IR 05000395/1989011

Insp Rept 50-395/89-11 on 890601-30.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Monthly Maint Observations,Operational Safety Verification,Esf Sys Walkdown & Onsite Followup of Events

ML20247D576
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	07/12/1989
From:	Cantrell F, Hopkins P, Modenos L, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247D574	List: IR 05000395/1989011 ML20247D567
References
50-395-89-11, NUDOCS 8907250239
Download: ML20247D576 (10)

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UNITED STATES -

o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p4 - ], REGION 11 g ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W,

.*- '2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 4, . . . . . ,o

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Report No.: 50-395/89-11 Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name : V. C, Summer 1989 Inspection Cond ted:gJune1-30 Inspect rs: /

Rich rd L. Prevatte e  ?!/ d'7 Da'te Signed

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2 ll LlrV'9 m Perr 7 . Hopkins C ,,

Da'te Signe'd M 7// Z M Le'o P. Modenos (June 26-29,1989) Da'te Sig'ned Approved by: / 2 89 Flfyd'3. Cantrell, SectWn Ehief D(te Sfigned Division of Reactor Projec,ts SUMMARY Scope:

This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observation,  ;

operational safety verification, engineered safety features system walkdown, '

onsite followup of events and subsequent written reports, evaluation of licensee self-assessment capability, action on previous inspection findings and other areas. Certain tours were conducted on backshift or weekends. Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on June 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 18, and 25, 198 Results:

The unit began the month in cold shutdown to permit replacement of two pressurizer safety valve The valves were reworked and tested at the Westinghouse facility in Banning, California. They were reinstalled and tested in place on June 5, 1989, using the computerized set point verification device (SPVD). The unit was restarted on June 11, 1989. The unit achieved full power on June 13, 1989, and was operated at full power for the remainder of the 8907250239 890712 PDR

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O ADOCK 05000395 PDC ..

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reporting perio The areas of maintenance and surveillance continue to perform satisf actoril A series of personnel errors in transferring a TS monthly channel check from the operators log to a monthly surveillance test procedure resulted in the channel check being deleted from the procedure and operator log and not being performed for a period of approximately two year The item was identified as a non-cited violation (paragraph 2). The ESF system walkdown on the reactor make-up water system identified only minor deficiencies which were immediately corrected by 'he licensee (paragraph 5). The evaluation of the licensee self-assessment capability discussed in reports 87-07 and 87-09 was completed in this report with no adverse findings (paragraph 7).

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications

• 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• M. Browne, Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems

• A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services

"D. Moore, General Manager, Engineering Services K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance G. Taylor, Manager, Operations D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services M. Williams, General Manager, Nuclear Services K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of 37 selected surveillance tests including all aspects of the Reactor Shutdown Margin Calculation for Reactor Startup, STP 134.001. The inspectors verified that required administrative approvals were obtained l prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified l

personnel, required test instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to servic :

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l l On May 27,1989, '6ile performing the monthly STP 135.001 post accident monitoring instruments channel checks, the licensee found that the sodium

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' hydroxide storage tank level was not listed in the OATC log check or in STP 135.001 as required by TS 3.3.3.6. Upon discovery of this item the licensee stopped the performance of the STP and made a procedural change to incorporate the channel check into.the ST Further investigation by the licensee determined that revision 6 of the procedure issued May 20, 1987, did not incorporate the monthly channel check for the sodium hydroxide storage tank level. Since it had been the intent to transfer the channel check from the 0ATC log to the STP, the channel check was deleted from the OATC log when the STP was issued. The l licensee's analysis of this event determined that the safety significance The sodium hydroxide storage tank is used

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of this event was negligibl to remove iodine from the containment during a LOCA. A MCB alarm would l annunciate should the sodium hydroxide storage tank level exceed the high I' or low level set points. Their response was immediate and adequate in ensuring that the STP was corrected. A copy of the event will be placed in the operations reading file to ensure that all personnel were aware of this erro LER 89-10 will be issued on this even The cause of this event was personnel error, failure to perform adequate review of a procedure while making changes. This is contrary te TS 6. and 10 CFR 50, Appendix This licensee-identified violation will not be cited because the criteria specified in Section V.G. of the NRC Enforcement Policy was satisfied. While no violation is issued, it is suggested that the licensee be acutely aware of the potential consequences for failure to give adequate attention to detail in procedural review This item will be tracked under, Inadequate Procedure Review, NCV 89-11-0 No violations or deviations were ident-ifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS, industry codes and standard The inspectors determined that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by qualified personne The inspectors independently verified that the equipment was properly tested before being returned to servic Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given system's performance. The following specific maintenance activities were observed:

MWR 8990950 kemove and rework operator for XVG3107A-$W MWR 890099 Remove lagging and repair leak on valve XVG08001C l

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i MWR 8900576 Repair seat leakage on PCV0444B-RC l

l PMTS 104182 Repair and calibrate standby instrument air compressor temperature switch PMTS P119448 Service water flow controller on C chiller PMTS 104177 Repair standby instrument air compressor lube oil temperature indicator MWR 8900127 Repair and calibrate feedwater instrunent 03350 MWh 8901040 Repair main control board ground fault alarm MWR 8910149 Adjust feedwater pump seal injection flow PMTS 119578 Test dew point transmitter The operations and maintenance activities observed during this report were satisfactor New barriers have been installed in the control room to monitor and restrict control room accessibility by placing a tagging desk at the entrance of the access door to the control are It is yet too early to determine the advantages and disadvantages in relationship to control room access and maintenance activitie No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707) The inspectors toured the control room, reviewed plant logs and records and held discussions with plant staff personnel to verify that the plant was being operated safely and in conformance with applicable requirements. Specific items inspected in the control room included: adequacy of staffing and attentiveness of control room personnel, TS and procedural adherence, operability of equipment and indicated control room status, control room logs, tagout books, operating orders, jumper / bypass controls, computer printouts and annunciator Tours of other plant areas were conducted to verify equipment operability, control of ignition sources and combustible materials, the condition of fire detection and extinguishing a equipment, the control of maintenance and surveillance activities in progress, the implementation of radiation protective contrcls and the physical security pla Tours were conducted during normal and random off-hour period The May report (89-09) paragraph 4c provided a discussion on a pressurizer safety valve that lifted on May 29, 1989, and resulted in a manual trip of the unit from 100 percent powe The unit was placed in cold shutdown to permit safety valve removal, rework and

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replacement. After unit shutdown a decision was made to remove and rework safety valve C, which had lifted, and valve B that had exhibited signs of leakage during plant operation. During unit cool down two spare safety valves were shipped to the Westinghouse repair facility at Banning, California for rework, setting and testin After plant cool down the installed, B and C valves were also. removed and shipped to Westinghouse for diagnostic testing, rework set. point adjustment and testin An investigation team consisting of Westinghouse engineers, a Crosby (valve manufacturer) engineer and techr.ician, a failure analysis consultant, a NRC Region II engineer, and two licensee senior engineers were dispatched to the Westinghouse repair facility to observe and assist in diagnostic testing for root cause determinatio Although. some deficiencies were identified and corrected, the licensee does not believe that the root cause of this failure has been fully establishe The spare safety valves were installed during the week of June 5, 1989. All hangers, supports, and discharge piping was inspected for freedom of expansion and movement. The safety valve loop seal lines were instrumented to provide control room indication if the loop seal is lost during operatio The unit was heated up to operating temperature and the set point of all three valves was verified using the licensee SPVD. All valves were set within the TS allowable tolerance of one percent. The unit was then restarted on June 11, 1989, and returned to full power on June 13, 1989. The licensee continues to work with Westinghouse and other industry organizations in search of a root cause and plausible actions to provide a long term solution to this and other related safety valve problems. The licensee submitted 8.ER 89-11 on this item and will- submit a follow-up report upon final determination. The inspectors will continue to follow this item as additional information become availabl No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the reactor make-up water syste The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system line-up g rocedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration. The inspectors looked for equipment conditions and items that might degrade performance (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc. The inspectors verified that

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valves, including instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appropriate. The inspectors compared both local and remote position indication The following deficiencies were identified: two valve caps missing, PRT & RCP #3 seal stand pipes make-up supply valve XVD01945-MU was not fully open, ILT'7604 and ILT 07604-HD-MUI's had hard wheels missing, and sections of insulation was loose on RWS No. violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Follow-up of Events and Subsequent Written Reports (92700, 93702)

The inspectors reviewed the following LER's and SPR's to ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified event or deficiency was in conformance with regulatory requirements, TS, license conditions, and licensee procedures and control (Closed) SPR 89-05, Inoperable meteorological instrumentation. This item was reported to Region 11 in a letter dated June 2,1989. This report covered meteorological instrumentation that was placed in an inoperable status for greater than seven days to permit equipment ' modifications and upgrades to improve system reliability. This work was completed and the system was declared operable on June 5, 1989. The inspectors reviewed the report and the actions taken while this equipment was inoperabl (Closed) SPR 85-21, Reactor building containment third period surveillance tendon forces and SPR-83-11 on the same issue. These items were reported to Region II in letters dated January 17, 1986, and January 4, 1984, respectivel The items covered the failure to achieve

'the minimum average tendon lift off forces during surveillance testing of containment tendons. After extensive research and review by the licensee and NRC, TS Amendment No. 76 was issued on June 14, 1989, which now considers the relaxation that will occur in the tendons and provide minimum lift off-force valve that are achievabl No violations or deviations were identifie . Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)

The inspectors completed the review that was started in this area in April 1989 and discussed in reports 89-07 and 89-09. The preceding reports covered the evaluation of PSRC and NSRC activities. During this reporting period ISEG activities and the licensee's overall program was reviewed in dept The inspectors reviewed activities that had occurred in the past year and were documented in LER's, enforcement history, operating activities, INPO inspections, SALP reports, selected non-conformance reports, licensee and

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NRC performance indicators and QA trend reports. This review indicates that the plant's overall operating performance has shown a slight decline in the past year. A review of the licensee assessment of this decline appears to show the causes to be personnel errors and a lack of strict procedural complianc The review of ISEG shows that this group. is -taffed by a senior engineer and four other engineers from various disciplines. The members of this group Eave diversified backgrounds and appear to be qualified to perform their assigned functions. One member of the group has a SR0 license and past experience as a shift technical adviso The duties and responsibilities of ISEG are clearly delineated in technical oversite procedure, Independent Safety Engineering Group (T0-302) and Management Directives 6 and 8. This group has the freedom and independence to pursue

. issues and escalate them to senior management, if needed, to ensure adequate resolution. ' Specific examples of this escalation were identified during this revie A review of documentation and interviews with ISEG personnel revealed that they are conducting reviews and providing independent oversight of plant activities including maintenance, operational problems, modifications, procedures, chemistry and radiation protection programs, QA effectiveness, plant performance, operational experience and other areas as deemed necessary. Reviews are being conducted on a periodic and as needed basis in all the above areas. However, the existing documentation of reviews, findings and corrective actions taken is weak and difficult to audi It appears some items are not documented and are tracked by verbal communication and commitment ISEG started conducting SSFI's on selected systems in the fall of 198 Since that time inspections have been completed on four systems with a fifth currently in proces The scope, depth and caliber of recommendations and requests for system changes have significantly i increased as a result of these inspection These efforts have led to {

increased productivity and improved creditability for ISEG. The findings J and recommendations of ISEG are tracked and a status is provided in monthly reports to managemen ]

This review identified instances when ISEG reviews were able to identify problems that have been overlooked by line organizations. Noteworthy was ISEG's identification of a low cooling water flow problem on the RBCU's j during a safety injection and identification of the root cause for two 1 consecutive reactor trips in 1988. They were also highly instrumental in identifying the root cause of resin intrusion into the steam generators and the root cause for two turbine trips in 198 Overall, the licensee appears to have an effective self-assessment progra Recent training in root cause identification to. key personnel and increased management awareness and attention should lead to additional improvement in this are l

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< Action on Previous Inspection Findings. (92701, 92702)

The inspector witnessed seat leakage testing and the subsequent disassembly of the C Pressurizer SRV that prematurely lifted on May 28, 1989. .The testing and disassembly was- accomplished at the Westinghouse

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. test facility in Banning, California. A team of Summer, Westinghouse, and

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Crosby personnel and a failure analysis consultant were also present.

! Summer SRV's~are installed on individual insulated loop. seals attached to the top of the pressurizer. Each SRV body is also insulate Summer sends their pressurizer SRV's to the Westinghouse test facility because actual plant loop seal conditions can be. simulated by Westinghouse. The Westinghouse test facility contains a loop seal and has the' ability to

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control the loop seal, valve body, and valve ambient temperatures as specified by the utility. The Westinghouse SRV test facility does not

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have the capability to perform SRV full flow testin Upon receipt of the C SRV at the Westinghouse test. facility, the valve was seat leak tested with nitrogen. The results of the nitrogen seat leak test indicated that the seat leakage rate was too high to obtain a set point on' the . loop seal test stand. The valve was disassembled and all-internals inspected. Per. Westinghouse and licensee persor.nel, the overall internal conditions of C SRV were good and significantly better than other

.SRP s that were recently overhaule During disassembly major problems were identified. Several indications existed that suggested cocking of the SRV disc' in the seat. There were indications of steam cutting over approximately 180 degrees of the disk seating surface and .the pin that secures the disk in place rubbed a small scratch on the inner surface of the upper nozzle ring. Investigation into the possibility that SRV discharge pipe loading created a bending moment on the valve causing cocking and subsequent seat leakage - was being investigate After reassembly of the C SRV, plans were to set point test the valve on the loop seal test loo Set point testing with hot water, steam, and helium at various ramp rates were planned in order to determine the effect on set point. The licensee tentatively expects to issue a final report on the C SRV summarizing the disassembly and test results in July 198 . . Other Areas An OSTI follow-up inspection team was onsite from June 26 - 30, 198 Information on the results of their visit will be deliaeated in Inspection Report 89-1 .The Region II Project Engineer for the V. C. Summer Plant served as the backup resident -inspector for the week of June 25, 1989 during the absence of the assigned resident inspector.

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1 Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 30, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. The testing and reinstallation of the pressurizer safety valves were discussed in dept SCE&G instituted a modification that adds an annunciator to the main control board to alert the operator that a loop seal temperature is hig Root cause analysis is being pursued by Westinghouse and the license Final determination of the cause of valve perturbation is not complet Surveillance and maintenance are performing satisfactorily. The licensee took immediate action to correct a series of personnel errors that resulted in missing a monthly channel check for approximately two year Minor defic.iencies found during ESF walkdown were corrected immediately by the licensee. Licensee self-assessment was discussed in dept No dissenting comments were received from the~ licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio . Acronyms and Initialisms ESF Engineered Safety Feature

. INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operators ISEG Independent Safety Evaluation Group LER Licensee Event Reports LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MCB Main Control Board MWR Maintenance Work Request NCV Non-Cited Violation NSRC Nuclear Safety Review Committee NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation 0ATC Operator At The Controls OSTI Operational Safety Team Inspection PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet PSRC Plant Safety Review Committee PRT Pressurized Relief Tank QA Quality Assurance RBCU Reactor Building Cooling Unit RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SPR Special Reports SPVD "et Point Verification Device SRO Senior Reactor Operator SRV Safety Relief Valve SSFI Safety System Functional Inspector STP Surveillance Test Procedures TS Technical Specifications

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