IR 05000395/2011002
| ML111170411 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/2011 |
| From: | Gerald Mccoy NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Gatlin T South Carolina Electric & Gas Co |
| References | |
| IR-11-002 | |
| Download: ML111170411 (23) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ril 27, 2011
SUBJECT:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2011002
Dear Mr. Gatlin:
On March 31, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 12, 2011, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, one licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) is listed in this report. Because of the very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Virgil C.
Summer Nuclear Station.
SCE&G 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12
Enclosure:
NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000395/2011002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Report No.: 05000395/2011002 Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) Company Facility: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Location: P.O. Box 88 Jenkinsville, SC 29065 Dates: January 1, 2011 through March 31, 2011 Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector E. Coffman, Resident Inspector M. Meeks, Operations Engineer (Section 4OA2.2.2 and 4OA7)
Approved by: Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000395/2011002; 01/01/2011 - 03/31/2011: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station; Routine
Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by a regional operations engineer. No findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The unit began the inspection period at full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) and operated at full power until January 17, 2011, when a reactor shutdown to Mode 3 (Hot Standby) was commenced to address a high level alarm that was received for the C reactor coolant pump motor upper oil reservoir. The unit was restarted on January 19 and returned to full RTP on January
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Actual Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an impending adverse weather inspection to review the licensees overall preparations and protection of employees and risk-significant systems in response to a period of high winds and a tornado warning issued for the area on March 1, 2011. The inspectors reviewed the licensee response actions and weather reports during the period and verified the licensee had implemented applicable sections of operations administrative procedure (OAP)-109.1, Revision (Rev.) 3B, Guidelines for Severe Weather, and emergency planning procedure (EPP)-015, Rev. 17, Natural Emergency. Following the adverse weather conditions, the inspectors walked down site outside areas, including the service water cooling pond, to ensure that debris had not been introduced that could adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted three partial equipment alignment walkdowns which are listed below, to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other train or system inoperable or out of service (OOS). Correct alignment and operating conditions were determined from the applicable portions of drawings, system operating procedures (SOPs), and technical specifications (TS). The inspections included review of outstanding maintenance work orders (WOs) and related condition reports (CRs) to verify that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could lead to the initiation of an event or impact mitigating system availability. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- B emergency diesel generator (EDG) while the A EDG was OOS for scheduled preventive maintenance
- A EDG and turbine driven emergency feedwater pump while B EDG was OOS for scheduled preventive maintenance
- A and C service water (SW) pumps while the B SW pump was OOS for scheduled preventive maintenance
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed recent CRs, WOs, and impairments associated with the fire protection system. The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to determine whether they supported the operability and availability of the fire protection system. The inspectors assessed the material condition of the active and passive fire protection systems and features and observed the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The inspectors conducted routine inspections of the following five areas (respective fire zones also noted):
- Auxiliary building (AB) 374 foot elevation (fire zones AB-1.1, 1.2, and 1.3)
- Control building (CB) 412/425 foot elevation cable spreading rooms (fire zones CB-1.1, 1.2, 2 and 5)
- EDG rooms A and B (fire zones DG-1.1/1.2 and DG-2.1/2.2)
- AB switchgear room 463 foot elevation (fire zone AB-1.29)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted one heat sink performance sample. The inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed aspects of the heat performance tests conducted by the licensee March 8, 2011, on the B component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger and March 21 on the A CCW heat exchanger. The inspectors discussed the test results with the system engineer, reviewed SW and CCW system health reports, verified CCW heat exchanger backflush compensatory measures were being conducted at the recommended frequency, and verified that CCW heat exchanger performance issues were entered into the licensees CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations
a. Inspection Scope
On February 28, 2011, the inspectors observed the performance of senior reactor operators and reactor operators on the plant simulator during licensed operator requalification training. The scenario involved a dropped control rod from 25 percent power, followed by a loss of coolant accident as a result of a control rod ejection from the top of the reactor vessel (LOR-SA-006). The inspectors assessed overall crew performance, communications, oversight of supervision, and the evaluators' critique.
The inspectors verified that any significant training issues were appropriately captured in the licensees CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated two equipment issues described in the CRs listed below to verify the licensees effectiveness with the corresponding preventive or corrective maintenance associated with structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The inspectors reviewed Maintenance Rule (MR) implementation to verify that component and equipment failures were identified, entered, and scoped within the MR program.
Selected SSCs were reviewed to verify proper categorization and classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors examined the licensees 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) corrective action plans to determine if the licensee was identifying issues related to the MR at an appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were established and effective. The inspectors review also evaluated if maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) or other MR findings existed that the licensee had not identified.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees controlling procedures, i.e., engineering services procedure (ES)-514, Rev. 5, Maintenance Rule Implementation, and station administrative procedure (SAP)-0157, Rev. 0A, Maintenance Rule Program, to verify consistency with the MR requirements.
- CR-10-03177, A EDG room cooling fan XFN-75A tripped on overload condition
- CR-11-00343, A reactor makeup pump tripped immediately on manual start
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, for the five selected work activities listed below:
- (1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;
- (2) the management of risk;
- (3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and,
- (4) that emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors evaluated the licensees work prioritization and risk characterization to determine, as appropriate, whether necessary steps were properly planned, controlled, and executed for the planned and emergent work activities.
- Work Week 2011-04: risk assessment for scheduled maintenance activities associated with the following: diesel fire pump; AB electrical switchgear room cooling fans; emergent plant shutdown/restart for corrective maintenance to repair the C reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor upper oil reservoir level alarm system; emergent replacement of solid state protection system loop B temperature comparator card; and replacement of reactor coolant drain tank valve and flow transmitter
- Work Week 2011-07: risk assessment for scheduled maintenance activities associated with the following: A EDG (Yellow risk); emergent work on the AB steam pressure barrier door (DRAB/304A); and main generator and Alterrex preventive maintenance
- Work Week 2011-09: risk assessment for scheduled maintenance activities associated with the following: turbine driven emergency feedwater (TDEFW) pump; B EDG minor maintenance activities (Yellow risk); B centrifugal charging pump and associated components; and B spent fuel pool cooling pump, valve, and instrument minor maintenance
- Work Week 2011-10: risk assessment for scheduled maintenance activities associated with the following: B motor driven emergency feedwater (MDEFW)pump; AB electrical switchgear room cooling fans; B SW pump and associated components (Yellow risk); diesel fire pump; switchyard electrical relay work activities (Yellow risk); and B reactor building spray pump
- Work Week 2011-12: risk assessment for scheduled maintenance activities associated with the following: A MDEFW pump; new switchyard relay building modification (Yellow risk); and A SW and SW booster pump (Yellow risk)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed four operability evaluations listed below, affecting risk significant mitigating systems to assess, as appropriate:
- (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations;
- (2) whether operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred;
- (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered;
- (4) that the licensee considered other degraded conditions and their impact on compensatory measures for the condition being evaluated; and,
- (5) the impact on TS limiting conditions for operations and the risk significance in accordance with the significance determination process. Also, the inspectors verified that the operability evaluations were performed in accordance with SAP-209, Rev. 0E, Operability Determination Process, and SAP-999, Rev. 5, Corrective Action Program.
- CR-11-00203, C reactor coolant pump motor upper oil reservoir high level alarm
- CR-11-00336, Centrifugal charging pump B auxiliary oil pump tripped on B phase thermal overload
- CR-11-00642, K1 relay auxiliary contacts would not drop out during testing due to an installation error
- CR-11-01094, Wrong bulbs installed in EDG local control panels
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
For the one equipment change listed below that was considered a temporary modification, the inspectors witnessed aspects of the implementation and evaluated the change for adverse effects on system availability, reliability, and functional capability.
This temporary modification allowed the temporary installation of special portable heaters in the B EDG room in order to provide additional room heating around the engine to reduce the heat loss from the engine jacket water system. Documents reviewed, as applicable, included associated 10 CFR 50.59 reviews, Engineering Technical Work Records, engineering design calculations, WOs and implementation packages, corrective action documents, applicable sections of the UFSAR, TS, and design basis information.
- CR/Non-Conforming Condition (NC) 10-04747 Disposition #1 Repair, Room DB-36-03 Temporary Heaters
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the six maintenance activities listed below, the inspectors reviewed the associated post-maintenance testing (PMT) procedures and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to assess whether:
- (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;
- (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed;
- (3) test acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;
- (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;
- (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;
- (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;
- (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and,
- (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The inspectors verified that these activities were performed in accordance with general test procedure (GTP)-214, Rev.
5A, Post Maintenance Testing Guideline.
- WO 1100934: PMT following replacement of solid state protection system comparator card for loop B temperature
- WO 1100295: PMT following reseal of control room pressure boundary breach for pulling new cables for the reactor coolant pump vibration monitoring system
- WOs 0906994, 0908000, 1000155, and 1013911: PMT following scheduled preventive maintenance on B SW pump
- WOs 1012499, 1013385, and 1014738: PMT following scheduled preventive maintenance on the A SW booster pump
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed the inspection activities described below for the scheduled short duration outage in Hot Standby (Mode 3) to investigate a high level alarm on the C RCP motor upper oil reservoir and make repairs to the oil reservoir housing vent tubing that was found bent. The outage began on January 17, 2011 and ended on January 20. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
- The outage work plan was reviewed to ensure that appropriate risk controls, defense-in-depth, and TS requirements were considered in the configuration of important plant safety equipment, and outage personnel resource scheduling took into consideration fatigue management requirements.
- Portions of the plant shutdown were observed to ensure that TS and licensee procedural requirements were met for controlling key safety functions and plant configuration changes, and that defense-in-depth was maintained commensurate with the licensees outage risk control and reactivity management plans.
- The inspectors reviewed and observed personnel containment entries to verify that the licensee controlled the entries and work activities in accordance with the appropriate TS and licensee procedural requirements for maintaining containment integrity, foreign material exclusion, security access, and radiological controls.
- The inspectors conducted several containment building walkdowns during and following the completion of licensee work activities to ensure that items were not left in containment that might contribute to emergency core cooling system sump screen blockage.
- The inspectors observed reactor restart, mode changes, and changing plant configurations to verify that TS, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites were met during these activities.
- The inspectors reviewed various problems that arose during the outage to verify that the licensee was identifying problems related to outage activities at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the six surveillance test procedures (STPs)listed below to verify that TS or risk significant surveillance requirements were followed and that test acceptance criteria were properly specified to ensure that the equipment could perform its intended safety function. The inspectors verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria were met.
In-Service Tests:
- STP-220.001A, Rev. 9, Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump and Valve Test (B pump)
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Tests:
- STP-114.002, Rev. 12B, Operational Leakage Calculation Other Surveillance Tests:
- STP-503.003B, Rev. 3, Functional Test of Train B SW to EF Cross Connect Circuits
- STP-345.040, Rev. 11, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Slave Relay Test for Train A XPN-7011
- STP-125.008, Rev. 6G, Diesel Generator A 24 Hour Load Test
- STP-125.009, Rev. 8G, Diesel Generator B 24 Hour Load Test
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Simulator Licensed Operator Requalification Training Evolution
a. Inspection Scope
On February 28, 2011, the inspectors reviewed and observed the performance of a simulator-based licensed operator requalification training evolution (LOR-SA-006) that required implementation of emergency preparedness actions for the declaration of an Alert. The training scenario involved a dropped control rod from 25 percent power, followed by a loss of coolant accident as a result of a control rod ejection from the top of the reactor vessel. The inspectors assessed emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendation development.
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees conduct of the training and critique performance and verified that, as appropriate, performance weaknesses were captured in the licensees operator training program or CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Emergency Preparedness Training Drill
a. Inspection Scope
On March 23, 2011, the inspectors reviewed and observed the performance of a quarterly licensee emergency preparedness training drill (EPP-09-01B) that involved a simulated earthquake and subsequent reactor vessel fuel damage from loose parts followed by reactor coolant system leakage in excess of makeup capability. The inspectors assessed the emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendation development. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees conduct of the drill and critique performance.
The inspectors verified that the drill critique identified drill performance weaknesses and entered these items into the licensees CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified the accuracy of the licensees PI submittals listed below for the period January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010. The inspectors used the performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Revision 6, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedure SAP-1360, Rev. 1, NRC and INPO/WANO Performance Indicators, to check the reporting of each data element. The inspectors sampled licensee event reports (LERs),operator logs, tagout records, plant risk records, plant status reports, CRs, and performance indicator data sheets to verify that the licensee had properly reported the PI data. Also, the inspectors discussed the PI data with the licensee personnel associated with the performance indicator data collection and evaluation.
- Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted more in-depth reviews of the two issues listed below to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees corrective actions for important safety issues.
1) Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) FY 2010-01, Recent Inspection Experience for Components Installed Beyond Vendor Recommended Service Life The inspectors performed searches of the licensees corrective action database for the previous 5 years to identify aging concerns that were similar to those listed in OpESS FY 2010-01. From the results of this search, inspectors selected CR-08-01513 and performed an in-depth review of the associated corrective actions, with a focus on procedures for establishing shelf life criteria and preventive maintenance for components.
CR-08-01513 discussed a past Part 21 detailing the life expectancy of electrolytic capacitors found in several Woodward diesel generator components, evaluated the impact on installed Woodward components, and listed several necessary corrective actions. The inspectors assessed whether the issue was properly identified; documented accurately and completely; adequately considered extent of condition; and identified appropriate and timely corrective actions. Inspectors also selected four sets each containing a Woodward 2301a governor and a DRU (Digital Reference Unit), examining the applicable procurement procedures, purchase orders, refurbishment documentation and shelf life criteria. Documents reviewed by the inspectors included:
- CR-08-01513, Evaluate age of capacitors for Woodward Governor electronic controls
- CR-08-03760, OE26873, Evaluate DG erratic KW output event at Cooper Nuclear Station for applicability to VC Summer
- 10CFR21 Report of Defects and Non-Compliance - Engine Systems, Inc.,
Report No. 10CFR21-0082, Rev. 2, Woodward Electronic Controls with Electrolytic Capacitors
- SLC-49, Rev. 0, Woodward Governor Components for the Colt Emergency Diesel Generator systems at VCS
- ES-324, Rev. 3C, Establishment of Shelf Life Criteria
- SAP-1286, Rev. 7A, Procurement of Materials 2) Licensee corrective actions associated with NRC Violation (VIO)05000395/2010004-001, Failure to Notify the Commission of a Change in Medical Status The inspectors reviewed the implementation of licensee corrective actions associated with VIO 05000395/2010004-01, which was documented in CR-10-03348. The inspectors performed a detailed review of a random sample of licensed operator medical records and associated documentation, in order to assess the effectiveness of programmatic enhancements. The inspectors also reviewed updated procedures governing licensed operator medical status, as well as a sample of condition reports related to licensed operator medical issues. Documents reviewed by the inspectors included:
- Licensed Operator Medical Files: 5-6 years of history each (15 records reviewed)
- SAP-1160, Rev. 9, Medical Requirements for Special Duties
- CR-11-00256, Licensed Operator may not have complied with license condition
- CR-11-00304, Licensed Operator medical restriction not identified following 2008 EKG
- CR-11-00305, Issues identified during audit of licensed operators medical examinations
- CR-11-00367, Fitness for Duty (FFD) violation involving a licensed operator
- Letter from Mr. T. Gatlin to NRC, VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1; DOCKET NO. 50-395; OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12; REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION EA-10-204; NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2010004, dated November 22, 2010
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.
These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Quarterly Resident Inspector Exit Meeting On April 12, 2011, the resident inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Thomas Gatlin and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the results of these inspections. The inspectors confirmed that inspection activities discussed in this report did not contain proprietary material.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as an NCV.
- 10CFR 55.25 states If, during the term of the license, the licensee develops a permanent physical or mental condition that causes the licensee to fail to meet the requirements of § 55.21 of this part, the facility licensee shall notify the Commission, within 30 days of learning of the diagnosis, in accordance with § 50.74(c). For conditions for which a conditional license (as described in §55.33(b) of this part) is requested, the facility licensee shall provide medical certification on Form NRC 396 to the Commission (as described in § 55.23 of this part). Contrary to this, the licensee identified that they did not notify the Commission within 30 days after a licensed operator was diagnosed with a permanent physical medical condition as required by 10 CFR 55.25. This was identified in the licensees CAP as CR 11-00304 and 11-00031. This finding was of very low safety significance because the licensed operator performs non-licensed shift technical advisor duties and has been inactive during the time in question.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- J. Archie, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- A. Barbee, Director, Nuclear Training
- L. Bennett, Manager, Plant Support Engineering
- L. Blue, Manager, Nuclear Training
- M. Browne, Manager, Quality Systems
- M. Coleman, Manager, Health Physics and Safety Services
- G. Douglass, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
- M. Fowlkes, General Manager, Engineering Services
- D. Gatlin, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- M. Harmon, Manager, Chemistry Services
- R. Haselden, General Manager, Organizational / Development Effectiveness
- R. Justice, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- G. Lippard, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- D. Shue, Manager, Maintenance Services
- W. Stuart, Manager, Design Engineering
- B. Thompson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- R. Williamson, Manager, Emergency Planning
- S. Zarandi, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
None
Closed
None
Discussed
None