ML20059A415

Forwards List of Topics for Discussion During Planned Site Visit Re Hardened Wetwell Vent at Facility.No Conclusions Will Be Reached During Site Visit

ML20059A415
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	08/17/1990
From:	Labarge D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Brons J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
References
NUDOCS 9008230049
Download: ML20059A415 (5)

Text

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IAugust 17, 1990 l

Docket No. 333 DISTRIBUTION- I a postet N e w w - 0GC Mr. John C. Brons .

NRC/ Local PDRs EJordan Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation PDI-1 Reading File ACRS(10)

Power Authority of the State of New York SVarga' Plant File 123 Main Street RWessman DLaBarge ,

White Plains, New York 10601 CYogan CMcCracken i MThadani AThadani c

Dear Mr. Brons:

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SUBJECT:

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION DURING PLANNED SITE VISIT TO ADDRESS THE HARDENED WETWELL VENT AT THE FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT By letter dated June 15, 1990, the NRC forwarded the staff's backfit analysis for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant which concluded that there was sufficient-justification for requiring installation a hardened vent. You responded to this;backfit analysis by letter dated July-25,1990, and concluded .

that your examination of the backfit analysis continued to show that'the value of installation of a hardened vent was exceedingly small. In addition, you also explained that the present vent path is believed.to be unique in that it consists of hard pipe from;the primary. containment to the inlet transition

piece of the Standby Gas Treatment.. System, which is located outside of the reactor building pressure boundary. 'Thus,.you concluded that-installation of a hardened vent was not appropriate at this time and that the final decision for its insta11ation'should await the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) results.

In' order to gain further insightcinto the design of the potential wetwell vent path, and address the appropriateness of-a delay in-finalizing the backfit

' decision, the staff has established a team to visit the site on August 21, '

1990, to discuss and walkdown the appropriate equipment, systems and' A procedures. The team will be led by Mr. Jack Kudrick, Section Chief, Plant l Systems Branch-and will include four other.NRR and Region I personnel.  :

Attached is an outline of the topics which the team is expected to examine during the site visit. Each is expected to be discussed in as much detail as 1 appropriate in order to form a basis for our subsequent evaluation. No conclusions will be reached during the sito visit. ,

NhsiGNED DYr '

David E. LaBarge, Project Manager  !

Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

.0ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

-As stated cc w/ enclosure:

.See next page /

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' DOCUMENT NAME: TRIP TO FITZPATRICK ,

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c Mr. ' John; C. Brons James A~.- FitzPatrick Nuclear

. Power Authority of the State _of New York i Power, Plant

'CCt' l Mr. Gerald C. Goldstein. Ms.IDonna Ross Assistant General Counsel- New York State' Energy Office Power Authority of the State 2. Empire. State Plaza i of New York 16th' Floor  !

1633 Broadway ~ Albany,: New York 12223 New York, New York 10019-Resident Inspe'ctor's Office- Pegional Administrator, Region 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -U.,S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-Post Office Box 136 )

475 Allendale Road m Lycoming, New York 13093 King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 l

Mr. William Fernandez Mr.-A. Klausman'-

Resident Manager Senior:Vice President _ Appraisal-

' James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear and Compliance Services t Power Plant Power Authority of the State Post Offict Fox 41 of New York Lycoming, New York 13093 1633 Broadway-- i New York, New York 10019 -

fir. J. A. Gray, Jr. Mr. George Wilverding, Manager

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Director Nuclear Licensing - BWR Nuclear Safety Evaluation Power Authority of the State Power Authority of the State-of New York of New York 123 Main Street 123 Main Street; White Plains, New York' 10601 White Plains,' Hew York 10601 1 i

Supervisor Mr.-R. E..Beedle. "

Town of Scriba Vice President Nuclear Support l R. D. #4 ' Power Authority of the; State l Oswego, New York 13126 of New York 123 Main-Street l White Plains,'New York 10601 Mr. J. P. Bayne, President ,

Power Authority of the State  !

1 of New York Mr. S. S. Zulla l 1633 Broadway New York, New York 10019 Vice President Nuclear Engineering-Power Authority of the; State of New York 123 Main Street Mr. Richard Patch White Plains, New York 10601 Quality Assurance Superintendent 1 l

James A. Tit 4 Patrick Nuclear

_l Power Plant Post Office Box 41 Mr. William Josiger, Vice President Lycoming, New York 13093 Operations and Maintenance Power Authority of

• the -State of New York, 123 Main Street.

Charlie Donaldson, Esquire White Plains, New York :10601 Assistant "itsev General

' New York DJrW of Law k h h w York 10271

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l ENCLOSURE HARDENED WETWELL VENT ISSUE FITZPATRICK. NUCLEAR. POWER. PLANT-SITE. VISIT-TOPICS '

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PURPOSE The ' purpose of the site visit- is to' gather further information on the unique- .l plant-specific features of the existing wetwell vent path for the J.A. FitzPatrick

.. Nuclear Power Plant. , This added information, combined-with the response; provided in the Power' Authority of the State of New York (. licensee) letter of July 25,1990, should enable the NRC staff to properly evaluate.your'existin'g-vent pathway. The degree with which this pathway complies with the' criteria forLa hardened vent will, to a great extent, determine whether a schedular delay is appropriate. It should be noted that the staff will not be prepared- l to discuss the various issues related to the plant-specific. analysis.

H The following activities will be discussed in as much detail as= appropriate.

ACTIVITIES

1. Installation Details:

The purpose of this activity will be to thoroughly understand lboth'the >

arrangement, branch line isolation, and line supports in the pathway between the primary containment and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) room. In addition, the focus will-be on the' capability of the SGTS l room to withstand a pipe rupture. Since the doors are possible= weak

. points in the design, the team will be interested in the failure modes and in particular, the potential'for failure of the door to the secondary containment.

• With a reasonable understanding of the potential for failure lof the room, the team will be interested in both personnel and equipment in the vicinity of the room as a result of a pipe rupture.- The following areas will be examined:

Arrangement of the piping-and-equipment. f Adequacy of the vent piping within the reactor building to: meet the venting criteria, 1

, 1 Isolation of brancn pipino within the reactor building.

Design of the SGTS room and' doors.

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Exit piping from the SGTS fans to the stack.

Any equipment that could be damaged in the vicinity of the SGTS room when venting occurs.

Piping supports. '

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-2. Procedures and instructions:  !

The sole purpose of this activity is to provide the team with an understanding of the circumstances and conditions of a venting action. It <

is not the intent of the team to reassess the adequacy of the procedures.

This information will aid in the evaluation of the capability of the  ;

pathway. The following areas will be examined: i l

Type of venting instructions (procedures, guidelines).

Completeness and adequacy of present venting procedures or written guidance. i General discussion of procedure changes which may result-if i present vent path is determined to be acceptable, Ventingcriteria(parameters,setpoints). t Proceduralventinqsteps(path, valves, interlocks),

t Support systems required (electrical power, station air)

Authorization for venting under severe accident conditions.

Containment pressure when SGTS damage is expected.

Discussions with the operators regarding their understanding of 4 the venting issue and constraints to venting.

Training programs.

Relationship of the Containment Atmosphere Dilution System.

3. Expected consequences, if any, of venting. .

The concern is the patential damages and the associated consequences due to a pipe rupture. Following the rupture,-the team will also be interested in the possible deflagrations in the vicinity of the break, ,

This is important since there will be ignition sources due to the presence of the power supplies for the SGTS. The following areas will be examined:-

Pipe / valve damage.

Damage to SGTS components.

Damage to SGTS room, including doors.

Consequences of pressurizing the SGTS room.

Radiological consequences of venting, including discussion of '

ground vs. elevated releases and pathway from SGTS room.

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Impact on accessibility to equipment and plant due to radiological or combustible gas.

Effects of combustible gas in the vent stream, consideration of -

ignition sources in the SGTS room.

Probability of steam from a ruptured SGTS getting back into.the- -

reactor building and causing uamage to safety-related equipment, v

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