ML20134G618
| ML20134G618 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134G593 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-96-14, NUDOCS 9702100472 | |
| Download: ML20134G618 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000395/1996014
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION II
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Docket No.:
50-395
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License No.:
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Report No.:
50-395/96 14
Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G)
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Facility:
V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
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Location:
P. O. Box 88
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Jenkinsville SC 29065
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Dates:
December 1-28, 1996
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Inspectors:
B. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector
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T. Farnholtz, Resident Inspector
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W. Holland, Reactor Inspector, RII (Section M8.1)
Approved by:
G. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5
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Division of Reactor Projects
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ENCLOSURE 2
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9702100472 970127
ADOCK 05000395
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EXECUTIVE SUMARY
V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
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NRC Inspection Report 50 395/96 14
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 4-week
period of resident inspection: in addition, it includes the results of an
announced inspection by a regional reactor inspector.
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Operations
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In general, the conduct of operations was professional and
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safety conscious (Section 01.1).
A review of the licensee's cold weather protection program revealed no
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discrepancies or concerns. Appropriate actions were taken prior to the
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onset of sub-freezing temperatures (Section 02.2).
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A violation was identified concerning the failure to properly store
ladders in accordance with the approved engineering analysis which
represented a failure to follow Station Administrative Procedure
(SAP) 142. Station Housekeeping Program. This violation was a repeat of
a similar violation issued in August 1996 (Section 02.3).
An Unresolved Item (URI) was identified concerning the status and the
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proposed disposition of three different components that had been in the
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Removal and Restoration (R&R) log book for several years (Section 02.4).
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The inspectors concluded that the Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC)
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was satisfying the Technical Specification (TS) required function of
reviewing matters related to nuclear safety (Section 07.1).
Maintenance
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Maintenance activities were generally completed thoroughly and
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professionally (Section M1.1).
Personnel conducting observed surveillance tests were knowledgeable and
performed the testing as required (Section M2.1).
An URI uas identified concerning a missed surveillance test on the
Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) pump and the licensee's
review for other missed surveillance tests on the Emergency Feedwater
(EFW) pumps (Section M2.2).
The licensee's root cause analysis of the scaffolding erection problems
that occurred in the A diesel generator room was thorough and accurately
determined the root causes of the problems (Section M7.1).
Maintenance and surveillance activities relating to remote shutdown
equipment (control room evacuation panel) were being performed in a good
manner. This conclusion was based on both inspection and review of the
licensee's Quality Assurance surveillances of this area. A weak Fire
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Emergency Procedure was identified. Additionally, a weakness was
identified for lack of routine monitoring of the Refueling Water Storage
Tank level indication in the Auxiliary Building and the source range
nuclear instrumentation in the Intermediate Building (Section H8.1).
Enoineerina
A review of engineering action on Reactor Building Cooling Unit motor
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failure, a review of Engineering and Operations interfaces and the
Temporary Accept As Is program was conducted. No concerns or
discrepancies were identified (Section E1.1).
Plant Support
Radiological controls observed during the conduct of tours and
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observation of plant activities were acceptable (Section R1.1).
Security and safeguards activities observed during the conduct of tours
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and observation of plant activities were good (Section S1.1).
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Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 maintained full power throughout the inspection period.
I.
Operations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent
reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general, the conduct of
operations was professional and safety conscious.
Specific events and
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noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71707)
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the reactor building instrument
air system.
No discrepancies were identified.
02.2 Cold Weather Preparations
a.
Insoection Scope (71714)
The inspectors conducted an independent review of the licensee's
preparation for the onset of cold (sub freezing) weather. This
inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71714.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed the requirements of Operations Administrative
Procedure (0AP) 109.1, Guidelines for Extreme Temperature Conditions.
Revision 0.
This procedure describes the necessary actions to prevent
damage to components from extreme hot or cold temperatures. Prior to
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the onset of sub freezing weather, the licensee performed the
appropriate section of this procedure (Section 6.1).
This included
preparing the Service Water System. Industrial Cooling Water System,
Condensate System, auxiliary boiler, and the various onsite buildings
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for prolonged exposure to sub-freezing ambient temperatures. The
inspectors independently examined the level sensing lines for the
Condensate Storage Tank and the Refueling Water Storage Tank to ensure
that tne heat tracing and insulation were in good condition.
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addition, the inspectors verified that power was available to the heat
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tracing panels and that they were operating properly.
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The inspectors reviewed all open Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) having
to do with freeze protection. There were a total of four open MWRs.
Three were either working or in planning. The fourth MWR (91I3015) was
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written on a heat trace panel for the waste evaporator which is no
longer in use. The licensee indicated that they were evaluating options
to retire this equipment and clear the open MWR.
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c.
Concbsions
A review of the licensee's cold weather protection program revealed no
discrepancies or concerns. Appropriate actions were taken prior to the
onset of sub-freezing temperatures.
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02.3 P1 ant Tour
a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
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The inspectors performed plant tours of accessible portions of the
plant. During the plant tours the inspectors visually inspected major
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components to identify any general conditions that might degrade system
operation.
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b.
Observations and Findinos
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On December 11, during a tour of the 436 foot level of the Auxiliary
Building, inside the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA), the
inspectors observed a ladder storage area in an area designated room
36 17(SE). A posted sign adjacent to the ladders read as follows:
" ladder storage area, maximum number of ladders to be stored in this
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area: 3."
The inspectors observed four ladders lying on their sides.
Three of the ladders were secured by a chain to a nearby handrail while
the fourth ladder was not secured in any way. The inspectors informed
the Shift Engineer of this situation and the fourth ladder was removed.
The inspectors reviewed Designated Storage Area Change Request Number
129 and the associated engineering analysis for this storage area. lhe
analysis indicated that the primary concern for this storage area was to
ensure that the maximum floor load limit was not exceeded.
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case, the area was only analyzed for three ladders. The analysis also
specified that the ladders should be chained to eliminate fall down
concerns.
Station Administrative Procedure (SAP) 142. Station Housekeeping
Program, Revision 11. Section 6.11, provides the requirements for the
designation of storage areas in the plant. As required by the
procedure, an engineering analysis had been performed, attached to the
storage request, and had ap3ropriately identified limitations due to
floor loading concerns.
SA) 142 also requires that the storage area
request originator ensure that all provisions, recommendations, or
limitations identified in the engineering review are complied with.
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this case, the procedure was not followed because the maximum number of
ladders allowed to be stored in this area was exceeded and all the
ladders were not chained as required. This failure to follow SAP 142 is
a violation of TS 6.8.1.a and is identified as Violation 50 395/96014-
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This NRC identified violation is a repeat of a previously issued
violation which was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50 395/96008
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dated August 16, 1996 (Violation 50 395/96008 01, failure to follow
station housekeeping program procedure). The licensee responded to this
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Notice of Violation in a letter dated August 29, 1996. The corrective
actions taken to avoid further violations described in this letter
indicated that management reviewed the incident with the civil
maintenance supervisors to heighten their awareness of compliance with
engineering designated requirements. The violation on December 11,
1996, could have reasonably been prevented by corrective actions for the
violation issued on August 16, 1996, and the corrective actions for
similar examples of storage problems identified after August 16, 1996,
by the licensee's Quality Assurance group.
c.
Conclusions
A violation was identified concerning the failure to properly store
ladders in accordance with the approved engineering analysis which
represented a failure to follow SAP-142 Station Housekeeping Program.
This violation was a repeat of a similar violation issued in
August 1996.
02.4 Review of System Status and Removal and Restoration (R&R) Loo Book
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors conducted a review of the daily system status controls
audit and the R&R Log Book.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On December 24, the inspectors reviewed the daily system status controls
audit required by Station Administrative Procedure. SAP 205, Status
Control And Removal And Restoration, Revision 8.
The audit verifies
that the R&R log book, the computer status of all systems required to
function during accident conditions Bypassed Inoperable Status
Indication, and main control board orange tags are in agreement as to
system status. The audit also verifies that the R&R check sheets are
accurate. The inspectors found that the audit was complete and
accurately verified system status.
During this review the inspectors also identified three R&Rs in the R&R
log book that had existed for several years. These included Action R&R
- 910742 dated July 30, 1991, for the B Train Waste Gas Recombiner:
Tracking R&R #880794 dated November 13, 1988, for Pressurizer Group 1
Backup Heaters; and Tracking R&R #930013 dated January 7, 1993, for the
Waste Evaporator, Evaporator Level Control.
Procedure SAP 205 defines
Action R&Rs as normally R&R entries for which TS Limiting Conditions for
Operations (LCO) requirements are met only by reliance on the action
requirements and that action must be completed to restore the equipment
to full LC0 requirements within a specified time period or additional
actions must be initiated. A Tracking R&R is normally an R&R entry
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which is prepared at the Shift Supervisor's discretion to track systems
or components to ensure timely and proper restoration.
Station Administrative Procedure, SAP-205, requires an evaluation of
non outage R&Rs in effect for greater than 30 days. The procedure
states that the evaluation should document the reason why the equipment
has not been restored to operable status and what the final disposition
is to be. The inspectors reviewed the current evaluations attached to
these R&Rs and found they were not clear as to why these R&Rs had
existed for so long, what was necessary to restore this equipment, and
what the final disposition was expected to be. The inspectors were
concerned that the appropriate controls had not been applied to track
and disposition this equipment.
Pending further review of this issue with the licensee to determine
equipment status and the 3roposed disposition of each R&R. this issue
will be identified as an Jnresolved Item, URI 50 395/96014 02.
c.
Conclusions
An URI was identified concerning the status and the proposed disposition
of three different components that had been in the R&R log book for
several years.
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Quality Assurance in Operations
07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities
a.
Insoection Scope (40500)
The inspectors observed the monthly Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC)
meeting to verify that it met the TS requirements.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors attended the monthly PSRC meeting on December 17. The
meeting was called to order by the Operations Manager with the required
quorum present. An agenda was distributed to all PSRC members or
alternates aresent to define the subject matter to be discussed at the
meeting. T1e PSRC reviewed Condition Evaluation and Reporting reports,
procedure revisions, a Radiation Emergency Plan change, safety
evaluations, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changes, and Non
Conformance Notices (NCN). Personnel from specific areas were present
at the meeting to provide more information and explain particular
issues.
The discussions were open and members participated by asking
questions or voicing concerns. The inspectors concluded that the PSRC
meeting satisfied the TS required function of reviewing matters related
to nuclear safety.
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c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the PSRC was satisfying the TS required
-function of reviewing matters related to nuclear safety.
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Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1 (0 pen) Unresolved . Item 50-395/96007-05, conducting core alteration
without containment integrity. On April 18, 1996, with the plant.
shutdown for a refueling outage the licensee aerformed FHP 604,
Functional Testing of Fuel Handling Systems.. Revision 10, Change A, in
preparation for fuel movement. As part of this procedure the
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containment refueling bridge was indexed over the reactor vessel and the
gripper was lowered within the pressure vessel. A question was raised
as to whether this should be considered a Core Alteration. The Summer
TS define a Core Alteration as the movement or mani >ulation of any
component within the reactor pressure vessel with t1e vessel head
. removed and fuel in the vessel. The Summer TS definition contains the
language " movement or manipulation of any component" a literal
interpretation would include lowering the fuel handling bridge gr!pper
into the pressure vessel and therefore should be considered a Core
Alteration. The licensee may not have established containment integrity
when this evolution was performed. This URI will remain open pending_
completion of an NRC evaluation of this issue.
08.2 (0 pen) Unresolved Item 50 395/96007 03, paint coat in containment does-
not meet application specification. On May 7, 1996, the licensee
identified (NCN 5452), during an inspection of the floors outside the
RCS loops in containment, that qualified coatings had not been applied
as described in safety related Civil Maintenance Procedure CMP 500.001,
Application of Protective Coating To Concrete Surfaces Inside The
Reactor Building, Revision 4.
The licensee identified that Keeler &
Long paint H1 had not been applied as described in CMP 500.001. Only
one coat of the H1 paint was applied when two coats were specified. The
paint vendor reviewed the single coat of H1 paint concern for the
licensee and determined that although a single coat of H1 paint had not
been tested in this application on the containment floor a single coat
was tested on containment walls and passed the ANSI N101.2 criteria.
The vendor concluded that it was not critical to apply a second coat of
paint and recommended that the licensee plan to apply another coat of
paint during the next refueling outage. The inspector concluded that
there was a high probability that a single coat of paint would probably
pass the testing criteria and did not constitute a significant safety
concern.
As part of the NCN review the licensee performed a 10 CFR Part 50.59
screening. The licensee concluded that this NCN did not represent a
change to the procedures or facility as described in the FSAR. The FSAR
Section 6.2.1.6, Materials, states that safety related coating systems
are used in containment for concrete and carbon steel surfaces. These
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coating systems satisfy the quality assurance requirements of ANSI
N101.4Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI</br></br>N101.4" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., 1972, " Quality Assurance for Protective Coatings Applied to
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Nuclear Facilities." The FSAR also states that selected coating
manufacturers have documented test results certifying compliance with
ANSI N5.12,1974, " Protective Coatings (Paints) for the Nuclear
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Industry", and ANSI N101.2, 1972, " Protective Coatings (Paints) for
Light Water Nuclear Reactor Containment Facilities." From the review of
the 10 CFR Part 50.59 screening document and the wording in the FSAR it
was not clear to the inspectors how the licensee reached their
conclusion that this issue did not represent a change to the facility.
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This URI will remain open pending a more thorough review of the 10 CFR Part 50.59 screening.
II.
Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments
a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work
activities:
PMTS P0205663, calibration of suction pressure indicator gauge on
the A Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) pump.
PMTS P0205576, perform semi annual lubrication check on the A
MDEFW pump.
PMTS P0201261, perform 2 year operational check of the A MDEFW
pump 7.2 KV breaker.
PMTS P0202876, perform 2 year molded case circuit breaker testing
on the 480 volt EFW pump area cooling fan breaker.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be
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professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the
work package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced
and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently
observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job 3rogress, and
cuality control personnel were present whenever required )y procedure.
khen applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in place.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be
professional and thorough.
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H2
Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
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M2.1 Surveillance ObservatioD
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a.
Insoection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance
tests:
STP 105.014, Train A Slave Relay Go Circuit Testing, Revision 14.
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STP 503.003, Functional Test of SW TO EF Cross Connect Circuits,
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Revision 5.
b.
Observations and Findinos
The inspectors found that the tests were conducted using correct
procedures and test equi > ment.
For STP 503.003 the inspectors observed
the pre job briefing wit 1 the electricians, the interfacing between the
groups required to conduct the test, and the control of the test
activity. The inspectors concluded that personnel conducting the
observed surveillance tests were knowledgeable and performed the testing
as required.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that personnel conducting the observed
surveillance tests were knowledgeable and performed the testing as
required.
M2.2 Hissed TS Surveillance Test On The Turbine Driven Emeraency Feedwater
(TDEFW) Pump
a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding a missed TS
surveillance test on the TDEFW pump.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On December 2, the licensee identified that a TS required quarterly
slave relay test for the TDEFW pump, due no later than November 30, had
not been performed within the TS required time interval. The TS
Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1, Table 4.3 2, Functional Unit 6.b,
Emergency Feedwater, requires that a slave relay test for Automatic
Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays be performed quarterly. The test
of the A train slave relay (K634) had last been performed on August 7,
1996.
The surveillance requirement is documented in procedure, STP 220.002,
Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test, Revision 1.
The
inspectors reviewed this issue with the licensee and found that the
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licensee was reviewing the surveillance history for all threa EFW pumps
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to determine if other surveillances had been missed. Pending completion
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of the licensee's surveillance history review, this issue is identified
as an Unresolved Item and is identified as URI 50-395/96014 03.
c.
Conclusions
An URI was identified concerning a missed surveillance test on the TDEFW
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pump and the licensee's review for other missed surveillance tests on
the EFW pumps.
M7
Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities
M7.1 Review of Scaffolding Problems Root Cause Analysis
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a.
Inspection Scope (62707. 40500)
As a result of scaffolding erection problems in the A diesel generator
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room, the licensee initiated a root cause analysis which included a
review of the scaffolding erection program. The inspectors reviewed
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this root cause analysis.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors concluded from their review of the root cause analysis
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that it was thorough and accurately determined the root causes of the
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scaffolding erection problems that occurred in the A diesel generator
room (see NRC Inspection Report 50-395/96013). The root causes included
a failure to identify to the crew erecting the scaffolding the
safety related equipment in the Diesel Generator (DG) room, a failure to
use self checking to ensure intended actions were correct before they
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were performed, a failure to identify in documentation that the Heating,
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Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) duct was safety related, and a
failure to ensure in verbal communications that all safety related
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equipment in and around the job location was properly understood.
c.
Conclusions
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The licensee's root cause analysis of the scaffolding erection problems
that occurred in the A diesel generator room was thorough and accurately
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determined the root causes of the problems.
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M8
Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues
M8.1 Remote Shutdown System
a.
Inspection Scope (62700. 71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance and testing program
for the Control Room Evacuation Panel (CREP) and associated circuitry
for plant shutdown control in the event control room habitability is
lost at the Summer Nuclear Station.
Specific areas of review included
the FSAR, TS, the Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER), selected
work order packages, selected surveillance packages, selected
preventative maintenance activities, and procedures directly related to
operation of the CREP and associated equipment. The inspectors also
reviewed recent quality assurance surveillance observations relating to
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maintenance calibration activities.
b.
Observations and Findinas
During inspection preparation, the inspectors reviewed the FSAR, Section
9.5.1 and noted that it referenced the FPER as the design basis document
for the evaluation of the potential effects of a fire on any location in
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the plant. The FPER also was used to demonstrate that a fire would not
adversely affect safe shutdown. During the review of the FPER, the
inspectors noted that significant reliance was placed on manual operator
action for system alignments to support safe shutdown operations during
fire scenarios.
The inspectors reviewed the Fire Emergency Procedures
(FEP) associated with control room evacuation due to a fire.
Procedures
reviewed were:
Procedure No.
Title
FEP-1.0, Revision 9
FIRE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SELECTION
FEP 4.0, Revision 2
CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION DUE TO FIRE
FEP 4.1, Revision 1
PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM HOT STANDBY TO
COLD SHUTDOWN DUE TO FIRE IN CONTROL
BUILDING
During review of FEP-4.1, the inspectors noted that step 3.4 required
operators to " Borate the Reactor Coolant System per Attachment II."
Attachment II of FEP 4.1 provided instructions to borate the reactor
coolant system (RCS) using the normal boration equipment (boric acid
tank, flowpath, valves, and piping). The inspectors reviewed section
3.4.2.2 of the FPER which listed equipment deleted as safe shutdown
equipment in fire scenarios.
Section 3.4.2.2 stated, in part, "Boration
was previously to have been accomplished using boric acid tanks, pumps,
and associated valves. Equipment formerly listed for boration has been
either be(sic) deleted (boric acid tanks and pumps) or secured to
prevent spurious operation....
Boration required for safe shutdown will
now be accomplished by taking makeup water from the refueling water
storage tank (RWST), which provides a source of makeup water with 2000
ppm concentration of boric acid to the suction side of the charging
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pumps." The licensee informed the inspectors that initial conditions
for FEP 4.1 had been established during performance of FEP 4.0.
Ste)
3.3 of FEP 4.0 required, in part, that operators establish a flowpati
from the RWST to the suction side of the charging aumps which the
licensee considered met the intent of the FPER. T1e inspectors agreed
that the above flowpath was established as stated: however, step 3.4 of
FEP 4.1 recuired operators to establish a boration flowpath using
equipment celeted as safe shutdown equipment by the FPER.
Based on the
above. FEP 4.1 could be )otentially confusing to the o)erators, in that
the operators could get aogged down trying to align a ) oration flow path
that may not function correctly. The inspectors considered the
procedure weak, in that, it relies on operator knowledge to understand
that step 3.4 of FEP 4.1 is an additional means of boration and is not
needed if the boration path (step 3.4) can not be established.
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The Summer Nuclear Station CREP included two cabinets located in the
intermediate building (XPN7200A and XPN7200B) and various local
component controls and instrumentation. The CREP was installed and
modified to current configuration arior to 1987. The inspectors
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reviewed the licensee's component listory records and selected three
modification packages for review. The documentation reviewed was:
Work Reauest No.
Component
Work Performed
208010013
XPN7200A
Equipment and wiring
modifications to
XPN7200A
208000017
XPN7200A
Install auxiliary panel
and pull cable
208010014
XPN7200B
Delete indicator
No discrepancies were noted.
The inspectors also reviewed four completed work request packages and
the most recent preventative maintenance packages for XPN7200A and
XPN7200B. The documentation reviewed was:
Work Reauest No.
Component
Work Performed
94T3276
XPN7200B
Investigate for possible
problem with circuit for
XVT08152
9304214
XPN7200A
Repair as necessary
(temperature indicator
pegged low)
93I3338
XPN7200A
Replace fuse for power
to ITY00430C
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Work Reauest No.
Comoonent
Work Performed
(cont'd)
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9303524
XPN7200B
Repair as necessary
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(wiring problem)
PM Task No.
ComDonent
Work Performed
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P0199833
XPN7200A
Inspect, clean, & check
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termination integrity
(annual)
P0199834
XPN7200B
Inspect, clean, & check
electrical termination
integrity (annual)
The inspectors verified that work activities were approved, controlled.
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and completed in accordance with procedural requirements. The
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documentation clearly discussed work request problems discovered and
maintenance corrective actions implemented. Also, adequate )ost
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maintenance testing was documented for maintenance accomplis 1ed.
The inspectors reviewed TS surveillance requirements (SR) 4.3.3.5 and
verified that instrumentation listed in Table 4.3 6 of the TS were
installed at the locations described.
In addition, field observations
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verified that required instrumentation on the CREPs was in operation and
the interiors of the panels were in good condition.
In addition,
walkdowns were accomplished to verify that remote switches were
installed at selected locations as required by the FPER. The inspectors
also reviewed surveillar.ce test documentation to verify that TS SR were
being accomplished as required. The documentation reviewed was:
Procedure No.
Title
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STP 113.001, Revision 4
REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTS CHANNEL
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CHECK (performed in October and
November 1996)
STP-345.058, Revision 3
CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL
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(ILT03631A) CALIBRATION (performed
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February 12, 1996)
STP 345.064. Revision 4
RCS LOOP "C" COLD LEG TEMPERATURE
INSTRUMENT (ITE00430A) CALIBRATION
(performed February 20, 1996)
No discrepancies were noted.
The insaectors also reviewed the safety evaluation reports referenced in
the FPER and noted that two remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation
components not referenced in TS 3.3.3.5 were used to monitor important
safe shutdown aarameters during fire scenarios requiring control room
evacuation. Tlese components were source range nuclear instrument
.
12
indication and Auxiliary Building (AB) RWST level indication. The
inspectors reviewed the licensee's surveillance requirements for these
components and noted that calibrations were being accomplished on the
l
same frequency as instrumentation listed in TS SR 4.3.3.5.
However, no
channel checks were being documented as accomplished on the AB RWST
level indicator.
In addition, no documentation was available which
indicated that the source range nuclear instrumentation, located
adjacent to XPN7200B was being periodically monitored.
The apparent
lack of routine monitoring of RWST level indication in the AB and the
source range nuclear instrumentation in the Intermediate Building was
identified as a weakness.
The inspectors reviewed three Quality Assurance Technical Service's
I
surveillances of maintenance calibration or preventative maintenance
activities which had been accomplished during 1996. No deficiencies
were identified by Quality Assurance in these areas. The inspectors
considered the licensee's performance in the calibration area was good
based on both inspection results and QA surveillances.
c.
Conclusions
Maintenance and surveillance activities relating to remote shutdown
equipment (control room evacuation panel) were being performed in a good
manner. This conclusion was based on both inspection and review of the
licensee's Quality Assurance surveillances of this area. A weak fire
emergency procedure was identified. Additionally, a weakness was
identified for lack of routine monitoring of the RWST level indication
in the Auxiliary Building and the source range nuclear instrumentation
in the Intermediate Building.
III. Enaineerina
El
Conduct of Engineering
E1.1 General Comments (37551)
General engineering activities were reviewed to determine their
effectiveness in preventing, identifying, and resolving safety issues,
events, and problems. These included a review of engineering action on
Reactor Building Cooling Unit motor failure, a review of Engineering and
Operations interfaces and the Temporary Accept As Is program.
No
concerns or discrepancies were identified.
E7
Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities (37551)
E7.1 Review of Vodated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Commitments
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner
contrary to the FSAR description highlighted the need for a special
focused review that compared plant practices, procedures and/or
parameters to the FSAR description. While performing the inspections
1
.
13
discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable
portions of the FSAR that related to the areas inspected.
No
discrepancies were identified.
j
JV.
Plant Support
R1
Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
R1.1 General Comnents (71750)
The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of
tours and observation of plant activities and found them to be
i
acceptable.
S1
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed security and safeguards activities during the
conduct of tours and observation of plant activities and found them to
be good.
V.
Manaoement Meetinas
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on January 7 and 15,
1997. On January 9,1997, a teleconference between licensee management
and Region II management concerning a proposed violation involving an
inadecuate fire emergency procedure. After additional reviews, the
procecura was determined to be adequate but a weakness in procedure
content was identified.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary
information was identified.
3
X2
Management Meeting Sunmary
4
On December 16 NRC management presented the Systematic Assessment of
Licensee Performance (SALP) results to the licensee at a meeting on
site. Following the SALP presentation the NRC held a meeting with state
and local government officials.
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14
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
'
F. Bacon, Manager, Chemistry Services
L. Blue, Manager, Health Physics
M. Browne, Manager, Planning and Scheduling
'
S. Byrne, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
l
R. Clary, Manager, Quality Systems
H. Fowlkes, Manager, Operations
S. Furstenberg, Manager, Maintenance Services
D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services
G. Moffatt, Manager, Design Engineering
K. Nettles, General Manager, Strategic Planning and Development
H. O'Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
A. Rice, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience
l
G. Taylor, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
i
T. Taylor, General Manager, Engineering Services
R. Waselus, Manager, Systems and Component Engineering
R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority
G. Williams, Associate Manager, Operations
1
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15
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and
Preventing Problems
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62700: Maintenance Implementation
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 71707: Plant Oprations
IP 71714: Cold Weather Preparations
IP 71750: Plant Support
IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50 395/96014 01
VIO failure to follow station housekeeping program
procedure (Section 02.3).
50 395/96014 02
URI status and proposed disposition of three different
components in the R&R log book for several years
(Section 02.4).
50 395/96014 03
URI missed surveillance test on TDEFW pump and review of
other missed surveillance tests on EFW pumps (Section
M2.2).
Closed
None.
Discussed
50-395/96007 05
URI conducting core alteration without containment
integrity (Section 08.1).
50 395/96007 03
URI paint coat in containment does not meet application
specification (Section 08.2).
.
.