IR 05000369/1982017

IE Insp Repts 50-369/82-17 & 50-370/82-12 on 820417-0515. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Comply W/Housekeeping & Cleanliness Requirements

ML20062J560
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	06/11/1982
From:	Bemis P, Bryant J, Heatherly T, Hopkins P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20062J485	List: IR 05000369/1982017 ML20062J482 ML20062J508 ML20062J525 ML20062J546
References
50-369-82-17, 50-370-82-12, NUDOCS 8208160401
Download: ML20062J560 (9)

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Report No. 50-369/82-17 and 50-370/82-12

_icensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Units.1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos. NPF-9 and CPPR-84 Inspection at the McGuire site near Charlotte, North Carolina Inspectors: M d. /h/[1c, .b [2////82 P. R. Bepis~ g / _.Date Signed d // _N, b////82 P. Hopki '

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Approved by: _ _

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ryailt , ec 1 n Chief, Division of Dat'e SigneP -

ject and Resident Programs

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SUMMARY i

Inspection on April 17 - May 15, 1982

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Areas Inspected

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This routine announced inspection involved 230 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of operation safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, significant event followup, plant trips, TMI followup items, and trainin Results

Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in six areas; one item of noncompliance was found in one area (violation - failure to comply with housekeeping and cleanliness requirements -

paragraph 7a).  ;

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8208160401 820802 PDR ADOCK 05000369 G PDR __

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• M. McIntosh, Station Manager

• Sample, Projects and Licensing Engineer

• M. Pacetti, Chairman SSRG

• D. Lampke, Licensing Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included superintendents, operating engineers, shif t supervisors, reactor operators, unit coordinators, station group supervisors, planners, technicians, mechanics, specialists, security, office personnel, corporate design engineers, training and QA personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 24, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The station manager acknow-ledged the result . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 7 . Operating History At the beginning of the inspection period the unit was operating at approximately 50% power due to a power level limitation related to Model D steam generators (SG) imposed by the NRC on April 1,1982. On April 29, 1982, the inspector attended a meeting between Duke Power personnel and Westinghouse personnel in which a revised operating program was submitted to the NRC. This submittal included results of the last eddy current testing (ECT) performed at McGuire Unit 1, the results of the data obtained from the internal instrumentation installed in two tubes of steam generator (S/G)

"A", the latest test results of nondomestic nuclear power plants with similar S/G's, and followup information requested by the NRC in the April 1, 1982

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letter. The NRC staff looked favorably on the submittal and assured Duke Power of a response before the end of the 1500 hour0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> run time, after a close review by the NRC staff and consultants.

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During the entire inspection period, the unit operated at approximately 50*.

power except for two transients which are explained.in detail in paragraph 9. Also, during the inspection period the emergency plan was implemented when an unusual event was declared due to the loss of both ESF trains. This event -is also explained in detail in paragraph . Operational Safety Verification Throughout the inspection interval the inspectors observed operational activities in the plant and the control room. The.following activities were reviewed and/or observed as possible on a daily basis: shift turnover; control room and shift manning; control and other vital area access; control room and plant operators adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities; instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety for anomolies; operator understanding of alarmed control room annunciators including initiation of corrective action in a timely manner; operator response to computer alarms; valve and electrical alignment for emergency safeguards features (ESF), and reactor protection system (RPS) inputs in the control room in compliance with technical specification'(TS) requirements; shift supervisor, control operator, tag out, and operator's work request logs; access and egress from the protected area in compliance with require-ments of the security procedures; and egress from controlled areas in compliance with the health physics pla During the inspection period the inspectors also observed, reviewed and/or verified the following: status of instrument calibration, equipment tags and radiation work permits; results of selected liquid and gaseous samples; and gas and liquid waste discharges and logs. The inspectws toured the accessible areas of the plant to make an assessment of the following: plant and equipment conditions; areas which could be fire hazards; interior of selected electrical and control panels; proper personnel monitoring practices, housekeeping and cleanliness practices; and radiation protection

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controls. The inspectors performed a complete walkoowr, cf - the diesel generator starting air system and cooling water syste Based on this review and observation two inspector followup items were identified.

Automatic Actuation Signal for Containment Spray System

! During the inspection of the control board lineup for the containment

spray (NS) system the inspector noticed on the print for NS system that

the actuation of NS pumps requires both an "S" signal which is

generated by the safety injection logic and a "p" signal which is

generated by Hi-Hi containment pressur The inspector feels the i requirement for both signals to be present can generate a safety

, concern for the following reason: Should a small loss of coolant

accident (LOCA) take place inside containment a safety injection (SI)

i initiation could take place due to either pressurizer pressure or HI

! containment pressure, depending on the size and location of the break.

i Operations personnel will reset the SI signal at a minimum of one minute (due to a timer) up to approximately ten minutes so they can

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take manual control of the SI equipment. Should the break continue to l propagate after the SI signal is reset to the point the Hi-Hi containment pressure setpoint is reached the NS pumps will not receive !

an automatic start signal because the "S" signal is no-longer presen !

{ The plant is built according to Westinghouse design for start signals to the NS pumps, but until this logic can be reviewed by NRC technical

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personnel it will remain an Inspector Followup Item (369/82-17-01; !

370/82-12-01).

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' Automatic Actuation of Containment Spray Suction Valves.

L During the control board walkdown of the NS system it was found that '

the valves which allow the NS pumps to take suction from the refueling water storage tank (FWST) do not receive an automatic open signa These valves are in parallel to meet single failure criteria and during r plant operation these valves are required to be open, but most equip-ment required to be started, opened, or closed receives a " check" signal to insure the emergency safeguards features (ESF) equipment is in the correct position. This item addresses the NS suction valves, *

but two valves in the ECCS also do not receive a check signal for

! correct positio Until this item can be reviewed by NRC technical personnel it will remain an Inspector Followup Item (369/82-17-02; 370/82-12-02).

7. Maintenance

Maintenance activities were observed in progress throughout the inspection

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perio lhe inspector verified that the following activities were accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures: Radiation controls, fire prevention and safety measures, and QA/0C hold points were observed as appropriate; test equipment used was verified to be calibrated, and data recordeo was compared to that observed; required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating work; limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met while maintenance was being performed; replacement parts and materials used were properly certified; testing and calibration as necessary were completed prior to returning

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equipment to service; and housekeeping requirements were me ,

The inspector reviewed portions of outstanding work orders for safety-related systems to insure the licensee is performing maintenance in a

, timely manner and that an excessive backlog is not developing. The

inspector examined the used procedures for technical adequacy and the

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completion of work order The following maintenance activities were i observed and reviewed in depth: '

! MP/0/A/7600/36 Dresser Relief Valve Bonnet Screwed To Body-Corrective Maintenance  ;

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, IP/0/B/3150/02 Peak Shock Recorder and Annunciator Calibration *

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Based on this review and observation one violation, one unresolved item, and

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one inspector followup item were identified and are discussed in t paragraphs 7a-c.

. Lower Annulus Housekeeping and Posting Requirement ; The inspector entered the lower annulus with licensee personnel on May 14, 1982 to observe the calibration and maintenance of seismic

instrumentation, in particular peak shock recorders.

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(1) Upon entry to the lower annulus the inspector noticed that there was no sign posted providing the housekeeping level requirement *

I (2) Inside the annulus the inspector found numerous cigarette butts j and balled up cigarette pack Station Directive 3.11.0 Revision 7, " Housekeeping and Cleanliness,"

which implements 10 CFR 50 Appendix B criterion V and the accepted QA program section 17.2.5 requires that Level IV housekeeping areas be  !

marked by prominently displayed signs and prohibits use of tobacco product J Failure to meet Station Directive requirements described above  !

constitutes a violation (369/82-17-03).

' Communication between Inside and Outside the Annulus.

i i When individuals enter the annulus the only communication they have ,

with the outside is with a phone which 13 strung from the outsid t

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This creates a concern in that the annulus door must be closed af ter entrance into the annulus and, according to licensee personnel, the (

line has been cut in the past leaving individuals inside without  :

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outside contac Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) fig-656 was submitted to add a phone '

in the annulus and Work Request 91779 NMS has been written to perform

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the work. Work is expected to be performed during the next outage.

l Until the phone has been installed this will be an Inspector Followup i Item (369/82-17-04; 370/82-12-02). Problem with exiting the Lower Annulu The lower annulus area is posted as a high radiation are Upon leaving the area, the inspector found it impossible to open the door without outside assistance. Operations stated that at the time this

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problem occurred they were running the annulus ventilation system to perform D0P and freon testing of the filters. Startup and operation of this system created a high differential pressure which make it extremely hard (if not impossible) to open the annulus door. The  ;

, occurrence of this type of situation would appear to be contrary to the  !

j requirement that individual shall not be prevented from leaving a high  ;

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l radiation are Until this item can be discussed with NRC Health I physics personnel it shall remain an Unresolved Item (369/82-17-05).  ;

i Surveillance Surveillance activities were observed throughout the inspection interva The inspector reviewed and/or verified that procedures used conform to the technical specification (TS) requirements and had received proper licensee review and approval; that test instrumentation was properly calibrated; that .

l the systems were removed from service and restored to service per procedure;  ;

test prerequisites and acceptance criteria were met; test data was accurate  ;

and complete; completed tests were properly reviewed and discrepancies were  ;

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rectified; and tests were performed by qualified individuals. The following surveillance activities were observed in greater dept PT/1/A/4208/01B Containment Spray Pump B Performance Test PT/1/A/4208/02 NS Valve Stroke Timing (quarterly)

Work Order 108007 Retest Valve Stroke after Repair of Leak l PT/1/A/4700/10 Shift Turnover Verification PT/1/A/4600/03A Semi-Daily Surveillance Test PT/1/A/4600/03B Daily Surveillance PT/0/A/4400/01D Fire Pump Operability Test ,

l PT/1/A/4204/01A Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Performance Test  ;

PT/1/A/4204/018 Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B Performance Test i

PT/1/A/4209/01A Centrifugal Charging Pump JA Performance Test PT/1/A/4150/08 Target Flux Difference Calculation

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l IP/0/B/3150/03A Strong Motion Accelerograph Seismic Trigger Calibration

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IP/0/B/3150/02 Peak Shock Recorder and Annunicator Calibration  :

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IP/0/B/3150/04 Calibration Procedure for SMA-3 Strong Motion Acceleration System PT/0/A/4450/08B Control Room Area Outside Air Pressure Train B Test i

PT/0/A/4450/12 V. E. Test (Nuclear Air cleaning)

Based on the above review and observation, one inspector followup item was identifie i

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The inspector witnessed PT/1/A/4401/01A, " Component Cooling Train A Performance Test", and reviewed PT/1/A/4204/01A, " Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A performance Test". During these tests, parts of the system were placed in an abnormal configuration. The control room operators were relied upon to take corrective actions to prevent component or system damage based upon their system knowledge and with the aid of control room indications and alarms, but without specified definitive guidance for safe equipment operatio Until the licensee reviews these procedures to insure that definitive guidance is transcribed from applicable reference documents, to prevent equipment damage and/or personnel hazard, this item will be an Inspector Followup Item (369/82-17-06). Significant Event Followup On April 23, 1982, at approximately 7:50 p.m. the licensee implemented the emergency plan by declaring an unusual event due to both ESF trains being inoperable and began a unit shutdown. At 10:38 p.m. the plant was manually tripped due to a feedwater problem, which is discussed in paragraph 10a. At 2:35 a.m. on April 24, 1982 one ESF train was restored to service and the licensee secured from the unusual event. Conditions that led to the unusual event are described belo During the surveillance test of diesel generator (D/G) 1A on April 23, 1982 the breaker would not close to allow the diesel to tie into its associated bus and at 6:15 p.m. of the same date D/G 1A was declared inoperable. At the time this occurred, centrifugal charging pump 1B was inoperable due to preventive maintenance being performed. An ususal event was declared because neither ESF train met the operability requirement Technical Specifications (T/S) allow one hour to fix the problem or begin a unit shutdown. At 7:50 p.m. unit shutdown was commenced. 0/G 1A was returned to operability at 2:35 a.m. on April 24, 1982 which allowed the licensee to secure from the unusual even Even though T/S required the unit shutdown, all the equipment in ESF train A, except for the D/G could operate and be powered by normal power sources

- the only piece of equipment that could not operate was the emergency power sourc Cause of the failure of the breaker to close was due to wire terminations made in the local panel when they should not have been mad This caused a signal to the protective relay that the diesel was tripped on overcurren Improper the terminations were due to an IEA technician error. This occurrence is discussed in detail in licensee event report 82-3 . Plant Transients. Trips and Safety System Challenges During the inspection period, the unit experienced two transients, a reactor trip and a 45*. load reduction in 21 seconds, as well as three minor transients due to digital electrohydraulic control (DEH) problems. These transients are discussed in more detail in the following paragraph =

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7 Reactor trip On April 23,1982 at 7:50 p.m. the licensee began a unit shutdown as required by T/ The reason for ' this shutdown is discussed in paragraph At 10:38 p.m. the reactor was manually tripped from a power level of approximately 25*. due to loss of feedwater which caused a turbine tri Main feedwater pump 1A tripped due to a discharge pressure setpoint being set too low. The unit was maintained at no-load temperature and pressure while IEA attempted to repair D/G 1A and centrifugal charging pump 1B. The licensee attempted to tie the unit back into the grid at 4:46 p.m. on April 24, 1982, but it immediately tripped off line. A faulty relay in the generator field relay system was found. It was repaired and the unit was tied back into the grid at 10:03 p.m. on April 24, 198 Turbine runback On May 12, 1982 at approximately 8:39 the unit experienced a turbine runback from 50% reactor power to approximately 7%. The runback was caused by a stator water cooling problem on the main electrical generator. All systems functioned as required and neither the reactor nor the turbine tripped off line. The unit returned to 50%

power by 2:00 a.m. on May 13, 198 DEH problems The licensee is continuing to have minor problems with the turbine control system which cause load swings, but the operators and the plant react as expected to make the transients insignificant. The licensee is presently working to correct the DE , Independent Inspection During the inspection perico the inspector attended and reviewed various portions of the licensee's requalification and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)

upgrade progra The licensee is making a concerted effort to provide individuals with both an NRC license and actual plant operations experience to act in a supervisory and teaching role in their operator training program to ensure the most accurate information possible is being taught. The inspectors also attended timed tests that were being run at the McGuire simulator. These tests utilized licensed plant operators to test different

} formats for the emergency procedure upgrade.

l Also during the inspection period the inspector reviewed the licensee's

procedure for cold hydro of the Unit 2 reactor coolant system.

i Based on the above review and observation no violations or deviations were identified.

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1 Followup on TMI Items (Closed) TMI item, 80-RD-32, NUREG 0737 item III.D.1.1, Primary Coolant Radiation Sources Outside Containment. The inspector reviewed the licensee's commitment for identifying and reducing leakage from piping systems outside containment containing radioactive fluids and gase Procedures have been written and tests conducted on these system The procedures specified appropriate corrective actions. Weekly surveillance of systems will be conducted to reduce leakage to as-low-as practical level Implementation, procedural adequacy and documentation to verify corrective action were not reviewed, but will be completed in a followup inspectio Based upon the review of the licensee's commitment and establishment of test and surveillance procedures, this item is closed.

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