IR 05000395/1990021
| ML20056B461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Modenos L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056B456 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.K.3.01, TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM 50-395-90-21, NUDOCS 9008280314 | |
| Download: ML20056B461 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
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101 MAnlETTA STREET, N.W.
ATL ANTA, oEoRol A 30323
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i Report No.:
50-395/90-21 Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.:
50-395 License No'.:
NPF-12 Facility Name:
V. C. Summer Inspection Cond ted:
Jpy1-31,1990 Inspector:
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-W kO Lbo P. Modenos/
Date Signed d
Approved by:
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Floyd S/Cantrell, Section Cfy /
Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident _ inspector onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, onsite follow-up of written reports of nonroutine events at power reactor facilities, TMI action plan requirements follow-up, onsite follow-up of events at operating power reactors, information mettings with local officials, and other areas.
Selected tours were conducted on backshift or weekends.
Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on ten occasions during this inspection period.
Results:
The unit was operated' at 100 percent power for the majority of the reporting period.
The unit was shutdown for a period of approximately 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> on July 6 - 8, 1990, to correct an exciter vil: ration problem in the turbine generator alterex of the main generator (paragraph 7).
The licensee is commended for taking this approach rather than risk a future transient and potential challenge to safety systems.
-A violation involving failure to-take adequate corrective action was identified during a surveillance test (paragraph 2).
On July 10, 1990, the Regional Staff and NRR representatives presented the 1989/90 SALP to the licensee at the plant site.
Local of ficials were invited and attended the SALP presentation.
The NRC met privately with the local officials following the SALP presentation.
On July 12, 1990, Commissioner Curtiss visited the site.
He toured the plant and met with the site and corporate management.
9008280314 900815 PDR ADOCK 05000395
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted S
Licensee Employees W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics
- C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications i
- 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations M. Browne, Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance
- W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems
- A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing G. Moffatt, Manager,-Maintenance Services D. Moore, General Manager, Engineering Services K. Nettles,sieneral Manager, Nuclear Safety
- C. Price, Ma.4ager, Technical Oversite
- M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations G..Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- G. Taylor, Manager, Operations D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services
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M. Williams, General Manager, Administrative & Support Services K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
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operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Atteaded exit. interview
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l Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed -in the i
last paragraph.
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2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with. license requirements.
The inspector observed portions of six selecteo surveillance tests including all aspects of STP 120.002, Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test.
The inspector verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test diFCrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to service.
On July 16, 1990, the resident inspector was observing STP 120.002 while the operators were performing a cold fast start of the TDEFP.
The TDEFP failed to coast to a stop, after locally tripping the throttle valve.
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operator verified that the throttle valve was fully closed.
Upon further investigation the operator decided to close the steam drain valve (XVT02803A-MS) located directly up stream of the throttle valve, because too much drain flow can back up the other steam lines and roll the turbine.
Af ter the drain valve was closed the turbine coasted to a stop.
Checking the other steam drain valve (XVT028038-MS), the operator discovered that this valve was not fully closed as required.
The STP does not have a required signature block for these drain valves.
SOP-201, Main Steam System, requires a monthly verification of these valves to be signed and verified by two operators.
This procedure requires valve XVT02803A-MS to be 2 TURNS OPEN and valve XVT028038-MS to be CLOSED.
The failure to have valve XVT028036-MS in its proper closed position is a violatlon and is identified as violation 90-21-01 Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action.
This is the third example of a violation in which valves have been mispositioned in the last five months.
The other two examplies are discussed in inspection reports 90-06 and 90-18.
The licensee is pursuing a Management Review Board action item to identify root causes and proper corrective actions to reduce the likelihood of having similar occurrences.
One violation was identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspector observed maintenance activities of safety related cystems I
and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS, industry codes and standards.
The inspector determined that the procedures used were adequate to control
the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by qualified.
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personnel.
The inspector independently verified that the equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.
Additionally, the q
inspector reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given system's performance.
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following specific maintenance activities were observed:
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PMTS PG135068 Lubrication check for CCW pump A motor PMTS P0134038 Electrical equipment inspection for speed switch on CCW pump A PMTS P0132986 Calibration of CC heat exchanger A SW return HDR flow
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PMTS P0135204 Three year inservice inspection on EFW pump turbine MWR 9001387 Repair casing leak on booster pump B MWR 215070011 Modification to underground DG tank monitor
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MWR 9001406 Repair RMA 3 particulate channel background increase to >1000 cpm MWR 9001409 Calibration of CC heat exchanger B SW return HDR flow transmitter PMTS P0126286 Calibration of spent fuel cooling pump A suction
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pressure indicator
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PMTS P0136187 Calibration of B DG fuel oil decay tank level
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indicator PMTS P0135097 Semi-annual inservice inspection of B DG No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspector conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
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control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required char.nels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The inspector conducted weel.ly inspections.n the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component (s),
and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performance.
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Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazards.
The inspector conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shif t turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem ident*fication system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup (s);
and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
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Selected tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
Inspections included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, containment, cable penetration areas, service water intake structure, and other general plant areas.
Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage f rom the kystem was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required.
On a regular basis, RWP's were reviewed and spe.dfic work activities were monitored to assure they were being con ated per the RWP's.
Selected radiation protection instruments -ere periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration i
frequency were verified.
In the course of monthly activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The perfo. nance of various shifts of t'e security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts, b.
On July 2, 1990, while performing routine inspections in the intermediate building, the inspector discovered that fire door,
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IB 109, which leads to the B chiller, was open.
This door is a harsh / mild barrier.
The inspector notified the control room and an auxiliary operator responded within minutes and closed the door.
The auxiliary operator performed his tour of the area 30 minutes earlier and claimed that the door was closed.
In order to enter this area a key is required.
Apparently when the door is fully open, it impinges on a equipment base suppo-t plate and this prevents the door from closing.
FPP-015 requires inspections be performed in order to l
verify that ro conditions exist which will prevent a fire door from i
i performing its intended function.
The licensee wrote a R&R, and
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issued a MWR to add a door stop to correct this deficiency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor i
i Facilities (92700)
The inspector reviewed the following LER's to ascertain whether thq licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified event or deficiency was in conformance with regulatory requirements, TS, license conditions, and licensee procedures and controls.
(Closed)
LER 89-007, Missing jumper prohibits valve from performing intended function.
The A train RHR miniflow valve was improperly wired for approximately three days before the situation was corrected.
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cause of this event was the result of unclear instructions in a modification package.
After identifying the problem the system was returned to operable status.
This served as a lessons learned LER, which was made available to engineering personnel to review.
(Closed)
LER 90-002, Inadequate procedure leads to an inadvertent ESF actuation of a diesel generator.
During perfctmance of a STP. an emergency start was present on the B DG and, per procedure, the operator attempted to reset the emergency start signal.
The diesel was disabled by placing the mode selector switch to the maintenance mode; however, when the DG mode selector switch was returned to the operation mode, the diesel started.
This start constitutes an inadvertent ESF actuation.
The B DG circuitry is designed such that when the mode selector is in the maintenance mode the emergency start override push button in the main control room is disabled but the local override push button is operable.
The procedure specifically referred to the emergency start override push button in the main control room to be used to reset the diesel even though the mode selector was in the maintenance mode.
Thus, when the mode selector switch was taken out of the maintenance position, the DG started because the emergency start signal was still present.
The licensee
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revised the procedure to require the emergency start signal to be reset locally (this will reset the emergency start signal at all times).
In addition, a procedure that performs a similar test on the B charging pump, was also revised.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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TMI Action Plan Requirements Follow-up (TI 2515/65)
(Closed)
II.K.3.1.B Final recommendations, auto PORV isolation test / installation.
The staff approved the topical report and concluded
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that no change was required (SER accession No. 8308040054).
(Closed)
II.K.3.5.B. During loss-of-coolant accident, auto-trip of RCP's.
NUREG-0717, Supplement 1 SER dated April 1981, accepted the licensee's response to be consistent with the NUREG-0737 requirements.
(Closed)
III.D.3.4, Control room habitability.
NUREG-0717, SER, Chapter 22, accepts the control room habitability requirements.
The staff agreed that the applicant had satisfied the requirements of NUREG-0694.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
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On July C,1990, the licensee entered a planned mini-outage to repair an exciter vibration problem in the turbine generator alterex of the main generator.
The vibration was identified and monitored since the unit returned to power on May 23, 1990 after the fif th refueling outag '
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Engineering was observing and evaluating the condition of the turbine generator alterex since the restart.
Vibrations in the turbine generator alterex were measured betweea 8-11 mils.
GE, the vendor of the i
generator, informed the licensee that 12 mils vibration would be the limit that would require the plant to be shut down to repair the problem.
Licensee management, with encouragement f rom engineering, decided on a prudent action to enter Mode 2 for a weekend and repair the problem rather than wait for an unplanned generator trip.
Reactor Power was stabilized at 3 percent on the evening of July 6,1990.
The main turbine was taken off line.
The licensee replaced the grids, greased and added rubber bushings that were left out by maintenance during the refueling outage.
The decision to leave the bushings out was made by the maintenance group and the GE representative, because the technical information letter provided by GE did not list the rubber bushings.
This decision, however, was made without management involvement.
The unit was returned to service on July 8,1990 and the plant reached 100% power by July 9, 1990.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Information Meetings with Local Officials (94600)
On July 10, 1990, local government representatives from Lexington County, Richland County, Fairfield County, Newberry County, cnd the State of South Carolina attended the SALP presentation given by the NRC to SCE&G.
Following the SALP presentation, NRC representatives met privately with these representatives to discuss the mission of the NRC and the Region II.
The ensuring discussion indicated a satisfactory relationship with the licensee.
Most felt that SCE&G strived to keep them informed and worked with them on issues of mutual interest particularity in the area of emergency planning.
After a question as to why the plant was only rated l
Category 2 in Emergency Planning, an NRC representative explained the I
factors that go into the SALP process and specifically why the NRC felt that a SALP 2 rating in EP was correct.
NRC management thanked the attendees for their candor and feedback.
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Other Areas l
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On July 9,
1990 the Deputy Regional Administrator, the Deputy Director of Reactor Projects, the Acting Deputy of Reactor Safety,
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and the Reactor Projects Section Chief visited and toured the site l
with the resident inspector.
On July 10, 1990 the Regional staff and NRR Project representatives presented the 1989/1990 SALP to the licensee at the plant site.
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On July 12, 1990 Commissioner Curtiss visited the site.
He met with I
site management, toured the plant and had an exit with senicr corporate management and plant managemen p
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Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 1,1990, with
.those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.
Areas of discussion included the violation associated with the mispositioning of the TDEFP drain valve, Commissioner Curtiss' visit, the SALP presentation given by the NRC, the meeting with the local officials following the SALP presentation, as well as the f avorable comments made by the local officials of their relationship with the licensee.
No dissenting comments-were received from the. licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
11.
Acronyms and Initialisms CC Component Cooling CCW Component Cooling Water CPM Counts Per Minute DG Diesel Generator EFW Emergency Feedwater EP Emergency Personnel
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ESF Engineered Safety Feature FPP Fire Prevention Procedure GE General Electric HDR Header LER Licensee Event Reports MWR Maintenance Work Request NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet PORV Power Operated Relief Valve R&R Restoration and Removal RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
RCSLR Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate RHR Residual Heat Removal i
RMA LRadiation Monitor Atmosphere RWP.
Radiation Work Permits l-SALP Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance I
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!SER Safety Evaluation Report S0P Station Operating Procedure E
SPR-Special Reports l
STP Surveillance Test Procedures
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-SW Service Water
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i TDEFP Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump TS Technical. Specifications
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