IR 05000395/1988027
| ML20196C466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1988 |
| From: | Burnett P, Jape F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196C456 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-88-27, NUDOCS 8812080020 | |
| Download: ML20196C466 (6) | |
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E NUCl. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W.
p ATuwrA. oEonuia son Report No.:
50-395/88-27 Licensee:
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia,SC 29218 Docket No.:
50-395 License No.:
NPF-12 Facility Name: Summer
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Inspection Conducted:
0 tob r 31 - November 4, 1988 Inspector:
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a+L/h h
/r //2/M 1. t5urnett v
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uate digned Approved by:
O/d.(_..
a//2/dr t. Jaae, cnter /
Uate digned Test )rograms S6ctio/
n Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection addressed the areas of refueling activities, routine surveillance of core power distribution limits shutdown margin ano reactivity anomaly moderator temperature coeffl-cientatpower,andcalibrationofnuclearinstruments.
One industrial safety hazard was identified, idge properly secured Results:
an im high pressure gas bottle on a fuel handling br paragraph 2.
The frequency of instrument performance checks of the incore moveable detectors was questioned part faph 3.d.
A need for an additional a..eptance criterion in the quarterly incore-excore nuclear instrument correlation was identified -
paragraph 6.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted j
Licensee Employees
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- M. N. Browne General Manager, Station Support
- R.M.CampbeII,SeniorEnineerISEG
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"H. I. Donnelly, Senior En ineer, Regulatory Interface l
W. Higgins, Supervisor, R gulatory Compliance
W. Haltiwanger, Senior Reactor Engineer L
- S. R. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems i
- K.W. Nettles, nager,NuclearLicensin0
- A.
R. Koon Ma
General Manager, Nuclear Safety J. Shep), Associate Manager Operations
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- J. L. S(olds, General Manage,r Nuclear Plant Operations
G. J. Taylor, Manager, Operations
- 0. C. Warner, Manager,l Manager, Nuclear ServicesCore Engineering and Nuc i
- H. B. Williams, Genera K. W. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training
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Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, operators, security
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force members, and office personnel NRC Inspector p
P. Hopkins, Resident Inspector i
- Attended exit interview l
A list of acrcnyms and initialisms used in this report is given in the
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final paragraph.
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2.
Refueling Activities for Cycle 5(60170)
Defueling and refueling activities for the end of cycle 4 and the begin-
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ning of c cle 5 were scheduled and controlled by REP-107.002 (Revision 3),
Core Shu["fle. This inspection started with refueling about one-third t
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A review of the working co)y of the procedure and the refuel-t inc log book confirmed that the procecure had been maintained up-to-date i
anc that no significant fuel handling problems had been encountered, i
The inspector witnessed the management of refueling activities from the commcad post in the control room and observed the movement of fuel in the refueling canal and reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool.
The senior
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moved in the vessel. g was on the refueling bridge whenever fuel was being
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operator for refuelin Another SRO was stationed in the spent fuel pool area.
Actual fu'el manipulat,W were performed by contractor personnel under the supervision of the SH0s.
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One example of an industrial safety hazard was noted. A large nitrogen gas bottle was mounted on the fuel handling bridge in the SFP and was i
secured with twine.
The usual practice is to secure gas bottles with I
chain.
When the problem was identified to the SRO on the floor, he
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immediately took action to secure the bottle at two elevations with heavy
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fabric straps and to replace the protective cap on the bottle.
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nitrogen was used to power a gripper on a fuel insert handling tool, and
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that activity will be part of most future refueling programs.
At the exit interview, the licensee agreed to provide a proper stanchion or vertical
cradle to secure the gas bottle properly.
Control room activities included monitoring ICRR for each assembly addi-tion to the core.
The grapple was released only when an acceptable ICRR was calculated.
The inspector confirmed that new baseline count rates
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were obtained and a new statistical reliability test performed whenever
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there was an extended interruption in refueling activities.
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Other fuel handlina procedures reviewed for technical content and found to l
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be satisfactory ini.lucad:
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a.
REP-106.012 (Revision 1), Unusual Operations Involving Fuel Inserts, f
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REP-106.016 (Revision 1), Fuel Integrity h!onitoring
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No violations or deviations were identified l
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3.
SurveillanceofCorePowerDistributionLimits(61702)
The following procedures used in surveiflance of core power distribution t
were reviewed for technical adequacy and implementation of TS surveillance
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requirements:
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a.
STP-212.001(Revision 4),ReactorCoreFluxFiapping, l
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STP-204.001 (Revision 4), Hot Channel Factor Tetts, and i
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STP-205.001 (Revision 5), RC5 Flow Rate and R Determination.
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All procedures were found to be acceptable in content.
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i Station records for operating cycle 4 (June 1987 to August 1988) were
reviewed to determine if these STPs were performed with acceptable fre-
j quency and acceptable results.
For all of these STPs, the records con-firmed both acceptable frequency and results.
However, one question arose
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STP-212.001 has provisions for determining the optimum excitation l
voltage for the moveable incore detectors by running a current versus voltage curve or plateau.
This operation was, apparently performed
only twice in the cycle: on 6-9-87 at 27% RTP and on 6-11-87 at 99.7%
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The cycle extended to August 1988 without further testing of l
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the voltage saturetion curve; as far as can be determined by the records sent to pet nanent storage.
Such infrequent determination of the plateau is permuted by step 6.9.2 of the procedure, but is not typical of industry practice.
At the exit interview, the licer,see
agreed to review this aspect of the procedure.
4.
Determination of Reactor Shutdown Margin and Reactivity Balances (61707)
The following procedures used in so*veillance of core shutdown margin, estimated critical conditions and recctivity anomaly were reviewed for technical adequacy and implementation of TS surveillance requirements:
a.
STP-134.001(Revision 7),ShutdownMarginVerification,
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STP-201.001 (Revision 3), Core Reactivity Balance,
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c.
REP-109.022 (Revision 1), Inverse Count Rate flatio Plot, and
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REP-109.001 (Revision 0), Calculation of Estimated Critical
Conditions.
Station records for operating cycle 4 (June 1987 to August 1988) were
reviewed or sampled, to determine if these STPs were performed with
.i acceptablefrequencyandacceptablerescits.
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e.
Performance of STP-134.001 was sampled.
Over 20 procedures completed j
in modes 2 - 5 were examined and found acceptable.
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f.
STP-201.001 was aerformed, as required, on 31 EFPD intervals with J
acceptable resul;s.
Typically the reactivity deviations from the
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boron letdown curve were less than 100 pcm, or well within the limit j
of 1000 pcm.
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REP-109.001 requires a comparison of predicted and actual critical
conditions and a justification for the difference if it exceeds 50 i
which the agreenM was outside the limit, no justification was) in steps on 0 bank.
In the one case during the cycle (June 17 1987 j
i provided in or appended to the procedure.
However, in the file I
containing all of the copies of this procedure completed in cycle 4, j
there was a five page hand written analysis of the startup in ques-tion.
All of the contributors to the difference appeared to be
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examined adequately.
However, this analysis should have been noted
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in the appropriate section of the procedure and appended to the
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j procedure.
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Measurement of Moderator Temperature Coefficient at End of Core Life (61708)
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STP-210.001 (Revision 4), was performed on June 02, 1988 as an equilibrium Cg of 275 ppmB.
Power was held constant within 0.3% RTP while Cn was fTrst increased and them decreased 17 ppmB with the reactivity change
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j compensated by changes in RCS average temperatrm.
The two resulting
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measurements of MTC were in good agreement, -30.7 pcm/ F and -29.9 pcm/ F respectively, and were acceptably more positive than the limiting value of
- 33 pcm/0F of TS 4.1.1.3b.
An attempt was made to measure the MTC at E0L by correlation of burnup and temperature reduction necessary to maintain constant power.
The result was 'cceptable from a TS standpoint, but was in poor agreement with the value trom the baron change method and with the prediction, hence it was discarded.
6.
Incore/ExcoreDetectorCalibration(61705)
STP-209.002 Incore versus Excore Axial Offset, was performed at 90 day intervals tfiroughout cycic 4.
For all of th? five sets of measurements, the range of incore axial offset obtained spanned the range observed in the unperturbed condition throughout the cycle.
For the first two measurements, the data packages contained the correlation coefficients of the fits of incore axial e*fset versus chamber current for each of the eight chambers.
This information was abunt from the remainder.
The confidence that can be 31 aced in the measurements and the quality of the measurements are direct'y related to the correlation coefficients.
This inforr.ation should be part of the retained records, and an acceptance l
criterion established for the correlation coefficient.
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A related procedure, STP-202.001 (Revision 3), Target Axial Flux Differ-
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ence Measurements was performed with 31 EFPD frequency throuchout the
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over the entir3 cycle, yed within a very narrow band from +1.75T, to -3.3%
cycle.
The target sta i
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Followup of Previous Violation (92702)
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(Closed) Violation 395/88-07-01: Failure to properly implement procedures.
The licensee has completed corrective action to require a series of STPs
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and the REPS be revised to require independent verification of all proce-l dure results.
This item is closed.
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8.
Exit Intersto The inspectior st. ope and findings were summarized on November 4,1988,
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The inspector
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described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection find-l i
ings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as )toprietary any of the materials provided to
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or reviewed by the inspector curing this inspection.
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Acronyrrs and Initialisms Used in This Report
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EFPD -
Effective Full Power Day I
End Of Life l
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ICRR -
Inverse Cesnt Rate Ratio
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ISEG -
Inde endent Safety Engineering Group r
Moderator Temperature Coefficier t MTC
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pcm Percent Millirho
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Parts Per Million Boron RCS Reactor Coolant System
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Reactor Engineering Procedure REP
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RTP Rated Thermal Power
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SFP Spent Fuel Pool
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S90 Senior Reactor Operator
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SIP Surveillance Test Procedure
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Technical Specificatior, TS
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