IR 05000369/1982024

IE Insp Repts 50-369/82-24 & 50-370/82-16 on 820516-0602.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Surveillance, Plant Transient & Significant Event Followup,Operational Safety Verification & Maint

ML20062J093
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	07/22/1982
From:	Bemis P, Bryant J, Hopkins P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20062J076	List: IR 05000369/1982024 ML20062J072
References
50-369-82-24, 50-370-82-16, NUDOCS 8208160262
Download: ML20062J093 (11)

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p *"%g UNITED STATES

+, .f,, WUCLEAH REGULATORY COMMISSION o REGION 11 8 .: c 101 MARIETTA STREET o 8 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30303

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Report Nos. 50-369/82-24 and 50-370/82-16 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos. NPF-9 and CPPR-84 Inspection at the McGuire site near Charlotte, North Carolina Insp tors:

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Da'te Signed Approved by: ~. , .. / 6 tfautN 7/G [2 -

Bryant, ,Mytion Chief, Division of Da~te Signed

' Project and R6sident Programs SUMMARY Inspection on May 16 - June 20, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine announced inspection involved 330 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of surveillance, plant transient followup, significant event followup, operational safety verification, and maintenance.

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Results i

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Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie i 8208160262 820723 PDR ADOCK 05000369 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• M. McIntosh, Station Manager

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• G. Cage, Superintendent of Operations

• D. Lampke, Licensing Eng:. leer R. Fred Gray, Superintendent of Maintenance H. D. Lyerly, Manager of System Maintenance J. D. Murphy, Area Coordinator, Steam, SMS A. Glenn Kiser, Training and Safety Supervisor, SMS M. Horne, Supervisor, SMS, Steam McGuire W. E. Smith, Technical Specialist Maintenance J. Willis, QA Superintendent, Unit 2 M. Starnes, Superintendent Construction McGuire M. Couch, Technical Engineer, Supervisor Construction J. Yakoglu, Supervisor, Design Corporate Other licensee employees contacted included superintendents, operating engineers, shift supervisors, reactor operators, unit coordinators, station group supervisors, planners, technicians, mechanics, specialists, security, office personnel, corporate design engineers, training and QA personne Other Organizations J. Roth, Westinghouse D. -Puryear, Westinghouse

• Attended exit interview

, Exit Interview i

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 18, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The plant manager acknow-ledged the finding . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio . Operating History

! Unit 1 began the reporting period at 50% power, complying with an NRC l restriction due to analysis being performed by Westinghouse on the Model D L

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Steam Generator (S/G). On May 21, 1982 the licensee received permission to increase power to a maximum level of 75% for 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of operation. At 10:12 a.m. on May 12, 1982 the unit began increasing power above 50%.

During the reporting period the unit maintained 75% power except for the following exceptions which will be explained in more detail in later paragraphs: A load reduction to 50% on May 26, 1982 to facilitate turbine valve calibration

On June 5, 1982 "B" main feedwater pump (CF) tripped on lo suction <

pressure - the unit wat manually runback by the operators to 50% powe ,

i On June 13, 1932 reactor trip / turbine trip due to 2/3 reactor coolant system (NC) flow low on 1/4 loop The reporting period ended with the unit back at 75% powe ' Operational Safety Verification '

Throughout the inspection interval the inspectors observed operational activities in the plant and the control room. The following activities were reviewed and/or observed as possible on a daily basis: shift turnover; control room and shift manning; control and other vital area access; control room and plant operator adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities; instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety for anomolies; operator understanding of alarmed control room annunciators including initiation of corrective action in a timely manner; operator response to computer alarms; valve and electrical alignment for emergency safeguards features (ESF), and reactor protection system (RPS) inputs in the control room in compliance with technical specification (TS) requirements; ,

shift supervisor, control operator, tag out, and operator's work request ,

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logs; access and egress from the protected area in compliance with require-ments of the security procedures; and egress from controlled areas in compliance with the health physics pla During the inspection period the inspectors also observed, reviewed and/or i verified the following: status of instrument calibration, equipment tags i

and radiation work permits; results of selected liquid and gaseous samples; i and gas and liquid waste discharges and logs. The inspectors toured the accessible areas of the plant to make an assessment of the following: plant

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and equipment conditions; areas which could be fire hazards; interior of selected electrical and control panels; proper personnel monitoring ;

practices; housekeeping and cleanliness practices; and radiation protection control The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the residual heat removal system (ND) after the seismic work was performed on the ND heat exchangers ;

which is discussed in paragraph 9a.

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3 Unit 2 Cold Hydro On May 24, 1982 the inspector observed performance of the cold hydro of the Unit 2 reactor coolant system. The first and second attempts to reach the 3107 psig required by the test failed due to pressure release at approximately 2700 psig. It was found that a code safety valve on the pressurizer had not been properly gagged and once the safety was gagged the test was again run and successfully completed. Review of

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the paperwork involved will be addressed in next month's inspection repor Vital Batteries Mistakenly Declared Operable On June 8,1982 after a vital battery discharge test, operations ,

declared the batteries operable and returned them to service, but all l testing required to determine operability had not been complete After discussions with the individuals involved it was determined that miscommunication between the technician and the shift supervisor was the cause of the problem. The licensee discusses this event in more detail in an upcoming licensee event report (LER). This is the second time the batteries have been declared operable when testing had not been completed to insure operability. The corrective action the r'

licensee has proposed in the LER should correct the problem, but the inspector will also provide followu Based on this review and observation no violations or deviations were i identifie l Maintenance j Maintenance activities were observed in progress throughout the inspection

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period. The inspector verified that these activities were performed and ;

accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures. Radiation l controls, fire prevention measures, and QA/QC hold points were observed as !

appropriate to particular maintenance and/or design fix items. Test equipment used was verified to be calibrated and data recorded were compared to those observed. The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed in depth as to the work requests used to perform the maintenance j tompared to engineering design criteri !

, Inspection of System Maintenance Support (SMS) offices and facilities and training center was accomplished through interviews with top management, middle management, supervisors and random employees, -

records and direct observation of training activities as follows:

Training Center - General - well organized and managed and in a state

' of growth. Personnel are trained by SMS at the Center and by continual

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on-the-job training in the fiel ,

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4 Welder training - individuals are trained by qualified staff, using written lesson plans and training modules produced by Hobbart. Welding procedures are stringently impose Example: Welder must be on printout as being qualified and be issued a stencil so that all work may be identified. Training processes are ;

magnafluxed and/or radiographed to insure that individual has been '

, properly trained before doing job wor . QA-A quality assurance program is in effect. Example: QA must sign off all work, and welders must be requalified every 90 days and signed off by QA. These records are placed into individual records and are reflected in computer printouts with master fil ,

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Training is of high standards and is well documented. Example: A completed follow through of one individual with eight years of service !

with Duke. Individual's record was followed from hire through

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personnel, medical, training for maintenance, welding training, medical safety, accident training, et :

All training in welding certification is in accordance with updated I ASME codes. The facility has an extensive master copy on all code Safety training - Training is done by qualified people. People are informed of safe practices and supervision has ample safety directives

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with ample delivery of information to individuals. Example: Drivers i of forks lifts are trained, licensed, and must present this identifi-cation prior to receiving keys to equipmen [

Future Plans - All records to be placed on computer tapes. Well documented records are.in file on the different personne Other Records Reviewed Systems maintenance welding training evaluations  ; Weld inspection for welder performance qualification Process and performance qualification and welder requalification status reports Security records printouts and verification Qualification record System Maintenance Support manpower reports System Maintenance Support manpower and time report

! Back injury reports Supervisor reports for accidents 1 Hernia case reports 1 CRR training records 1 CPR, First Aid and Training reports and records

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All maintenance, QA and design criteria as applied to the seismic support system associated with the residual heat removal heat exhangers was monitored and followed closel A representative sample of hydraulic snubbers was randomly selected by the licensee from the total population of Unit l's safety-related hydraulic snubbers and tested them as per Technical Specifications Section 3/4.7.8C, plan number two. The inspector followed a number of these tests, as performed by three different crews, from start.to finis Followup checks, observations and inspections will be in the next monthly repor The following maintenance activities were followed in depth, Work Request #109076 OPS, Repair 1B Condensate Booster Pump (CBP) Work Request #108810 OPS, Investigate Reason For Excessive Oil Leak From IB CBP Moto Investigation revealed wiped bearings on both ends, bearing journal scarred on both ends with bearing housing burre Work Request #108777 OPS, Repair Leak at Stud on Valve Top Cap

! Work Request #91849 NSM, Modify Seismic Restraint on The Top of The ND Heat Exchanger according to sketch NSM MG 915, for 1A and 1 (included observation and inspection of welding, qualifications on 1A and IB ND Heat Exchanger.) Work Request #008662 PMP, Perform Channel Functional Test on Response Spectrum Recorder. Instruments 1MM1MT 5070 11EEAN9010 Work Request #109093 OPS, Remove and replace 2C Condensate Booster Pump Motor for Use on Unit 1 - (1B Condensate Booster Pump). W/0 will be closed when installed back on Unit No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Surveillance and operational activities were observed throughout the inspection period. The inspector verified that these activities were performed and accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedure Test equipment used was verified to be calibrated and data recorded were compared to those observed where possible. Radiation controls were observed l in effect. The following surveillance activities and procedures were observed in greate; dept OP/0/A/6500/01A, Ventilation Unit Condensate Tank Operation NOTE: Working copy updated to comply with control copy in in (Added enclosure 5.2 for update) Completed observation and surveillance. (Personnel qualified)

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PT/1/A/4400/04 RF/NF High Velocity Flush a'nd Clorination Observed (personnel qualified)

TP/1/A/1200/21 CFSM Piping Vibration Test (Completed)

PT/0/A/4450/13 Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VA) Register Po Verification Periodic Test (W/C) (Completed)

PT/0/A/4450/15 Nuclear Air Cleaning Flow Measurements (W/C) (Completed)

PT/0/A/4450/12 Nuclear Air Cleaning Flow Measurements OP/0/A/6100/09 Removal and Restoration of Station Equipment (These were recording charts for instrumentation in control room)

PT/1/A/4700/10 Shift Turnover Verification (Proper crew assignments, all logs and systems status reports)

PT/1/A/4600/03A Semi-Daily Surveillance Items PT/1/A/4600/01, RCCA Movement Test OP/1/A/6150/08 Rod Control OP/0/A/6100/08 Reduction in Power 75% to 50% to align turbine stop valves for sequential mode PT/1/A/4208/01A Containment Spray (NS) Pump 1A Test PT/1/A/4250/04A Weekly Turbine Test PT/1/A6300/01 Turbine Generator Operation IP/0/B/3190/01 Preventive Maintenance, Inspection and Cleaning PT/0/A/4600/04 Incere Instrumentation (Required manuals and references available)

OP/0/A/6150/07 Incore Instrumentation (Required manuals and references available)

PT/0/A/4600/02B Nuclear Instrumentation System Recalibration PT/1/A/4150/01B Reactor Coolant Leakage Calculation PT/1/A/4600/03B Daily Surveillance Items

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f PT/1/A/4600/03A Semi-Daily Surveillance Items PT/1/A/4250/04A Weekly Turbine Test No violations or deviations were identified within areas inspecte . Significant Event Followup During construction work to install the retaining device for the Residual Heat Removal (ND) Heat Exchanger upper seismic supports on Unit II, Unit I was examined to determine how the bolting was don Upon looking at Unit I's upper seismic support on the ND heat exchangers it was found that the retaining bolts were missing on 1A and IB heat exchanger The Resident Inspector discussed the missing bolts with the Station Manager, who then requested a Design Engineering review of the installation. After review, Design Engineering determined the bolts necessary for proper seismic restrain The licensee requested and received from NRR an emergency change in Technical Specifications to permit operation of Unit 1 for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> while bolts were installe During the night of June 9,1982, the Resident Inspector, after observing maintenance procedures, Design Engineering fix, and installation, requested all design calculations and drawings. After review he suggested that it would be prudent for design to re-examine its calculations and its fix, to ascertain the adequacy of the completed design fix. Design locked at the first fix, recalculated, then modified the design by adding sufficient plating to insure that the design met requirements. The Resident followed all phases of the operation in an attempt to insure the application of quality and application of the design fi The licensee is investigating to determine how the problem was overlooked and steps that wilI be taken to insure that like incidents will be precluded on Unit The residual heat exchangers are vertical standing equipment requiring an upper lateral support in addition to the lower support base. The instal-lation sequence for the equipment and supports is as follows:

1) Installation of lower support frame - M-18 2) Setting of heat exchanger 3) Installation of hold down bolts for lower suport - M-10 4) Installation of upper support frame - M-18

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5) Installation of upper support bolts - M-10 (missing)

A review of the documentation revealed that the construction technician support engineer issuing the M-10 inspection form, " Equipment Bolting," did not realize the requirements for the upper bolting (the two lugs look like lifting lugs) or failed at the later date to issue the M-10 documentatio '

As a result, the upper support bolt was not installed. The equipment review at turnover to Steam Production failed to identify the requirement for an upper bolt installation on the specific Lug A review of other typical situations has identified five other heat exchangers similarly supported. A review of the documentation found that four of the five heat exchangers had the proper documentation issued. The

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fifth package was missing the required M-10 for the installation of the I

upper bolt. All heat exchangers of this design were checked for completion.

It should be noted that the quality assurance programs for M-9 and M-18 have undergone revisions since the occurrence of the problem which clarified procedural responsibilities for installing equipment. Also M-18 inspection requirements have been increased considerably since the NU Hx were instal a i.

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The inspectors determined that the licensee, after finding the problem, had

taken adequate corrective action on the equipment involved and adequate

actions to prevent recurrence.

10. Plant Transients, Trips and Safety System Challenges During the inspection period two transients occurred on McGuire Unit 1: On June 5, 1982 while the unit was at 75% power the "B" reactor coolant

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(CF) pump tripped due to lo suction pressure. There was no real loss of suction pressure, but a failure of the pressure transmitte When a CF pump trips with the Unit above 50% power there should be an automatic runback of the turbine to 50% power. The automatic runback did not function, but the operators immdeiately realized the problem and manually ran the Unit back to 50% power. Further investigation showed the Digital Electrohydraulic (DEH) turbine control system never reviewed the runback signal due to a ::et of slide links being left open. The licensee has not been able to determine through paperwork review why or when the slide links would have been opened. Until the determination is made this item will be carried as Unresolved Item (369/82-24-01.) Reactor Trip / Turbine Trip On June 13, 1982 the unit experienced a reactor trip / turbine trip. The trip was due to RCS low flow on 2 of 3 transmitters on 1 of 4 loops above 49% power. On June 7, 1982 Channel 3 on one RCS loop was declared inoperable and put into the trip condition as per Technical Specifications. On June 13, 1982 the power supply for reactor

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protection System (RPS) Channel 1 momentarily lost power which put all i Channel 1 bistables in the trip condition. Now the RPS saw both Channel ,

1 and Channel 3 in the trip condition which trips the reactor above P-8 (49% Reactor Power.)

l Following the ensuing turbine trip, a steam generator power operated relief valve (PORV) opened and did not reseat. The reactor operators i identified the problem and immediately isolated the PORV. Reactor ;

pressure did not drop below 2060 psig.

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Following the reactor trip, feedwater pump discharge valves closed, and a pressure surge occurred in feedwater heater lines due to slow response on pamp recirculation valves. Six 3/4 inch feedwater heater valves relieved and four did not resea The reactor is presently operating with three of four steam generator i PORV's isolated, and the six 3/4 inch relief valves gagged. None of i these valves are required for operations. The licensee will determine ;

corrective actions and valve necessary repairs on a shut down in the

near future. This is Inspector Followup Item 369/82-24-03.

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i i The licensee is presently trying to determine cause of the momentary

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loss of power which initiated the reactor trip. This is Inspector Followup Item 369/82-24-0 . Independent Inspections Table 3.2.2.-2 Note 18 of the FSAR commits the Licensee to seismically qualify several components within the emergency diesel auxiliary systems in

lieu of building the components to applicable codes and standards. The inspector verified that seismic qualification reports were available for four of these components, (intake and exhaust silencers, starting air tanks, ;

and lube oil filters). No violation or deviations were identified within !

the areas inspecte !

l Verification of "as built" configuration. The inspector conducted a partial

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walkdown of the starting air system on the 2B diesel to verify as-built ,

configuration. Line and grade and installation of components were verified to be correct except as noted below. One check valve described in the FSAR, Section 9.5.6.2, was missing from the air compressor discharge pipin Discussions with the Licensee's design group revealed that the valve had !

been removed using the formal design process but, due to an oversight, the ,

FSAR had not been updated. The Licensee committed to revise Section 9.5. '

of the FSAR. The Licensee also provided design documentation that indicated that air dryers would be installed within the system to mitigate the effects of internal moisture and subsequent corrosion. No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte ,

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J Review of Construction Test Procedures.

. f The Licensee's procedure for. hydrostatic testing the reactor coolant system ,

i was reviewed for adequate format and to insure that equipment and personnel  !

i safety precautions / procedures were specified. The procedure did'not include i

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-steps to monitor reactor vessel full flow filter differential pressure j during reactor coolant pump run-ins. The Licensee made a commitment to make appropriate procedural changes to monitor full flow filter differential *

, pressure while reactor coolant pumps were running. All other procedural-i steps and specified controls appeared adequate. No violations or deviations were identified within areas inspecte l

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