IR 05000395/1989009
| ML20245F846 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Hopkins P, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245F778 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-89-09, 50-395-89-9, NUDOCS 8906280262 | |
| Download: ML20245F846 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES -
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l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'
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- Report No. :
50-395/89-09?
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Licensee 1:' South Carolina' Electric & Gas Company
. Columbia, SC 29218 d
' Docket No. : '50-395U License'No. : NPF-12
' Facility Name~: V.'C.'
Summer-
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. Inspection Cond eted :- May 1-31 1989 i
Inspect rs:
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Richard L. Prevatte Date Signed.
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( Perry C. Hopkins Date Signed
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. Approved '
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loyd S. Canfrell,,Section Chief 0at'e Signed..
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Division of Reactor Projects J
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' SUMMARY
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Scope:
m This'routineiibspection was conducted by the resideNtsinspectors' onsite;in the
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areasJof monthlyf surveillance. observations, monthly maintenance observation,.
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operational safety verification,' engineered safety > features system Walkdown, '
evaluation of licensee self-assessment capabilityponsite" follow-up of events 1.
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and subsequent written reports, action on previous ~ inspection findings, and t
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other areas.
Certain tours were conducted on backshift or weekends..'Backshift or weekend tours were. conducted on May 4, 5, 11, 12, 16, 17 and 28, 1989.
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Results:
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R The. unit was operated 'at L100 percent power from the start of the Li spection per.iod until' the reactor was manually tripped due to the actuation' of. the C
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f pressurizer safety valve on' May 28,.1989 (paragraph 4c).
The unit was placed
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.in cold shutdown for ~ pressurizer safety valve replacement and remained in that L
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condition until the end of the, reporting period.
The areas of maintenance and surveillance continue to perform.well with no deficiencies identified.
Based
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upon a NRC concern the licensee reviewed their FSAR and TS on diesel generator
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fuel oil storage capacity and discovered that the amount of fuel oil required by TS for mode 1 through 6 was insufficient to provide the required 7 day.
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i supply '(paragraph 4b).
The ESF system walkdown of the emergency diesel j
. generator system indicated - that the diesel generators are well maintained i
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(paragraph 5).
The evaluation of the licensee's self-assessment (paragraph 7),
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l which was started in report 89-07, was continued _ in this report with an evaluation of the licensee's offsite nuclear-review committee (NSRC).
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- inspection and, review was completed on the licensee's recently installed AMSAC system (paragraph 9b).
This installation was completed and placed in operation in early -1989.
It appears to be operating satisfactorily and no major t
deficiencies were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics 0. Bradham,.Vice President, Nuclear Operations C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications
- W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
- S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems
- A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services D. Moore, General Manager, Engineering Services K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations i
G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance G. Taylor, Manager, Operations
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D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services l
M. Williams, General Manager, Nuclear Services i
K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training j
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Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview I
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements.
The inspectors observed portions of 16 selected surveillance tests including all aspects of Steam Generator B Feedwater Flow Instrument Calibration, STP 395.008.
The inspectors verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to service.
The technicians and/or operators per orming these tests appeared to be well indoctrinated in the test procec re requirements.
They performed the tests with familiarity gained tirough training and experience.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
' The inspectors observed maintenance activities of ' safety related systems and components to ascertain that.these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS, industry codes and ' standards, The-inspectors determined that the procedures used were adequate to l
control.the. activity,. and that these activities were accomplished by qualified. personnel.
The: inspectors independently - verified that the
- equipment was properly tested before being returned to service. - Addi-tionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine. that.the licensee was giving pr.iority to safety related main-tenance and notl develop' ; a backlog which might affect a given system's:
performance. The follou ng specific maintenance. activities were observed.
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'MWR 89E051 Test size 2 MCC contactors.and 100VA transformer to determine contactor pickup voltage-PMTS P0117843'
Inspect and repair HVAC system mechanical water chiller A MWR 8900731 Adjust standby accumulator pressure back PMTS P0117057.
Calibrate sprinkler system lo temperature alarm switch MWR: 8900732-Repair condenser A hot well emergency make up control valve MWR 8900718 Repair photohelic switch PMTS P0117054-Repair DG room area ambient hi temperature alarm switch PMTS P0117817 Replace DG air start distributor air inlet filter PMTS-P0118336 Change oil in outboard bearing on DG B. engine PMTS P0119372 Check and set valve backlash on DG B engine PMTS P118338 Lubricate, oil and change duplex filter on DG rocker arm PMTS P0119184 Lubricate DG B PMTS P0119244 Perform auxiliary boiler 2. hour run PMTS P0119336 Inspect and repair 7.2kV switchgear breaker l
MWR 8900108 Replace ser> ice water cooling coil
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l MWR 8900829 Calibrate left zone hi vibration recorder alarm for i
main control board turbine generator alarm l
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PMTS~P0116728 Repair nuclear valve leak off hi level switch PMTS P117710 Calibrate. auxiliary boiler drum level transmitter PMTS P115833 Calibrate recycle evaporator pressure transmitter
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PMTS P118834 Repair charging pump C suction header pressure indicator i
MWR 9810250 Recalibrates switch for instrument air system MWR '8800903 Investigate and repair XPN0099 preaction sprinkler system MWR 8900784 Troubleshoot and repair RML-2 MWR 8910147 Repair multiplier / divider card MWR 8900847 Repair moduflush switch to HVAC chiller No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors toured the control room, reviewed plant logs.and i
records and held discussions with plant staff personnel to verify i
that the plant was being operated safely ar.d in conformance with applicable requirements.
Specific items inspected in the control room included: adequacy of staffing and attentiveness of control room
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personnel, TS and procedural adherence, operability of equipment and
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indicated control room status, control room logs, tagout books, operating orders, jumper / bypass controls, computer printouts and j
annunciato.s.
Tours of other plant areas were conducted to verify i
equipment operability, control of ignition sources and combustible i
materials, the condition of fire detection and extinguishing equip-ment, the control of maintenance and surveillance activities in progress, the implementation of radiation protective controls and the physical security plan.
Tours were conducted during normal and random off-hour periods.
j b.
Because of problems identified at other nuclear plants, Region II requested that the licensee review the diesel generator fuel oil storage capacity limits established in TS and the FSAR.
This review I
was to validate these limits with respect to diesel generator fuel consumption based on current loading under accident conditions.
TS 3.8.1.1.b requires that each diesel be provided with a separate fuel oil day tank containing a minimum volume of 300 gallons of fuel and a separate fuel oil storage system containing 42,500 gallons for mode 1, 2, 3 and 4.
TS 3.1.8.2 requires a volume of 30,000 gallons /DG in modes 5 and 6.
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The licensee review determined that a 1976 design. calculation based on anticipated diesel loading required 42,500 gallons of fuel for each DGFOST to meet the seven day requirement of ANSI N195-1976.
This capacity was based on the second option offered by the ANSI standard.
This was a time dependent load method with a minimum 10 percent margin included.
lhe time dependent loads used in that calculation were taken from FSAR table 8.3 3.
In May of 1980, a FSAR change notice FCN-189 was issued to change and update the electrical loading in FSAR table 8.3-3 for electrical loads connected to the DG during a design basis accident with a loss of offsite power.
This change resulted in a new calculation which determined that 47,100 gallons /DG of fuel oil was needed to meet this seven day loading requirement.
This calculation also determined that
33,200 gallons /DG was needed in modes 5 and 6 instead of the 30,000 l
gallons currently listed in TS.
These calculations were also based on the time dependent method of loading with a 10 percent margin and a margin for fuel unavailable at the tank bottom.
Upon reviewing this information and discovering the errors, the licensee verified that each DGF0ST contained greater than 47,100 gallons /DG.
Special instruction SI89.13 was issued on May 13, 1989 to insure that this amount is maintained in each DGF0ST to meet the operability requirement.
A. review of past operating history indi-cates that the installed 52,000 gallon tanks had been operated for periods with less than 47,100 gallons /DG fuel.
The licensee currently plans to submit a TS change in July 1989 to correct these errors.
The FSAR will be updated in a change notice. Other pro-cedural and with documentation changes that will be made by July 31, 1989.
Additional details of this item are contained in LER 89-09.
c.
At 00:29 a.m.
on May 28, 1989, the reactor operator received annunciation and alarms which indicated that a pressurizer safety valve had operated and immediately reseated.
At 00:35 a.m. this event again occurred.
Operations then proceeded to have I&C technicians connect a strip chart recorder to the acoustic leak a
monitor to identify which valve was operating.
Slight " pops" were
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again noted at 01:33 a.m. and 02:06 a.m.
At 02:54 a.m. C pressurizer j
safety valve opened and RCS pressure began to decrease rapidly.
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RCS pressure decreased to less than 2000 psi, the reactor operator j
manually tripped the reactor and prepared to manually initiate safety
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injection.
The safety valve reseated at approximately 1900 psi and i
RCS pressure was stabilized at approximately 2000 psi.
All systems, j
with the exception of one steam dump valve that failed to automat-I ically close, appeared to function correctly.
Control air to the dump valve was secured causing the steam dump valves to fail shut.
The unit was placed in cold shutdown to permit pressurizer safety I
valve replacement.
The licensee is currently investigating this l
incident to determine root cause and corrective action.
It is
l anticipated that the unit will be down for approximately two weeks.
i The licensee is currently preparing a LER on this item.
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On May 30, 1989, while performing the monthly diesel generator operational test, STP 125.002, an inadvertent start occurred. While
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testing the air start check valve the operator released the fuel rack lever before the engine had fully stopped rolling.
This resulted in an automatic start while in the maintenance mode.
The engine was
'then secured and the STP was conducted satisfactorily.
The licensee reported this as an ESF actuation on May 29, 1989.
Further review of.
l NUREG 1022 Supplement 1, item 6.9 determined that this event has not
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reportable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
i The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the emergency diesel generator system.
The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system line-up procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration.
The inspectors looked for equipment conditions and items that might degrade
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performance (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc.
The inspectors verified that valves, including instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appro-priate.
The inspectors compared both local and remote position indications.
The following deficiencies were identified:
the S0P valve line up list incorrectly lists XVG-20981A-DG as XVP-20981A-DG and valve XVT 20987-DG should be XVT 20986-DG.
Valve XVP 20973A-DG is missing its identification tag and XVT 10995B-DG has a bent valve-stem.
The label plate for APN-IDB2 needs to be reglued on the back of switchgear XSW-108.
Overall, the system appeared to be well maintained indicating acceptable maintenance activities and good work practices.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite follow-up of Events and Subsequent Written Reports (92700, 93702)
The inspectors reviewed the following LER's and SPR's to ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified event or deficiency was in conformance with regulatory requirements, TS, i
license conditions, and licensee procedures and controls.
(Closed)
LER 88-06 and SPR 88-05, Safety injection / reactor trip when A main steam isolation valve closed during testing.
This item was reported to Region II in a LER dated June 10, 1988 and a SPR dated July 8, 1988.
l In addition to the above, this item was also addressed in a Severity I
Level III Violation that was closed in report 89-06.
A review of the corrective actions stated in the LER indicate that they have been essen-tially completed and were closed when the above violation was closed.
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- (Closed)' LER 88-03, SG 1evel errors caused by condensation in sensing lines.1 This item was reported to Region' II in a LER dated March 8,1988.
The initial corrective action was to raise the SG 1evel trip set points to.
compensate for' the - errors. caused by ' steam condensing and filling. the
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sensing - lines to the condensate, pots.
Modification 21359, completed'
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during the forth' refueling outage, relocated the condensate pots to the I
same elevation as the sensing taps and placed them as close as possible to
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This eliminated the siphon-effect phenomenon.
The instruments-were then respanned 'and the SG 1evel set points were returned to their original.value.
(Closed)
LER. 88-07, Reactor trip on A train reactor protection system due to -inadequate procedure and.LER 88-09, Reactor trip due 'to personnel error. ' The above. items were initially reported to Region II in letters dated July 1, 1988 and August 25, 1988.
At that time it was believed that-the root causeL of this event was either a faulty switch or1 incorrect operation of the switch.
Further review of this item discovered that
personnel were not familiar with the switch design and how to correctly
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Procedural changes were made to insure correct
operation-of the MCB reactor trip switches and a warning label was
,1 installed in the MCB to alert the operator of correct switch. operation. A l
revision to the original LER's was forwarded to Region II on March 16, 1989.
'(Closed) LER 88-10, Failure to perform fire watch following a fire system computer malfunction.. This item was reported to Region.II in a letter dated 0ctober 6,1988. ' This item was also identified in a violation 88-19-0111ssued November 1,1988.
All corrective action has been com--
pleted except for the development of a training program for fire protec-
' tion by the Nuclear Technical Education and Training Department.
This program is scheduled for completion in September 1989.
The LER is closed and incomplete action will be tracked under violation 88-19-01.
(Closed)' LER 89-04, Personnel error resulting 'in an engineered safety feature actuation.
The inspectors reviewed the event documentation and the corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence of this type of event.
The corrective actions stated in the LER have been completed.
(Closed). LER 89-03, Electrical problem resulting in all three MSIV's being inoperable.
The cause of this event was a design deficiency.
A review of the event, documentation, and corrective action indicates that the immediate and long term corrective actions were adequate and appropriate.
No violations or deviations were identif'ed.
7.
Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
The inspectors attended a meeting of the licensee's Nuclear Safety Review
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Committee (offsite) held on May 18, 1989 at the V.C. Summer plant.
Ten of i
che twelve committee members plus two alternates were present at the
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meeting.
A newly appointed member, Mr. H.C. Miller who is a current employee of VEPCO, attended this meeting.
He is part of an agreement between SCE & 3 and VEPC0 to assist each other in their nuclear oversite and safety activities.
The meeting agenda covered TS changes, the status of plant operations and events that have occurrea since the past meeting, presentations and discussions on significant modifications, failed fuel description, a report on ISEG identified potential safety problems, shepherd's committee reports on operations, a discussion of the minutes from the previous meeting, a report from individual members on items assigned for their review, the applicable item required by TS and other miscellaneous items.
and schedule for the next three meetings was also discussed.The list of open i A review of the committee composition and membership indicates that it is well staffed with highly qualified individuals.
The consultant from Phoenix Power Services, the Associate Dean of Engineering from the Uni-versity of South Carolina and the recent addition of the VEPC0 repre-sentative who has experience in nuclear station operation and management provides a good outside viewpoint and prospective to this committee.
entire membership was active The in discussions during the meeting.
The overall meeting agenda and topics of discussion appeared to focus on safe plant operation.
The new committee chairman appeared to be highly moti-vated and to have a positive influence on the committee.
TS require that this committee meet at least once every six months.
review of records indicates that meetings are generally held once A
quarter with special meetings as deemed necessary by the chairman. per review of the minutes from the meetings conducted in the past year indi-A cate that the committee has reviewed and addressed the items that require this review *s described in TS 6.5.2 nd SCE & G management directive No. 6.
This review also indicates that weaknesses identified by the licensee, NRC and INP0 are reviewed by NSRC to insure that appropriate corrective action has been or will be taken to correct the weakness and preclude recurrence.
In addition to the above, licensee event reports, special reports, INPO, SER, SOER, and industry experience information are received and reviewed by the committee to assess the adequacy of the licensee actions in response to these items.
Open items or concerns addressed in PSRC that are not resolved during that meeting are assigned to board members and given task numbers for tracking identification.
Dates are also assigned to insure that these items are brought back to the committee for discussion and close out.
The ir.,;ectors reviewed the minutes of the meetings conducted in 1988 and 1989 to determine what, ment as a result of NSRC reviews.if any, recommendations had been made to manage-It appears that recommendations are made on a routine basis by individual shepherd committee's when a weakness is identified.
The recommendations and/or findings are followed up and reported back to the main committee at the next general meeting.
The NSRC appears to be achieving satisfactory results in this area.
It did not appear that any of these items required elevation to the full committee to obtain the required action.
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Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(0 pen)
Inspector Follow-up Item 86-26-05, review PMTS report of overduc preventive maintenance.
This weakness was identified during the OSTI inspection and involved overdue PMTS and the lack of a clear defini; ion of l
mandatory activities.
This report indicated that QA was looking into this.
J item and had scheduled a reinspection for April 7,1989 to verify comple-tion of corrective action.
The inspectors discussed this item with' QA and reviewed the results of
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their reinspection.
As a result of concerns identified in the follow-up
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inspection a meeting was held.with station management, QA, maintenance and
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scheduling on April 19, 1989 to discuss this item and the needs for corrective action..QA has received the following commitments from station managements:
1) schedulers, planners and supervisors will be trained and indoctrinated to insure that PMTS tasks are scheduled and completed by their eue date; 2) SAP-143 will be revised to insure that non performance evaluation forms are initiated for all PMTS that are not completed on
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schedule; 3) The accuracy of CHAMPS monthly overdue PMTS list's will be l
improved; 4) SAP-143, revision 5 will clearly define mandatory PMTS and i
develop.a better classification for PM's; 6) all personnel will be trained
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in the requirements of the revised SAP-143; and 7T the current mandatory PM's list will be reviewed and corrected by August 1,1989.
QA currently plans to conduct follow-up audits in this area to insure that all program l
deficiencies are corrected.
The inspector will continue to monitor
implementation of the.above corrective actions and the follow-up QA audits l
until the above items are corrected.
The results of these activities will be documented in a future inspection report.
9.
Other Areas a.
The. senior resident inspector visited the H.B. Robinson site on May 4, 1989 to review site badging, complete site specific and respirator training, and familiarize himself with site changes that have occurred in the past year.
This was accomplished as a part of the back-up site resident inspection program.
b.
(Closed)
T2500/20, Inspection to determine compliance with ATWAS rule 10CFR50.62.
The inspectors reviewed the inspection criteria delineated in the above temporary instruction, the NRR safety evalua-tion report dated culy 28, 1989, on the licensee's implementation of these requirements and the licensee installed AMSAC system to deter-mine compliance with the above guidance.
The licensee selected to resolve this issue by implementing WCAP-10858-P-A.
This is the AMSAC system which monitors SG water level and actuates the AMSAC system to trip the main turbine, start the auxiliary feedwater pump and isolate SG blowdown when SG 1evel is below the lo - lo set point.
This system uses presently installed IT~~
detection equipment and a vendor supplied AMSAC cabinet that is installed in the relay room.
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9 There are no explicit controls for the AMSAC system in the control room.
The control room operator can individually start the turbine i
driven or motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, trip the main i
turbine or close the SG blowdown valves from the control room.
Once the AMSAC system is initiated the action will go to completion unless deliberate action is taken by the operator to return the final actuation device to normal operation.
This installation was completed under MRF20726 during the fourth refueling outage which ended in December 1988.
The system is not safety related but all parts were procured and installed under the licensee's quality related program with QC oversight.
The quality assurance and technical requirements for this equipment are prescribed in technical requirements package No. TRP-24 AMSAC dated August 31, 1988.
This procedure, in addition to establishing the design and installation requirements, also details the requirements for equipment operation, testing and procurement of replacement
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parts.
Since the installation was completed prior to this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the modification package and verified that the field installation met the applicable modification specifications, drawings And procedures.
The system was preoperationally tested using a vendor developed and licensee approved maintene'ce special instruction test procedure (MSI 20726).
These tests e re satis-factory.
With the exception of the refueling outage test (ICP 345-048) which is currently in final review, the 50P's, A0P's and ICP's that affect or interface with this system have been revised or implemented as required.
The AMSAC system will be tested once every 60 days.
This test will be a series of overlapping tests to verify channel analog accuracy,
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set point accuracy, logic / processor operation, timer accuracy and continuity through the output coil.
Testing of the transmitters which provide input signals to AMSAC will be a part of the existing RPS testing.
During all modes of testing, AMSAC will be pieced in
bypass at the local cabinet to prevent spurious operation.
When the
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unit is placed in bypass, a control room annunicator will alert the operator to this change of status.
Testing of the AMSAC outputs to the final actuation devices will be performed each refueling outage.
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While reviewing this item, the inspectors discovered that the 60 day L
instrument test requirement had not been accomplished since the equipment was placed in service in December 1988.
Further investi-gation revealed that a request for preventive maintenance, SAP-143 attachment 1, had never been initiated 'o get this test incorporated into CHAMPS.
Upon identification of this problem the licensee completed the necessary documentation to corr, *
this error.
The equipment was satisfactorily tested on May 11, 1989.
A review of CHAMPS revealed that the remaining tests have been incorporated.
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The licensee completed a human factors: study and. determined that the system controls and indications were cF-ite to. keep the operator
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This st% also determined that the control room indication is consistent with the overall control room indication design.
Until the issue. involving the need for TS for
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ATWAS ~ ir. resolved, the _ licensee intends to use the requirements of their-quality related plan and established plant procedures to govern equipment control and operation.
It is presently intended to
' restrict equipment out of service periods to less than 60 days.
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Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 31, 1989, with
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.those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas, inspected and. discussed the inspection findings.
The actuation'of C pressurizer. safety valve at normal system pressure that. occurred on May 28, 1989 and the licensee's planned corrective actions were discussed in detail.
Additional discussions covered the immediate corrective action and the TS and FSAR changes to correct. the DGF0ST capacity problem,. the '
ESF system walkdown. of the emergency diesel generator, evaluation-of the licensee self-assessment as it' pertains to the NSRC, and the AMSAC installation operation and test requirements.. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
11.
Acronyms and Initialisms AC Alternating Current AMSAC ATWAS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry A0P.
Abnormal Operating Procedure ANSI American National Standards. Institute ATWAS Anticipated Transient-Without a Scram CHAMPS Computerized History and Maintenance Program DG Diesel Generator DGF0ST Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank ESF Engineered Safety Feature FCN Field Change Notice FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report HVAC Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning L
ICP Instrumentation Control Procedure I&C Instrumentation and Control INP0 Institute of Nuclear Power Operators ISEG Independent Safety Evaluation Group LER Licensee Event Reports MCB Main Control Board MRF Modification Request Form MSIV Main Steam Interceptor Valves MWR Maintenance Work Request NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NSRC Nuclear Safety Review Committee OSTI Operational Safety Team Inspection PM Preventive Maintenance PMTS Dreventive Maintenance Task Sheet PSRC Plant Safety Review Committee PSI Pounds Per Square Inch QA Quality Assurance-QC Quality Control RCS Reactor Coolant System RPS Reactor Protection System
SAP Station Administrative Procedure
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SER Safety Evaluation Report SG Steam Generator SI Safety Instruction SOER Significant Operators Event Report 50P System Operating Procedures SPR Special Reports STP Surveillance Test Procedures TRP-Technical Requirements Package TS Technical Specifications VEPC0 Virginia Electric Power Company i
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