IR 05000395/1998010

Insp Rept 50-395/98-10 on 981122-990122.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20203G441
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	02/01/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203G413	List: IR 05000395/1998010 ML20203G409
References
50-395-98-10, NUDOCS 9902190304
Download: ML20203G441 (13)

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i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11

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Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 ,

Report No.: 50-395/98-10 Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) -

i Facility: V. C. Summer Nuclear Station ,

Location: P. O. Box 88 '

Jenkinsville, SC 20065 Dates: November 22,1998 - January 2,1999

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Inspectors: K. O'Donohue, Acting Senior Resident inspector M. King, Resident inspector (In-Training)

Approved by: R. C. Haag, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

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9902190304 990201 PDR ADOCK 05000395 G PDR

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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V. C. Summer Nuclear Station

' NRC Inspection Report No. 50 395/98-10 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. . The report covers a six week period of resident inspectio l Operations i i

• Observed control room activities were conducted satisfactorily and in accordance with !

- approved procedures and Technical Specifications. The inspectors noted consistent use of annunciator response procedures, proper communication practices, and operator -

attentiveness. Access control kept the control room free from congestion and unnecessary distractions (Section 04.1).

Maintenance  !

• Component cooling water pump and system maintenance, direct current ground alarm troubleshooting, and surveillance testing of the reactor vessel level indicator system was professional and thorough. All work was performed with the work package present and actively referenced. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks (Section M1.1).

• The maintenance plan for replacement of the N-44 Power Range Drawer B High Voltage Power Supply and replacement of the associated drawer gain potentiometer was detailed and well organized. Work performed under these activities, including post maintenance testing was professional and thorough. All post maintenance testing was completed in accordance with the procedures and all acceptance criteria were met !

(Section M1.2). l l

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Enoineerina

• Testing under the feedwater flow rate and temperature normalization program was :

performed satisfactorily and in accordance with approved procedures. The system !

engineer who conducted the surveillance tests and maintained the records demonstrated a good level of knowledge (Section E1.1).

Plant Sucoort

'* Several deficiencies, including configuration control issues, were identified during the performance of the chemistry post accident sample system sample drill and monthly ;

comparison sampling. These deficiencies were captured by condition evaluation reports ;

and the licensee drill critique process for resolution (Section R1.2).

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• An observed source check of personnel contamination monitors at the radiological control area exit were properly conducted and documented (Section R2.1). i l

• Licensee staff performance during the emergency drill was good. Operator response in the simulator was good. Operators exhibited proper procedure adherence and three t

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-way communications. Backup Emergency Operations Facility manning and activation were timely (Section P.4.1).

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The security fence, isolation zone fence, motion detection equipment, and security l cameras were observed to be in good condition during a walkdown of the security j

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L J l: i l- J Report Details  !

Summary of Plant Status -

l L , Unit 1 began this inspection period at approximately 100 percent power.; On December 4, .

l - power was reduced to 40 percent for planned secondary plant maintenance activities. The unit 1

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l- was returned to approximately 100 percent power on December 7. On December 22, at 4:00 a.m., power was reduced to 94 percent for repair of the D Feedwater Booster Pump which had an increasing vibration trend. The repair was completed and power was returned to 100 percent power at 5:15 p.m. the same day and remained there throughout the remainder of the

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Linspection perio l l 1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations l

, O1.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. fr. general, the conduct of. operations was professional and safety-conscious. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections belo .2 : Unit Power Reduction and Turbine' Condenser Activities (71707)

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On December'4, at approximately 9:35 p.m., the licensee initiated a power reduction to allow for corrective and preventive maintenance activities on selected secondary. -

systems. The primary objective for the planned power reduction to 40 percent was to identify and plug any leaking turbine main condenser tubes. Other significant activities

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Included maintenance on the B Main Feedwater Pump, C Circulating Water Pump, and the 1 A High Pressure Feedwater Heater Level Controller. The pre-job planning, pre-job ' l briefs, material staging and adequate personnel staffing aided the operators in l successful changes in plant power. The plant was returned to 100 percent power at i 6:00 p.m. on December 7, as scheduled. The inspectors noted a high level of attention  !

to detail by the operators during power changes. The inspectors reviewed a portion of j the associated procedures and documentation of the maintenance activities. No j i concerns were identified. The inspectors also toured the plant after maintenance )

activities were completed and noted that the maintenance work areas were clean and l housekeeping conditions were goo l l

04- Operator Knowledge and Performance  !

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O4.1 : Control Room Performance

. a.- Inspection Scooe (71707)

, ' The inspectors conducted inspections in the following' areas: ' control room staffing, access control, operator behavior (fitness for duty), operator adherence to procedures,

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technical specifications (TS) and limiting condition for operations, clearances, and shift

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_ _ Observations and Findinas The inspectors conducted daily inspections of control room activities. The requirements of Station Administrative Procedure (SAP)-200," Conduct of Operations," Revision 7, which established the required shift manning, shift relief routines and control of access and activities in the control room were reviewed. The inspectors verified that:

. The control room staffing met the TS requirements,

. Access control to the control room was well maintained, keeping the area free from congestion and unnecessary distractions,

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Control room communications were professional, using proper three-way repeat !

back techniques l

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. Control room operators were alert and attentive to plant conditions; and acknowledged and responded to control roem alarms by referring to the j Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs), and  ;

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Verbal turnover meetings were conducted in an orderly manner and properly ;

discussed existing plant conditions and anticipated plant evolution When questioned by inspectors about plant conditions the operators demonstrated a !

good level of knowledge (e.g., N-44 failure response, as disc med in Section M 1.2). I Shift reliefs were accomplished in an orderly manner betwou operators. Shift personnel were informed of existing plant status and condit!ons. A review of randomly selected relief checklists indicated that the applicable checklists were properly completed. The inspectors noted that during some shift meetings, the specific TS action

. statements and the time entered or remaining in relation to the out-of-service equipment

_ were discussed. The discussion of activo TS action statements was an effective means of informing all personnel in attendance (including non-operations personnel) of current plant condition ;

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The inspectors review of clearances verified that they had been implemented in -

accordance with procedural requirements of SAP-201, " Danger Tagging," Revision ' Conclusigrig

Observed control room activities were conducted satisfactorily and in accordance with

approved procedures and Technical Specifications. The inspectors noted consistent use of annunciator response procedures, proper communication practices and operator j attentiveness. Access control kept the control room free from congestion and

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11. Maintenarce

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M1- Conduct of Maintenance  !

M1.1 Obsehation of Work Activities j

. Invoection Scope (61726. 62707)

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- The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance and surveillance testing f activitie '

• STP-399.008 Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (RVLIS) Train A )

Calibration, Revision 6 (18-month calibrations)

. . MWR 9817653 DC System Train X Ground Trouble Alarm Locked in on Main i Control Board . .

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B Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump Motor inspection and '

Cleaning

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Lubrication Check for B CCW Pump

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. MWR 9816238 Calibrate ITS07064 (CCW B Heat Exchanger Outlet Cooling Water Temperature Switch) ,

. STP-360.036 ' RM-A3 Gaseous Channel Operationa! Test, Revision 6A l

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= MWR 9817629 Pressurizer Safety Valve Acoustic Monitor Troubleshooting, !

Calibration, and Alarm Setpoint Change per NCN 98-1139 ' i l Observations and Findinos l The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and thorotgh. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned task The inspectors frequantly observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job - i progress. Quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedur When applicable, the appropnate radiation control measures were in plac , Conclusions Component cooling water pump and system maintenance, direct current ground alarm troubleshooting, and surveillance testing of the reactor vessel level indicator system i were professional and thorough. All work was performed with the work package present >

and actively referenced. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their  ;

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. assigned task M1.2 Observation of Power Ranoe Drawer N-44 Repair

, Inspection Scope (61726. 62707)

The inspectors observed the maintenance and surveillance activities conducted following the licensee's discovery of a high-pitched noise coming from the N-44 Power Range Drawer B High Voltage Power Suppl . . _ _

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-- Observations and Findinos }

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r On December 12, the inspectors observed the replacement of the N-44 Power Range i Drawer B High Voltage Power Supply and replacement of the associated drawer gain l

- potentiometer. A decision was made to replace the power supply following the !

licensee's discovery of a high-pitched noise. The licensee also performed a scheduled l

- replacement of the drawer gain potentiometer. The inspectors reviewed the  !

troubleshooting and maintenance plan that was developed and conducted unde t Maintenance Work Request MWR 9817503. The maintenance plan was detailed and i well organized. The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be !

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Surveillance Test Procedurei (STP)-310.008, "NIS Power Range N-44 Calibration,"

Revision 8, Instrumentation Control Procedure (ICP)-500.019, " Nuclear Instrument 3 Pcwer Range and Miscellaneous Drawer Alignment and Troubleshooting," Revision 2, :

and STP-302.041, "NIS Power Range N-44 Operational Test," Revision 9, were ,

implemented and properly documented by the Instrumentation and Control (l&C) !

- technicians. Proper self-checking and use of peer checks were observed. The ' ;

. technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. Soldering ,

was properly performed during installation of the new gain potentiometer despite i cramped conditions in the N-44 drawer. The inspectors noted good communication between maintenance and operations personnel in that control room personnel were

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notified prior to initiation of alarms caused by the maintenance activity. ' ;

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The inspectors observed post maintenance testing conducted under STP-102.002, "NIS I 4 Power Range Heat Balance," Revision 8, STP-108.001," Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio,"

. Revision 6, and STP 133.001," Axial Flux Difference Calculation," Revision 5. All testing ' was completed in acmrdance with the procedures and all acceptance criteria were met.

] .The inspectors reviewed the associated Removal and Restoration documentation which -

listed the correct Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirements for N-44 being out of service. The inspectors verified that control room log books properly documented this activity. The inspectors questioned the control room operators concerning potential

~; operational effects if N-44 had failed during this activity. The operators were knowledgeable of these effects and were aware of the correct procedures for response i i

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' Conclusions i

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The maintenance plan for replacement of the N-44 Power Range Drawer B High.

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Voltage Power Supply and replacement of the associated drawer gain potentiometer

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was detailed and well organized. The work performed under these activities including post maintenance testing was professional and thorough. All post maintenance testing was completed in accordance with the procedures and all acceptance criteria were met.

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lik Engineering  !

E1 ~ Conduct of Engineering j l

E Feedwater Flow Rate and Temperature Normalization Proaram )

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- Inspection Scoos (376S1) '

The inspectors reviewed the feedwater flow rate and temperature normalization program i and discussed the normalization method and documentation with the responsible system engineer and reactor engineering management to determine if the activities were being conducted in accordance with procedures, regulatory requirements and -

licensee commitment b. ' Observations and Findinas The feedwater flow rate and temperature normalization program provided a method by

. which the values for feedwater flow and feedwater temperatures could be adjusted

~ (normalized) to within the calorimetric computer program using the leading edge flow meter (LEFM). The LEFM's highly accurate ultrasonic system measures both feedwater flow rate and temperature more accurately than the plant's normal flow venturis or resistance temperature device (RTD) elements. The program is conducted under Engineering Services Procedure (ES)-560.120, "Feedwater Flow Rate and Temperature Normalization Surveillance," Revision 2. .This procedure is performed monthly when

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plant power is greater than or equal to 95 percent (normally performed at 100 percent power).-

The inspectors reviewed previous monthly surveillance normalization constant worksheets that had been completed since the LEFM system was made operationalin

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August 1997. The inspectors also reviewed surveillance data collected after the power ascension on December 7 at 95 percent and December 9 at 100 percent power. The

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data was properly obtained, reviewed and accepted for use. The inspectors noted that the data collected at 95 percent power required a Technical Work Record (TWR WB13366) to evaluate the LEFM data due to slight unexpected differences in the

" Estimated Fluid Temperature" display value. Licensee discussions with the vendor

' determined the LEFM was operating as expected and the display difference was due to ea slightly lower feedwater pressure which is normal when operating at 95 percent powe The licensee stated that a procedure change to ES-560.120 will be processed to explain this expected variation if tests are performed at other than 100 percent power. The l - inspectors noted that the control room shift supervisor and control room operators were properly informed of the results prior to making any computer adjustments that would l affect control room indication.

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issues.1The Y2K issue had been investigated by the LEFM vendor and it was

determined that no hardware problems existed and that no Y2K effects on flow or j temperature measurements would occur. A minor problem was identified with the date j

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output if a manual year change is made after the year 2000. The licensee indicated that

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l the new software to correct this minor problem is targeted to be installed by the end of ;

January 199 The system engineer was very knowledgeable of the procedures, equipment, and LEFM program. The inspectors verified he was maintaining the required data. No discrepancies were identified and all acceptance criteria was met for the most recent i

. surveillance activitie I Conclusions Testing under the feedwater flow rate and temperature normalization program was performed satisfactorily and in accordance with approved procedures. The system l engineer who conducted the surveillance tests and maintained the records l

demonstrated a good level of knowledg l

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

E (Open) Unresolved item (URI) 50-395/98006-01: licensee controls of steam propagation barriers. NRC inspection Report 50-395/98-09 which was issued on December 21,1998, documented the staff's position on controlling steam propagation barriers (SPB) per TIA-98-004, " Lack of Allowed Outage Time Guidance for Inoperable

. Hazard Protection Equipment," which was an enclosure to the report. The licensee revised Fire Protection Procedure (FPP)-025, " Fire Containment," Revision 3, to incorporate additional guidance requirements for opening SPBs. This remains an open URI pending further NRC revie [V. Plant SUDDort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R General Comments (71750)

The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of tours and observation of maintenance activities and found them to be acceptabl ;

R1.2 Post Accident Samolina System Drill and Operation Insoection Scope (71750)

The inspectors observed the Post Accident Sample System (PASS) Drill Scenario and the monthly operation of the Nuclear Sample System for comparison of the PASS and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) grab sample analysi Observations and Findinas I On December 16, the inspectors observed the 1998 Chemistry PASS Drill Scenari The drill was performed in accordance with the requirements of EP-100, " Radiation Emergency Plan," Revision 41, for a semiannual Health Physics Drill to analyze in-plant

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, liquid samples with simulated evaluated radiation levels using the PASS. The objective l of the drill was to train personnel and evaluate the ability of the Chemistry organization to collect a post accident sample under simulated accident conditions. The PASS program is required by TS 6.8.4.d. Section ll.B.3 of NUREG-0737," Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," includes the following guidance:"The combined time l allotted for sampling and analysis should be three hours or less from the time a decision i is made to take a sample." l The drill simulated using the PASS to draw and analyze a post accident sample of the l reactor coolant system (RCS) as directed by the Emergency Director following a ,

simulated large break loss of coolant accident. The drill simulated assembling a team in the Operational Support Center, increased background and dose rates, directing the i sample purge to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) and a PASS system flush to the PR j The drill also simulated taking a sample from the A residual heat removal (RHR) loop under cold leg recirculation conditions and included taking an actual sample of the B ,

RCS loop for the monthly PASS and RCS grab sample comparison. The inspectors  ;

reviewed the drill and the actual sampling procedures including Chemistry Procedures !

l (CP)-920," Operation of the Nuclear Sample System Under Post Accident Conditions,"

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Revision 1 A, and CP-921, " Operation of the Nuclear Sample System for Comparison of the Post Accident Sample System and RCS Grab Sample Analysis," Revidon 1 A. The i inspectors also reviewed the licensee drill comments for the 1997 Pass Drill to compare !

them with the 1998 dril !

t The inspectors noted several deficiencies related to the PASS drill and the monthly ;

sample compariso Having the PASS drill combined with the monthly PASS comparison sampling complicated the actions of the performers which resulted ir. 4 onfusion and ,

contributed to some of the problems noted below. Th4 * . made it difficult to ;

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evaluate whether the sampling and analysis could be w.c;mplished in the three-l hour time period stated in NUREG-0737. The licensee later noted that verifying the three-hour capability was not an objective of this training dril '

• Problems with burned out light bulbs on the sample valve control panel were noted during the drill. The burned out light bulb was replaced with an incorrect i bulb even though it was recognized that it was the wrong bulb. The inspectors ,

I were concerned because replacement of light bulbs with the correct size and l

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type is an important part of configuration contro ;

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consistently use the proper phonetic alphabet. Procedure performance was also challenged by poor three-way communications. The inspectors review of the 1997 drill comments indicated that similar communication issues occurred during that drill. The inspectors observed that test personnel did not pause sufficiently ,

after the repeat back of information to allow the action to be halted if an incorrect ;

repeat back occurre '

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The chemistry room sample hood flag tape was missing. The flag tape is used to verify adequate air flow. A chemistry supervisor administrative letter was posted requiring the air flow verification. Inadequate air flow could result in exposing plant personnel to noxious fumes. The licensee responded immediately by installing a new indicating flag tap :

. The pH buffer tank was empty and had to be refilled during the drill. The inspectors verified that this tank has a monthly preventive maintenance activity which checks the pH buffer expiration date, but that verification of adequate level I in the pH buffer tank was not included in the chec .

The hydrogen sample flask became pressure locked to the quick disconnect fittings in the sample sink making it very difficult to remove. The sampling I procedures did not provide guidance for depressurizing the line. During a later PASS / RCS grab sample comparison on December 22 the hydrogen sample flask becams pressure locked again. The inspectors were concerned that during an actual PASS activity under accident conditions, individuals could receive higher that expected radiation exposures if the hydrogen sample flask became pressure locked and additional time was needed to obtain the sample. The j licensee was reviewing this concer . Unapproved operator aid markings on the PASS sample panel were note The licensee was responsive to issues raised during the drill and generated Condition l Evaluation Report (CER) 98-1138 to address the discrepancies. The inspectors reviewed a draft report of drill critique. It was a through and well-organized in the 14 evaluation areas, with three areas rated poor, six areas rated satisfactory, four areas :

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rated good and one area rated excellent. The licensee critique summary provided recommendations for improvements and concluded that the drill was satisfactory overal The inspectors reviewed the results of the monthly PASS / RCS grab sample comparison taken during the drill and noted that the results were unsatisfactory. The licensee believes this was possibly due to air entrainment in the system and generated l CER 99-0023 to evaluate this item. The inspectors observed another PASS / RCS grab i sample comparison on December 22 and noted that the acceptance crite;ia was me c. Conclusions Several deficiencies, including configuration control issues, were identified during the performance of the chemistry post accident sampla system sample drill and monthly comparison sampling. These deficiencies were captured by condition evaluation reports 1 and the licensee's drill critique process for resolutio j i

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R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment R Source Check of Personnel Contamination Monitors Insoection Scope (71750)

The inspectors observed the source check of personnel contamination monitors at the radiological control area exi Observations and Findings On December 22, the inspectors observed the source check of the Eberline Personnel Contamination Monitors. The source check consisted of an eight-second count of the 33 portal monitor zones udng an Analytics Technetium (Tc-99,0.005 microcurie) source to verify proper alarm response. The observed testing was properly conducted and documented in accordance with SAP-501, " Administrative Controls for Calibration of Health Physics Instrumentation," Revision 5B. The inspectors reviewed the source check sheet and found that all required data was properly recorded. Source check calibration stickers on the access portal monihrs were also verified to be current for all three personnel contamination monitor Conclusions An obseived source check of personnel contamination monitors at the radiological l

control area exit was properly conducted and documente !

P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP  ;

l P4.1 - 1998 Trainina Emeraency Drill  !

l Inspection Scope (71750) l l \

The inspectors observed the 1998 training emergency drill. One of the inspectors participated in the drill in the role that an NRC resident inspector would fill during an

, event in which the licensee activated their emergency response facilitie !

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On December 9, the licensee conducted an announced training emergency drill. There ;

were four drill objectives to demonstrate:  !

. The abili'y of the technical support center (TSC) to accept and maintain functions trse.tferr:d trom the primary emergency operations facility (EOF)

. The ability of the EOF staff to evacuate the primary EOF and activate the backup EOF II d

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- The ability of the EOF staff to establish communications with the TSC from the backup EOF

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The ability of security to establish access control and accountability at the backup EOF The EOF was manned and subsequently evacuated due to a simulated loss of power and fire resulting in the activation of the backup EOF. The inspectors observed the operations response crew in the control room simulator, manning of the EOF, and staffing and activation of the backup EO The inspectors observed operators' response to the scenario. Communication between operators was good, generally applying three-way communications. The operators exhibited adequate procedure use. The inspector noted some difficulty with information transfer to the TSC; however, it was determined to be due to the logistics of the drill a did not indicate that a communication problem would exist for an actual avant. Marmhg of the EOF was timely in that required personnel were available and familiar with e.c;r roles. The backup EOF was setup, manned, and activated with the required staff tind additional support personnel available within one hour and 20 minutes after evacuation of the EOF. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's emergency drill critique and found the participants were appropriately self-critical. All concerns and identified issues were documente Conclusions Licensee staff performance during the emergency drill was good. Operator response in the simulator was good. Operators exhibited proper procedure adherence and three way communications. Backup Emergency Operations Facility manning and activation were timel S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Security Perimeter Walkdown and Plant Tour Observations a. Insoection Scoce (71750)

The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the security perimsier and observed security practices during normal plant tours, b. Observations and Findinas Inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the security perimeter on December The general appearance of the security fence, isolation zone fence and motion detection equipment and cameras appeared to be in good condition. The inspectors identified minor concerns which were discussed with security personne I in reviewing a minor discrepancy with a security lock-down door the inspectors noted that there was no formal trackirg of the number or status of these doors that are out of

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service. Security management was responsive to this observation. Security lock-down doors were installed prior to the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE).

The Summer OSRE report, issued May 30,1997, stated that on-site drills performed during the OSRE demonstrated that pre-OSRE efforts to enhance response force capability by physical modifications were effective. These lock-down doors were part of -

that effort. The inspectors also noted when reviewing the OSRE report that the licensee ,

had indicated they would add a remote lock closure on an unsecured door which was on -

a path a drillintruder had used during the OSRE exerciii,c. The licensee is still !

evaluating this proposed door modification and currently has no scheduled date for '

completion. Although the OSRE report specifically stated that it did not result in any i new commitments, it also stated a continuing concern is that every plant carefully evaluate and validate any changes to its defensive strategy (including out of service -

equipment) which effects the ability to protect public health and safet ,

c. Conclusions j The security fence, isolation zone fence, motion detection equipment, and security cameras were observed to be in good condition during a walkdown of the security perimete V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary j l

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 11,1999. The licensee acknowledged the !

findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie l l

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l l

Licensee i

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F. Bacon, Manager, Chemistry Services  !

L. Blue, Manager, Health Physics  !

S. Byrne, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations  !

R. Clary, Manager, Quality Systems  !

M. Fowlkes, Manager, Operations ,

S. Furstenberg, Manager, Maintenance Services i D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services )

G. Moffatt, Manager, Design Engineering

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L Hipp, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services A. Rice, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience G. Taylor, Vice President, Nuclear Operations R. Waselus, Manager, Systems and Component Engineering ,

R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority l B. Williams, General Manager, Engineering Services

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G. Williams, Associate Manager, Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering .

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations '

IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations l lP 71750: Plant Support Activities i IP 92903: Followup - Engineering :

l l ITEMS DISCUSSED l Discussed i

l 50-395/98006-01 URI Licensee controls of steam propagation barriers l (Section E8.1)

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