IR 05000369/1982008
| ML20054K351 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1982 |
| From: | Bemis P, Bryant J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054K336 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-82-08, 50-369-82-8, NUDOCS 8207010453 | |
| Download: ML20054K351 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d"
S REGION 11 E
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 k,
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ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303
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Report No. 50-369/82-08 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire 1 Docket No. 50-369 License No. NPF-9 Inspection at licGuire 1 site near Charlotte, North Carolina Inspector:
(2 A h [>t o b 4/A3///L P. R. Bemik ()
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DfteSigned V/2r 2_
Approved by:
ux, J
'Bry~ ant, Sgfon Chief, Division of
'Date Signed
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oject and Rdsident Programs SUMMARY Inspection on February 22 - March 8,1982 Areas Inspected This special announced inspection involved 30 resident inspector-hours on site in the area of LER 81-181 followup.
Resul ts Of the one area inspected, one item of noncompliance was found (Violation -
operation with batteries below Technical Specification limits).
8207010453 820621 PDR ADOCK 05000369 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. McIntosh, Station Manager G. Cage, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance
- L. Weaver, I&E Engineer
- W. Sample, Projects and Licensing Engineer
- D. Lampke, Licensing Engineer M. Pacetti, Chairman SSRG G. Cruzan, SSRG J. Painter, Shift Supervisor L. Massey, Shift Supervisor R. Blake, Shift Supervisor A. Beaver, Assistant Shift Supervisor J. Pressley, Assistant Shift Supervisor K. Reece, I&E Coordinator B. Hart, I&E Coordinator L. Cooke, I&E Supervisor C. Tyler, I&E Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, and operators.
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- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 8,1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The station manager acknow-ledged the findings.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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Follow-up on LER 81-81
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When the inspector performed his followup of LER 81-181, many inconsis-tencies were found between the licensee report of the event and the actual occurrences, in addition one major problem area was identified which was not reported.
The following is a chronology of the events and, where applicable, the inconsistencies as identified by the inspector using log books,
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interviews with personnel involved, work requests, shift turnover sheets and alann typewriter print;uts:
(a) On November 12, 1981 battery EVCA was found to have a single cell approaching the T/S specific gravity limit.
Operations placed battery EVCA on equalizing charge which made the battery inoperable.
(b) On November 13, 1981 an instrument technician performing a monthly battery surveillance test using procedure IP/0/A/3061 found the corrected specific gravity in cell #16 of battery EVCB to be 1.194 which is below the Category B T/S requirement of 1.195 and more than 0.020 below the battery bank measured average of 1.218.
Enclosure 11.2 of IP/0/A/3061/01 step 10.2.9(c) states that if the recorded value falls below the T/S value the battery is inoperable.
The technician reported the information to an IAE supervisor early that morning, but neither the technician nor the supertisor reported this information to the shift supervisor as required by IP/0/A/0061/01 step 10.2.8 which is required by T/S 6.8.1.(c).
(c) During the afternoon of November 13, 1981 two IAE supervisors vent to battery EVCB to verify the readings taken earlier by the technician.
The initial readings taken by one supervisor and verified by another were found to be below T/S limits, but readings taken at a different place in the same cell registered above T/S values.
Based on the latter readings the supervisor decided not to notify the shift supervisor. The IAE supervisor did not document his actions or the specific gravity readings he found as required by Station Directive 4.2.1 which is required by T/S 6.8.1.(a).
(d) On November 14, 1981, battery EVCB was found to be inoperable due to low specific gravity by a different IAE crew.
This finding was reported to operations who placed battery EVCA back in service after determining its operability and placed battery EVCB on equalizing charge, making EVCB inoperable.
(e) On November 15, 1981 operations placed battery EVCB back in service as operable, but there is no documentation which shows the battery to be operable. The licensee reported this violation in reportable occurrence #81-181, but the report showed the wrong date. The date used was November 14, 1981, which was obtained from an operations log.
The alann typewriter and shift turnover sheets show the breakers to the bus being closed on November 15, 1981. These breakers returned the battery to service.
(f) The licensee investigation shows battery bank EVCB declared inoperable at 11:23 p.m. on November 15, 1981, operable at 12:10 a.m. on November 16, 1981, and inoperable at 2:30 a.m. on November 17, 1981.
The T/S Out of Action logs do not show that the battery bank was declared operable at the above times. The licensee investigator apparently did not understand the paper work entries on these dates and at no time during the times listed above was the battery actually
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1 declared operable.
Therefore, on LER 81-181, where the licensee reported battery EVCB being restored to operable status twice is incorrect. The battery was only declared operable incorrectly once.
Items a, b, and c above apparently were completely overlooked by the licensee during the investigation due to incomplete review of supporting documenta tion.
During the investigation the following pieces of documenta-tion were not reviewed: Work Request #0005846 PMP, which identifies all of the problems in items a, b, and c; alarm typewriter printouts and shift turnover sheets which would have identified items e and f.
This incomplete investigation is in violation of station directive 2.8.1. which requires a complete investigation and is required by T/S 6.8.1. (a).
The ficGuire station batteries are sized for two unit operation, while only one unit is operational to date. Therefore, there was adequate battery power available to Unit 1 at all times during this incident, items a-f above relate to the same event; therefore, they are collec-tively cited as a single violation (369/82-08-01).
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