ML20215B404

Insp Repts 50-348/87-10 & 50-364/87-10 on 870411-0518. Violations Noted:Failure to Follow Administrative Procedure AP-16, Conduct of Operations,Operations Group, Section 3.1.13.5 Re Attending Unit 1 Control Board

ML20215B404
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	06/03/1987
From:	Bradford W, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215B306	List: ML20215B305 ML20215B346 ML20215B404
References
50-348-87-10, 50-364-87-10, NUDOCS 8706170316
Download: ML20215B404 (7)

See also: IR 05000348/1987010

Text

. .

pnOtop UfdlVED STAVES

'

NUCl. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

REGION 11

g ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

• 'g ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323

'+4.....

. Report Nos.: 50-348/87-10 and 50-364/87-10

Licensee: Alabama Power Company

600 North 18th Street-

Birmingham, AL 35291

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8-

Facility'Name: Farley "l' and 2

Inspection Conducted: April 11 - May 18, 1987

Inspection at3Farley' site near Do han, Alabama

Inspectors:

W 'H.

( 1d 4

adfofd t

b+'

b3 (7~

'Da e Signed

Approved by: b h

H.' C. Dance, Section Chief

[p J I7

Dat6 Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, onsite inspection entailed: monthly surveillance observa-

tion, monthly maintenance. observation, operational safety verification,-

licensee event reports,. followup of plant events, and service water modifica-

tion.

Results: One violation was identified which involved failure to follow

approveo orocedures (Paragraph 7),

e706170316$$6 0 48

PDR ADOCK PDR

G

. .

-l

REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted:

J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager

D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager

k'. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant. Manager

R. D. Hill, Operations Manager

C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager

R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager

L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager

L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager

B. Moore, Operations Supervisor

J. E. Odom,. Operations Unit Supervisor. -l

B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor

T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor-

J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor

L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor

R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor

L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager

J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations

personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and

office personnel.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management

interviews throughout the report period and on May 18, 1986, with the

general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection

findings were discussed in detail. The licensee.did not identify as

proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during 'this inspection.-

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

This was not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information 'is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve . violations- or

deviations. One unresolved item is identified in paragraph 10.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation.(61726)

The inspectors observed and reviewed Technical Specification required -

surveillance testing and verified that testing was. performed in' accordance

with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that-

limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria

and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the

test; that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly

reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that

personnel conducting the tests were qualified. The inspector witnessed /

reviewed' portions of the following test activities:

t

'

. .

2

STP - 70,0 - Containment Sump Surveillance .

..

STP - 33.0A - Solid State Protection System Train "A" Operability Test

STP - 20.0 - "A" Train Penetration Room Filtration System

STP - 43.1 - Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Isolation Test

STP - 71.0 - Main Control Room Remote Valve Verification

STP - 24.5 - Service Water System Flow Path Verification

STP - 80.16 - Degraded Grid Voltage.and Loss of Voltage Protection

Relays Operability Test - Modes 1,2,3,4

STP - 10.0 . ECCS Subsystem Flow Path Verification Test

STP - 33.1A - Safeguards Test Cabinet. Train "A" Functional Test

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. MonthlyMaintenanceObservation(62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components

were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance.

with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and :tandards,

and were in conformance with Technical Specifications.

The folloving items were considered during the review: limiting condi-

tions for operations were met while components or systems were removed

from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating : the work;

activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected

as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior i

to returning components or systems to service; quality control records l

were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; l

parts and materials were properly certified; radiological controls were )

implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests-

were reviewed to determine the. status of outstanding jobs to assure that'

priority was assigned to safety-related equipment. maintenance which may

affect system performance. The following maintenance . activities : were

observed / reviewed:

2C charging pump gear oil cooler cleaning

2A charging pump PM's

2A BAT LT-106

2B Diesel Generator air compressor

Floor drain tank filter replacement ,

Diesel engine fire pump i

2B charging pump room cooler i

2B diesel generator #10 cyli>>tr injector

i4c violations or deviations w:re identified. i

7. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed. applicable logs

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report

period. The inspectors verified the 'perability of selected emergency

systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of

affected components. Tours of the auxilict, building, diesel building,

turtine building and service water structure were conducted' to observe  ?

1

!

_

.

3

plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibra-

tions. The inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions l

for Operations (LCO) and results of selected.surve'ilance tests. The l

verifications were accomplished by direct observa son of monitoring ]

instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic

'

snubbers, and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry results. j

The licensee's compliance with LC0 action statements were reviewed as l

!

events occurred.

The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee manage-

ment and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor, shift

foremen and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions provided a

daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing activities in

progress, as well as discussions of significant problems. l

The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force

members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the

facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-

tion of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of gates,

doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were proper;

and procedures were followed.

On April 27, 1987 at approximately 7:30 a.m., the operator at-the-controls

(0ATC) reactor operator position on Unit 1 control board was left

unattended for approximately 20 seconds. Even though the position was not

properly attended by the plant operator the shift supervisor, whose desk

is within the designated 0ATC boundries, took over the 0ATC operator

functions when it was noted that he was not within his designate area.

This event was caused by a breakdown in communications. The 0ATC operator

needed to replace a chart recorder with new chart paper. The chart paper

storage is behind the emergency power panel but still inside the main

control room, The unit operator was preparing to

test procedure (STP) at the balance-of-plant (80P) perform

control a surveillance

board which is

behind the main control board. The 0ATC told the unit operator he would

be right back. Apparently the unit operator did not hear this. Both

operators turned away from each other and proceeded out of the 0ATC area.

The 0ATC violated section 3.1.13.5 of Administrative Procedure 16 " Conduct

of Operations, Operations Group" which require that the 0ATC shall under

no circumstances leave the at-the-controls area without obtaining a

qualified relief operator. The shift supervisor was pressed into service

as the 0ATC operator without proper notification and briefing as required

by plant procedures. This is a violation 50-348/87-10-01. The license'e

initiated immediate corrective action which required that all plant

operators read the applicable sections of AP 16. The duties of the

control room operators have been redefined as well as the boundaries of

the 0ATC operator. Training was held for all licensed shift personnel and

was documented by training attendance sheets.

No other violations or deviations were identified.

L

l

, .

4 +

l

8. Licensee Event Reports

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential

generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information

included in the report meets the NRC reporting requirements and to s

consider whether the corrective action discussed in the report appears 1

appropriate. Licensee action, with respect to selected reports, were J

reviewed to verify that the event had been reviewed and evaluated by the

licensee as required by the Technical Specification; that corrective  !

action was taken by the licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety j

setting and LCOs were not exceeded. The inspector examined selected i

incident reports, logs and records, and interviewed selected personnel, j

The following reports are considered closed:  ;

i

Unit 1 LERs

LER 87-06 - Personnel error results in missed fire watch. This l

'

licemee identified violation meets the requirements of

I

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V and therefore, this

violation is not cited.  !

l

LER 87-07 - Reactor trip due to source range detector failing high

No violations or deviations wert identified.

9. Follow up of Plant Events (93702)

On May 14,1986 at 10:45 a.m. Unit 1 tripped from 100% power from steam l

flow greater than feed flow coincident with low steam generator level in  !

10 steam generator. The engineered safeguards systems were not I

challenged. The i, rip occurred as a result of operator error. The I

operator was running two diesel generators. While preparing to remove one l

of the diesel generators from service he inadvertently opened the wrong

electrical breaker. The breaker which was opened fed 4160V buss 1H. This

buss did not auto fast transfer to its alternate feeder. This denergized

Reactor Coolant Pump 1C as well as motor control centers (MCC). The MCC's

which supply power to the hydraulic oil pumps on 1A and IB steam generator

turbine feed pumps lost power which caused the main feed pump turbines to

trip. The licensee is investigating the auto fast transfer on 1H buss.

The inspector had no further questions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Service Water Modification to 1B RHR Room Cooler.

The licensee completed the change out of two-inch and under carbon steel

pipi'1g to stainless steel piping on the service water cooling to 1B RHR

pump room cooler. The work was completed under PCN 584-1-2914 and

controlled under MWR 157474 and MWR 138205,

i

l

i

t- _  !

. - _ _ _ .

, --

.- ,

1 g

1

5 1

During the performance of STP. 24.5, Service Water System Flow Path. .

i

Verification Test, the licensee found service water valves 17B and 21B  ;

closed. The v61ves' are the inlet and outlet valves for 18 RHR room - I

cooler. The valves were realigned to the proper open position. The  :

valves were determined to be closed for approximately 61 hours7.060185e-4 days <br />0.0169 hours <br />1.008598e-4 weeks <br />2.32105e-5 months <br />. This is )

within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period allowed. by Technical' Specification 3.5.2. -The {

valves were listed on the hydrostatic test valve , lineup sheet to be j

positioned open.' There is no documentation.which indicates. closure of_the'  ;

valves; The MWR's do not list 17B and 21B as valves to be manipulated .  ;

.since they are not hydro test boundary valves. This item is unresolved, ,

pending further review (348/86-10-02). -1

l

11. Semi-Annual Effluent Release Report (90713)

Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 requires the licensee :to submit within

60 days after January 1 and' July 1 of' each year, routine radioactive

effluent release reports covering the operationo: f the unit during the j

previous six months. The licensee's Semi-Annual Radiological Effluent-  ;

Release Report for July 1,1986, 'through December 31, 1986, was received. 1

February 23, 1987. The effluent release data summarized in ' the. table-

below was obtained from current and previous Semi-Annual Effluent. Release

Reports ,

,

Effluent Release Summary for Farley

Units 1 and 2

Liquids (curies)

Calendar Fission and  ;

Year Activation Products Tritium i

1984 1.50 E-1 7.79 E+2 ,

1985 1.05 E-1 1.10 E+3

1986 1.85 E-1 1.34 E+3

!

1

Gases (curies)

Calendar Fission and

Year Activation Products lodines Tritium

1984 7.72 E+3 7.22 E-3 2.71 E+2' l

1985 2.37 E+3 5.84 E-3 4.70 E+2-

1986 3.12 E+3 2.02 E-3 2.15 E+2

,

,

1

i l

. .

--

6

It should be noted that gaseous releases from the plant have decreased

from 1984 values. Also, reported quantities of gaseous fission and

activation prooucts and iodines were less than the 1985 averages of

gaseous releases per unit for 21 operating PWRs in Region II (5180 curies

and 0.06 curies respectively). Liquid releases of fission and activation

products did not vary significantly from the 1984 values but were below

the 1985 average liquid release per unit of 1.35 curies. However, liquid 4

tritium releases were approximately 1.5 times the 1C'35 average of

420 curies per unit. No uncontrolled releases of either liquid or gaseous

effluents were reported for calendar year 1986.

Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 requires the radioactive effluent release i

report to be submitted 60 days after January 1 of each year and to include  !

an assessment of radiation doses to the likely most exposed member of the j

public from reactor releases during the previous 12 consncutive months, i

The assessment of the radiation doses is to ba performed in accordance I

!

with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (0DCM). A summary of the 1984,

1985 snd 1986 annual doses to the likely most exposed number of the public  !

is presented in the table below: j

8

Dose Summary: Farley Units 1 and 2

Liquid Effluent Pathway

Calendar Total i

vear Body (mrem) Thyroid (mrem) GI-LLI(mred  !

l

1984 2.1 E-1 2.2 E-2 3.7 E+1

1985 3.2 E-2 8.7 E-3 6.4 E-2

1986 6.1 E-2 1.9 E-2 1.4 E-1

Gaseous Effluent Pathway

Calendar Total

Year Body (mrem) Skin (mrem)

1984 3.7 E-1 7.2 E-1

1985 1.3 E-1 3.0 E-1

1986 1.2 E-1 2.7 E-1

The inspector noted that the reporting requirements for the Semi Annual

Effluent Release Report as specified by the technical specifications and

the applicable portions of Regulatory Guide 1.21 were met.