ML20148E357

Insp Repts 50-348/87-37 & 50-364/87-37 on 871216-18.Util Noted One Violation Re Employee Failure to Sign in on Radiation Work Permit.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Allegations Pertaining to Radiation Protection Program

ML20148E357
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	03/01/1988
From:	Collins T, Hosey C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148E338	List: ML20148E334 ML20148E357
References
50-348-87-37, 50-364-87-37, NUDOCS 8803250071
Download: ML20148E357 (8)

See also: IR 05000348/1987037

Text

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• A Ric . UNITED STATES

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, o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION il

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[.n 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

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• ATLANTA,GEORGt A 30323

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..... MAR 161988

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Report Nos.: 50-348/87-37 and 50-364/87-37

Licensee: Alabama Power. Company

600 North ~18th Street

Birmingham, AL 35291-0400

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 '

Facility Name: Farley

Inspection Conducted:,-D ember 16-18,-1987

Inspector: , a 8 #7

T.~ R. Collins Da~te Signed

Approved by: /!

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C.M.Hosey,JSectionghief

. Date Signed

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope: This special, announced inspection was conducted to followup on

allegations regarding the radiation protection program.

Results: One licensee identified violation for failure cf a licensee employee  :'

to sign in on a Radiation Work Permit (RWP).

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PDR ADOCK 05000348

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

R. Bayne, Chemistry Supervisor

D. Grissett, Emergency Planning Supervisor

M. Mitchell, Health Physics and Radwaste Supervisor

• 0. Morey, Assistant General Manager

• C, Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent

B. Patton, Plant Health Physicist

J. Woodard, General Manager

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Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members, and  !

office personnel.

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• W. H. Bradford, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 18, 1987,

' The inspector

with thote persons indicated in Paragraph I above.

described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the licensee

identified violation (Paragraph 4.g). No dissenting comments were

received from the licensee. Proprietary information is not contained in

this report.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

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This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4. Followup on Allegations (99014)

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a. Allegation (2850058271)

A lower level manager was not qualified for his assigned position.

Discussion and Finding

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. The inspector discussed with licensee management representatives the

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knowledge and qualifications of the individual in question. The

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inspector reviewed the individual's training records and resume and

, determined that the lower level manager had a Bachelor of Science i

degree and five years expr.rience in his specialty, which met the l

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requirements of ANSI N18.1, 1971, Section 4.3.2 as required by

Technical Specification 6.3, Facility Staff Qualifications.

Conclusion

This allegation was not substantiated,

b. Allegation (2850058254)

A hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 1 Turbine / Generator which

contaminated the hydrogen system. Smears of a vendor's truck and

couplings snowed contamination above acceptable levels. Alleger

wanted to notify the vendor but was overruled. Report of this

incident which occurred in February 1982, omitted smear results

showing contamination levels.

Discussion and Finding

The inspector discussed this event with licensee management

representatives and determined that an event similar to the

allegation had occurred in September 1981. Rather than a hydrogen

explosion an electrical fault (arc) had occurred on the Unit 1 Main

Generator which resulted in shutting down Unit 1. Unit I remained

shut down and was in a refueling outage between September 1981 and

March 1982. The inspector reviewed the incident report issued by the

licensee which included radiological survey results of the Unit 1

Main Senerator/ Turbine arc incident. The inspector selectively

reviewed the radiological survey results of the Unit 1 Main

Generator / Turbine, Hydrogen System and the vendor truck and concluded

that radioactive contamination levels were well below action

guidelines as established by radiation control procedures,

< 1,000 dpm/100 cm2 beta / gamma and < 100 dpm/100 cm2 alpha. Unit 2

began a routine outage early as the result of the electrical fault.

Survey records that were reviewed did not appear to be changed or

altered in any way.

Conclusion

This allegation was partially substantiated in that an electrical

fault had occurred on the Unit 1 Main Generator which resulted in

shutting down Unit 1. Although surveys of the Main Generator were

performed by the licensee, the likelihood of the generator being

contaminated is remote. No contaminated system makes direct contact

with the Main Generator. However, no violations or deviations of

regulatory requirements were identified.

c. Allegation (2850058263)

Smears of the reactor cavity indicated that thousands of counts per

minute (cpm) alpha was detected using a scintillation alpha probe.

Smears of reactor cavity walls taken by the alleger indicated alpha

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contamination levels up to 400 dpm/100 cm 2

. Alleger reported this

j result in the survey but the survey was changed.

Discussion and-Finding

The inspector discussed this issue with licensee management

representatives and HP technicians and determined through review of

contamination survey records performed during 1982 and 1983 that only

trace amounts of alpha contamination were detected. The area where

alpha activity was most significant was the reactor cavity and spent

fuel pool area. Survey results revealed that alpha contamination was

2,000 to 8,000 dpm/100 cm 2 . However, the beta / gamma activity from

these same smears indicated 2.0 X 10' to 3.0 X 10' dpm/100 cm 2 . With

extreme high beta / gamma activity, up to 5% of the beta / gamma value

could be recorded as alpha _ radioactivity when counting alpha and beta

particles simultaneously using an alpha / beta counting system. This

results when a percentage of the beta particles are counted in the

alpha energy window. The licensee cut up these smears to reduce the

interference from beta / gamma activity with the alpha activity and

after counting the individual sections of the smears in aggregate

using a beta / gamma and alpha proportional counters, alpha

contamination levels were found to be non-detectable. The inspector

also concluded after review of survey records that no changes

appeared to have been made to the alpha survey results. Therefore,

the inspector could not prove or disprove that changes were made on

the survey records.

Conclusion

This allegation was partially substantiated in that alpha

contamination appeared to be present on extremely high beta / gamma

radioactivity smears. However, analysis performed by the licensee

demonstrated that the alpha contamination levels were below licensee

action levels. No violations or deviations of regulatory

requirements were identified.

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d. Allegation (2850058162)

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During plant operations with failed fuel, the alleger felt he

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received a high extremity dose. Alleger also stated that the

licensee operated for a long time without extremity TLDs.

Discussion and Findings

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The inspector discussed this issue with licensee management

representatives and Chemistry technicians and concluded after

i interviews with selected individuals (Health Physics and Chemistry

j personnel) and review of radiological survey's and radiation work

permits (RWPs) for the period of 1982 and 1983, that personnel

required to take reactor coolant samples (RCS) were issued extremity

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dosimetry. The inspector reviewed the alleger's dosimetry records

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and determined that extremity TLD's had been issued when required and

the results were well within 10 CFR 20.101 limits. The inspector

reviewed the licensee's program for issuance of extremity TLDs and

determined that since 1982 and 1983 and presently the limit for

issuing extremity dosimetry has been that the extremity dose rate is

> 6 times the anticipated whole body dose rate.

Conclusion

This allegation was not substantiated.

e. Allegation (2850058033, 2850058051, 2850058179, 2850058305)

A vendor company identified a problem with the accuracy of the whole

body counter.

A contract technician indicated that whole body counter coefficients

were badly off.

A vendor identified problems with the whole body counter.

A vendor found a large discrepancy between the vendor's whole body

counter and the licensee's.

Discussion and Finding

The inspector discussed these issues with licensee management

representatives and dosimetry personnel. After interview of selected

individuals (Chemistry Supervisors and Dosimetry personnel), review

of selected calibration records, whole body count (WBC) results, and

comparison of the licensee's WBC results and the vendor's WBC results

the inspector identified no discrepancies. The inspector also

reviewed the licensee's approved procedures both for the licensee's

and the vendor's whole body counters and concluded that these

procedures were adequate both for operation and calibration of the

whole body counters.

Conclusion

These allegations were not substantiated.

f. Allegation (2850058355)

A licensee employee had an internal deposition of xenon rather than

iodine.

Discussion and Finding

The inspector discussed this issue with HP Supervisory personnel and

was informed that no known incidents had occurred resulting in an

internal deposition for the individual in question. The individual

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was not available for interview, since he was no longer employed by

the licensee. The inspector reviewed the individuals dosimetry file

for internal exposure results, and concluded that for the individual

in question no positive internal exposures of iodine were received by-

the individual in question.

Conclusion

This allegation was not substantiated.

g. Allegation (2850058260, 2850058295)

Two licensee employees entered Unit 1 containment violated RWP

requirements and the Radiological Incident Reports (RIRs) were

destroyed.

Discussion and Findings

The inspector discussed these issues with licensee management

representatives and HP personnel and, for one of the above mentioned

licensee personnel, the inspector reviewed an RIR that was written on

February 8, 1982, for failure to sign in on an RWP for routine

inspection as required by Radiation Control Procedure FNP-RCP-002,

Section 6.1.7, prior to entering Unit 1 containment. The other issue

regarding failure to follow RWP requirements, the inspector concluded

after interviews with the individual in question and HP personnel (HP

supervisor and HP technicians), that apparently no RWP requirements

were violated, therefore, no RIR was required to be written.

Conclusion

These allegations were partially substantiated in that a licensee

employee entered Unit I containment for a routine inspection and

failed to sign in on the RWP prior to entry. The licensee properly

documented this event on a RIR as required by procedure. However,

since the NRC Enforcement Policy,10 CFR 2, Appendix C,1986, states

that a violation identified by the licensee will not be cited by the

NRC if (1) it was identified by the licensee; (2) it fits in Severity

Level IV or V; (3) it was reported if required; (4) it was or will be

corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a

reasonable time; and (5) it was not a violation that could reasonably

be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective

actions for a previous violation. The inspector concluded that this

apparent violation met the criteria specified in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C

and would be considered licensee identified (50-348, 364/88-02-01),

b. Allegation (2850058178, 2850058014)

A licensee employee had an excessive uptake of iodine in the lungs

and after a couple of showers the activity disappeared.

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Discussion and Finding

The inspector discussed this issue with licensee management

4 representatives and HP personnel (supervisors and technicians). The

inspector concluded after review of the individuals dosimetry file

! and RIRs, that an event similar to the allegation had occurred and

the individual in question had received a potential _ intake of

radioactivity on March 10, 1983, while performing work on IB Reactor

Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT). Review of the Lincident and 'the

individuals WBC results indicated that the individual did not have

any skin contamination and his Maximum Permissible Body Burden (MPBB)

was < 10%. The isotopes included Cr-51, Fe-59,and Co-60. . Followup

WBCs revealed no detectable activity. The licensee documented this

event on an RIR as required by procedure and performed WBCs of the

individual to assess the intake of radioactivity.

Conclusion

This allegation was partially substantiated in that an event similar

to the allegation had occurred and after the individual had showered

prior to the WBC, the intake was assessed to be < 10% fiPBB internal

exposure, and was also below 10 CFR 20.103 limits. No violations or

deviations of regulatory requirements were identified,

i 1. Allegation (2850058193)

Alleger saw a licensee employee pull a rope from the reactor cavity

without a respirator as required by the RWP and therefore, became

contaminated.

l Discussion and Finding

The inspector discussed this event with licensee HP personnel

(supervisors and technicians) and with the individual involved and

4 concluded tht.t the alleged event probably had occurred on January 13,

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1982. The inspector determined that the individual had become

contaminated, while working inside Unit I containment, performing

decontamination inside the reactor cavity, but not from pulling a

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rope out of the reactor cavity. Upon exiting containment, the

individual performed a whole body frisk and found increased activity

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on his right shoulder. Survey results revealed 6,000 dpm/ probe area.

Af ter discussion with HP personnel involved in the incident (HP

l supervisor and HP technicians) and review of selected respiratory

! issuance logs and interview of the individual involved, it was

. determined that the individual was issued and wore the required

l respiratory equipment while performing decontamination in the reactor

i cavity. The licensee determined that during decontamination the

j individual's plastic suit had separated exposing this area to high

levels of contamination. The inspector reviewed the RIR written on

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this event and concluded the licentre documented this incident as

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Conclusion U

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This allegation was partially substantiated in. that the individual in r

question .did become contaminated while performing work inside Unit I

reactor cavity, but not from pulling a rope out of the reactor cavity

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without a respirf ter. No violations or deviations of regulatory '

]- requirements war,e identified. j

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J. Allegation (2850058282)

First aid kits and equipment in the first aid station in the

Auxiliary Building, Nurse's Station in the Training Facility, and the-

Plant Emergency Vehicle (PEV) were either missing or in need of

repair. Also, the PEV did not contain a trauma kit and the patients

compartment was tot kept orderly as required.

Discussion and Finding

The inspector discussed these issues with licensee representatives

(Emergency Planning (EP) Supervisor and EP Technicians). The

a inspector determined,through review of quarterly inventory records as

required by administrative control procedure, FNP-0-SHP-52, for 1982,

1983, and 1987 and through tours and observation of these facilities,

that the .first aid stations had the required first aid kits and

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trauma kit.in the PEV. The inspector also determined by observation

that the first aid kits and PEV were well maintained as required by

administrative control procedures,

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Conclusion

Thisallegationpasnotsubstantiated.

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! 5. Radiological Surveys '

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The inspector requetted the licensee to perform smear surveys of selected

areas within the radiolugical controlled area (RCA) and analyze them for

alpha, beta, and, gamma radioactivity. The inspector observed the

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performance of tha surveys. Surveys were taken in the Unit 1 Spent Fuel

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Pool Area, Waste Sorting Area, Unit 1 Primary Sample Room, and the

i Radwaste Solidification Area.

I The inspector informed licensee management representatives that these

smecr samples (approximately 213) would be analyzed by the NRC Region II

office and the results reported to the licensee.

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