IR 05000395/1990027

Insp Rept 50-395/90-27 on 901001-31.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Surveillance Observations,Monthly Maintenance Observation,Operational Safety verification,on- Site follow-up of Written Repts of Nonroutine Events

ML20062G358
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	11/16/1990
From:	Cantrell F, Haag R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20062G354	List: IR 05000395/1990027 ML20062G348
References
50-395-90-27, NUDOCS 9011290141
Download: ML20062G358 (9)

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• *tcq UNITED ST ATIS

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• Do NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMisslON f" p REGION il y

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} ,101 MARIETTA STREET, AT L ANT A, GEORGt A 30323

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Report No.: 50-395/90-27

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Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company

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Columbia, SC 29218

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Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 l

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facility Name: V. C. Sunmer ,

l Inspection Conducted: October 1 - 31, 1990 ,

inspector: MM. [, 7 4 ///// 9/> >

Robert C. Haag, Senior R/ esident Inspector D6te 51gned

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Approved by: ,74 / M 94 '

Floyd 5. Cantrell, Sect op Chief

Date Signed Division of Reactor Pr/ ects SUMMARY Scope:

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This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspector onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observation,

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operational safety verification, onsite follow-up of written reports of i nonroutine events at power reactor facilities, and onsite follow-up of events

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at operating power reactors. Selected tours were conducted on backshift or weekends. Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on five occasion Results:

The plant operated at or near 100 percent power throughout = the inspection period. A failure to obey radiological contamination controls was identified by the inspector during a preventive maintenance activity on a reactor building spray pump motor (paragraph 3). Testing and repair activities for early I warning system sirens lacked timely notification of siren failures and

! resulting corrective action (paragraph 4).- The identification of a design deficiency for the chilled water system expansion tank indicated an indepth review by engineering personnel during a system related engineering evaluati (paragraph 6.b). An inspector follow-up item was identified on the stroke time tes, ting accuracy for air operated valves (paragraph 6.a).

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REPORT DETAILS * Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics

• K. Beale, Supervisor, Emergency Services

• C. Bowman, Manager, Maintenance Services c

• Browne, Manager Systems Engineering & Performance-

• B. Christinsen, Manager, Technical Services

, *H. Donnelly, Senior. Engineer, Nuclear Licensing S. Furstenberg, Associate Manager, Operations .

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• Gibson, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services D. Goldston, Supervisor Test Unit -

D. Haile, Engineer, Nuclear Licensing

• Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance

• A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing

• D. Moore, General Manager, Station Support K. Nettles General Manager, Nuclear Safety '

H. O'Quinn, Associate Manager, Maintenance Services

• C Price, Manager, Technical Oversite

• J. Proper, Associate Manager, Quality Services

• M. Quinton, General Manager, Engineering Services

• L. Shealy, Senior Engineer, ISEG S. Skidmore, Engineer, Design Engineering

• J. Skolds, Vice President, Nuclear Operations G. Soult, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• G. Taylor, Manager, Operations l l *M. Williams, General Manager, Administrative & Support Services K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security. force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview Acronyms and in'itialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap ; MonthlySurveillanceObservation(61726) 1 The inspector observed surveillance activities of safety related systems ;

, . and components listed below to ascertain that these' activities were

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l conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspector verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance ,

with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was calibrated, '

limiting conditions for operation were met. Upon completion of the test,

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the inspection verified that test results conformed with technical :

specifications end procedure requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel, and the systems were properly returned to servic Specifically, the inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

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STP-345.037 Train "A" solid state protection system actuation logic and master relay tes ,

• STP-105.003, Safety injection valve operability test. The inspector observed retest of the accumulator fill check valve XVC0886 During the initial test, pressure on the test gauge used for back leakage indication spiked high. After several flushing evolutions, the valve !

reseated during the test and the STP was satisfactorily complete However, the licensee informed the inspector that additional-engineering oversite would be provided for future testing of the check valve to determine if additional corrective action is neede * STP-105.001, Quarterly test of "B" charging / safety injection pum * STP-115.002, Reactor building air lock test. The inspector observed the RB personnel air lock barrel test and the retest of the interlock mechanism for the escape air lock. The initial interlock test failed when the outer door vent valve opened while the inner door was ope This potential release pathway defeated the intent of the interlock mechanism. This condition was corrected by repa' ring shaft coupling During the repair activity the licensee identif:ed that the technical manual for the escape air lock stipulates a maximum force of 30 pounds when using the levered arm operating mechanis The licensee believes that excessive force may have contributed'to the interlock malfunction and to the extended repair effort. During the retest a spring scale was used to ensure that less than 30 pounds of force was ,

used to open the air lock doo The inspector questioned the licensee to determine if the 30 pound maximum force was critical to the operability of the interlock mechanism, and if additional actions were needed to prevent the use of excessive force _during future door openings. After reviewing this issue the licensee installed permanent signs with operating instructions at the air lock. Included in the '

instructions were requirements to control the force used when opening the air lock door '

• STP-503.002, Calibration of the thermal overload protection devices for motor operated valves XVG31080 and XVG3109D (RB cooler 2B inlet and outlet valves).

No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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3 Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) i Station maintenance activities for the safety-related systems and ;

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components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with T The following items were considered during this- review: that limiting ,

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed .

from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work,

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activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel,

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parts and materials used were properly certified, and radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance that may affect system performance. The following maintenance activities were obser%J:

• Investigation and repair of the erratic reading from loop "B" service water temperature indicator ITI-4510 (MWR 900D51)

Preventive maintenance on "B" service water traveling screen (PMTS P0137220) <

Preventive maintenance on the "A" reactor building spray-pump motor (PMTS P0133417). The work involved visual inspections, changing the motor bearing oil and meggering the motor. The inspector noted that the electricians were not wearing any protective clothing while

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changing the oil even though the motor and pump were roped off as a .

i contaminated area. The inspector questioned the licensee concerning radiological practices while working in a contaminated are The licensee responded that the " Contaminated Area" sign, which included a statement to contact HP prior to entry, allows the . HP's to establish protective clothing requirement Additionally, the licensee stated that prior to performing the vork.. the electricians were informed of the the need to wear protectiv? gloves when working on the motor. A health physics problem report was subsequently initiated. Resulting action involved counseling the electricians on the errors committed and informing the remaining electricians of the event and the need to obey radiological postings. This NRC identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Set. tion V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfie *

Addition of lube oil to the "A" emergency diesel generato Approximately 110 gallons of oil was added to the diesel. The licensee stated that this was the first oil addition since the oil was changed out during the last refueling outag For approximately

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five months after the outage, the diesel had been tested on a seven day interval due to previous failures of the diesel. Based on these ;

numerous diesel starts the licensee stated that it was not unusual to add this quantity of lube oi *

• Investigation and repair of .the governor speed control for the emergency feedwater pump turbine TPP-008 (NCN 4046). Initially, the turbine trip 9ed on low lube oil pressure during a surveillance tri The applicable 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TS LCO was entered. Replacement of a relief valve which regulates lube oil pressure resolved the -low. lube oil trip problem. During the subsequent retest the licensee was unable to obtain proper speed control from the control. room or from the local speed control knob on the governor. Several adjustments and maintenance test runs were performed before the licensee thought the speed control problem was corrected. During-the next retest effor .

which took place on the third day of the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO, turbine speed dropped when a load (flow through the. pump) was placed on the turbine. A Woodward governor technical representative was brought onsite and he completed additional adjustment of the governor. The STP was then satisfactorily' performed and the turbine was declared operable with three hours rem:ining on the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO. The j inspector considers this repair at.tivity an: additional example of the

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licensee's need to improve their techiiisi expertise for the turbine governor controls (previously identified in Inspection Report 50-395/90-22). The licensee should continue with previous efforts to in,arove the technical knowledge of Woodward governors among plant personne No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

a. . The inspector conducted daily inspections in the following areas:

control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limitino conditions. for operations; examination of panels containing 4.strumentation and other reactor protection system elements to oetermine that required channels are operable; and review of'ccotrol room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspector conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:

verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment,breakerpositions,conditionofequipmentorcom)onent(s),

and operability of instrumentation and support items esse'itial to system actuation or performanc *

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b Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment ,

conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspector verification conducted review biweeklyofinspections and walkdown in thetagout(s

. safety related following) in areas:

effect; review of sampling program (e.g., )rimary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant' liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of

implementation of the plant problem identification system; verifica-tion of selected portions of containment isolation lineup (s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 Selected tours were conducted on backshifts or weekend Inspections included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, containment, cable penetration areas, service water intake structure, and other general plant areas.

< Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure thet detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investi-pated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required. On a regular basis, RWP's were reviewed and specific -

work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP's. Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie In the course of monthly activities, the inspector included a review '

of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and. Vital areas access

ontrols; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts, On October 5, 1990, the inspector was informed by emergency preparedness personnel that both early warning sirens in zone B-1 had failed the growl test. Procedure EPP-022. Verification of Communica-tions Operability, provides instructions for performing the test and required actions for siren failure Per EPP-022, a zone is considered inoperable-if less than 50 percent of the sirens are operable. A note on the growl test data sheet requires that the

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emergency planning unit or shift supervisor be notified immediately when a zone is determined to be inoperable. The electricians, who performed the growl test, actually discovered that zone B-1 sirens were inoperable on October 4,1990, but did not make the immediate

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notification until the following da Af ter the emergency planning unit was notified of the siren failures, the remaining notifications

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required by EPP-022 were made in a timely manner. . Notification of the communications department for repair of the sirens was made at that time. Subsequently, the inspector was informed that the sirens were repaired on October 8, 199 ;

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Based on the length of time (four days) from the discovery to the repair of the sirens, it does not appear that the licensee took -

corrective actions for an inoperable zone of the early warning siren system. The inspector expressed concern that personnel involved with testing and repair of sirens may lack the sensitivity to ensure that *

timely resolution or compensatory measures are taken for inoperable zones of the siren system. For 1990, the average failure rate during the monthly growl test has been 9 percent. In addition, 39 inadver-tent actuations of sirens have occurred in 1990 which also rendered the sirens inoperable. With the large number of siren failures, the inspector believes the licensee should be sensitive to the criteria for zone operability and the resulting actions necessary for timely repairs. The licensee dnformed the inspector that the electricians performing the growl test would be re-instructed on the critical aspects of EPP-022, and that the communication department would be reinstructed in the requirement f or siren repairs to be made in a timely manner. The licensee has also been planning to replace the radio activation portion of the early warning siren system, however, this modification is not scheduled for completion until late 199 No violations or deviations were identifie ,

5. Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (92700)

The inspector reviewed the following LER's to ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified event or >

deficiency was in conformance with regulatory requirements, TS, license e.onditions, and licensee procedures and control (Closed) LER's 89-11 and 89-15 Manual reactor trips due to lifting of pressurizer safety valves. The licensee determined the cause of both events was the loss of the loop seal for the safety valves. Both valves had initial seat leakage, which caused an increase in the loop seal temperatur As leakage increased, loop seal temperature increased correspondingly until the loop seal was finally loss. This caused a reduction in the lif t setpoint of the safety valves and the premature lifting of the "C" valve in May,1989, and "A" valve in August,198 During the last refueling outage, modifications were completed to remove the loop seals for the three pressurizer safety valves. Temperatures _were closely monitored during the plant startup to ensure the valves were properly performing. Seat leakage from the safety valves, which is monitored as a function of the daily RCS leakage, has been negligible since the refueling outag '

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(Closed) LER 90-03, Computer software error which resulted in a nonconservative setpoint calculation for the RB surge exhaust radiation monitor. This condition had existed since the ' nitial startup of th plant in October, 1982. A review of previous releases verified that the instanteneous release limits of TS had not been exceeded. The computer sof tware used in the setpoint calculation for the RB purge exhaust radiation monitor was corrected. The procedures and software for all other effluent monitor setpoints were reviewed to ensure compliance with the ODCM and TS. No additional errors were identifie . Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702) While performing diagnostic testing en air operated isolation valves in the VU system, the licensee discovered the actual stroke time for volve'XVT6490A was four to five secondt while the recent STP stroke time was 1.8 second A previous NCN disposition had addressed isolation valve stroke times which exceeded the 1.5 second design basis value. In the NCM disposition, the 1.8 second stroke time was used in the operability evaluation for the VU system. After the licensee discovered the actual stroke time was greater than seconds, XVT6490A was tagged closed whic.) allowed continued VU system operatio Several days later the inspector noted that. the position of the limit switch for- valve XVT6490B appeared similar to the limit switch arrangerent for XVT6490A. The licensee believes that'the incorrect positioning of XVT6490A limit switch caused the erroneous STP stroke l time. The inspector was concerned that the STP stroke time for l XVT6490B may not have reflected actual valve stroke time. While reviewing this concern and the finalized diagnostic test data, the lit.ensee noted that a small deviation may exist between the actual and STP stroke times for XVT6490B. While evaluating this difference the licensee tested the remaining four isolation valves in the VU syste The actual stroke times for these valves were approximately five seconds greater than previous STP values. The resulting actions from the NCN evaluation included raising the low level setpoint for l

the VU system expansion tank and modifying the alignment of the-l nonessential portions of the VU system. Additionally, the licensee

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reviewed the previous STP stroke times for other air operated valves and ccmpared them with the minimum design basis stroke times.- The licensee stated that for these valves the margins between minimum and the STP stroke times were large enough to compensate for possible error in stroke time measurements. While the amount of margin addresses the immediate operability concern for other air operated valves, the issue of accuracy for STP stroke time testing for air operated valves has not been resolved. The licensee informed the inspector that they are reviewing this issue to determine which areas of the test program require improvement. Final resolution and inspector _ review of the air operated valve test program is identified as Inspector follow-up Item (IFI) 395/90-27-0 l

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8 On October, 26, 1990, the licensee identified a design deficiency in the chilled water system. The deficiency involved the ability of the i expansion tank to provide sufficient system makeup water in the event cf a non-seismic line break. The VV system has two independent trains with a separate expansion tank for each train. Four air !

operated valves in each train isolate non-essential loads from the essential portion of the VU system. The isolation valves receive a closed signal from a safety injection actuation or an expansion tank low level signa During a review of the stroke times for these isolation valves, the licensee questioned the ability of the expansion tank, with a 3/4 inch surge line, to provide timely ' indication of a piping break or provide sufficient make up until a . break was isolated. The licensee's architect and engineering firm reviewed this concern and concluded that the safety function of the VU system could not be assured following a pipe rupture. A postulated seismic event could result in a common mode failure of both trains of VV. Possible components effected by the loss of cooling water flow are various safety related room coolers, charging pump gear and oil coolers, and e mponent cooling water pump motor jacket cooler The licensee made the appropriate one-hour report per 10 CFR, Part 50.7 Giltert/ Commonwealth also made a 10 CFR, Part 21 report concerning the Cesign deficienc The luensee's immediate corrective action was to close the eight valves which isolated non-essential portions of the VU system.

i Additional action was taken to monitor and compensate for the loss of cooling water to various non-safety related areas. Several options are being reviewed by the licensee for permanent resolution to this problem. The inspector will follow the licensee's corrective actions ,

including any additional measures that may result from the ongoing monitoring program. Documentation of the inspector's follow-up l review will be included in the close out of the LER and Part 21 addressing this issu No violations or deviations were identified, t Other Areas Two regional inspections were performed at the Summer Plant during this

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inspection period. The first -inspection involved material control and l

accountability, while the second inspection dealt with the radiological effluent and primary chemistry program . ExitInterview(30703)

The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on November 6,1990, with those persons-indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the .

areas inspected and discussed- the inspection finding _

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The error in contamination controls during a preventive maintenance task was discussed with the licensee and the need for management to identify if ,

this was an isolated case or if additional corrective measures are neede An apparent lack of sensitivity while testing and repairing early warning *

system sirens was also discussed with the licensee. The inspector r.oted- '

that the identification of the VU system design deficiency was a-result of indepth reviews and questioning by engineering personne No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of. the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during the inspection, a 9. Acronyms and Initialisms ,

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EPP Emergency Planning Procedure Engineered Safety Feature

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ESF HP Health Physics  ;

IF1 Inspector Follow-up Item LCO Limiting Conditions for Operations LER Licensee Event Re> orts MWR Maintenance Work lequest NCN Non-Conformance Notice >

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation ODCM Offsite-Dose Calculation Manual >

PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet RB Reactor Building RWP Radiation Work Permits SPR Special Reports '

STP Surveillance Test Procedure TS Technical Specifications '

VV Chilled Water P

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