ML112970065

Summary of PSEG Drop-in Visit, 9-28-2011 and Slides

ML112970065
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	10/21/2011
From:	Arthur Burritt Division Reactor Projects I
To:	Darrell Roberts Division Reactor Projects I
BURRITT AL
References
Download: ML112970065 (63)

Text

October 21, 2011 MEMORANDUM TO: Darrell J. Roberts, Director Division of Reactor Projects FROM: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief /RA/

Projects Branch 3

SUMMARY

OF SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 PSEG DROP-IN VISIT On September 28, 2011, Mr. Tom Joyce, President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Mr. Robert Braun, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations, Mr. John Perry, Vice President of Hope Creek, Mr. Paul Davison, Vice President of Operations Support, Mr. Larry Wagner, Plant Manager Salem Units 1 and 2, Ms. Anndria Gaerity, Director of Emergency Services, and Ms.

Christine Neely, Director of Regulatory Affairs, all representing PSEG Nuclear LLC, met with the Regional Administrator and members of the Region I staff at the NRC offices in King of Prussia, PA. PSEG requested the meeting to provide a general update on the status of Hope Creek and Salem.

During the meeting, the following topics were discussed:

1. Plant performance updates for Salem and Hope Creek;

2. Key Personnel Staffing Changes at Salem and Hope Creek;

3. Security updates;

4. Fukushima Response;

5. New nuclear plans; and

6. Stakeholder outreach activities.

The meeting began at 10:00 a.m. and ended at 12:30 p.m. No regulatory decisions were requested or made during the meeting and there were no commitments for any follow-up actions on the part of Region. The slides used by PSEG to conduct the briefing are enclosed with this memorandum.

Enclosure:

As stated

MEMORANDUM TO: Darrell J. Roberts, Director Division of Reactor Projects FROM: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief /RA/

Projects Branch 3

SUMMARY

OF SEPTEMBER 28, 2011, PSEG DROP-IN VISIT On September 28, 2011, Mr. Tom Joyce, President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Mr. Robert Braun, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations, Mr. John Perry, Vice President of Hope Creek, Mr. Paul Davison, Vice President of Operations Support, Mr. Larry Wagner, Plant Manager Salem Units 1 and 2, Ms. Anndria Gaerity, Director of Emergency Services, and Ms.

Christine Neely, Director of Regulatory Affairs, all representing PSEG Nuclear LLC, met with the Regional Administrator and members of the Region I staff at the NRC offices in King of Prussia, PA. PSEG requested the meeting to provide a general update on the status of Hope Creek and Salem.

During the meeting, the following topics were discussed:

1. Plant performance updates for Salem and Hope Creek;

2. Key Personnel Staffing Changes at Salem and Hope Creek;

3. Security updates;

4. Fukushima Response;

5. New nuclear plans; and

6. Stakeholder outreach activities.

The meeting began at 10:00 a.m. and ended at 12:30 p.m. No regulatory decisions were requested or made during the meeting and there were no commitments for any follow-up actions on the part of Region. The slides used by PSEG to conduct the briefing are enclosed with this memorandum.

Distribution: via e-mail Douglas, C., DRP Roberts, D., DRP Schroeder, D., DRP Ayres, D., DRP Bower, F., DRP Burritt, A., DRP McKenna, P., DRP Cline, L., DRP Patel, A., DRP Turilin, A., DRP McKenzie, K., Resident OA SUNSI Review Complete: _LC_ (Reviewer's Initials)

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH3\BRIEFINGS & SITE VISITS\2011\DROP-IN PACKAGES\

PSEG DROP IN_

SUMMARY

_9_28_11.DOCX After declaring this document An Official Agency Record it will be released to the Public.

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE mmt RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME LCline/ LC ABurritt/ALB DATE 10/20 /11 10/21 /11 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

PSEG Nuclear NRC Region I Update Tom Joyce, President & CNO Robert Braun, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations John Perry, Vice President Hope Creek Paul Davison, Vice President Operations Support Larry Wagner, Salem Plant Manager Anndria Gaerity, Director Emergency Services Christine Neely, Director Regulatory Affairs September 28, 2011 1

Agenda Introductions Tom Joyce Overview Bob Braun Hope Creek Performance Update John Perry Salem Performance Update Larry Wagner Security Update Anndria Gaerity Fukushima Response Paul Davison New Nuclear Christine Neely Closing Comments Tom Joyce 2

3 4

PSEG OSHA Rate vs. INPO Index / Capacity Factor 5 100 4.5 90 4

80 INPO Index / Capacity Factor 3.5 70 3

OSHA Rate 2.5 60 2

50 1.5 40 1

30 0.5 0 20 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 OSHA Rate INPO Index Capacity Factor 5

Staffing Changes Staffing Changes to Assure Alignment, Continuous Improvement and Development of our People:

Plant Managers at both Salem and Hope Creek Director Emergency Services Corporate Manager Learning Programs

• Experienced technical specialist staff Director Special Projects (Fukushima)

Manager Environmental Affairs

• Centralized environmental staff 6

Hope Creek Performance Update John Perry 7

Hope Creek 2011 Scorecard 8

2011 Equipment Reliability Index (ERI) Performance Hope Creek E R I S ub- E R I P o i n ts A r ea E R I S u b - In d ic a t o r s H O P E C R EE K I n d i c a to r N o . M ax im u m E l e c tr i c G e n e r a ti o n F o r c e d L o s s R a te

( L a g g in g )

1 .1

( I n d u s t r y d e f i n it i o n - 1 8 m o r u n n in g a v e r a g e )

10 10 U n p l a n n e d P o w e r R e d u c t i o n s p er 7 0 0 0 h r s C r i ti c a l

( L a g g in g ) 1 .2 10 10

( N R C I n d i c a t o r)

P o s t R e fu e l i n g O u ta g e P er f o r m a n c e

( L a g g in g ) 1 .3 2 2

( 1 0 0 D ay s )

U n p l a n n e d L C O E n tr i e s C h a l l e n g e t o O p s ( L a g g in g ) 2 .1 ( S / D a n d < 7 2 h r s in l a s t 3 m o n t h s ) 4 4 O p e r a to r W o r k A r o u n d s

( L a g g in g ) 2 .2 2 2 C ri t i c a l C o m p o n e n t F a i l u r e s

( L a g g in g ) 2 .3 10 8

( in l a s t 3 m o n t h s )

S a f et y S y s te m U n a v a i l a b i l i t y S y s t e m H e a lt h ( L a g g in g ) 3 .1

( N R C I n d i c a t o rs - M S P I )

8 8 S y s t e m H e a lt h I m p ro v e m e n t E f f e c t i v e n e s s

( L e a d in g ) 3 .2 6 6 M a i n te n a n c e C o r r e ct i v e C r i ti c a l W o r k B a c k l o g 4 .1 4 4

( L e a d in g ) ( N o n - O u ta g e )

D e f i c i en t C r i ti c a l W o r k B a c kl o g

( L e a d in g ) 4 .2 3 3

( N o n - O u ta g e )

D e f e rr a l o f C r i t i c a l P M s

( L e a d in g ) 4 .3 6 6 M a i n te n an c e F e e d b a c k

( L e a d in g ) 4 .4 2 2

( % o f P M s w i th F ee d b a c k )

T i m e l y C o m p l e t io n o f C r i t i c a l P M s

( L e a d in g ) 4 .5 4 4

( 1 s t H al f o f G r ac e )

W o r k M a n a g e m en t W o rk W e e k S c o p e S u r v i v a l 5 .1 6 6

( L e a d in g ) ( A v e r a g e o f la s t 3 m o n t h s )

W o rk W e e k S c h e d u l e C o m p l e t i o n

( L e a d in g ) 5 .2 6 6

( A v e r a g e o f la s t 3 m o n t h s )

L ong T e r m P lan n in g L o n g R a n g e P l a n I m p l em e n ta t i o n E ff e ct i v e n e s s 6 .1 7 7

( L e a d in g )

A g e of R ed & Y e l l o w S y s te m s

( L e a d in g ) 6 .2 6 6 M o n i to r i n g & T r e n d i n g C h e m i s tr y E ff e c ti v e n e s s I n d e x 7 .1 2 2

( L e a d in g )

P M P rogram B ases A P - 9 1 3 P ro c e s s ( L e a d in g ) 8 .1 2 2 8 5 to 1 0 0 G R E E N L e a d i n g In d i c a to r s 54 44 7 5 to 84 W H IT E L a g g i n g In d i c a to r s 46 54 6 0 to 7 4 Y E LL O W E R I P o in t T o t a l 100 98 le s s t h a n 6 0 R E D E R I P o i n t T o ta l L a s t M o n th J u l- 1 1 10 0 In d u s t r y T o p Q u a r t il e 88 E R I M o n th l y / Y e a r - E n d G o a l 88 9

Hope Creek Plant Performance Issues Main Steam Safety Valves Key learnings Actions taken Actions remaining Emergency Diesel Generator Performance and Improvements Key learnings Actions taken Actions remaining August 2011 External Events Response Key learnings Actions taken Actions remaining 10

Engineering Focus Area - Improving Technical Rigor Actions Taken Trained on technical product selection, development and approval Implemented observation program and monthly performance data analysis Implemented new procedure on review of external technical products Actions Remaining Perform effectiveness review 11

Hope Creek Key Events for 2011 USA safety culture assessment Hope Creek PIRS inspection Complete pilot and fully implement Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel USA SOER 10-2 Management Systems Review March Planned Outage Emergency planning - New Jersey evaluated drill License Renewal Preparation for H1R17 12

Salem Performance Update Larry Wagner 13

Salem 2011 Scorecard 14

2011 Equipment Reliability Index (ERI) Performance - Salem 15

Salem Plant Performance Issues Service Water Performance and Improvements Key learnings Actions taken Actions remaining Circulating Water Performance and Improvements Key learnings Actions taken Actions remaining Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Performance and Improvements Key learnings Actions taken Actions remaining 16

Salem Detritus Data Weekly Average (1994-2011) 20000 2011 1994 18000 1995 200 1996 1997 16000 1998 1999 2000 14000 2001 Detritus Density (kg/10 6 m3 )

2011 200 2002 12000 2003 2004 2010 2011 2005 10000 2006 2008 2007 2008 8000 2009 2010 6000 2011 2004 4000 2000 0

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 WEEK (Data through 09/25/2011) 17

Station Performance Improvement Plan Zero Tolerance for Equipment Failure Operations identification and prioritization Work management coordination Maintenance ownership of work Corrective Action Product quality Average age Process Rigor Pre-outage milestones Ownership of plant improvement through crew Management Review Meetings (MRMs) 18

Salem Key Events for 2011 USA safety culture assessment Operations training - INPO accreditation S2R18 refueling outage Salem CDBI inspection USA SOER 10-2 Management Systems Review License renewal Dry cask storage campaign Implement Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel S1R21 refueling outage 19

Security Anndria Gaerity 20

Security Focus Areas Safety Officers Security barriers Engagement Officers Stations Material Condition Facilities Project Unresolved Issue (URI) 21

Security Key Events for 2011 Force-on-force Realigned security organization and added Shift Operations Manager from Hope Creek operations Hurricane Irene Qualified six additional Assistant Team Leaders New class of officers in initial training 22

Fukushima Response Paul Davison 23

PSEG Fukushima Response Immediately Implemented Corporate Issue Management Procedure Performed Seismic and Flooding Response Verification Physical and procedure validation NRC inspection followed Personnel Dedicated to Implement Long Term Actions Significant Stakeholder Outreach Employee, Board of Directors, retiree and shareholder New Jersey and Delaware political leaders New Jersey Nuclear Task Force Federal and state legislators Plant tours 24

Salem/Hope Creek Flood Design 25

INPO Industry Event Reports Fuel Damage Caused by Earthquake and Tsunami Spent Fuel Pool Loss of Cooling and Makeup Near Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of all AC Power 26

New Nuclear Christine Neely 27

ESP Project Update - Licensing Process Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2012 2013 2014 Submit Early Site Permit Application NRC Acceptance Review Public Comment Period - Opportunity to Intervene NRC C-4 Public Meeting NRC & Applicant Respond to Contentions NRC Environmental Scoping Public Meeting ALSB Review of Petitions NRC Review of Early Site Permit Application NRC Issue Requests for Additional Information PSEG Respond to RAIs NRC Issue Draft EIS NRC Issue Final EIS NRC Issue Draft Safety Evaluation Report ACRS Meeting - Advanced SER NRC Issue Final SER Mandatory Hearing on Early Site Permit NRC Issue Early Site Permit 28

Calendar/Events/Questions 29

Recent Events/Looking Ahead September Economic Development Assoc. of NJ driving tour (9/14)

NJ Energy Coalition Annual meeting @ EERC (9/15)

Health & Safety Expo (9/15)

A team EP training drill - all facilities (9/15)

Nuclear Safety Review Board (week of 9/19)

Delaware Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) tour (9/19)

PSEG Vets @ Nuclear kickoff meeting (9/19)

Salem County Chamber Economic Development Forum (9/23)

Japanese EP benchmarking (week of 9/26)

Delaware National Guard driving tour (9/26)

NJ DEP Councils tour (9/29)

October Drop-in with NRC Chairman/Commissioners (10/6)

New Castle Chamber of Commerce tour (10/11)

Delaware ASME meeting @ EERC (10/11)

PEG PAC luncheon (10/14)

Stand Up for Salem dinner (10/20)

Salem S1R21Outage begins (10/23)

Salem County Chamber Best of Salem County event (10/27) 30

Closing Comments 31

Back up Slides - Hope Creek 32

BWR Fleet 2-Stage Users The Target Rock 2-Stage users are:

Hatch, Pilgrim, Cooper, Fitzpatrick, Fermi, Brunswick, Browns Ferry & Hope Creek.

Each station has a history of seat leakage and/or setpoint drift.

Recently, Hatch, Fitzpatrick, & Pilgrim modified their 2-Stage SRVs to create 3-Stage SRVs.

33

Internal Drift (+/-3%) OE RF8 - 6 of 14 failed setpoint (Platinum Coated discs*)

RF9 - 2 of 14 failed setpoint (Platinum Coated discs*) (1 yr cycle)

RF10 - 3 of 14 failed setpoint (Platinum Coated discs*)

RF11 - 8 of 14 failed setpoint (Platinum Coated discs*)

RF12 - 5 of 14 failed setpoint (Platinum Coated discs*)

RF13 - 3 of 14 failed setpoint (Platinum Coated discs*)

RF14 - No failures of 7 sampled (Solid Stellite 21 Pilot discs)

RF15 - 6 of 14 failed setpoint (Solid Stellite 21 Pilot discs)

RF16 - 6 of 14 failed setpoint (Solid Stellite 21 Pilot discs)

• Platinum Coating applied to the disc using the IBAD process (Ion Beam Assisted Deposition) by Southwest Research at their San Antonio facility in Texas.

34

Model 7567F (2-Stage) 35

SRV Plant Locations 36

Leakage & Drift Trending By Operating Cycle 14 12 Leakage Number of SRVs Setpoint > +/- 3%

10 8

6 4

2 0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Operating Cycle Number 37

Historical Actions (Setpoint Drift)

Utilized a Correlation Program to determine there were no common cause/common trends. (Kalsi Engineering)

Determined that the HC Water Chemistry did not have the potential to promote Corrosion Bonding. (Kalsi Engineering)

Benchmarked Other 2-stage Users Operational &

Maintenance Practices. (Fermi Station)

Installed Stellite 21 Pilot Replacement Discs. (RF13) 38

Operations with a Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel (OPDRVs)

NRC Staff believes that an OPDRV is any activity that could result in draining or siphoning the reactor pressure vessel water level below the top of fuel, without crediting mitigating measures to terminate or prevent water inventory losses.

This definition would encompass many outage-related activities, including Control Rod Drive Mechanism Replacements.

The BWROG has provided comments to the NRC on their draft Enforcement Discretion on performing OPDRVs with relaxed Secondary Containment requirements.

The NRC's goal is to publish a RIS with the Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) by October 1, 2011, to support upcoming refuel outages.

Long-term solutions being explored include creating a new Technical Specification just for OPDRVs, including a definition.

39

Hope Creek Risk of External Events PRA Fire Current Status Current Status Seismic

• Based on Fire PRA Rev 0 (2010) *Based on IPEEE 1997

• Rev 1 is being planned for 2012 *New SPRA being planned 2014

• Rev 0 results are judged to be conservatively high Fire Internal Events Seismic Internal Events Key Contributors/Characteristics Key Contributors

• Transformer Fires in the Yard Fire *Seismic induced 1E 120vac instrument failures

• MCR Fires/Use of 28v *Seismic induced 1E 125vdc failure

• D & C EDG/EDG Ventilation Seismic *Seismic induced (LOOP + HPCI failure)

• Seismic induced LOOP + random failures External Floods External Other External Hazards Flood Key Contributors/Characteristics

• Doors & Hatches (Admin. Internal Current Status Controls Credited) Events *Based on IPEEE 1997

• No other significant threats *No current revision plans identified Current Status

• Based on IPEEE 1997 Key Contributors/Characteristics

• Next revision not planned All Other External Hazards (High Winds and Tornadoes, External Floods, Transportation and Nearby Facility Accidents, Release of Onsite Chemicals and Detritus) were screened out per compliance with 1975 SRP criteria or a bounding CDF fell below the IPEEE screening criteria (<1E6/yr)

External Flood Internal Events 40

Response to August External Events - VA Earthquake Plant Response Effective EP classification and notification (Common UE)

Several fluid tank alarms (DWFDS, EDG Fuel Oil, HCU Accumulators)

Ground motion below trigger for active instrument recording (<0.01g)

Key Learnings Seismic scratch plate data anomalies Integrate Acts of Nature and Engineering procedures for plant inspections External phone line congestion for Emergency Preparedness fax to Local/NRC authorities Actions Taken Recalibrated seismic instrumentation to confirm response Actions Remaining Incorporate lessons learned into AB procedure (10/31/11)

Implement web based tool for EP notifications (June 2012) 41

Response to August External Events - Hurricane Irene Plant Response Timely staffing of two full Operating and ERO teams Rigorous implementation of Severe Weather Procedure Minor water intrusion into known susceptible areas of plant Key Learnings Pre-staging of extra sump pumps in known susceptible areas Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) System availability impacted due to licensing commitment on portable Hydrogen Trailer Actions Taken Pre-Staged pumps permanently in susceptible areas Actions Remaining Evaluate design change or commitment options for HWC (12/31/11)

Revise Severe Weather Procedures with specific actions to address vulnerable areas (10/31/11) 42

Engineering Focus Area Technical Rigor NOS elevation action plan showing positive results - some vendor product review and NOTF documentation performance shortfalls persist.

Actions Taken Trained on technical product selection, development and approval Implemented observation program and monthly performance data analysis Implemented new procedure on review of external technical products Actions Remaining Participate on INPO troubleshooting assist visit at Salem next week Complete training to improve troubleshooting performance (09/30/11)

Complete Effectiveness Review (January 2012) 43

Back up Slides - Salem 44

Regulatory Assurance Focus Area Leveraging corrective action and training to improve plant performance Actions Taken Implemented Performance Improvement Integrated Matrix (PIIM) pilot at Salem Station Implemented Safety Culture Panel Actions Remaining Implement PIIM at Salem Station Owner: J. Kandasamy Due Date: 10/01/11 Implement PIIM at Hope Creek Station Owner: M. Gaffney Due Date: ???

45

Salem - Cross-Cutting Aspect Matrix AREA COMPONENTS ASPECTS 2Q2010 3Q2010 4Q2010 1Q2011 2Q2011 Total

a. Systematic process 0 Decision Making HUMAN PERFORMANCE (H)

b. Conservative assumptions PP 1 (1)

c. Communicating decisions 0

a. Design margin and backlogs IE 1 Resources b. Trained and qualified personnel 0 (2) c. Procedure and documentation adequacy MS 1

d. Adequate facilities and equipment 0 Work Control a. Planning 0 (3) b. Coordination BI IE 2

a. Human error prevention techniques 0 Work Practices (4) b. Procedure use and adherence IE MS 2

c. Oversight IE 1 Corrective Action Program a. Identification 0 (1)

Corrective Action (P)

b. Trending 0

c. Evaluation 0

d. Corrective action 0

e. Alternative process 0 Operating Experience a. Evaluation and communication MS 1 (2) b. Implemented and institutionalized 0 Self and Independent a. Performance and effectiveness 0 Assessments b. Safety performance indicators 0 (3) c. Results communicated / issues addressed 0 Envirornment for Raising a. Behaviors and interactions 0 SCWE (S)

Concerns b. Alternative processes 0 Preventing, (1)

Detecting & a. Training 0 Mitigating Retaliation b. Investigation 0 (2) c. Chilling effect 0 (Severity a. Wilfulness 0 Levels 1 through 4) b. Impeding Regulatory Process 0

c. Actual Consequences 0 Findings without cross-cutting issues 1 0 0 1 0 1 Total number of findings 2 0 1 4 3 3 Cornerstones IE Initiating Events MS Mitigating Systems BI Barrier Integrity EP Emergency Preparedness y

ORS Occupational Radiation Safety PP Physical Protection 46

Salem - Regulatory Margin Scorecard Maximun Actual Reactor Oversight Process 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 Comments Score Score R.1 Indicators green - All R.1 indicators with a margin to white Unit 1: MSPI Heat Removal (AFW) is RED (applies to any R.1 greater than 75%. Unit 1: Unplanned Scrams is RED indicator) white - One or two R.1 indicators with a margin Unit 2: Unplanned Scrams is Yellow to white 75%to 51%. Unit 2: MSPI Cooling Water Systems is White yellow - one or two R.1 indicators with a margin Common: PA Security Equipment is Yellow to white 50%to 26%; or three or four indicators with a margin to white 75%to 51%.

red - Any R.1 indicator with a margin to white (Y) (R) (R) (R) (R) 10 0

<25%; or three indicators with a margin to white 50%to 26%; or greater tha four indicators with a margin to white 75% to 51%.

Findings / Quarter green < 2 findings 4Q10: 13 AFW Pp inoperability (1MS52 latching) (H.2.c) white 3 findings 1Q11 Missed TS surveillance batt. Capacity test (H.4.b) yellow 4 or 5 findings 1Q11: Tear in the Unit 2 CREACS (H.3.b) red >6 findings 1Q11: Unit 1 Rx Trip (H.2.a) 2Q11: MDO requirements to Security Force (H.1.b) 2 (G) 0 (G) 1 (G) 5 (Y) 3 (W) 2Q11: Fuses not installed in 3T60 (H.3.b) 10 8 2Q11: Equipment in CFZ without permit (H.4.c)

Greater than green green - no greater than green or SL3 or greater findings or SL 3 or findings greater findings in yellow - one greater than green or SL3 or higher the last four findings quarters red - greater than one greater than green or SL3 or higher findings 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 10 10 Negative green < 2 comments .

Comments/Quarter white 3 or 4 comments (written yellow 5 or 6 comments correspondence) red >7 comments 0 (G) 0 (G) 1(G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 5 5 2Q10: Unit 2 automatic trip due to the tripping of 21 SGFP (H.4.b) 4Q10: 13 AFW Pp inoperability (1MS52 latching) (H.2.c) 1Q11 Missed TS surveillance batt. Capacity test (H.4.b) green - no SCCI Letter 1Q11: Tear in the Unit 2 CREACS (H.3.b)

X-cutting Aspects - white - criteria met for cross-cutting theme but 1Q11: Unit 1 Rx Trip (H.2.a)

Human Perf / last 4 no SCCI Letter 1 (G) 0 (G) 1 (G) 2 (G) 2 (G) 2Q11: MDO requirements to Security Force (H.1.b) 10 10 qtrs. yellow - 1 SCCI Letter 2Q11: Fuses not installed in 3T60 (H.3.b) red - greater than one SCCI Letter 2Q11: Equipment in CFZ without permit (H.4.c)

Cross-Cutting 1Q11: LTA - Design control (P.2.a)

Aspects (last 4 quarters) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 1 (G) 0 (G) 10 10 PI&R green - no SCCI Letter yellow - criteria met for cross-cutting theme but X-cutting Aspects -

SCWE / last 6 qtrs.

no SCCI Letter 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 10 10 red - SCCI Letter 47

Salem - Regulatory Margin Scorecard (continued) 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 Comments Maximun Actual Score Score LERs green 1 LERs 4Q10: U2 trip on GEN protection (in the past 12 white 2 to 4 4Q10: U1 trip on RCP Bus UV months) yellow 5 to 6 3Q10: Fuel Movement w/ Chiller O/S red 7 3Q10: "B" Phase MPT Failure 3Q10: Inoperable TDAF Pp during Mode Change 2Q10: 1C vital bus deenergized / EDG auto start 1Q10: U2 trip on CW condenser heat removal 1 (Y) 3 (R) 2 (R) 1(R) (4)R 1Q10: U2 trip on 21 SGFP trip 10 0 1Q11: SW122 2Q11: 12 SW Stanchion 2Q11: 1R19s auto start of AFWPp 2Q11: Unit 1 manual trip (grassing) 2Q11: 2PR1 2Q11: FHB high flow Special Reports green <2 (in the past 12 white 3 to 5 months) yelllow 6 to 7 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 5 5 red >8 Missed Surveillance green 1 3Q10: 1CC109 (20472731)

Tests white 2 to 3 2Q10: Unit 1 AFW buried pipe IST (20459689)

(in the past 12 yellow 4 1 (G) 1 (W) 0 (W) 1 (W) 1 (W) 1Q11: B 28V Dc battery (20495611) 8 4 months) red 5 2Q 11: 11FHB exhaust filter unit (20504776)

NOED Process green 0 Starts yellow 1 (in the past 12 red 2 months)

(when Licensing becomes aware that the NRC has 0 (Y) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 10 10 committed resources towards the potential NOED)

Unplanned green - no additional inspections 4Q10: Security PI&R Inspection (Work hours during Inspections white - one or two additional resident or Outages)

(in the past 12 specialist inspections months) yellow - three or four additional resident or specialist inspections, or 1 SIT or 1 AIT. 0 (G) 0 (G) 1(G) 0 (Y) 0 (Y) 10 8 red - greater than 5 additional resident or specialist inspections, or greater than 2 SITs, or greater than 2 AITs, or 1SIT and 1 AIT.

Communication Issues Maximun Actual Phone Communications / Calendar Quarter VP to Region I green 3 3 (G) 3 (G) 3 (G) 3 (G) 3 (G)

PM to Region I white 2 yellow 1 >3 (G) >3 (G) >3 (G) >3 (G) >3 (G) 5 5 red 0 From Region I green 0 2Q10: AFW buried pipe / ISI (comm + / override) white 1 2Q10: U2 containment liner yellow 2 2* (W) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 1Q10: Cleared Procedure Quality SCCI 5 5 red 3 5 5 Max Actual Total 123 95 Score 48

Salem - Regulatory Margin Scorecard (continued)

Color Max 10 8 5 Score green 10 8 5 white 8 6 4 yellow 5 4 2 red 0 0 0 Max Actual Salem + Corp 173 140 Total Salem Index 77.2 Salem + Corp 80.9 Indexl NOTES:

-Color of cell determined by the period the indicator is measured (e.g. for cross-cutting aspects the number of findings in previous 4 Qtrs determines the color of the cell).

-Numbers in cell reflect quarterly performance (e.g for Human Performance cross-cutting aspects a number 3 in a cell means that there were 3 findings in that quarter that had a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance)

Note the Salem Regulatory Margin Index for the Second Quarter of 2011 is 77.2 which is Yellow based on the below color ratings:

The combined Salem and Corporate index is 80.9 which is White Green = Index of 90 through 100 White = Index of 80 through 89.9 Yellow = Index of 70 through 79.9 Red = Index less than 70 49

Corporate - Regulatory Margin Scorecard 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr Maximun Actual 2010 2011 2011 3rd Qtr 2011 Comments Score Score Management Visits/Contacts with NRC/year Last dropin 05/26/2010; next dropin 09/28/2011 to Region I 1 1 1 1Q11 W. Dean onsite; 2Q11 Rep. Carney 5 5 Green 2/yr public meeting Yellow = 1/yr Red = 0/yr 4Q10 Commissioners dropin; 1Q11 RIC; 2Q11 H. Chernoff, E. Leeds; 3Q11 CTN to Headquarters 1 1 2 1 5 5 dropin F. Akstulewicz; next Commissioners dropin 10/06/2011 Meeting Attendance/Quarter Fatigue Management Task Force, Sump Green 2/Qtr Performance Task Force, Licensing Forum, NEI Yellow = 1/Qtr >2 (G) >2 (G) >2 (G) >2 (G) LATF, EP Working Group, Safety Culture 5 5 Red < 1/Qtr Assessment Task Force; Dry Cask Issue Task Force RUG; RONSA; PWR and BWR OG; WIN; Green 3/Qtr NAYG RUG/RONSA and White = 2/Qtr

>3 (G) >3 (G) >3 (G) >3 (G) 4Q10 PRD JK OGs; 2Q11 PRD LAM OGs; 5 5 Industry Mtgs/Qtr Yellow = 1/Qtr 3Q11 LAM ERM OGs, PRD NCAC Rules Red < 1/Qtr Committee Other Green =0 Fukushima; NJ Governor's Task Force; Number of negative White =1 Tritium public/media (G) (R) (R) (R) 5 0 Yellow =2 3Q11 Salem UE issues/quarter Red 3 Green =0 4Q2010 RI-2010-A-0091 Number of White 1<3 1Q2011 RI-2010-A-0094, RI-2011-A-0009 1 (W) 2 (W) 0 (G) 0 (G) 5 5 allegations/Qtr. Yellow 3<5 Red 5 Includes: Annual Public meeting, License Renewal and EP meetings. New plant public Green < 5 meetings have received moderate public Public Attendance at White 5 to 10 (G) (G) (G) (G) interest. 5 5 Public Meetings* Yellow 11 to 20

• This PI does not include public attendance Red > 20 which is supportive of plant operations.

Number of short Green 1 cycle licensing White 2 & 3 0 (W) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 5 5 requests in last 12 Yellow 4 & 5 months Red >5 Senior Level Leadership transitions for Braun, Davison, PSEG Sr. Staff time Organizational Turnover, (G) (G) (G) (G) Fricker, Booth seemless and internal. 5 5 in office / Stability Stability, and KR&T L. Wagner, D. Lewis 3Q11 Number of license Green 0 submittals deemed White 1 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 0 (G) 5 5 unacceptable in the Yellow 2 past 12 months Red >2 0 50 45 NOTES:

-Color of cell determined by the period the indicator is measured (e.g. for short cycle licensing requests the number of findings in previous 4 Qtrs

-Numbers in cell reflect quarterly performance (e.g for short cycle licensing requests a number 2 in a cell means that there were 2 short cycle 50

Back up Slides - Fukushima 51

NRC Staff Response Fukushima Daiichi 90 Day NTTF Recommendations for Implementation without unnecessary delay (SECY-11-0124)

Perform seismic and flood protection walkdowns to identify and address plant-specific vulnerabilities (through corrective action program) and verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance for protection features (Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54). Rec 2.3 Reevaluate and upgrade as necessary the design-basis seismic and flooding protection of structures, systems, and components for each operating reactor (Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54).

Rec 2.1 Engage stakeholders in support of rulemaking activities to enhance the capability to maintain safety through a prolonged SBO (Rulemaking). Rec 4.1 Develop and issue Orders to licensees to provide reasonable protection of the equipment used to satisfy the requirements of B.5.b from the effects of external events, and to establish and maintain sufficient capacity to mitigate multi-unit events (NRC Order). Rec 4.2 Develop and issue Orders to licensees with BWR Mark I primary containment designs to take action to ensure reliable hardened wetwell vents (NRC Order). Rec 5.1 Issue an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to engage stakeholders in rulemaking activities associated with the methodology for integration of onsite emergency response processes, procedures, training and exercises. (Rulemaking). Rec 8 Perform a staffing study to determine the required staff to fill all necessary positions to respond to a multi-unit event and evaluate what enhancements would be needed to provide a means to power communications equipment necessary for licensee onsite and offsite communications during a prolonged station blackout event (Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54). Rec 9.3 52

Industry Actions Since March 11 Verified measures to manage extreme events Increased operator awareness and safety margins for spent fuel cooling and makeup Evaluating the extension of coping durations for extended loss of AC power Developing detailed timeline of Fukushima event Developed governance, goals and principles to guide industry response 53

Near-Term Industry Recommended Actions Seismic and Flooding Design Bases Walk down seismic and flooding protection against current design basis requirements (2.3)

• Develop procedures & acceptance criteria

• Obtain NRC concurrence

• Report results to NRC Use Generic Issue 199 as a model for potential updates to plant design bases (2.1)

• Establish protocol for evaluating new and significant information on seismic and flooding 54

Near-Term Industry Recommended Actions Extended Loss of AC Power Pursue an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) to revise §50.63 (4.1)

Assure sufficient equipment is available to meet §50.54 (hh)(2) requirements for a multi-unit event (4.2)

• Protect portable equipment from external events using appropriate commercial standards 55

Near-Term Industry Recommended Actions Hardened Vents Assure adequate accessibility, and the ability to operate, BWR Mk 1 hardened vent valves assuming no AC power (5.1)

Report results to NRC and implement any warranted improvements 56

Near-Term Industry Recommended Actions Spent Fuel Pools Assure ability to monitor spent fuel pool level and temperature remotely assuming extended loss of AC power

• Provide diverse power supply for monitoring

• Safety-related power supply would not have changed situation at Fukushima 57

Near-Term Industry Recommended Actions EOPs, SAMGs and EDMGs (8)

Assure appropriate training on SAMGs and EDMGs

• Operators and Emergency Response Personnel Standard should be one of familiarity, not proficiency, commensurate with the likelihood of events Integration of procedures and guidelines is a longer-term activity 58

Going Forward Recommendations Must maintain current plant focus on safety and reliability Post-Fukushima actions must be integrated and prioritized with other important actions Given diversity of plant designs, locations and threats, implementation should be flexible, risk-informed and performance-based Continue to develop lessons-learned from Fukushima 59

Fukushima Daiichi INPO IER Overview INPO Issued three Industry Event Reports 11-1 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused by Earthquake and Tsunami Mitigate damage from beyond basis events bounded by large fires and explosions (B.5.b)

Verify the capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions required by station design is functional and valid Verify the capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required by station design Perform walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipments function could be lost during seismic events appropriate for the site 11-2 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Spent Fuel Pool Loss of Cooling and Makeup For outage periods, verify the implementation of actions to address recommendations 1 through 4 and 6 through 12 of SOER 09-1, Shutdown Safety, as they relate to the safety functions associated with spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling and inventory makeup For on-line periods when the time for the SFP to reach 200 degrees Fahrenheit upon loss of normal cooling is less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, establish controls to identify and protect systems and equipment required to maintain the functions of spent fuel pool decay heat removal and inventory control Establish, for all plant conditions, the time for the SFP to reach 200 degrees Fahrenheit (bulk temperature) in the event that normal cooling is lost Verify the adequacy of station abnormal operating procedures (AOPs) for responding to the loss of SFP cooling and/or inventory Revise station emergency operating procedures (EOPs) to include a precautionary statement that spent fuel pool level and temperature should be monitored 60

Fukushima Daiichi INPO IER Overview 11-4 Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of All AC Power in Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Event For all units, develop methods to maintain (or restore) core cooling, containment integrity, and spent fuel pool inventory using existing installed and portable equipment during an extended loss of electrical AC power event that lasts at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Identify essential instrumentation needed for monitoring core, containment, and spent fuel safety.

Develop methods to ensure these functions are maintained throughout an extended loss of AC power event Develop methods for providing fuel to power emergency response equipment Provide communications equipment suitable for on- and off-site communication needs during an extended loss of AC power event 61