IR 05000395/2020001

Integrated Inspection Report 05000395/2020001

ML20122A256
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	05/01/2020
From:	Randy Musser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3
To:	Stoddard D Dominion Energy South Carolina
References
IR 2020001
Download: ML20122A256 (20)

Text

May 1, 2020

SUBJECT:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2020001

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. On April 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. George Lippard, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Randall A. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000395 License No. NPF-12

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000395 License Number: NPF-12 Report Number: 05000395/2020001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0034 Licensee: Dominion Energy South Carolina (DESC)

Facility: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Location: Jenkinsville, SC Inspection Dates: January 01, 2020 to March 31, 2020 Inspectors: J. Dolecki, Senior Resident Inspector E. Hilton, Resident Inspector K. McCurry, Acting Resident Inspector T. Nazario Cruz, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Randall A. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate procedures and actions following safety-related charging pump failure to start Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [P.2] - 71111.19 Systems NCV 05000395/2020001-01 Evaluation Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and including appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria. Specifically, after charging pump 'A' failed to manually start due to a degraded main control switch on November 18, 2019, safety-related Operations Administrative Procedure (OAP)-100.5, Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Equipment, did not provide adequate instructions for operators to troubleshoot the issue and repair the switch prior to charging pump 'A' failing to start again on January 7, 2020.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000395/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for V.C. 71153 Closed Summer Nuclear Station,

Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.4.

LER 05000395/2019-001-01 LER 2019-001-01 for V.C. 71153 Closed Summer Nuclear Station,

Unit 1, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.4.6.1.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.

Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. From January 1 - March 19, 2020, the inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week during which they conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, and observed risk significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to reschedule the inspection to a later date.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Emergency diesel generator (EDG) 'B' prior to a monthly surveillance run on January 14, 2020

(2) Service water train 'B' in preparation for an upcoming permanent modification on February 21, 2020

(3) Emergency feedwater train 'A' with work ongoing on emergency feedwater train 'B' on March 16, 2020

(4) Residual heat removal train 'A' on March 17, 2020

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Intermediate Building (IB) Battery Charger Room A/B (412'), Fire Zone IB05, on February 24, 2020

(2) Turbine Building General Area, all elevations, Fire Zone TB01, on January 27, 2020

(3) Service Water Pump House (SWPH) Electrical Equipment Room A, Fire Zone SWPH01, on February 24, 2020

(4) SWPH Service Water Pump Area (436') / Valve Pit Room (425'), Fire Zone SWPH05, on February 24, 2020

(5) IB General Area, all elevations, Fire Zone IB25, on March 11, 2020

(6) Auxiliary Building General Area, all elevations, Fire Area AB01, on March 26, 2020

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed operations personnel during the semiannual 'B' EDG operability test after a test deficiency was identified related to chart recorder frequency readings on February 19, 2020; during maintenance test run of the 'A' EDG after issues were identified with the service water flow indications and jacket water temperature on March 6, 2020; and during response to failed pressure transmitter and associated abnormal operating procedure entry on March 26, 2020.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed a simulator evaluation that included a failed closed pressurizer block valve, tripped charging pump, tripped main condenser vacuum pump, degrading main condenser vacuum, failure of the reactor trip system, and an unisolable main steam line break on January 27, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) 'A' EDG during a series of preventative maintenance and corrective action activities.

(2) Chemical and volume control system for maintenance rule-related analyses and the licensees system plant health review.

(3) Reactor building cooling units for review of past and upcoming maintenance activities to correct vibrational concerns, and for maintenance rule-related analyses and the licensees system plant health review.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;

(1) Yellow risk during scheduled maintenance on the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump on January 13, 2020

(2) Yellow risk during solid state protection system actuation logic and relay test on February 7, 2020

(3) Elevated risk during scheduled maintenance activities on the 'B' EDG during week of March 9, 2020

(4) Emergent work/elevated risk following loss of the digital rod position indication system on March 5, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Condition Report (CR)-20-00131 - Chiller 'B' due to leak on January 15, 2020

(2) CR-19-04308 - Core subcooling margin monitor due to 'B' train calibration failure and associated compensatory actions on February 13, 2020

(3) CR-20-00665 - 'A' EDG due to air receiver tanks reduced wall thicknesses on March 11, 2020

(4) CR-19-04191 - Containment integrity due to nitrogen purge isolation valves left open on February 11, 2020

(5) CR-20-00830 - 'B' Chiller due to inadvertent oil sample on March 16, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) SOP-102, "Chemical and Volume Control System" - 'A' charging pump following replacement of main control room switch on January 8, 2020

(2) STP-125.002A, "Diesel Generator A Operability Test" - 'A' EDG following series of maintenance activities on March 7, 2020

(3) STP-125.002B, "Diesel Generator A Operability Test" - 'B' EDG following series of maintenance activities of March 13, 2020

(4) SOP-211, "Emergency Feedwater System" - 'B' emergency feedwater pump following electrical preventative maintenance on March 16, 2020

(5) ICP-500.019, "NI Power Range and Miscellaneous Drawers Alignment for Troubleshooting / Maintenance" - Audio count rate channel INI00034 following reinstall and calibration on February 26, 2020

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) STP-125.002B, "Diesel Generator B Operability Test," on January 14, 2020

(2) STP-123.003B, "Train B Service Water System Valve Operability Test," on January 17, 2020

(3) STP-136.001, "Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Operability Test," on February 25, 2020

(4) STP-220.07, "Backup Air Supply Check Valve Test for Emergency Feedwater Valves," on February 19, 2020

(5) STP 302.002, "Delta T-T avg Protection Loop B Operational Test," on March 17, 2020

(6) MTP-E-50733.003B, "EDG Train B: Baseline Phase Rotation Testing," on March 13, 2020

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensee staff during simulator-based requalification evolution training involving a faulted steam generator and adverse containment on January 22,

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) CR-19-01802, CR-19-04499, CR-19-03444 - Licensee corrective actions from three Severity Level IV traditional enforcement violations in past 12-month period

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000395/2019-001-01, Virgil C. Summer, Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19105B284). The inspectors reviewed the updated LER submittal. The inspectors determined that no additional performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements occurred. The previous LER submittal was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000395/2019002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19225D219). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000395/2019001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19134A300) under the Inspection Results Section. This LER is closed.

(2) LER 2019-002-00 for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.4 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML19283B209). The inspectors determined that no performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements occurred. This LER was submitted and subsequently retracted by licensee correspondence titled "Cancelation of LER 2019-002-00 for V.C.

Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.4," dated January 23, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML20024F545). For tracking purposes this LER is considered closed.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate procedures and actions following safety-related charging pump failure to start Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [P.2] - 71111.19 Systems NCV 05000395/2020001-01 Evaluation Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and including appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria. Specifically, after charging pump 'A' failed to manually start due to a degraded main control switch on November 18, 2019, safety-related Operations Administrative Procedure (OAP)-100.5, Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Equipment, did not provide adequate instructions for operators to troubleshoot the issue and repair the switch prior to charging pump 'A' failing to start again on January 7, 2020.

Description:

The safety-related charging pumps are relied on to mitigate an accident. When safety injection (SI) logic conditions are actuated, the charging pumps automatically start to provide high head SI into the reactor coolant system (RCS). Also, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) require the manual start of a charging pump during certain accident conditions. For instance, operators are instructed to manually start a charging pump following an SI termination when RCS temperature or pressurizer level cannot be maintained, for cold leg recirculation in response to inadequate core cooling, and during a transfer to hot leg recirculation.

On November 18, 2019, during the performance of a surveillance test coming out of a forced outage in accordance with system operating procedure (SOP)-102, "Chemical and Volume Control System," the 'A' charging pump failed to start after the main control board (MCB)manual switch was taken to start. The licensee entered OAP-100.5, Section 8.4, Equipment Start Failures or any 7.2 kV and 480-volt breaker malfunction. Electrical maintenance personnel were sent to investigate the breaker. As stated in CR-19-04154, electricians determined that there were no issues with breaker alignment and power was available. The electricians then requested that operations attempt to manually start the pump again. The pump started successfully. On January 7, 2020, during the performance of a post-maintenance test start in accordance with SOP-102, the 'A' charging pump failed to start after the MCB manual switch was taken to start. The licensee again entered OAP-100.5 to investigate the equipment start failure. Electrical maintenance personnel investigated the breaker and manual switch and identified that the manual start contacts on the MCB switch did not provide consistent continuity. The 'A' charging pump was declared inoperable.

Following equipment start failures, operators enter OAP-100.5 Section 8.4. This section, in part, provides the following direction:

• If possible, sequester the breaker and switch.

• If not possible, document the basis in a condition report (CR) and contact electrical maintenance to initiate a work order and a troubleshooting plan when necessary.

• If applicable, declare the component inoperable and generate a Removal &

Restoration (R&R) report.

However, on November 18, 2019, the operators did not troubleshoot the MCB switch, document the basis for not doing so in a CR, initiate a work order to take additional actions, or generate a R&R. Furthermore, although not directed in OAP-100.5, a second manual start of the 'A' charging pump was performed.

OAP-100.5 does not provide adequate direction to operators following the failure to start of a safety-related SSC to appropriately determine whether sufficient troubleshooting has been satisfactorily accomplished before returning the SSC to service. Additionally, OAP-100.5 does not provide direction to operators to restart safety-related equipment if an investigation of the failure does not determine a cause. Specifically, OAP-100.5 does not provide sufficient procedural guidance to ensure a degraded condition does not exist and that all causes to equipment failure are addressed prior to starting safety-related equipment.

Corrective Actions: Following the 'A' charging pump failure to start on November 18, 2019, the licensee generated CR-19-04154. Following the 'A' charging pump failure to start on January 7, 2020, the licensee generated CR-20-00046, declared the pump inoperable, initiated a work order, and replaced the MCB switch prior to restarting the 'A' charging pump and declaring the pump operable. The licensee correlated CR-19-04154 and CR-20-00046, with actions driven via changes to CR-19-04154. Within CR-19-04154, the licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined the cause of the start failure as degradation of the cover plate and start contact on the MCB switch. Also, the licensee identified similar switches to evaluate through an extent of condition and initiated actions for one-time replacement of the switch and created an action to enhance the guidance in OAP-100.5.

Corrective Action References: CR-19-04154, CR-20-00046, and CR-20-00470

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined OAP-100.5, a safety-related procedure containing activities affecting quality, did not prescribe instructions appropriate to the circumstances with quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors also used examples in IMC 0612, Appendix E, effective January 1, 2020, to determine whether the performance deficiency was more than minor. Similar to Example 4.c, the performance deficiency was more than minor because the

'A' charging pump was returned to service and due to the inadequate troubleshooting performed, the licensee did not identify the MCB manual switch had a degraded cover plate and corroded contacts which could have impacted the charging pump's ability to perform its safety function in a design basis event.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Specifically, using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because even though the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating component, the system maintained its probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) functionality because the 'A' charging pump never lost its automatic start capability and the 'C' charging pump could still be relied on to feed the A-train through manual action.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the condition in the field to determine the cause of the start failure before returning the pump to service. In addition, the condition report generated was not appropriately screened to reflect the safety significance of this issue.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states in part activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

Contrary to the above, the licensee did not prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances, including appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities had been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the instructions given in OAP 100.5, Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Equipment, were not appropriate for troubleshooting the equipment failure of charging pump A which failed to manually start on November 18, 2019, and then subsequently on January 7, 2020.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Review of licensee corrective actions as a result of three Severity 71152 Level IV traditional enforcement violations in past 12-month period As documented in Inspection Reports 05000395/2019001, 05000395/2019010, 05000395/2019004, from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019, the NRC issued three Severity Level (SL) IV Traditional Enforcement Violations in the area of impeding regulatory process.

The NRC did not conduct IP 92723, Follow-Up to Inspection for Three or More Severity Level IV Traditional Enforcement Violations in the Same Area in a 12-Month Period, as a traditional enforcement follow-up inspection. Inspectors determined that the three SL IV violations were not related to each other and therefore would not warrant the follow-up review described in IP 92723. Inspectors determined that V.C. Summer / DESC understands the causes of the multiple SL IV traditional enforcement violations. Also, the inspectors determined V.C. Summer / DESCs corrective actions to address the violations are sufficient.

V.C. Summer / DESC generated a series of condition reports following the NRC's issuance of the SL IV violations. The inspectors determined the licensee entered the violations into their corrective action program in a timely manner. The condition reports (CRs) included, in part, CR-19-01802, CR-19-04499, and CR-19-03444. Additional CRs were generated to capture other observed deficiencies. The CRs contained an assortment of corrective actions to resolve the noncompliance and to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.

The inspectors reviewed the CRs and determined that there were no additional performance deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On April 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr.

George Lippard, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.04 Drawings D-302-085 Emergency Feedwater (Nuclear) Revision 51

D-302-221-1 Service Water Cooling Revision 33

D-302-222-3 Service Water Cooling, B - Train Outside RB Revision 6

D-302-222-4 Service Water Cooling, B - Train Cooling to RBCU Loop Revision 4

Procedures ES-120 Operability or Functionality Recommendation Development

SAP 209 Operability Determination Process

Work Orders 1906897

71111.05 Corrective Action CR-20-00767

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings FP1AB-374 Auxiliary Building, EL. 374 Revision 1

FP1AB-388 Auxiliary Building, EL. 388 Revision 2

FP1AB-412 Auxiliary Building, EL. 412 Revision 2

FP1AB-436 Auxiliary Building, EL. 436 Revision 2

FP1AB-463 Auxiliary Building, EL. 463 Revision 1

FP1AB-485 Auxiliary Building, EL. 485 Revision 1

FP1IB-412 Intermediate Building, EL. 412 Revision 3

FP1SWPH-425 Service Water Pump House, EL. 425 Revision 1

FP1SWPH-436 Service Water Pump House, EL. 436 Revision 3

FP1TB-412 Turbine Building, EL. 412 Revision 1

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

FP1TB-436 Turbine Building, EL. 436 Revision 2

Procedures FPP-022 Fire Prevention Revision 5

NFPA 805 Fire Protection (FP) Revision 2

Work Orders 1811413-001 May 29,

2019

1816352-001 September

10, 2019

71111.11Q Corrective Action CR-20-00513

Documents CR-20-00937

Procedures AOP-401.7 Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel Failure Revision 4

ARP-001 Panel XCP-624, Annunciator Point 1-6, AMSAC General Revision 7

Warning

STP-125.013B Diesel Generator B Semiannual Operability Test Revision 1

Work Orders 1918041

71111.12 Corrective Action CR-19-01499

Documents CR-19-01874

CR-19-01926

CR-20-00665

CR-20-00667

CR-20-00694

CR-20-00713

CR-20-00789

CR-20-00796

CR-19-02601

CR-19-03866

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CR-19-03945

CR-19-04201

CR-20-00490

Miscellaneous MRule Expert Panel (MREP) Agenda 20200220

MRule Evaluation for CR-19-04154

MRule Evaluation for CR-20-00046

Procedures MMP-460.038 Inspection, Cleaning and Lubrication of Reactor Building Revision 1,

Cooling Units XAA0001A/B and XAA0002A/B Change A

OAP-106.1 Operating Rounds Revision 17

SAP-0157 Maintenance Rule Program Revision 2

SOP-306 Emergency Diesel Generator Revision 19

STP-116.001 Reactor Building Cooling Unit Functional and Iodine Revision 7

Removal Removal System Test

Work Orders 1806817

1806949

20586

2003059

1912424

71111.13 Corrective Action CR-19-03361

Documents CR-20-00727

CR-20-00682

CR-20-00690

Procedures ICP-500.026 Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) Maintenance and Revision 2,

Troubleshooting Procedure Change C

MMP-300.015 Turbine Maintenance, Emergency Feedwater Pump Revision 19

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

TPP0008

OAP-114.1 Protected Equipment Program Revision 2

STP-345.037 Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Revision 19

Relay Test Train A

Work Orders 1914629-005

1918095

71111.15 Corrective Action CR-19-02358

Documents CR-20-00131

CR-20-00162

CR-19-04191

CR-19-04308

CR-20-00329

CR-20-00082

CR-19-03018

CR-20-00665

CR-19-01499

CR-18-01093

CR-20-00830

Miscellaneous IB-6 HVAC Chilled Water System Revision 19

Procedures GOP-2 Plant Startup and Heatup (Mode 5 to 3) Revision 18

OAP-106.3 Locked Valve Program Revision 7H

SAP-1800 Plant Issue Management Revision 0

SOP-201 Main Steam System Revision

15G

STP-115.001 Penetration Isolation Verification Revision 15

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

STP-135.001 Post Accident Monitoring Instruments Channel Check Revision 11

STP-345.045B ITM00499B, RCS Core Subcooling Margin Monitor Revision 2

Calibration B Train

Work Orders 163122

1906654

1908952

1911675

71111.19 Corrective Action CR-19-04154

Documents CR-20-00046

CR-20-00743

CR-20-00744

CR-20-00820

CR-20-00826

Corrective Action CR-20-00470

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Procedures EOP-1.2 Safety Injection Termination Revision 20

GTP-215 Troubleshooting Plan Development Revision 3

OAP-100.5 Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Revision 4

Equipment

SOP-102 Chemical and Volume Control System Revision 25A

SOP-211 Emergency Feedwater System Revision 14

STP-125.002A Diesel Generator A Operability Test Revision 2

Work Orders 2000604

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2000609

71111.22 Corrective Action CR-20-00147

Documents CR-20-01115

Drawings D-302-781 Steam Generator Blowdown Revision 31

Procedures GTP-302 Inservice Testing of Valves Fourth Ten Year Interval Revision 17

MTP-E- EDG Train B: Baseline Phase Rotation Testing Revision 0,

50733.003B Change B

SOP-212 Steam Generator Blowdown Revision 18

STP-123.003B Train B Service Water System Valve Operability Test Revision 8

STP-125.002B Diesel Generator B Operability Test Revision 3

STP-136.001 Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Operability Test Revision 9

STP-220.07 Backup Air Supply Check Valve Test for Emergency Revision 7

Feedwater Valves

STP-302.002 Delta T-TAVG Protection Loop B Operational Test Critical Revision 13,

Surveillance Test Category I Change K

Work Orders 1916665

1916875, Steps

001 and 002

1918065-001 02/19/2020

71152 Corrective Action

Documents CR-19-03437

CR-19-03444

CR-19-01287

CR-19-01802

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CR-19-04328

CR-19-04499

Corrective Action CR-20-00638

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

71153 Corrective Action CR-19-02144

Documents

CR-19-04201

Procedures MMP-406.038 Inspection, Cleaning and Lubrication of Reactor Building Revision 1,

Cooling Units XAA0001A/B and XAA0002A/B Change A

STP-114.002 Operational Leakage Calculation Revision 12

STP-116.001 Reactor Building Cooling Unit Functional and Iodine Revision 7

Removal System Test

17