ML20149G741
| ML20149G741 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149G736 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-97-05, 50-395-97-5, NUDOCS 9707240043 | |
| Download: ML20149G741 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000395/1997005
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
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' Docket No.: 50 395
License No.: NPF 12
Report No.:. 50 395/97 05
Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) !
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Facility: V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
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l Location: P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065
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Dates: May 4 June.14, 1997
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. Inspectors: B. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector
T. Farnholtz, Resident Inspector
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M. Ernstes, Rector Inspector (Section 05.1)
P. Harmon, Reactor Inspector (Section 05.1)
P. Hopkins, Project Engineer (Sections 01.1 and H2.1
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Approved by: G. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
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Enclosure 2
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9707240043 970711 l
PDR ADOCK 05000395 i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
NRC Inspection Report No. 50 395/97 05
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week
period of resident ins)ection; in addition, it includes the results of
announced inspections ay a regional inspector and a project engineer.
Operations
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. Intermediate Building operator logs were taken in accordance with
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administrative procedures (Section 01.1).
. A Non cited Violation was identified for a failure to follow procedure
while performing a test of a CCW pump to restore operability. TMs
error resulted in securing cooling flow to an operating CCP. Tk i event
was not similar to two previous events in which CCPs operated without
CCW. The corrective action for the previous events had not adequately
raised operator awareness to ensure that CCW cooling flow is maintained
to an operating CCP during CCW pump evolutions (Section 01.2).
. The operator aid program was being conducted in accordance with the
Operations Administrative Procedure (Section 01.3).
. Pre-job briefings conducted by the Operations Shift Supervisor
adequately informed maintenance personnel of potential operational risks
and concerns associated with spent fuel cooling and feedwater system
maintenance (Section 01.4).
. A detailed system walkdown found that the safety related chill water
system was considered to be able to perform its design function for
normal and accident conditions. Observations in the areas of poor
housekeeping, poor material condition, minor drawing errors, and a
personnel safety condition were made. These concerns were appropriately
addressed by the licensee (Section 02.1).
. A violation was identified for corrective actions not being effective in
preventing a repetition of storage problems. This was the second NRC
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identified repeat of this violation (Section 02.2).
. A management observation program of Operations was implemented. This
management attention to operations has the potential to enhance
operations by identifying inconsistencies and problems, and reinforce
good practices (Section 04.1).
. Control room operators demonstrated good plant awareness when they
identified a malfunctioning pressurizer spray valve (Section 04.2).
. The inspectors concluded that the Requalification Training Program was
conducted in an effective manner. A strength was identified in the
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direct involvement of Operations in the annual examinations and the
critiques of operator performance. Job Performance Measures (JPMs) were
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not effective in providing performance feedback. The quality of the
JPMs used as test items contributed to this lack of effectiveness. The
annual examination provided an appropriate level of challenge to the
operators to allow meaningful feedback to both the individuals and the
training program. Recent operating history indicated no significant
operator performance problems. Operator performance during the
simulator scenarios was indicative of an effective training program.
The operators exhibited strong command and control, crew discipline, and
excellent communications. The requalification program and the annual
examination met the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59, "Requalification"
(Section 05.1).
. The Plant Safety Review Committee meeting observed met Technical
Specification quorum requirements and focussed on safety while reviewing
agenda items (Section 07.1).
. The Management Review Board meetings, to discuss recent plant trips and
storage problems, were constructive and focussed management's attention
on resolving identified concerns (Section 07.2).
Maintenance
. All observed maintenance tasks were conducted in a competent and
professional manner. Appropriate tools, equipment, and procedures were ,
used. Proper radiological controls were utilued when required (Section
M1.1).
. Surveillance activities were conducted satisfactorily and in accordance
with applicable procedures (Section M2.1).
. Two examples were identified where procedural enhancement had the
potential to compensate for the infrequent performance of activities by
technicians. In one activity, a breaker charging motor was damaged
(Section M4.1).
Enaineerina
. The licensee's consequence analysis for a larger than expected Emergency
Feedwater (EFW) flow differentials between steam generators concluded
that the as found condition of the EFW system would not have produced a
condition which was outside of the plant's design basis. The
methodology and assumptions used in the analysis were acceptable 1
(Section E2.1).
. The modification package to replace the existing sump level probes in
the Auxiliary Building with a more reliable level switch was complete
and appropriately detailed. Specified post modification testing
requirements were acceptable to ensure proper switch operation (Section
E2.2).
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! . The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately evaluated the
- water hammer issues associated with the condensate system and the
l. deaerator (Section E8.1).
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[ Plant'Suooort
l . Postings at locked doors between the radiation controlled area and the
- . Intermediate Building were satisfactory (Section R1.1).
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. . A pre-job briefing to discuss personnel safety and radiological issues
i prior to a planned reactor building entry was well conducted and >
j- effective. NO concerns were identified (Section R1.2).
. Security activities observed during the conduct of tours and observation
i . of plant activities were acceptable (Section S1.1).
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- Reoort Details
Summary of Plant Status
At the beginning of the inspection period, the plant was operating at
approximately 100 percent reactor power. On May 30, power was reduced to
approximately 85 percent to perform repairs on the C main feedwater pum). The
plant returned to full power on June 2 and remained at that level for t1e
remainder of the inspection period.
I. Doerations
01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707) l
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent
reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of
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operations was professional and safety conscious. Specific events and l
noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
The inspectors accompanied an Intermediate Building operator performing
Technical Specification (TS) required rounds. During the tour, the
operator was thorough in verifying and recording the required equipment
parameters.
01.2 Loss of Comoonent Coolina Water System Flow To An Operatina Charaina
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a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The ins)ectors reviewed the circumstances associated with an operator ,
error tlat occurred while performing a Component Cooling Water (CCW) I
pump test.
b. Observations and Findinas l
On May 7, at 2:06 a.m., during the performance of Surveillance Test i
Procedure (STP) STP 222.002, " Component Cooling Pump Test," Revision 2,
to determine operability of the B CCW pump, the A train CCW Jump was i
secured while supplying cooling water to the A Centrifugal Clarging Pump
(CCP) gear and oil cooler. The A CCP ran without cooling for about 57
seconds Mfore this condition was recognized by the operator and action
taken to restore CCW flow. Temperature checks of the pump were
performed and found to be satisfactory.
The STP required the B CCW pump to be started in both slow and fast
speed to establish pump operability. The STP provided the overall
3rocedural guidance while referencing the specific System Operating
)rocedure (S0P) S0P-118 " Component Cooling Water," Revision 13, to
achieve pump starts, stops, speed changes, and necessary system
realignments to conduct the test. The portion of the test that required
the B CCW pump to be started in slow speed was completed satisfactorily.
The operator then proceeded to conduct the fast speed portion of the
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- test. This part of the test was more complex since it was necessary to
- perform system realignments to accommodate the increased pump flows due.
[ to fast speed operation. Step 6.2.6 of STP-222.002 referenced the
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operator to shift the B CCW pump to fast speed in accordance-with SOP'
L 118.Section IV.E " Shifting Train B To Fast Speed In.The Inactive
Loop." While performing the referenced section of the S0P the operator
misinterpreted a step and secured the A CCW pump by placing the pump
switch in the "After-Stop" position. On the next page of the procedure
a note discussed the status of the A CCP and the necessity.to transfer
the inservice CCP. At this step in the procedure the operator
recognized that CCW cooling to the A CCP was secured and had been
supplied by the A CCW pump.
The licensee assembled a root cause evaluation team to review this
event, determine.the root causes, and recommend corrective action. The
inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and concluded that the
team had identified the causes of the event. The operator performing
the test had not followed the CCW system S0P while performing the ,
section of the'S0P to realign the system for fast speed operation. This
was attributed to misunderstanding the intent of two ste)s in Section
.IV.E of S0P 118. The operator failed to recognize that le was securing
CCW cooling to an operating CCP. The inspectors also reviewed the
licensee's recommended corrective actions which -included procedural
enhancements and concluded that they addressed the causes of this event.
The failure to follow the procedure for maintaining CCW cooling flow to
an operating CCP is identified as a violation. This non-repetitive
licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV
consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is
identified as NCV 50 395/97005 01.
The inspectors also reviewed this event in comparison to two previous
events that resultad in CCPs operating without CCW cooling. In the two
previous events a CCP was started without CCW cooling. "n this event
cooling water was secured to an operating CCP. The inspectors concluded
after reviewing the two previous events that these were not similar to
the recent violation. The inspectors, however, concluded that the
corrective action for the previous events had not adequately raised
operator awareness to ensure that CCW cooling flow is maintained to an
operating CCP during CCW pump evolutions.
c. - Conclusion
A Non cited Violation was identified for a failure to follow procedure
while performing a test of a CCW pump to restore operability. This
error resulted in securing cooling flow to an operating CCP. This event
was not similar to two previous events in which CCPs operated without
CCW. The corrective action for the previous events had not adequately
raised operator awareness to ensure' that CCW cooling flow is maintained
to an operating CCP during CCW' pump evolutions.
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01.3 Review of Ooerator Aids
a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the conduct of the Operator Aids program which
is controlled by Operations Administrative Procedure (0AP), 0AP 105.1,
" Control of Operator Aids," Revision 2. The inspectors also sampled
several operator aids and verified that they conformed with their
operator aid request.
b. Observations and Findinas
The licensee has defined an operator aid as a label or other device
affixed to a control panel, component, or other structure that enhances
the ability of 0)erations Department and Test Unit personnel to perform
their duties. T1e inspectors' review of the sample of operator aids
found they were all in conformance with their respective operator aid
requests. The inspectors found that the operator aids appeared
technically correct, were appropriately justified and located in the
correct areas. The description on each operator aid was as described in
the operator aid request and they were identified correctly as operator
aids.
c. Conclusions
The operator aid program was being conducted in accordance with the OAP.
01.4 Pre Job Briefinas
a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed pre job briefings by the Operations Shift
Supervisor (SS).
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed pre job briefings by the Operations SS for
Feedwater Isolation Valve (FWIV) and Spent Fuel Cooling (SFC) valve
maintenance. Both tasks involved higher than normal risk to the plant.
The FWIV maintenance involved replacement of the pilot air pressure
regulator on the C FWIV. The potential existed for FWIV closure and a
plant trip. The SFC valve maintenance involved the repacking of an
unisolable valve from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The valve repacking
was performed on the backseat. If the backseat did not seal, the
potential existed for an eight to ten thousand gallon leak from the SFP
into the Auxiliary Building.
Both briefings with the involved maintenance personnel covered
preparations for the jobs, expected communications, parameters to
monitor, personnel safety, and the potential hazards. The inspectors
concluded that the briefings adequately prepared the personnel involved
for the risks and concerns associated with these tasks. Prior to
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repacking the SFC valve, the inspectors verified that should the
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backseat of the valve not prevent the valve from leaking, the SFP water
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c. Conclusion
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Pre job briefings conducted by the Operations SS adequately informed .
maintenance personnel of potential operational risks and concerns. '
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown
a. Insoection Scope (71707)
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The inspectors conducted a detailed ESF system walkdown of the j
safety related chilled water system. This walkdown was conducted using l
the guidance provided in Inspection Procedure 71707. ;
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors conducted a detailed system walkdown of the chilled water
system to assess the general condition of system com)onents including l
labeling, to verify that system valve msitions matc1 the system '
drawings and SOP, and to assess plant lousekeeping in the area of system
components. The following procedure and system piping and
instrumentation drawings were used during the performance of this
walkdown:
. S0P 501 "HVAC Chilled Water System," Revision 15. .
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. Drawing D 302 841, " System Flow Diagram, Chilled Water Pump and l
Chiller Area," Revision 22. '
- Drawing D 302 842, " System Flow Diagram, Chilled Water to 4
Cooling Coils A," Revision 16. 4
. Drawing D 302 843, " System Flow Diagram, Chilled Water to
Cooling Coils B," Revision 15.
The inspectors considered that the chilled water system was able to
perform its design function for both normal and accident conditions. No
misaligned valves were identified and component labeling was adequate.
The inservice air handling units appeared to be functioning properly and
chilled water temperatures throughout the system were as expected for
the prevailing conditions.
Poor housekeeping was identified in areas that were not frequently
traveled. Identified items included foreign material in cable trays,
significant amounts of debris in some areas, and unauthorized
construction material. Also, two minor drawing errors were identified
on drawing D 302 842.
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) .In addition, several. examples of poor material condition were observed, i
A number of chilled water system valves were observed to have a large !
- ' amount of corrosion on the bonnets and handwheels. A number of valves
had minor packing leaks. Several inoperable light fixtures and some -
damaged pipe insulation were also noted. One personnel safety issue was
observed involving a safety chain not being installed on a ladder. ,
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- These concerns were communicated to the licensee for their resolution. i
L The inspectors also reviewed the applicable sections of the FSAR and i
identified no discrepancies.
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A detailed = system walkdown found that the safety related chill water
l~ system was considered to be able to perform its design function for
! normal and accident conditions. Poor housekeeping,. poor material
! condition, minor drawing errors, and a personnel safety condition were
- . observed. These concerns were appropriately addressed by the licensee.
02.2 Failure To Follow Storace Area Reauest Evaluation
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a. Insoection Scope (71707)
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1 In conjunction with an ESF system walkdown, the inspectors reviewed
L overall plant housekeeping and storage.
i b. Observations and Findinas
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i Station Administrative Procedure (SAP), SAP-142, " Station Housekeeping
! Program," Revision 11, Section 6.11, provides the requirements for the
! designation of storage areas in the plant. Engineering services
i wrsonnel are responsible for reviewing all Designated Storage and
. iousekeeping Area Request (DSHARs) for areas inside the Protected Area
to ensure that no design critaria are compromised. This review ,
} includes, as a minimum, an evaiuation of combustible loading, structural '
floor loading, electrical loading and anti falldown (seismic )
interaction). - As required by the procedure, an engineering analysis had
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! been performed, attached to the storage request, and had appropriately
} identified limitations due to potential fire loading and seismic
- interactions. SAP 142 also requires that the storage area request j
- originator ensure that all provisions, recommendations, or limitations
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identified in the engineering review are complied with in the storage
area.
On June 4, during a tour of the Control Building 482 foot level, the
inspectors inspected a permanent equipment storage area adjacent to
safety related equipment. The storage area contained charcoal
change out carts (hoppers) on rollers and hoses used to replace charcoal
in the ventilation equipment installed on that level. The inspectors
reviewed the DSHAR and the associated engineering review that was
attached to the wall in the storage area. The inspectors found that the !
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material was not being stored in accordance with the posted storage
limitations.
The engineering review identified a concern with the flammability of the
flexible hoses used with the change out equipment. The review
recommended that the hoses be removed and stored in a non-safety /non-
seismic structure or location in order to maintain area combustible
loading at a minimum. There was no automatic fire suppression
capability in that area of the control building where the cart and hoses
were being stored. The engineering review also recommended that the
equipment be secured to the building wall by the installation of pad
eye (s) and cabling to prevent these items from moving around during a
potential seismic event. The engineering review designated an adjacent
area where the equipment should be stored. The inspectors found that
the engineering recommendations identified in the engineering review
were not being implemented. The hoses were not stored in a separate
location and the change-out equipment was not in the location designated
in the storage request and not secured to the building wall.
This failure to follow station storage requirements is the second repeat
(third occurrence) identified by the inspectors. Previous violations of
storage requirements were identified on July 15, 1996, and on December
11, 1996. In both the previous violations, the licensee failed to
follow the engineering evaluation attached to the storage request.
Previous corrective actions including personnel counseling, verification
of storage requests, and procedural changes did not prevent recurrence.
This is identified as Violation 50 395/97005 02.
c. Conclusions
A violation was identified for corrective actions not being effective in
preventing a repetition of storage problems. This was the second NRC
identified repeat of this violation.
04 Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Control Room Manaaement Observations l
a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed an Operations observation program. I
b. Observations and Findinas
On May 19, plant management began an eight week around the clock
operations observation program. Independent observers witnessed
operational activities in the control room and in the plant to give
feedback on the conduct of plant operations. The program was
implemented, in part, as a response to recent o The
observations were being compiled in a log book.perational
The inspectorsproblems.
concluded that this management attention to plant operations has the
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potential to enhance performance by identifying inconsistencies and
problems, and reinforcing good practices.
c. Conclusions
A management observation program of operations was implemented. This l
management attention to operations has the potential to enhance
operations by identifying inconsistencies and problems, and reinforcing
good practices.
04.2 Pressurizer Soray Valve
a. Inspection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the identification
of a partially stuck open pressurizer spray valve.
b. Observations and Findinas
On May 31, operators observed on the main control board unusual
indications of control group heater amps with the RCS pressure steady
and normal. A review of plant computer data indicated that the
pressurizer spray valve off the A RCS loop, PCV 444D RC, was open with a
closed demand signal.
An evaluation of plant computer data for the spray valves indicated that
PCV 4440 RC was partially open. The valve apparently failed to fully
close after receiving a close demand signal. A subsequent Reactor
Building (RB) entry and troubleshooting by the licensee identified that
the spray valve was in fact partially open due to a problem with the
valve's air control system. A volume booster in the air control system
was replaced, and the valve was returned to a fully functional status.
The inspectors concluded that this observation by control room operators
demonstrated plant awareness and attention to changing plant conditions.
c. Conclusions
Control room operators' demonstrated good plant awareness when they
identified a malfunctioning pressurizer spray valve.
05 Operator Training and Qualification
05.1 Licensed Operator Reaualification Proaram Evaluation -(71001)
a. Inspection Scoce
During the week of May 5 through 8. Region based inspectors used the
guidance of Inspection Procedure 71001 to assess the Licensed Operator
Requalification Program. The inspectors witnessed the administration of
week 2 of the 5 week examination process. The Operating shift crew
examined during the inspection was D Shift, with a total of seven Senior
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Reactor Operators, and four Reactor Operators. The inspectors observed
simulator examination scenarios, plant and simulator walk through l
examinations in the form of Job Performance Measures (JPMs), and l
reviewed the 50 question written examination. In addition, the l
inspectors reviewed the administrative controls the licensee used to
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ensure the Requalification Program met the requirements in 10 CFR 55.59. l
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors evaluated th written examination and concluded the
50 question test was challenging and comprehensive. The examination was
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an open reference examination, using test items sufficiently complex to
meet the guidance of NUREG 1021, " Operator Licensing Examination
Standards for Power Reactors," Attachment 3. " Examination Sample Plan,"
and Appendix B. " Written Exam Guidelines." The Requalification written
examination bank contained approximately 800 items, which satisfied the
guidance in NUREG 1021.
The licensee has taken an exception to the guidance of NUREG 1021 and no
longer administers a static simulator examination. The inspectors
determined that plant and control systems typically evaluated in this
section of the examination were appropriately sampled on the written
examination.
The dynamic simulator operating examinations were appropriately
discriminating. The scenarios presented challenges to the operating
crews that allowed a valid assessment of the crews and individuals.
Dominant accident sequences identified from the facility's Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) were incorporated into the operating tests.
Faults and events were related to a degree that allowed a logical,
reasoned approach by the operating crews in determining the nature of
the faults and accidents. During the simulator scenarios the operators
were observed to maintain good situational command and control. Three
part communications were used, throughout the exercises, in accordance
with station procedures.
The JPMs were adequate to ensure that a safety critical task could be
performed. However, several JPMs were not sufficiently complex to
provide a reasonable degree of confidence that the candidate was
demonstrating a mastery of the requalification training material or of
the functional position. For example, JPM 036B was a simulator JPM in
which the operator is required to respond to a continuous rod withdrawal
event. The initiating cue provided by the evaluator arompted the
operator to " respond to rod motion." After placing t1e Rod Control Bank
Selector to MANUAL, (which did not stop the withdrawal), the operator
was expected to trip the reactor. This was the only action required to
successfully complete the JPM. Other JPMs required a single, simple
step response from the o>erators. Although any training program
requires demonstrating tlat all required tasks be mastered, whether
simple or comalex, the testing process should be predisposed toward
those items w11ch provide meaningful feedback. A simple, single action
task will seldom provide any significant data for determining areas in
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which retraining is needed or where training programs should be
modified. Test items that r e too easy or fundamental such that ;
individuals with performan c problems could answer them correctly are
not sufficiently discrimbatir.g and should be used with discretion. i
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The inspectors discussed this issue with both Training Management and
Operations Management. The total population of JPMs in the licensee's l
examination bank was approximately 150 test items, which satisfied the
guidance in NUREG 1021.
The requalification examination was administered as planned, with a
minimum of changes in content or schedule. This reflected effective
planning and strong experience levels by the training staff. The
training staff involved in the examination used appro)riate performance
standards in grading and evaluating the operators. T1e staff conducted
critiques immediately after each dynamic simulator exercise. The
critiques were effective in identifying errors or problems, and
assigning the proper corrective actions. The threshold for providing
corrective feedback was appropriately conservative. Operations
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management actively participated in both the dynamic simulator
evaluation and in the critique of the crew and individuals. The
involvement of Operations in the training pmcess was especially useful
during the >ost scenario assessments. Thr e erations managers provided
direct feed)ack to Training regarding wha >erations expected in
matters of crew and individual behavior, munications, and procedural
adherence. This aspect of the Requalifit on program is considered a
strength.
Crew and individual feedback was provided n the form of completed
critique sheets for each of the dynamic simulator exercises. The sheets
were presented to each student at the completion of the examination
week, prior to returning to shift. The inspectors interviewed one SR0
and one R0 regarding the feedback provided. Both felt the feedback was
detailed enough to allow an accurate assessment of their performance.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the Requalification Training Program was
conducted in an effective manner. A strength was identified in the
direct involvement of Operations in the annual examinations and the
critiques of operator JPMs were not effective in providing
performance feedback. performance.The quality of the JPMs used as test ite
contributed to this lack of effectiveness. The annual examination
provided an appropriate level of challenge to the operators to allow
meaningful feedback to both the individuals and the training program.
Recent operating history indicated no significant operator performance
problems. Operator performance during the simulator scenarios was
indicative of an effective training program. The operators exhibited
strong command and control, crew discipline, and excellent
communications. The requalification program and the annual examination
met the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59, "Requalification."
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07 Quality Assurance in Operations
07.1 Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) Meetina
a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors attended a PSRC meeting to assess the effectiveness of ,
the process. '
b. Observations and Findinas
On June 10, the inspectors attended a PSRC meeting during which several
SAP changes were discussed. These changes were reviewed by the PSRC
with all questions and concerns being fully addressed. The PSRC voted
to approve each change. No concerns were identified.
In addition, the PSRC members were briefed on an Emergency Feedwater
(EFW) consecuence analysis which was performed following greater than
expecttd EFh flow differentials noted after the April 22 reactor trip.
Details of this analysis are described in Section E2.1.
c. Conclusions
The PSRC meating observed met TS quorum requirements and focussed on
safety while reviewing agenda items.
07.2 Manaaement Review Board (MRB) Meetinas
a. Inspection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors observed MRB meetings on May 9 and June 13.
b. Observations and Findinas
On May 9, the ins)ectors attended a MRB meeting which was held to review
the plant trips tlat occurred in April and the operating crew's
performance during the trips and subsequent restarts. The MRB also
discussed problems that were seen in the plant that needed resolution
including feedwater pump speed controls and feedwater system
performance, potential waterhammer problems, EFW status, and the
electro hydraulic system 0 ring failure.
The June 13 MRB meeting was held to review continued problems with
equipment storage in the plant. The meeting covered the recent storage
issue (see Section 02.2), the current program to designate storage
areas, and proposed ways to enhance the program.
Both HRB meetings were chaired by the Vice President, Nuclear
Operations. The meetings were attended by plant general managers and
other department managers. The inspectors considered the discussions to
be constructive, open, and focussed on resolving outstanding concerns.
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The meetings resulted in establishing action items to resolve the
identified concerns.
.
c. Conclusions
. The MRB meetings,.to discuss recent plant trips and storage problems,
i were constructive and focussed management's attention on resolving
. identified concerns.
08 Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1 (Closed) Temocrary Instruction (TI) 2515/86: Inspection of licensee's
actions taken to implement Generic Letter No. 81 21. " Natural
Circulation Cooldown." The licensee's training program to implement
Generic Letter (GL) 81 21 was reviewed in NRC Inspection Report (IR) No.
50 395/87032 and found to be acceptable. Inspectors' reviews of
licensee procedures for natural circulation cooldown and operator
interviews on the use of these procedures were documented in NRC IR Nos.
50 395/88003 and 50 395/88026. Following the licensee's resolution of
several procedural deficiencies identified during the inspection, the-
licensee's procedures were considered satisfactory. Based on the
results of these previous inspections, TI 2515/86 is closed.
,
II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments
.
a. Inspection Scope (62707)
'
The inspectors reviewed or observed all or portions of the following
work activities:
.
- Maintenance Work Request (MWR) 9710453, A Chiller Surging / Restore
Proper Operation.
- Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet (PMTS) P0210557, Lubricate C
-
Charging / Safety Injection (SI) Pump Motor.
- PMTS P0210454, Quantify Leakage from Mechanical Seals on the C
3 Charging /SI Pump.
- PMTS P0210474, Perform Operational Check, Electrical Inspection,
and Cleaning on the C Charging /SI Breaker.
j e MWR 9710605, Install Mounting Bracket for Level Switch ILS01966.
Packing.
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. NWR 9710844, Replacement of C Feedwater Isolation Valve '
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_ (XVG01611C) Pilot Air Pressure Regulator.
- MWR 9700139, Agastat Relay Calibration / Replacement XSW1DA13.
-
b. Observations and Findinas
The observed maintenance on the C chiller was performed in accordance l
with established procedures using acceptable work practices.
The preventive maintenance associated with the C charging /SI pump seals I'
was accomplished using the proper tools and equipment. Demineralized
water was used to clean the residual boric acid crystals from the seal
areas. Proper Health Physics (HP) procedures were utilized during the i
performance of this task. l
The mounting bracket installation for level switch ILS01966 was
performed in accordance with Hodification Review Form (HRF) 34428. The
existing level switch was replaced with a switch of a different design.
This required the installation of a different type of mounting bracket.
Level switch ILS01966 was located in a radiologically contaminated area.
This required HP assistance and the use of appropriate personnel
contamination protection.
The FWIV air pressure regulator replacement and the Spent Fuel Cooling
(SFC) system valve repacking were performed in accordance with the
procedures using acceptable work practices. These two tasks were
especially noteworthy because they both posed higher than normal plant
risk.
c. Conclusions
All observed raaintenance tasks were conducted in a competent and
professional manner. Appropriate tools, equipment, and procedures were !
used. Proper radiological controls were utilized when required.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
H2.1 S_urveillance Observation
a. Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors reviewed or observed all or portions of the following
surveillance tests:
. STP 121.00, " Main Steam Valve Operability Test," Revision 10.
- STP-170.010 " Fire Switch Functional Yest for XFN0064B and
XFN0065B, B Trai,, RBCUs," Revision 2.
'
- STP-125.002, " Diesel Generator Operability Test," Revision 17.
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. STP 120.004, " Emergency Feedwater Valve Operability Test,"
Revision 12.
. STP 124.001, " Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup," Revision 7.
- STP-102.001, " Source Range Analog Channel Operational Test,
N 31, N 32 N 33," Revision 5.
. STP 345.037, " Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and
Master Relay Test - Train A," Revision 13.
b. Observations and Findinas
As part of the STP 345.037 review, the inspectors verified that the
licensee had revised the procedure to include complete verification of
the P 4 circuitry (see NRC IR No. 50 395/97001).
During observation of the surveillance tests, the inspectors observed
good planning, communications and procedural adherence.
c. Conclusions
Surveillance activities were conducted satisfactorily and in accordance
with applicable procedures.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
M4.1 Pgrformance of Breaker Testina
a. Inspection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed the performance of Electrical Maintenance
Procedure (EMP). EMP 405.013. "7.2 kV Circuit Breaker 500 Operation
Maintenance," Revision 10, on the A train breaker for the C charging /SI
pump and STP 506.009, " Reactor Trip Breaker Testing," Revision 14.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed that the technicians performing EMP 405.013 did
not understand how to properly connect a Multi Amp SST-2 timer to
measure the breaker's as found open and close times. The technicians
contacted their supervisor for additional guidance, and the proper
connections were established to provide the required data. A procedure
change was initiated to clarify the use of the Multi-Amp timer. A
similar problem was also identified during the performance of STP-
506.009.
In a later section of procedure EMP-405.013, the technicians manually
charged the charging springs using a ratchet handle. The ratchet handle i
was not removed when it was no longer required. When the charging motor
was energized later in the procedure, the charging motor was damaged and
had to be replaced. The ratchet was used in the clockwise direction
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instead of the counter clockwise direction as recommended in the 7.2 kV
Magna Blast circuit breaker technical manual. The technicians also
manually charged the springs with the breaker control mwer connected.
No personnel were injured during this event, but the c1arging motor was
damaged and required replacement.
The inspectors reviewed the training records for the electrical
technicians involved in the breaker maintenance and found they had
received training in 1993. The training staff used the a) proved )
procedures and the circuit breaker technical manual as a 3 asis for the q
training program for the 7.2 kV breakers. The training facilities were
considered to be adequate.
c. Conclusions
Two examples were identified where procedural enhancement had the
potential to compensate for the infrequent performance of activities by !
technicians. In one activity, a breaker charging motor was damaged.
III. Enaineering j
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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1 EFW Flow Balance
a. Inspection Scooe (37551. 92903)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's consecuence analysis which was
performed because of larger than expected EFv flow differentials between
Steam Generators (SGs) following the manual reactor trip on April 22.
b. Observations and Findinas
An Unresolved Item (URI) was owned in NRC IR Ho. 50 395/97003 (URI 50-
395/97003 05) concerning a higler than expected differential EFW flow
between each of the SGs following a manual reactor trip. Part of this
URI involved a review of the consequences of the observed system
conditions to determine if the design basis assumptions were met.
The licensee performed an EFW consequence analysis to address the
question. The analysis included three system performance evaluations:
. Maximum flow to a faulted SG.
. Automatic isolation of emergency feed to the faulted SG.
- Minimum flow to the intact SGs.
The results of these evaluations indicated that the system's function to
limit the maximum EFW flow to less than or equal to 1000 gallons per
minute (gpm) to a faulted SG may not have been met. The automatic
isolation and the minimum flow evaluations showed that they would have
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been met with the EFW system in the as found condition. As a result of
these evaluations, the licensee performed a consequence analysis to
4
address the impact of EFW flow exceeding 1000 gpm to the faulted SG.
The licensee determined that the inability to limit EFW flow to less
4
than or equal to 1000 gpm to the faulted SG potentially impacts two
design basis analysis:
. RB pressure and temperature analysis for steam line break
. RB flood analysis
'
The analysis showed that the resulting pressure and temperature
conditions inside the RB would be within the bounds of current analyses.
4
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Also, the resulting RB flood level would have been acceptable for
current plant equipment to ensure accident mitigation, establish safe
l- shutdown co titions, and perform post accident monitoring functions.
.
The inspectort, reviewed the licensee's methodology and assumptions used j
'
in the analysis. The EFW system hydraulic model was a normalized
- version of the same model that was originally used for the system
analysis. The specific post trip system conditions were analyzed. The
3 assumptions used were reasonable and provided an acceptable level of
confidence in the results. The inspectors agreed with the licensee's ,
. conclusion that the as found condition of the EFW system would not have !
i
produced a condition which was outside of the plant's design basis.
i
The URI (50 395/97003 05) will remain open pending review of the
licensee's root cause evaluation to determine the cause of the
{ out of specification valve stop adjustments.
c. Conclusions
,
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The licensee's consequence analysis for larger than expected EFW flow I
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differentials between SGs following a manual reactor trip concluded that l
<
the as found condition of the EFW system would not have produced a
condition which was outside of the plant's design basis. The inspectors i
determined that the methodology and assumptions used in the analysis !
were acceptable. I
E2.2 Modification to Replace Leak Detection System Switches j
, a. InsDection Scope (37551) I
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The inspectors reviewed the MRF 34428 Jackage and sup)orting
i documentation. The purpose of this MR was to make t1e Auxiliary
- Building leak detection system more reliable. ;
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b. Observations and Findinas l
2
The licensee initiated a modification to replace the existing Magnetrol
- capacitance probes in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump room sumps,
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the waste evaporator room sumps, and the alarm drains in the Auxiliary
Building. A more reliable Magnetrol flood level switch was designated
as a replacement instrument.
The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screening review which was
completed in sup) ort of this modification. The screening review
indicated that t11s activity did represent a change to the facility as
described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or the Fire
Protection Evaluation Report (FPER). Because of this, a 10 CFR 50.59
safety evaluation was completed. All questions on the safety evaluation
were answered N0 and appropriate justification was included. The FSAR
was identified as requiring revision to change the description of the
level sensing devices. No change to the FPER was required.
Appropriately detailed instructions were provided to the Instrumentation
& Control (I&C) technicians, the civil maintenance technicians, and the
electrical maintenance technicians to complete the required tasks. The
replacement switches required that a different bracket be fabric ited and
installed in the various sumps. Drawings and measurements were govided
to modify the existing brackets to accommodate the replacement switches.
The replacement switches did not require a 120 volt AC power su) ply as
did the original probes. The instructions addressed removing t11s power
supply. The replacement switches were designated as seismically
qualified and seismically mounted as were the original probes.
Post modification testing requirements were specified in the HRF
package. A functional test was specified following installation. This
required plugging the drain in each sump or temporarily disabling the
sump pump, and filling the sumps with water until the switch actuated.
The acceptance criteria for the post modification functional testing was
specific and included the appropriate alarm functions. ,
1
c. Conclusions
The modification package to replace the existing sump level probes in I
the Auxiliary Building with a more reliable level switch was complete I
and appropriately detailed. Specified post modification testing
requirements were acceptable to ensure proper switch operation.
E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities (37551)
E7.1 Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Commitments I
A recent discovery of a licensee o)erating their facility in a manner l
contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a special l
focused review that compared plant practices, procedures and/or l
parameters to the UFSAR description. While performing the inspections l
discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable
portions of the FSAR that related to the areas inspected. No
discrepancies were identified.
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Insoection Followuo Item (IFI) 50 395/97003 02: Licensee I
corrective action to prevent DA transients. This item adaressed the
licensee's evaluation and proposed corrective actions for water
hammer / pressure transients that occurred in the condensate system and
Deaerator (DA) during the plant restarts following the plant trips in
A)ril 1997. The engineering evaluation concluded that the transients in
t1e DA were caused by the injection of relatively cool condensate water
(75 100 Fahrenheit (F)) into a relatively hot DA (approximately 330 1
F), causing' flashing of the condensate, immediate pressure and
temperature depression in the DA heater section, bulk boiling and
flashing of the storage tank water, and generally high stress loads on l
the DA. The licensee's evaluation of these events recommended revision
of SOPS and operator training to minimize occurrences of this type of
event. The procedure revisions will include a review of the need to
maintain a hot DA during plant restart conditions. The stringent
feedwater temperature requirements for the model D 3 SGs have been
relaxed since the SGs were replaced. A recommendation was also made for
a comprehensive inspection of the interior of the DA during the next
refueling outage. The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately
evaluated the water hammer issues associated with the condensate system
and the DA.
IV. Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R1.1 General Comments
The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of
tours and observation of maintenance activities and found them to be
acceptable. During an ESF system walkdown the inspectors observed
postings at locked doors between the radiation controlled area and the
Intermediate Building. All postings were found to be satisfactory.
R1.2 Pre-Job Briefina for RB Entry
a. Insoection Scope (71750)
The inspectors attended a pre job briefing conducted in preparation for
a planned RB entry.
b. Observations and Findinas
On June 2, the inspectors attended a pre-job briefing prior to the
licensee performing a RB entry to isolate air to a RCS spray valve. The
purpose of the briefing was to ensure that all involved individuals were
familiar with their s)ecific responsibilities and the expected
conditions in the wor ( area. Attendees included the shift engineer,
maintenance perscanel, and HP personnel. The heat stress conditions and
.
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18
the radiological controls were discussed in detail. The inspectors
considered the briefing to be effective and well conducted.
c. Conclusions
A pre job briefing to discuss personnel safety and radiological issues
prior to a planned RB entry was well conducted and effective. No
concerns were identified.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed security activities including compensatory
measures during the conduct of plant tours and plant activities and
found them acceptable.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on June 19, 1997. The
licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee l
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F. Bacon. Manager, Chemistry Services i
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L. Blue, Manager, Health Physics
S. Byrne, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
R. Clary, Manager, Quality Systems
!
M. Fowlkes, Manager, Operations
S. Furstenberg, Manager, Maintenance Services
D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services l
G. Moffatt, Manager, Design Engineering !
K. Nettles, General Manager, Strategic Planning and Development l
H. O'Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
A. Rice, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience
G. Taylor, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
R. Waselus, Manager, Systems and Component Engineering
R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority
B. Williams, General Manager, Engineering Services
G. Williams, Associate Manager, Operations
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 71001: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
IP 92901: Followup Plant Operations
IP 92903: Followup Engineering
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50 395/97005 01 NCV Securing of CCW to an operating charging pump
(Section 01.2).
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50 395/97005-02 VIO Failure to implement effective corrective action for '
i
equipment storage violations (Section 02.2).
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I Closed
50 395/97005 01 NCV Securing of CCW to an operating charging pump
(Section 01.2).
l 50 395/97003-02 IFI Licensee corrective action to prevent DA transients
(Section E8.1).
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Discussed
50 395/97003 05 URI Evaluation of high EFW system differential flow rates
(Section E2.1).