 1

Operational Pesformance: A - Normal; B - During Transients; and C - Programs and f

Processes ED Escalated Descretion - No Civil Penalty Strength Overau Strong Licensee Performance 2

Matenal Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Weakness Overau Weak Licensee Performance 3

Human Performance: A - Work Performance; B - Knc;idge, Skins, and Abshbes; C -

eel

  • Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action i

4 Engineenng/ Design: A-Design; B - Engineenng Support; C - Programs and Processes VIO LevelIV Violation NCV Non-Cited Violation 5

Problem Identification and Resolution: A - Identification; B - Analysis; and C - Resolubon v

DEV Deviation from NRC Requirerrents I

NOTES:

1 Positive individual Good Licensee Perfonnance Eels are apparent violabons of NRC requirements that are being considered for i

escalated enforcement achon in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy e

{

Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Achon'(Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600.

l However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues i

LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC

- identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions URI "

Unresolved Inspechon item are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee wiu be provided with an opportunity 1a either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2)

Licensing Licensing issue from NRR request a predecisional enforcement conference

[

MISC MisceHaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.).

URis are unresolved items about which more. formation is required to determine in j

whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions nn the issues,

(

and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

i L

FROfd: 10/1/97 TO: 8/23/98 Page 17 of 17 September 30,1998

[

1

_ - _ _ _. __=,__ __.

l FitzPatrick Inspection Plan For December 1998 Through May 1999 I INSPECTION PROGRAM AREA / TITLE PLANNED TYPE DATES INSPECTION 84750-01 Radioactive Waste Treatment, Effluent &

12/7-11/98 Core Environrnental Monitoring 86750 Radwaste/ Transport 2/8-12/99 Core Tl 2515138 Operator Workarounds 2/22-26/99 Si j

93802 Operational Safety Team inspection 5/31-RI 92903 (OSTI) and Engineering follow-up 6/11/99 Legend:

IP Inspection Procedure Tl Temporary instruction Program / Sequence Number Core Minimum NRC inspection Program OA Other Inspection Activity RI Additional Inspection Effort Planned by Region i SI Safety Initiative inspection l

-. _