ML20234C866

Forwards Part 21 Repts Recently Received by Nrc.Attachments 1 & 2 Inadvertently Omitted from

ML20234C866
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	07/01/1987
From:	Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Dewease J LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
REF-PT21-87-145-000 PT21-87-145, PT21-87-145-000, NUDOCS 8707060699
Download: ML20234C866 (2)

Text

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.. . JUL 1- 1987

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In Reply Refer To:

. Docket: 50-382.

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1 LouisianaPower&LightComhany ATTN: J.'G. Dewease, Senic Vice President l Nuclear Operations.

N-80' , j

, 317 Baronne Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Gentlemen:

This forwards, for your information, reports recently received Ly the Commission

.under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21. The attachments 1 and 2 were inadvertently omitted from our letter of June 23, 1987.

Although no response is required to this letter, we shall be please:I to answer any questions which you may have regarding this matter.

Sincerely, original Signed Dy J. P. Jnudon J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch Attachments:

1. Arizona Nuclear Power Project letter dated March 2, 1987

2. ISOMEDIX letter dated March 30, 1987

3. SOR,. Inc, letter dated April 27, 1987 l cc: .

Louisiana . wer & Light Company ATTN: G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator P. O. Box B i

'Killona, Louisiana 70066 Louisiana Power &. Light Company ATTN: N. S. Carns, Plant Manager P. O. Box B

.Killona, Louisiana 70066 (cccont'dnextpage)

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5 kW:cs JPJaudon J G- liardo /v

'(f]/'/87 J/(/87 y//87 / i 8707060699 870701 DR ADOCK Of y2 i

Louisiana Power & Light Company  !

Middle South' Services ATTN: Mr. R. T.- Lally P. O. Box 61000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161 Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN: K. W. Cook, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Manager 317 Baronne Street P. O. Box 60340 New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Louisiana Radiation Control Program Director bec to DMB (IE19) bec distrib. by RIV: ,

RPB D. Weiss, RM/ALF i RRI R. D. Martin, RA >

SectionChief(RPB/A) DRSP RPSB RSB MIS System Project Inspector, RPB RSTS Operator R. Hall RIV File NRR Project Manager i i

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. Attachment 1 Arizona Nuclear Power Project ' ' t- .

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March 02, 1987 023-02100-JGH/DRL U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Units 1, 2, 3 Docket Nos. 50/528, 529, 530

Subject:

Final Report - RER-QSE 87-11 A 10CFR21 and 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to Unit 2 "A" Diesel Generator Engine Fire File: 87-006-216

Reference:

(A) Telechone conver==+4an between R. C. Sorenson and D. R.

Larkin on February 26, 1987. (Initial Notification -

RER-QSE 87-11)

Dear Sir:

The NRC was notified of a Reportable Condition in the Unit 2 "A" Diesel Generator at PVNGS by reftrence (A).

Attached, is our final written report which satisfies the reporting requirements of 10CFR21 and 50.55(e) with the exception of paragraph 21.21(b)(3), subpart vi with regard to the names and locations of other facilities which may be affected. A copy of this report will be sent to Cooper Energy Services for their evaluation. I Very truly yours, I

C Ha'yn Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/DRL:Idf DESIGEATED 02ICINAL Attachments }

Cartifies By_ ty) ,(fy,g,x %

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4 023-02100-JCH/DRL March 02, 1987 Final Report - EER-QSE 87-11 1 Mr. D. F. Kirsch Director "

Page Two cc: J. M. Taylor Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 A. C. Gehr (4141)

R. P. Zimmerman (6295)

Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

. 1100 circle 75 Parkway - Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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• FINAL REPORT - RIR-QSE 87-11 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)

ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT (ANPP) 1 PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 ,

I. Description of Deficiency On February 8, 1987 at 2031 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.727955e-4 months <br />, fire alarms for the Unit 2A diesel generator engine were received in the control room.

73ST-2DG-01 (Integrated Safeguards Testing) was being performed on the Unit 2A diesel generator. The control room operators dispatched an Auxiliary Operator to investigate the cause of the alarms. Ihe Auxiliary Operator reported an engine fire near the 4R and SR cylinders. The Unit 2A diesel engine was tripped and the Fire Protection Department was notified. The fire was extingushed at approximately 2052 hours0.0238 days <br />0.57 hours <br />0.00339 weeks <br />7.80786e-4 months <br /> by manual hosing down with water. The Shift Supervisor immediately secured the area for safety considerations and root cause analysis.

Investigations to determine the extent of obvious damage and possible root causes were conducted on February 9. The following observations were made:

A. The 3R, 4R, SR, and 6R valve covers sustained various degrees of fire damage. The 4R aluminum alloy valve cover showed the most damage and portions were melted away. Valve cover SR was melted to a lesser degree than 4R. Valve covers 3R and 6R were charred but no permanent damage was noted.

B. The exhaust manifold showed charring at the 3R, 4R, SR, and 6R areas.

C. The lube oil header box showed charring and some deformation at the 4R, SR, and 6R areas.

D. Junction Box No. 3 for pneumatic trips was charred and some instrument root valve handles were burned.

E. The 3R, 4R, and SR fuel injection pumps showed varying amounts of fire damage.

F. The 4R and SR fuel injectors showed fire damage.

G. The crankcase, crankshaft inspection ports, instrument tubing, jacket water header, and explosion doors showed evidence of sooting and charring.

H. The SR fuel injection tube was found disengaged from the connector at the fuel injector. The ferrule was still in the injector.

Evaluation The fire has been determined to be caused by the disengaged fuel injection tube at the 5R injector. This fuel injection tube assembly was purchased from Cooper Energy Services as a

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replacement part and was recently installed. After the tube became disengaged from the injector fitting, pulsating fuel sprayed onto the 4R and SR valve covers and other nearby engine responents. 1he  ;

fuel eventually contacted the exhaust manifold and combustion occurred. Diesel fuel from the SR injector pump continued to feed the fire until the engine was stopped. This fire is considered by ANPP and the vendor, Cooper Energy Services (C.E S.), to be an external engir' fire with external engine damage.

During the investigation, ANPP determined that the nuts supplied with all the fuel tube assemblies (original equipment and _

replacements) were not manuf actured to SAE J521b specifications.

The nu u suppu eo to Au r do not have the proper 45 degree chamfer as specified in SAE J521b. Although not the root cause of the Unit 2 diesel engine failure, the ferrule manufacturer (Weatherhead, DANA Corporation) states that the 45 degree chamfer is required fcr a reliable assembly.

Root Cause The root cause for the fuel injection tube disengagement has been determined to be incorrect implementation of established manufacturing procedures f or fuel injection tubes at the vendor _'s racility The fuel injection tube assembly consists of a piece of T/2 inch 0.D. steel tubing with a 3/16 inch wall thickness, two flareless tube ferrules, and two tube nuts. ANPP purchased the replacement assemblies with the ferrules set on the tube by Cooper Energy Services.

C.E.S has determined that one of its employees has not been following the procedure that C.E.S. established for setting the ferrules. The " technique *' that the employee used to set the ferrules resulted in fuel tube assemblies that had inferior pull off strength compared to assemblies set by C.E.S. procedure. C.E.S.

states that the employee has been fabricating replacement fuel injection tubing assembifes and was not involved in the fabrication of the lines originally supplied.

Transportability The failed tube assembly was a replacement that was installed recently. The fuel injection tubes that were originally supplied with the engines have many hours of run time with no tube disengagement problems. The only suspect fuel injector tubes at 1

PVNGS are the replacements.

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operability When the Unit 2A diesel fuel line failure occurred, and during the subsequent investigation, Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).

A valkdown of the diesel generator engines in Units 1, 2, and 3 has been performed by Operations Engineering and documented on EER 87-DG-064. 1he following fuel oil line assemblies have been identified as replacement assemblies purchased from C.E.S.:

s Engine Assemblies WO Numbers IMDGA-H01 3L,4L,8L,2R,7R,8R,9R 00209666 1MDGB-H01 3L,7R 00209666 2MDGA-H01 2L,9L,4R,5R,8R,9R 00209661 I 2MDGB-H01 3L WR 198405 .

3MDGA-H01 2L,2R,8R WR 196150 3MDGB-H01 SL WR 196150

.These items will be replaced with properly manufactured assemblies under the referenced work orders and work requests. The suspect assemblies on all the diesel engines will be replaced before each unit' enters Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown).

Safety.Significant Assessment Each PVNGS unit has redundant diesel generators as part of the Class 1E AC electrical systems. These diesels are provided to mitigate potential events described in the FSAR which assume a loss of

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offsite power and which could be initiated during operations in Hodes 1 through 4. A diesel generator failure would constitute a substantial safety hazard. If a diesel engine fuel oil tube disengaged during plant operation the resultant loss of engine power and possible external engine fire could render the diesel generator inoperable.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications Based on the above, this condition has been evaluated as Reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e) since, if it were to remain uncorrected, it could adversely affect the safety of operations of the plant. This condition is also considered Reportable under the requirements of 10CFR21 since it could create a substantial safety hazard. This report satisfies the requirements of 10CFR21 with the exception of section 21.21(b)(3) Subpart vi with regard to the names and locations of other facilities which may be affected. A copy of this report will be sent to Cooper Energy Services for their evaluation.

III. Corrective Action A. Unit 2A Diesel J l

The fire damaged components from the Unit 2A diesel have been repaired or replaced as required. The following is a list of major components included in the 2A diesel repair.

1. 4R and SR power head assemblies

2. 4R and SR power head covers and inspection docts

. 4R and SR fuel injector assemblies and fuel lines

4. 3R, 4R, and SR fuel' injection pumps

5. 4R and SR inlet and exhaust rockers and push rods

6. Various control valves at,the No. 3 junction box. _

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4 After the engine was repaired, it was restarted and has successfully completed 73ST-2DG01 (Integrated Safeguards Test).

B. Fuel Injection Tube Assemblies I The suspect assemblies in all 3 units are being replaced as described in Section 1 - Unit 1 and Unit 2 operability and as stated in EER-87-DG-072. Also, the suspect spare assemblies from the ANPP parts warehouse will be reworked to ensure proper ferrule engagement on the tube prior to release from the warehouse.

ANPP has also decided to repair the diesel engine tubing nuts to ensure conformance with the SAE chamfer requirement. The repair of the nuts will be accomplished under EER-87-DG-074 and will be completed prior to Mode 4 entry in each unit.

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i f March 30, 1987 Mr. Gary G. Zech, Chief Vendor Program Branch Office of Inspection and Enforcement -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Zech:

. As you may know, Isomedix provides gamma radiation services related to the qualification of nuclear reactor safety-related equipment. During the past few months, the nuclear equipment qualification program af Isomedix has been under close review by both our customers (equipment manufacturers and test labs) and utility end users. The scope of this review has included our past and present operating procedures and controls as well as current and historical test records. Based upon our review and the recommendations of our customers, we have instituted some changes to operating procedures and documentation methods.

One item which was noted concerns the measurement tolerance associated with the dose and dose rate values certified by Isomedix on our test reports. Dur-ing a period of the late 1970's, a value of 3% was stated as the accuracy of the dose measurement. This value was based upon literature published regard-ing the Harwell Red 4034 Perspex dosimeter, the system primarily used to moni-tor these irradiations. However, the reporting of this tolerance value ceased by the early 1980's, and from that time until recently our test reports have not stated a value for the measurement tolerance associated with reported dose

, or dose rate values.

More recently, our Technical Department studied the Harwell Red 4034 dosimetry ]

system and estimated the tolerance associated with this system to be i 8% (4% l precision, 4% bias) at the 95% confidence level. This value has been stated j in our Standard Dosimetry Procedures since 1984, and is currently being quoted {

to customers when we are requested to bid on a job as well as listed on cur- '

rent test reports. However, the magnitude of this value has become a cause of concern to one of our customers and is the reason that this report is written.

Our survey of previous test records included the test files of the Automatic l Switch Company of Florham Park, NJ. This customer has used our radiation ser-vices for three equipment qualification testing programs involving solenoid ]

l valves and three involving pressure / temperature switches. Our evaluation of l test data for these programs was reported to ASCO, and they have requested l that we report our findings to your agency under 10CFR21. Their concerns are i as follows: O t- {

-e7040304tt-870330 ,

R PT21 EMV1h ISOMEDlX INC.

}O CORPORATE Off/CES = 11 APOLLO DRIVE. WHIPPANY, NEW JERSEY 07981

• C01) 887-4700 FAX 8871476 . TELEX 317361 I, -..

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Mr. Gary G. Zech March 30, 1987 2

1) That the minimum doses stated in the test reports for ASCO tests cannot be assured due to the negative measurement tolerance associated wit 6 each dose measurement. ,,

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2) That the maximum dose rates stated in the test reports cannot be assured due to the positive measurement tolerance associated with each measurement.

Note: ASCO also voiced concerns regarding dose rate uniformity, test sample temperature, and test records. These subjects were listed by Mr. Steve Alexander of your staff during his April,1985 ir.spection, and were addressed in our response dated June 26, 1955. The tests in question were performed ~

between 1978 and 1984, and as such do not reflect the program revisions which were instituted in response to the 1985 E.Q. inspection.

With respect to the question of tolerance for dose and dose rate measurements, our report to ASCO listed a value of 2% for the associated time measure-ments, based strictly upon the test tolerance for calibration of timers. Fol-lowing the issuance of this report, a review of calibration records for the past 5 years was performed for the timers in question. These records show that, in fact, the 5 error associated with these timer measurements has aver-aged less than 0.7%. Based upon this result, the total tolerance associated '

with Isomedix dose rate measurements (dose / time) is estimated to be i 8.6%,

while the tolerance associated with total dose measurements (dose rate x time) is estimated to be i 9.6%.

During the time of the April 1985 E.Q. inspection, the'sub,tect of test tolerance was discussed with Mr. Alexander. Based upon our conversations at that time, it was our understanding that the 10% margins applied to test doses, as prescribed by IEEE 323, were designed to compensate for errors asso-ciated with the measurement process. As the inspection report shows, this subject was not listed at a deficiency or even a coisnent by the inspector.

For this reasen we had not taken action with regard to specifying measurement tolerances in our reports. Since our estimate of total dose tolerance is within 10%, it is our belief that the test requirements for minimum dose have been met.

In the case of the dose rate measurements, the tolerance must be considered in regard to dose rate limitations imposed by the purchase order. The ASCO tests were typically performed at dose rates well below the purchase order limita-tions, so that a potential increase of g 10% will not cause a deviation. In one case, however, test records show a dose rate of 3.97 Mrads/ hour, whereas the P.O. states the rate.to be below 4 Mrads/ hour. There most certainly have been other instances where the test dose rate was within 10% of the specified maximum value, and in these cases the potential exists for deviations from specifications. The degree of deviation would not exceed 10%, however, so the effect of this upon a qualification test is likely not significant. As stated above, this report is sent at the request of our customer, due to their con-

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cerns over the qualification status of their products. While we do not feel that the situation is critical, we wish to bring these facts to the attention of NRC in order to receive a determination from you regarding them.

IsOMEDIX INC.

C049tATTOFFCEs e 11 APOLLO DRIVE. WHIPPANY NEW JEASEY 07961

• G01) m74700 L _

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- Mr. Gary G. Zech March 30, 1987

• 3 Obviously, any effects upon the ASCO tests will also affect testi performed for other customers, since the same systems were used to performithe work. We would therefore appreciate hearing from you regarding this matter in order to guide our planning in this area and to assist our customers whose projects may be affected.

Sincerely yours,.

ISOMEDIX INC.

hil/V Stevein R. Thompson W ^-

Quality Assurance Manager SRT:js cc: G. Dietz ,

W. Owens J. Young L. Olsen, ASCO

\

ISOMEDIX INC.

CORPORATE OFFCES

• 11 APOLLO DRIVE. WHIPPANY. NEW JERSEY 07951 * (201) N7 4700

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April 27,1987 To: All Nuclear Power Plant Quallfled Pressure Switch Users Re: Preliminary 10CFR PART 21 Notice SOR is investigating a potential problem with our gauge pressure switches.

We direct your attention to NRC information Notice IN 87-16. This notice addresses the SOR Series 1, 4, 5, 6, 8,. 9,12 and 54 switches.

We have discovered several switches at Davis-Besse Nuclear Generating Station which have contained a gas bubble formation bbtween the diaphragm layers within the sensing element of the switches. The cause of the prcblem has not yet been isolated. The use of 316 stainless steel diaphragms has not completely eliminated the bubble formation as previously concluded in IN87-16. .

An indicator of a bubble formation is the increase in deadband of the pressure switch (i.e.: the rise of the increasing set point and/or the fall of

-the decreasing set point). The formation of the bubbie may cause the set point to shift outside the technical specification limits.

SOR continues to investigate the phenomena. For any questions, please contact the factory at (913) 764-2630, and ask for Nuclear Sales.

Regards: '

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James R. Johnson Vice President - General Manager 042787-07/ES132 4 704300252 870427 gDR ADOCK 05000346 PDR &

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