IR 05000395/1985046

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Insp Rept 50-395/85-46 on 851201-31.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Nonroutine Events & Repts,Surveillance of safety-related Sys,Maint,Operational Events & Plant Startup from Refueling
ML20151T668
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 02/04/1986
From: Cantrell F, Hopkins P, Prevatte R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151T651 List:
References
50-395-85-46, NUDOCS 8602100333
Download: ML20151T668 (8)


Text

UNITED STATES p

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Report No.: 50-395/85-46 Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name: V. C. Summer Inspection Conducted: December 1 - 31, 1985 Inspectors:

Richardgrevatte

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Bate Gigned WwO A, //3//86 Perry C/ Hopkins (/ ( Qate' Signed Approved by: [_u N Floy'd T.~Cadtrell', 6e'ction Chief

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[ Tate Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved 360 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup on nonroutine events and reports, surveillance observations of safety related systems, observation of maintenance activities, followup of operational events, operational safety verifications, plant startup from refueling, engineered safety systems, organizational and administrative activitie Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Nauman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations 0. Bradham, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations J. Connelly, Deputy Director, Operations and Maintenance K. Woodward, Manager, Operations B. Croley, Group Manager, Technical and Support Services M. Quinton, Manager, Maintenance Services M. Browne, Manager, Technical Support G. Putt, Manager, Scheduling and Materials Management M. Williams, Manager, Nuclear Education and Training L. Blue, Manager, Support Services S. Hunt, Associate Manager, Quality Assurance Surveillance Systems A. Koon, Associate Manager, Regulatory Compliance J. Sefick, Associate Manager, Station Security B. Williams, Supervisor, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne . Exit Interview (30702,30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 2,1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio . Onsite Followup of Events and Subsequent Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (92700, 90714, 93792)

For nonroutine events selected for onsite followup, the inspectors determined that the licensee had taken corrective action (s) as stated in written reports of the events and that these responses to the events were adequate and met regulatory requirements, license conditions, and commitments. During the reporting period, nonroutine events were reported and the inspectors selected the following for onsite followup: Special Report SPR 85-018. On December 16, 1985, at approximately 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br />, the licensee identified a positive moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) for the reload core of Cycle 3. The condition was discovered during zero power physics testing under Surveillance Test Procedure STP-210.002, Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Measuremen The plant was in Mode 2 (startup) at an intermediate range power level

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of approximately 10-7 amps. The MTC was measured to be +0.32 pcm/* Control rod withdrawal limits were established in accordance with Technical Specification within twenty four hours to maintain the MTC less positive than zero, Special Report SPR 85-017.' On November 24, 1985, at 1927 hours0.0223 days <br />0.535 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.332235e-4 months <br />, Diesel '

Generator (D/G) "A" (XEG001A) was started and loaded to 4735 kw in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure STP-125.008, ' A' Diesel Generator Refueling Operability Test. One hour and forty-eight minutes l into the test the D/G unit tripped off the line. Initial investigation identified that the trip was due to high crankcase pressure as a result of a crankcase explosion as evidenced by lube oil leaking from the crankcase inspection ports on one side of the D/G uni Subsequent investigation revealed that number 8 piston and liner were severely galled. The unit was repaired and returned to operability 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> December 1, 198 LER 85-032 and P 21-85-00 Failure of 24VDC Motor to the Diesel Generator Voltage Regulato The 24 VDC Motor associated with the voltage regulator for the diesel generator failed due to a cracked delron pinion gear within the motor housing, Special Report SPR 85-019. On December 2, 1985, at approximately 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />, a malfunction of the Train "A" Engineered Safety Features (ESF)

load sequencer occurred during surveillance testing. The plant was in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) during the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure STP 125.010, Integrated Safeguards Test 'A' Train. The

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Licensee identified the malfunction to be a resetting of the. load sequencer during the loading steps prior to completion of the loading sequence. The Train "A" sequencer and diesel generator were declared inoperable and the required boration flow path was shif ted to Train

"B".

Investigations by the Licensee's instrumentation and control personnel identified a noise problem which was affecting the reset circuitr The investigation did not identify the source of the noise. Vendor representatives suggested a modification to provide an additional filtering network of capacitors to eliminate the adverse effects of the i

noise proble The modification was completed and the system was l successfully tested and returned to operable status on December 6, 198 A retest was perfrrmed on Train "B" to assure that no similar problem existed. A total of six tests were performed on Train "B" during the recent refueling outage. All six tests involved sequencers actuations and were successfully completed without exceptio Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie ~.

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3 Monthly Surveillance Observation'(61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license r.equirements. The inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance tests including all aspects of one major surveillance test involving safety-related systems. The inspectors determined that the surveillance test procedures conformed to Technical Specifications (TS)

requirements and verified that Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO's)

were met and that the surveillance test was completed at the required frequency. The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the test, that the ,

testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an  !

approved test procedure and that any required test instrumentation was properly calibrated. Upon completion of the testing, the inspectors observed that the recorded test data was accurate, complete and met TS requirements; verified any test discrepancies were properly rectified, and; independently verified that the systems were properly returned to service. The following specific surveillance activities were observed:

50P 509 Alignment of Fire Service STP 401.002 Main Steam Line Code Safety Valve ASME Section XI Tes SAP 132 Off Normal Occurrence Evaluation Reporting and Resolutio REP 107.001A Evaluate NIS trip REP 107.001B Set point STP 203.001A Target Axial Flux Dif REP 103.001 Control Rod Worth Measurement Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety-related systems and l components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications (TS) and appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors determined that these activities were not violating Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO's) and i that redundant ~ components were operable. The inspectors also determined (1) that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity; (2) that QC hold points were established where required; (3) that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to work initiation; (4) that proper radiological and appropriate ignition / fire prevention controls were implemented; and (5) that replacement parts and materials used were properly certified. The inspectors verified that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures. The inspectors independently verified that equipment was properly tested before

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being returned to service. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety-related maintenance and a backlog which might affect its performance was not developing on a given system. The following specific maintenance activities were observed:

MWR 850-2111 . Repair of Feedwater Pump C Suction Valve and Motor Controller-(1604C)

MWR 850-2250 Main Feedwater Pump D Discharge Strainer MRF 20433 Addition of Safety Related Regulators to MSIV Operators MWR 8502263 Repair of Pressure Control Valve PCV 4440 MWR 8500198 Repair Oil Leak, MPP 00288 MWR 8400800 Repair as necessary XPP0022A S0P 509 Alignment.of Fire Service Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702) On December 14, 1985, after a refueling outage of 70 days the itactor went critical' at 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br />. After completion of low power physics testing, (2 days) power escalation began on December 16, 198 The licensee has completed an engineering evaluation on the. main steam safety valve setpoints and submitted Revision 1 to LER 85-030, dated December 20, 198 On December 25, 1985, at 8:30 a.m., while at 92 percent power, pressurizer spray- valve PCV 4440 failed to close. This resulted in a rapid depressurization of the reactor coolant system (RCS). An attempt by the operator to close the valve was unsuccessful and the operator

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manually tripped the reactor. An automatic safety injection (SI) from low pressurizer pressure occurred almost immediately. The operator tripped reactor coolant pump 1A to stop pressurizer spray flow. All systems responded as required to'the automatic safety injection signa Pressurizer minimum pressure was 1770 PSIG (SI setpoint 1850 PSIG)

prior to the recover After RCS pressure was restored to 2335 at 8:45 a.m., the SI signal was reset and all systems were returned to norma RCS pressure during the SI reached a maximum of 2335 PSI The licensee followed procedural requirements in declaring an unusual event, notification of I&E Headquarters Emergency Response Center, state, local officials and Region II. Followup reports were made when the event was terminated.

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The initial investigation of the valve failure by the licensee indicated that excessive wear on the pilot valve stem caused the pilot valve 'to stick and provide an open signal to the valve positione Further investigation revealed that a sleeve in. the pilot valve had been installed up-side-down which resulted in the pilot stem binding on the sleeve. This resulted in the pilot valve ' sticking open and providing a continuous open signal to the positioner. The pilot valve was replaced and the pressurizer spray valve tested satisfactor This valve had been previously overhauled on December 1984 under -

maintenance work request (MWR) 84-I-0683. An inadvertent or spurious actuation had been documented in December 1984, . Check out and repairs <

were performed under MWR 84-0-2724. This check found the locking clip was loose. The locking . chip was reinstalled and the valve was tested satisfactor During plant startup from the maintenance outage in December 1985, operations reported a spurious actuation or indication of the valve to I&C Maintenance. Subsequent testing was unable to duplicate the event and it was determined by maintenance and operations that no problem existe After completion of the above repairs and completion of the post trip review the unit was returned to power on December 26,.1985. The licensee is continuing to evaluate this event and the result will be reported in an LER. The resident inspector will continue to evaluate this event as more information is made availabl This item is identified as an Unresolved Item *" Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure" 50-395/85-46-0 Within the areas inspected, no vit,lations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors verified the operability of an engineered safety features (ESF) system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the system. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration. The inspectors looked for equipment conditions and items that might degrade performance (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc. The inspectors verified that valves, including instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appropriat The inspectors compared both local and remote position indication The following systems were verified:

Emergency Core Cooling Auxiliary Feed water system Diesel Generators Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie "An Unresolved Item. is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviatio .

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6 Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and that the licensee's managercent control system is effectively discharging its responsibilities for contir ued safe operation by direct observation of activities, tours of the facil ty, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and reviewing facility record Verifications and observatio1 of control room staffing and shift turnovers were adequate in operational area Observation of instrumentation and recorder traces, control room . annunciators and personnel performance-confirmed that appropriate actions to return the situations to normal was adequate. The following were witnessed:

STP 130.004 Valve Operability testing (mode 4)

STP 104.003 Boron System Valve Lineup Verification Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Startup from Refueling (71711)

-The inspectors reviewed plant startup activities during the recovery from the recent refueling outage which ended on December 14, 1985. The inspectors ascertained that systems disturbed or tested during the refueling outage were returned to an operable status before plant startup and that plant startup,- heatup, approach to criticality, and core physics tests following the outage were conducted in accordance with approved procedures. Before

. plant startup, the inspectors performed a walk-through of appropriate portions of . systems disturbed during the refueling outage and independently ascertained that. these systems have been returned to service in accordance with approved procedure While witnessing the startup, the inspectors verified that the control rod withdrawal sequence and rod withdrawal authorization were available and that all surveillance tests required to be performed before the startup were satisfactorily completed. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the startup was performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures which had been revised to reflect changes made to the facility and to the startup testing program, and verified that startup activities were conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) require-ment The inspectors witnessed core physics-related tests and verified that they were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures and TS requirements as follows.

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STP 210.002 Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Measurement STP 210.001 Moderator Temperature Coefficient Determinatio (See paragraph 3, SPR 85-018)

STP 209.001-2 Incore vs~Excore Axial Evaluation STP 102.001 Source Range Analog Channel-Operational Test N-31, N-3 STP 134.001 Shutdown Margin Calculation STP 302-038 NIS Power Range 41 Operational Test STP 302-039 NIS Power Range ~42 Operational Test STP.302-040 NIS Power Range 43 Operational Test STP 302-041 NIS Power Range 44 Operational Test STP 202-001 Target Axial Flux Difference Measurement REP 107.003 Beginning of Cycle Dilution to Criticality STP 208.001 Shutdown and Control Rod Drop Test GOP 2 Plant Heatup from Hot Shutdown to Hot Standby. (Mode 4 to Mode 3)

GOP 3 Reactor Startup from Hot Standby to Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2)

GOP 4 Power Operation (Mode 1)

GOP 5 Reactor Shutdown from Startup to Hot Standby (Mode 2 to Mode 3)

GOP App-C Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.