IR 05000395/2020001
| ML20122A256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/2020 |
| From: | Randy Musser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3 |
| To: | Stoddard D Dominion Energy South Carolina |
| References | |
| IR 2020001 | |
| Download: ML20122A256 (20) | |
Text
May 1, 2020
SUBJECT:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2020001
Dear Mr. Stoddard:
On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. On April 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. George Lippard, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Randall A. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000395 License No. NPF-12
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000395
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0034
Licensee:
Dominion Energy South Carolina (DESC)
Facility:
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Location:
Jenkinsville, SC
Inspection Dates:
January 01, 2020 to March 31, 2020
Inspectors:
J. Dolecki, Senior Resident Inspector
E. Hilton, Resident Inspector
K. McCurry, Acting Resident Inspector
T. Nazario Cruz, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Randall A. Musser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate procedures and actions following safety-related charging pump failure to start Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000395/2020001-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.19 A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and including appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria. Specifically, after charging pump 'A' failed to manually start due to a degraded main control switch on November 18, 2019, safety-related Operations Administrative Procedure (OAP)-100.5, Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Equipment, did not provide adequate instructions for operators to troubleshoot the issue and repair the switch prior to charging pump 'A' failing to start again on January 7, 2020.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000395/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for V.C.
Summer Nuclear Station,
Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.4.
71153 Closed LER 05000395/2019-001-01 LER 2019-001-01 for V.C.
Summer Nuclear Station,
Unit 1, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.4.6.1.
71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. From January 1 - March 19, 2020, the inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week during which they conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, and observed risk significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to reschedule the inspection to a later date.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Emergency diesel generator (EDG) 'B' prior to a monthly surveillance run on January 14, 2020
- (2) Service water train 'B' in preparation for an upcoming permanent modification on February 21, 2020
- (3) Emergency feedwater train 'A' with work ongoing on emergency feedwater train 'B' on March 16, 2020
- (4) Residual heat removal train 'A' on March 17, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Intermediate Building (IB) Battery Charger Room A/B (412'), Fire Zone IB05, on February 24, 2020
- (2) Turbine Building General Area, all elevations, Fire Zone TB01, on January 27, 2020
- (3) Service Water Pump House (SWPH) Electrical Equipment Room A, Fire Zone SWPH01, on February 24, 2020
- (4) SWPH Service Water Pump Area (436') / Valve Pit Room (425'), Fire Zone SWPH05, on February 24, 2020
- (5) IB General Area, all elevations, Fire Zone IB25, on March 11, 2020
- (6) Auxiliary Building General Area, all elevations, Fire Area AB01, on March 26, 2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed operations personnel during the semiannual 'B' EDG operability test after a test deficiency was identified related to chart recorder frequency readings on February 19, 2020; during maintenance test run of the 'A' EDG after issues were identified with the service water flow indications and jacket water temperature on March 6, 2020; and during response to failed pressure transmitter and associated abnormal operating procedure entry on March 26, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed a simulator evaluation that included a failed closed pressurizer block valve, tripped charging pump, tripped main condenser vacuum pump, degrading main condenser vacuum, failure of the reactor trip system, and an unisolable main steam line break on January 27, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)
'A' EDG during a series of preventative maintenance and corrective action activities.
- (2) Chemical and volume control system for maintenance rule-related analyses and the licensees system plant health review.
- (3) Reactor building cooling units for review of past and upcoming maintenance activities to correct vibrational concerns, and for maintenance rule-related analyses and the licensees system plant health review.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;
- (1) Yellow risk during scheduled maintenance on the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump on January 13, 2020
- (2) Yellow risk during solid state protection system actuation logic and relay test on February 7, 2020
- (3) Elevated risk during scheduled maintenance activities on the 'B' EDG during week of March 9, 2020
- (4) Emergent work/elevated risk following loss of the digital rod position indication system on March 5, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Condition Report (CR)-20-00131 - Chiller 'B' due to leak on January 15, 2020
- (2) CR-19-04308 - Core subcooling margin monitor due to 'B' train calibration failure and associated compensatory actions on February 13, 2020
- (3) CR-20-00665 - 'A' EDG due to air receiver tanks reduced wall thicknesses on March 11, 2020
- (4) CR-19-04191 - Containment integrity due to nitrogen purge isolation valves left open on February 11, 2020
- (5) CR-20-00830 - 'B' Chiller due to inadvertent oil sample on March 16, 2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) SOP-102, "Chemical and Volume Control System" - 'A' charging pump following replacement of main control room switch on January 8, 2020
- (2) STP-125.002A, "Diesel Generator A Operability Test" - 'A' EDG following series of maintenance activities on March 7, 2020
- (3) STP-125.002B, "Diesel Generator A Operability Test" - 'B' EDG following series of maintenance activities of March 13, 2020
- (4) SOP-211, "Emergency Feedwater System" - 'B' emergency feedwater pump following electrical preventative maintenance on March 16, 2020
- (5) ICP-500.019, "NI Power Range and Miscellaneous Drawers Alignment for Troubleshooting / Maintenance" - Audio count rate channel INI00034 following reinstall and calibration on February 26, 2020
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) STP-125.002B, "Diesel Generator B Operability Test," on January 14, 2020
- (2) STP-123.003B, "Train B Service Water System Valve Operability Test," on January 17, 2020
- (3) STP-136.001, "Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Operability Test," on February 25, 2020
- (4) STP-220.07, "Backup Air Supply Check Valve Test for Emergency Feedwater Valves," on February 19, 2020
- (5) STP 302.002, "Delta T-T avg Protection Loop B Operational Test," on March 17, 2020
- (6) MTP-E-50733.003B, "EDG Train B: Baseline Phase Rotation Testing," on March 13, 2020
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee staff during simulator-based requalification evolution training involving a faulted steam generator and adverse containment on January 22,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) CR-19-01802, CR-19-04499, CR-19-03444 - Licensee corrective actions from three Severity Level IV traditional enforcement violations in past 12-month period
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000395/2019-001-01, Virgil C. Summer, Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19105B284). The inspectors reviewed the updated LER submittal. The inspectors determined that no additional performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements occurred. The previous LER submittal was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000395/2019002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19225D219). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000395/2019001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19134A300) under the Inspection Results Section. This LER is closed.
- (2) LER 2019-002-00 for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.4 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19283B209). The inspectors determined that no performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements occurred. This LER was submitted and subsequently retracted by licensee correspondence titled "Cancelation of LER 2019-002-00 for V.C.
Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.4," dated January 23, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML20024F545). For tracking purposes this LER is considered closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate procedures and actions following safety-related charging pump failure to start Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000395/2020001-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.19 A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and including appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria. Specifically, after charging pump 'A' failed to manually start due to a degraded main control switch on November 18, 2019, safety-related Operations Administrative Procedure (OAP)-100.5, Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Equipment, did not provide adequate instructions for operators to troubleshoot the issue and repair the switch prior to charging pump 'A' failing to start again on January 7, 2020.
Description:
The safety-related charging pumps are relied on to mitigate an accident. When safety injection (SI) logic conditions are actuated, the charging pumps automatically start to provide high head SI into the reactor coolant system (RCS). Also, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) require the manual start of a charging pump during certain accident conditions. For instance, operators are instructed to manually start a charging pump following an SI termination when RCS temperature or pressurizer level cannot be maintained, for cold leg recirculation in response to inadequate core cooling, and during a transfer to hot leg recirculation.
On November 18, 2019, during the performance of a surveillance test coming out of a forced outage in accordance with system operating procedure (SOP)-102, "Chemical and Volume Control System," the 'A' charging pump failed to start after the main control board (MCB)manual switch was taken to start. The licensee entered OAP-100.5, Section 8.4, Equipment Start Failures or any 7.2 kV and 480-volt breaker malfunction. Electrical maintenance personnel were sent to investigate the breaker. As stated in CR-19-04154, electricians determined that there were no issues with breaker alignment and power was available. The electricians then requested that operations attempt to manually start the pump again. The pump started successfully. On January 7, 2020, during the performance of a post-maintenance test start in accordance with SOP-102, the 'A' charging pump failed to start after the MCB manual switch was taken to start. The licensee again entered OAP-100.5 to investigate the equipment start failure. Electrical maintenance personnel investigated the breaker and manual switch and identified that the manual start contacts on the MCB switch did not provide consistent continuity. The 'A' charging pump was declared inoperable.
Following equipment start failures, operators enter OAP-100.5 Section 8.4. This section, in part, provides the following direction:
- If possible, sequester the breaker and switch.
- If not possible, document the basis in a condition report (CR) and contact electrical maintenance to initiate a work order and a troubleshooting plan when necessary.
- If applicable, declare the component inoperable and generate a Removal &
Restoration (R&R) report.
However, on November 18, 2019, the operators did not troubleshoot the MCB switch, document the basis for not doing so in a CR, initiate a work order to take additional actions, or generate a R&R. Furthermore, although not directed in OAP-100.5, a second manual start of the 'A' charging pump was performed.
OAP-100.5 does not provide adequate direction to operators following the failure to start of a safety-related SSC to appropriately determine whether sufficient troubleshooting has been satisfactorily accomplished before returning the SSC to service. Additionally, OAP-100.5 does not provide direction to operators to restart safety-related equipment if an investigation of the failure does not determine a cause. Specifically, OAP-100.5 does not provide sufficient procedural guidance to ensure a degraded condition does not exist and that all causes to equipment failure are addressed prior to starting safety-related equipment.
Corrective Actions: Following the 'A' charging pump failure to start on November 18, 2019, the licensee generated CR-19-04154. Following the 'A' charging pump failure to start on January 7, 2020, the licensee generated CR-20-00046, declared the pump inoperable, initiated a work order, and replaced the MCB switch prior to restarting the 'A' charging pump and declaring the pump operable. The licensee correlated CR-19-04154 and CR-20-00046, with actions driven via changes to CR-19-04154. Within CR-19-04154, the licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined the cause of the start failure as degradation of the cover plate and start contact on the MCB switch. Also, the licensee identified similar switches to evaluate through an extent of condition and initiated actions for one-time replacement of the switch and created an action to enhance the guidance in OAP-100.5.
Corrective Action References: CR-19-04154, CR-20-00046, and CR-20-00470
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined OAP-100.5, a safety-related procedure containing activities affecting quality, did not prescribe instructions appropriate to the circumstances with quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors also used examples in IMC 0612, Appendix E, effective January 1, 2020, to determine whether the performance deficiency was more than minor. Similar to Example 4.c, the performance deficiency was more than minor because the
'A' charging pump was returned to service and due to the inadequate troubleshooting performed, the licensee did not identify the MCB manual switch had a degraded cover plate and corroded contacts which could have impacted the charging pump's ability to perform its safety function in a design basis event.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Specifically, using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because even though the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating component, the system maintained its probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) functionality because the 'A' charging pump never lost its automatic start capability and the 'C' charging pump could still be relied on to feed the A-train through manual action.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the condition in the field to determine the cause of the start failure before returning the pump to service. In addition, the condition report generated was not appropriately screened to reflect the safety significance of this issue.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states in part activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Contrary to the above, the licensee did not prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances, including appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities had been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the instructions given in OAP 100.5, Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Equipment, were not appropriate for troubleshooting the equipment failure of charging pump A which failed to manually start on November 18, 2019, and then subsequently on January 7, 2020.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Review of licensee corrective actions as a result of three Severity Level IV traditional enforcement violations in past 12-month period 71152 As documented in Inspection Reports 05000395/2019001, 05000395/2019010, 05000395/2019004, from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019, the NRC issued three Severity Level (SL) IV Traditional Enforcement Violations in the area of impeding regulatory process.
The NRC did not conduct IP 92723, Follow-Up to Inspection for Three or More Severity Level IV Traditional Enforcement Violations in the Same Area in a 12-Month Period, as a traditional enforcement follow-up inspection. Inspectors determined that the three SL IV violations were not related to each other and therefore would not warrant the follow-up review described in IP 92723. Inspectors determined that V.C. Summer / DESC understands the causes of the multiple SL IV traditional enforcement violations. Also, the inspectors determined V.C. Summer / DESCs corrective actions to address the violations are sufficient.
V.C. Summer / DESC generated a series of condition reports following the NRC's issuance of the SL IV violations. The inspectors determined the licensee entered the violations into their corrective action program in a timely manner. The condition reports (CRs) included, in part, CR-19-01802, CR-19-04499, and CR-19-03444. Additional CRs were generated to capture other observed deficiencies. The CRs contained an assortment of corrective actions to resolve the noncompliance and to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.
The inspectors reviewed the CRs and determined that there were no additional performance deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr.
George Lippard, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
D-302-085
Emergency Feedwater (Nuclear)
Revision 51
D-302-221-1
Service Water Cooling
Revision 33
D-302-222-3
Service Water Cooling, B - Train Outside RB
Revision 6
D-302-222-4
Service Water Cooling, B - Train Cooling to RBCU Loop
Revision 4
Procedures
Operability or Functionality Recommendation Development
SAP 209
Operability Determination Process
Work Orders
1906897
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-20-00767
Drawings
FP1AB-374
Auxiliary Building, EL. 374
Revision 1
FP1AB-388
Auxiliary Building, EL. 388
Revision 2
FP1AB-412
Auxiliary Building, EL. 412
Revision 2
FP1AB-436
Auxiliary Building, EL. 436
Revision 2
FP1AB-463
Auxiliary Building, EL. 463
Revision 1
FP1AB-485
Auxiliary Building, EL. 485
Revision 1
FP1IB-412
Intermediate Building, EL. 412
Revision 3
FP1SWPH-425
Service Water Pump House, EL. 425
Revision 1
FP1SWPH-436
Service Water Pump House, EL. 436
Revision 3
FP1TB-412
Turbine Building, EL. 412
Revision 1
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
FP1TB-436
Turbine Building, EL. 436
Revision 2
Procedures
Fire Prevention
Revision 5
Fire Protection (FP)
Revision 2
Work Orders
1811413-001
May 29,
2019
1816352-001
September
10, 2019
71111.11Q Corrective Action
Documents
CR-20-00513
CR-20-00937
Procedures
Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel Failure
Revision 4
ARP-001
Panel XCP-624, Annunciator Point 1-6, AMSAC General
Warning
Revision 7
STP-125.013B
Diesel Generator B Semiannual Operability Test
Revision 1
Work Orders
1918041
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-19-01499
CR-19-01874
CR-19-01926
CR-20-00665
CR-20-00667
CR-20-00694
CR-20-00713
CR-20-00789
CR-20-00796
CR-19-02601
CR-19-03866
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-19-03945
CR-19-04201
CR-20-00490
Miscellaneous
MRule Expert Panel (MREP) Agenda 20200220
MRule Evaluation for CR-19-04154
MRule Evaluation for CR-20-00046
Procedures
MMP-460.038
Inspection, Cleaning and Lubrication of Reactor Building
Cooling Units XAA0001A/B and XAA0002A/B
Revision 1,
Change A
OAP-106.1
Operating Rounds
Revision 17
Revision 2
SOP-306
Revision 19
STP-116.001
Reactor Building Cooling Unit Functional and Iodine
Removal Removal System Test
Revision 7
Work Orders
1806817
1806949
20586
2003059
1912424
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-19-03361
CR-20-00727
CR-20-00682
CR-20-00690
Procedures
ICP-500.026
Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) Maintenance and
Troubleshooting Procedure
Revision 2,
Change C
MMP-300.015
Turbine Maintenance, Emergency Feedwater Pump
Revision 19
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
TPP0008
OAP-114.1
Protected Equipment Program
Revision 2
STP-345.037
Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master
Relay Test Train A
Revision 19
Work Orders
1914629-005
1918095
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-19-02358
CR-20-00131
CR-20-00162
CR-19-04191
CR-19-04308
CR-20-00329
CR-20-00082
CR-19-03018
CR-20-00665
CR-19-01499
CR-18-01093
CR-20-00830
Miscellaneous
IB-6
HVAC Chilled Water System
Revision 19
Procedures
GOP-2
Plant Startup and Heatup (Mode 5 to 3)
Revision 18
OAP-106.3
Locked Valve Program
Revision 7H
Plant Issue Management
Revision 0
SOP-201
Main Steam System
Revision
15G
STP-115.001
Penetration Isolation Verification
Revision 15
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
STP-135.001
Post Accident Monitoring Instruments Channel Check
Revision 11
STP-345.045B
ITM00499B, RCS Core Subcooling Margin Monitor
Calibration B Train
Revision 2
Work Orders
163122
1906654
1908952
1911675
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-19-04154
CR-20-00046
CR-20-00743
CR-20-00744
CR-20-00820
CR-20-00826
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-20-00470
Procedures
Safety Injection Termination
Revision 20
GTP-215
Troubleshooting Plan Development
Revision 3
OAP-100.5
Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant
Equipment
Revision 4
SOP-102
Chemical and Volume Control System
Revision 25A
SOP-211
Revision 14
STP-125.002A
Diesel Generator A Operability Test
Revision 2
Work Orders
2000604
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2000609
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-20-00147
CR-20-01115
Drawings
D-302-781
Steam Generator Blowdown
Revision 31
Procedures
GTP-302
Inservice Testing of Valves Fourth Ten Year Interval
Revision 17
MTP-E-
50733.003B
EDG Train B: Baseline Phase Rotation Testing
Revision 0,
Change B
SOP-212
Steam Generator Blowdown
Revision 18
STP-123.003B
Train B Service Water System Valve Operability Test
Revision 8
STP-125.002B
Diesel Generator B Operability Test
Revision 3
STP-136.001
Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Operability Test
Revision 9
STP-220.07
Backup Air Supply Check Valve Test for Emergency
Feedwater Valves
Revision 7
STP-302.002
Delta T-TAVG Protection Loop B Operational Test Critical
Surveillance Test Category I
Revision 13,
Change K
Work Orders
1916665
1916875, Steps
001 and 002
1918065-001
2/19/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-19-03437
CR-19-03444
CR-19-01287
CR-19-01802
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-19-04328
CR-19-04499
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-20-00638
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-19-02144
CR-19-04201
Procedures
MMP-406.038
Inspection, Cleaning and Lubrication of Reactor Building
Cooling Units XAA0001A/B and XAA0002A/B
Revision 1,
Change A
STP-114.002
Operational Leakage Calculation
Revision 12
STP-116.001
Reactor Building Cooling Unit Functional and Iodine
Removal System Test
Revision 7