IR 05000395/1993017
| ML20056D241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1993 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Haag R, Keller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056D232 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-93-17, NUDOCS 9308050121 | |
| Download: ML20056D241 (19) | |
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E 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 r,;
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Report No.: 50-395/93-17 Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12
Facility Name: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station l
Inspection Conducted: May 11 through June 15, 1993 Inspectors: k 'N 2v h /M 7 [2 /93 l
R. C. Haag, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
'bN7[ NTb 7[B[93 L. A. Keller, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
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Floyd SF Cantrell,' Chief
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Date Signed
Reactor Projects Ser' ion IB Division of Reactor e/ojects
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SUMMARY
t Scope:
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This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, mont.hly maintenance observations, operational safety verification, review of nonconformance conditions, information meetings with local officials, and action on previous inspection findings. Selected tours were conducted on backshift or weekends. These tours were conducted on nine occasions.
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Results:
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Planning and execution of the calibration of the main turbine first stage pressure controls at power was thorough and effective (paragraph 3).
Prompt action was taken to correct degraded capacitors in a security inverter (paragraph 4). Cooperation between the licensee and State and local officials appeared to be very good (paragraph 7).
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9308050121 930707 PDR ADOCK 05000395 G
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I Two violations were identified both of which involved failure to follow procedure and/or to have an adequate procedure (paragraph 4.g, 4.j, and 6.b).
" Skill of the craft" appeared to be a factor in the failure to satisfactorily complete the assigned tasks that led to these violations. A need for the
operators to develop a more questioning attitude was demonstrated by the
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events involving a lockout relay (paragraph 6.a) and the spent fuel pool high radiation alarm (paragraph 5).
In addition, the root cause analysis for these events was not sufficiently thorough to cover all relevant aspects. An inspector followup item was identified for labeling deficiencies in the panels behind the main control board (paragraph 8).
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees F. Bacon, Manager, Chemistry W. Baehr, Manager, Health Physics C. Bowman, Manager, Maintenance Services M. Browne, Manager, Design Engineering
- G. Caudill, Supervisor, Maintenance
- B. Christiansen, Manager, Technical Services
- M. Fowlkes, Manager, Nuclear Licensing & Operating Experience S. Furstenberg, Associate Manager, Operations
- L. Hipp, Manager, Materials & Procurement D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Safety
- K. Nettles, General Manager, Station Support H. O'Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
- M. Quinton, General Manager, Engineering Services J. Skolds, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- G. Taylor, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- R. Waselus, Manager, Systems Engineering
- R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority
- B. Williams, Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Dr. Ivan Selin, Chairman of the NRC, was onsite May 21, 1993, to tour the plant, meet with licensee management and the resident inspectors.
- F. S. Cantrell, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IB, was onsite June 14-15, 1993, to review inspection activities and for discussion with licensee management.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status Due to problems with main steam flow indication circuitry, the plant operated slightly below full power during most of the inspection period.
On May 29, 1993, a failure of the "B" circulating water pump impeller housing required a power reduction to less than 75 percent power until the subject pump impeller housing was replaced and the other two pumps were inspected. The pump impeller housing separated from the rest of the pump assembly due to erosion / corrosion. The plant achieved full power on June S, 1993, and remained at 100 percent power throughout the rest of the inspection perio ;
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Other inspections or meetings:
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The NRC staff conducted a meeting on May 12, 1993, to discuss the
facility's SALP Report and meet with local government officials i
following the SALP presentation.
(NRC Inspection Report No. 50-t 395/93-07)
During the week of May 17, 1993, a safeguards inspection was
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performed by regional inspectors (NRC Inspection Report No. 395/93-16).
3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below to ascertain that these activities i
were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was
calibrated, and limiting conditions for operation were met. Upon
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completion of the test, the inspectors verified that test results
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conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements, any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved and the systems were properly returned to service.
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Specifically, the inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
a.
Motor driven emergency feedwater pump "B" test (STP 220.001A). All activities observed were satisfactory.
Equipment performance was within acceptance criteria with no adverse trends.
b.
Component cooling pump "C" test (STP 222.002). No discrepancies were noted.
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c.
Quarterly surveillance test for the
"A" train battery (STP 501.002). No discrepancies were noted.
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Leak test of check valve XVB0003A-CV1 for the backup air supply accumulator to the control room ventilatin outside air intake
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isolation valve (STP 124.003).
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e.
First stage turbine pressure instrument calibration (STP 345.035).
As a result of steam generator tube plugging over the life of the plant, lower steam pressure and density resulted, with a i
corresponding increase in volumetric steam flow. A reduction in turbine first stage pressure also occurred due to the tube plugging.
These effects combined to reduce the margin between measured steam flow and-the high steam flow bistable setpoint. This resulted in the high steam flow bistable actuating for the "A" loop at approximately 99 percent power, even though actual steam flow was normal for the plant conditions at the time.
In order to restore
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the proper margin (as allowed by TS) between steam flow and the high
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steam flow setpoint program, the process instrumentation loops for
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turbine first stage pressure and steam flow were re-scaled. The
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inspector reviewed the procedures used to calibrate the loops and
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observed portions of the calibration activities. All activities f
observed were satisfactory. The inspector noted that this activity was thoroughly planned.
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Monthly surveillance test of "A" emergency diesel generator (STP l
125.002). While reviewing the test package, the inspector noted
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there were no instructions for performing vibration measurements for
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the diesel nor the generat>r. The inspector questioned why vibration readings were not taken and trended. The system engineer
responded that a few vibration readings were previously taken but no
meaningful information was obtained from the data. Also, the
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licensee plans to initiate a more structured vibration monitoring program for the EDG's as part of their predictive monitoring
program.
Planning and execution of turbine first stage pressure calibrations were thorough and effective. All observed tests were performed in accordance with procedural requirements and demonstrated acceptable results.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
l Station maintenance activities for the safety-related systems and
components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were
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conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with TS.
i The following items were considered during this review: that limiting i
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the j
work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were i
performed prior to returning components or systems to service, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and materials
used were properly certified, and radiological and fire prevention
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controls were implemented as required. Work requests were reviewed to
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determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority was
assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance that may affect. system
performance. The following maintenance activities were observed a.
Replacement of capacitors in' security invertor XIT5909 (MWR l
93E3001). During a previous PM on the invertor, indications of i
overheating was noted on several of the capacitors. An MWR was
initiated on January 7,1993, to replace the capacitors. The_
i licensee took prompt actions to correct this condition before the invertor's performance was degraded.
b.
Replacement of the blade shafts and shaft bushings in ventilation dampers XDP0098 and 9C (MWR 91M0277 and 92M0129).
Previously, the
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licensee had discovered that some of the shaft bushings were wearing prematurely. This caused damage to the shafts as they rotated on the damper housing in lieu of the bushing. An NCN describing this conditiva concluded that the damper would remain functional, yet repairs were required for long-term reliability.
Part of the repair effort was to install plates on the damper housing to provide additional contact surface area for the bushing. The corrective i
actions appeared to be approprirte.
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c.
Repacking of emergency feedwater valve XVT1030A-EF (MWR 93N3060).
l The inspector verified that correct packing material was utilized.
d.
Troubleshooting of EHC electrical malfunction alarm (MWR 9303892).
Annunciator XCP631 3-1, "EHC SYS ELECTRICAL MALFUNCTION" on the main
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control board (MCB) actuatad and locked in without any apparent alarm condition on the local alarm panel (XPN 6060). The light bulbs on XPN 6060 were subsequently replaced which revealed that the light bulbs for the "24 VDC house power supply low" alarm had burned
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out, and that it was in alarm. The cause of this alarm was a burned
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out G.E. meter relay, type 195. The failed relay did not affect the power supply voltage. Due to the potential risk of a turbine trip i
associated with replacing this relay, the licensee indicated that the relay will not be replaced until the turbine is off-line.
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the interim, operators are monitoring 24 VDC house power supply j
voltage at least once per shift. The inspector concluded that this course of action was acceptable.
e.
Visual inspection and cycling of relays for various safety-related breakers (PMTS P0166522, P0165705). All activities observed were satisfactory.
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f.
Adjustment of the racking pawl for "C" charging pump train "A"
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breaker XSW1DA 06 (MWR 9204421). The inspector verified that the
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deficiency did not affect the operability of the breaker. All activities observed were satisfactory.
g.
Pump bearings lube oil change-out for the "B" MDEFW pump (PMTS P0166272). Mechanical maintenance procedure, MMP 195.002,
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" Emergency Feedwater Pump Maintenance Motor Driven", was used for this task. Section 7.8, " Drive End and Thrust End Bearing 011 Change" was the appropriate section of the procedure for this task.
l The inspector concluded that the following steps in MMP 195.002 were the extent of the instruction provided for refilling the bearing oil reservoirs:
7.8.6 Install a cite approved oil per plant lube manual.
Record oil type /name that was used and amount.
7.8.7 Fill constant level oiler.
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Neither this procedure nor the plant lube manual provided the appropriate bearing oil reservoir level. The plant lube manual listed 2.3 pints as the quantity of oil for the bearings.
The inspector observed on June 7,1993, that the actual method for
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refilling the reservoir involved removing a plug on the side of the bearing housing and then adding oil through the inspection plug at the top of the housing, until oil started flowing out the tap for the removed side drain plug (see attachment 1). The amount of oil added was not measured. The mechanic estimated that one (1) quart was added. The side plug was reinstalled, then the constant level oiler was filled and reinserted. The mechanics indicated that this was the standard method for refilling the bearing reservoirs and that these specific steps were accomplished using " skill of the craft" knowledge.
The inspector noted that the technical manual for this pump (IMS-948-398) listed the oil level as 2-15/16 inches below the pump shaft l
centerline, whereas the level corresponding to the side drain plug was approximately 3-1/2 inches below shaft centerline. The
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inspector observed that the constant level oiler was not removed and reinstalled per the vendors recommendations, and was left at its lowest possible setting, which also corresponded to approximately 3-1/2 inches below shaft centerline.
Based on the applicable drawing for the bearing assembly, this oil level appeared to barely make contact with the oil " slinger" ring. The inspector was unable to determine how much margin existed for bearing lubrication at this oil level. After the inspector described his concerns to the job foreman, the oil level was raised to 2-15/16 inches below shaft centerline.
The licensee acknowledged that the method they were using to refill the bearing reservoirs, which was not described in the procedures, resulted in an oil level below the vendors recommendation and provided no assurance that the amount of oil specified in the lube manual was being added. The licensee also indicated that there was not an engineering evaluation, or other documentation, justifying a lower oil level than recommended in the technical manual or plant lubrication manual. However, the licensee believed that this issue had limited safety significance. This was based on the fact that there have not been any bearing failures in the past, and that their various diagnostic programs (temperature monitoring, vibration analysis, lube oil analysis) indicated satisfactory bearing performance.
The licensee subsequently developed a detailed procedure to insure the appropriate oil level was maintained for pump bearings equipped with constant level oilers. The inspector reviewed the new procedure (MMP 300.033) and found it to be acceptable. Additionally, the licensee indicated that they would perform a dimensional analysis of the pump bearing assembly to determine if it was possible for the oil level, corresponding to the constant level oiler's minimum setting, to be below the lowest point of contact for the oil " slinger" rin,
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The inspector concluded that the licensee had not established an
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adequate procedure for changing bearing oil in the MDEFW pumps.
This matter was identified as the first example of Violation 395/93-17-01. The inspector noted that the constant level oiler setting on
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the other safety-related pumps in the plant would have ensured adequate lube oil levels.
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Preventive maintenance to cycle relays and to visually inspect
breaker XMCIDA2X 06GH for RB spray header isolation valve XVG3003A, and breaker XMCIDA2Y 01HX for RCS charging line valve XVG8107 (PMTS l
P0165264 and P0165262). The inspector noted and pointed out to the electricians that the gasket between the breaker door and cubical was protruding on one side. This had not been identified by the electricians performing the work. While there was not a specific step in the PM procedure to inspect the gasket, the inspector considered that an item like this should be recognized during a PM type visual inspection. Other steps were performed satisfactorily.
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i Replacement of breaker for motor operated valve XVB95248-CC (PMTS
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P0165541). On May 19, 1993, the subject molded case circuit breaker (XMCIDB2Y-11AD) failed it's instantaneous trip test (all three phases had slightly higher current values than the test acceptance criteria). Normally the breaker would have been replaced but none were in stock. The subsequent NCN 4768 disposition stated that continued use of the breaker was acceptable until June 30, 1993.
The inspector verified fault protection and breaker coordination
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were acceptable for the degraded breaker. All aspects of the i
replacement activities were satisfactory.
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Preventive maintenance on "B" EFW pump motor MPP0021B (PMTS
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P0166365). This activity consisted of inspecting, testing and lubrication of the motor per procedure EMP 295.013. Paragraph 7.2 addresses the addition of new grease to the inboard and outboard i
bearings. Later in paragraph 7.5 a test run of the motor, with the j
bearing grease caps / plugs removed, is required to allow removal of i
excessive grease. However, when the lubrication work was actually being performed, a signoff for reinstalling the bearing grease caps / plugs in step 7.5.4 of the data sheet was completed. When the I
following shift crew saw that the signoff for reinstalling the caps / plugs had been completed, they assumed that the test run of the
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motor had also been completed.
Later in the shift, during a surveillance test for the EFW pump, a high temperature alarm for the motor bearing was received and the test was halted. The high bearing temperature (181 degrees Fahrenheit) was caused by excessive grease in the bearings. The failure to perform a test run of the motor with the bearing grease caps removed was the cause of the excessive grease in the bearings. The licensee reviewed the high temperatures experienced by the bearing and concluded that the l
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temperature reached would not adversely effect the bearing. The inspector agreed with the licensee's conclusion that the temperature experienced would not have damaged the bearing.
The licensee initiated a rework analysis sheet for this event. This analysis identified the cause of the event as a lack of procedure adherence by the initial crew when signing the wrong step on the data sheet. The inspector noted that step 7.5.3 of the data sheet has a signoff and actual reading for motor running current. Since this signoff could not have been completed without doing a test run-of the motor, the oncoming crew failed to perform an adequate review of the data sheet and completed work when they concluded that the test run had already been performed.
In addition, the inspector noted that a proper turnover of this job from one crew to another should have included a status of major work completed and any significant work remaining. The failure to perform the PM work on the "B" EFW pump motor as described in EMP 295.013 was identified as the second example of Violation 395/93-17-01.
A violation with two examples was identified for lubrication activities involving the MDEFW pumps.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Plant Tour and Observations i
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator
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adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for j
operations; and review of control room operator logs, operating
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orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections for the operability verification of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component (s), and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performance.
b.
Spent Fuel Cooling High Radiation Alarm i
During a tour of the control room on May 17, 1993, the inspector noted that the spent fuel cooling high radiation alarm and trouble alarm annunciators were illuminated.
Spent fuel cooling radiation
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monitor RM-L4 provides an input for both these alarms. The meter in the control room for PJi-L4 had a maximum reading which was above the warning and high radiation alarm setpoints.
In response to the inspector's questions, an operator stated that these conditions were caused by high radiation levels in the spent fuel pool (SFP) and had existed since the core was off loaded into the SFP in March 1993.
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After further review of the inspector's questions, the licensee I
stated that the alarms and high reading were actually caused by high radiation level in the process canister for RM-L4. The canister is
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maintained full by a continuous process flow of SFP water for the monitor.
The detector is located in a well which is in the i
canister. The licensee stated that during a refueling outage when
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the core is off loaded into the SFP, the radiation levels in the j
water will increase. Correspondingly, the radiation levels in the canister increase as radioactive particles settle out inside the canister.
Later the SFP radiation levels will decrease due to fuel reload and the SFP purification system.
However, the radiation levels in the canister usually remain high until the canister is cleaned or changed out.
Based on the inspector's review of the SFP activity levels for March, April and May, and RM-L4 readings before and after the canister was changed out on May 18, 1993, the inspector agreed with the licensee's conclusion for the cause of high radiation levels and alarms associated with RM-L4.
The inspector did question the responsiveness of operations in i
pursuing resolution of the high radiation alarm.
Based on earlier SFP activity levels, the canister could have been changed out and RM-L4 made usable some time earlier.
From previous experience with RM-L4 being in alarm during refueling outages, the licensee was aware of the need to change out/ clean the canister.
Yet there did
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not appear to be any process in place to ensure RM-L4 was returned to service in a timely manner. Also, poor communications within operations was exhibited when an operator was not aware of the cause of the high radiation alarm, yet management understood the cause of alarm. The licensee is reviewing changes for the SFP monitoring program to allow earlier recognition of the need to change out/ clean the process canister, c.
Failure to Maintain Constant Level Oilers on Safety-Related Pumps in Accordance with Vendor's Instructions
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During a plant tour the inspector noted that the constant level oiler reservoirs (see attachment 2) for the "A" Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP) and the "B" MDEFW pump were not secured to their lower castings. The manufacturer's (Trico Manufacturing Corporation) instructions for these type oilers (type "E") required d
thst the reservoir / upper casting assembly be adjusted to provide the proper oil level, then secured via the three set screws in the upper housing.
If oil additions are required, the proper method is to unscrew the reservoir from the upper casting, which does not affect the bearing oil level as determined by the three set screws.
Contrary to the manufacturers instructions, these oilers were left with the set screws backed out such that the reservoir / upper casting
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assembly was setting loose on the lower casting. This had the
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effect of keeping the constant level oiler at it's lowest possible
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setting. For the "A" SWBP this lowest setting still provided adequate oil for the bearing. However, due to the method of
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changing oil for the MDEFW pumps, this resulted in an oil level i
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below the MDEFW pump manufacturers recommended limit (see paragraph
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The licensee subsequently generated a procedure (MMP-300.033), which described the proper method for adding oil to constant level oilers.
6.
Review of Nonconformance Conditions (71707)
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ON0s were reviewed to verify the following: TS were complied with, corrective actions as identified in the reports were accomplished or being pursued for completion, generic items were identified and reported, and items were reported as required by the TS.
a.
ONO 93041 reported that on May 20, 1993, the 120 VDC breaker for control power to a safety-related 480 volt load center lockout relay (86TIEBI) was found in the open position. The load center is located in the SW pump house and provides power for various components related to and in the SW system. Without control power available to operate this lockout relay, the following functions were not available:
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The differential overcurrent protective trip for transformer XSWlEB1 feeder breaker and bus IEB1 feeder breaker.
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The differential interlock protective which prevents closing
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either of these feeder breakers until the lockout relay is reset once the condition has cleared.
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Neither the blue light which indicates that the lockout relay is operable nor the amber light which indicates that the relay has actuated were available.
i The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's root cause
analysis of this event. The licensee concluded that the most likely cause of the inadvertently opened breaker was a maintenance activity
performed in the cubical where the breaker was located. This activity was performed on April 3,1993, and was the last work conducted inside the cubical prior to the discovery of the open breaker. The corrective actions recommended by this analysis included labeling of the breaker (initially only an orange sticker identified the breaker) and adding a verification of the blue indicating light on the operating logs.
One aspect of this event that was not addressed by the licensee's root cause analysis was the length of time required to identify the open breaker. The blue indicating light is normally illuminated when control power is available. The light was adjacent to the
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switchgear volt meters, which were required to be read each shift.
If the breaker had been opened on April 3,1993, during the maintenance work, then approximately six weeks elapsed before it was
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recognized that the blue light was not lit and action was initiated.
If indeed this breaker was open for approximately six weeks, the operator's failure to note this abnormal condition indicated a lack
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of attention to detail and questioning attitude during normal t
rounds. The inspector considered that the licensee's root cause analysis was deficient by not addressing this potentially important implication on operator performance.
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b.
ONO 93042 reported that on June 7, 1993, "A" SW booster pump (SWBP)
was inadvertently rendered inoperable due to the removal of control
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power for the SWBP feeder breaker XSW1DB1 05A. The control room operators quickly recognized that control power was not available, i
after receiving a computer alarm, and returned the SWBP to operable condition. The total length of time for the inoperable SWBP was 48 minutes. The loss of control power was caused by an operator opening the wrong 120 VDC control power breaker.
Each 480 volt feeder breaker has two associated 120 VDC control power breakers for the opening and closing function of the feeder breaker. Operators have routinely opened the control power breakers for 480 volt feeder breakers during the tagout process. The 120 VDC breakers are
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located in the back of the 480 volt switchgear cabinets and access is provided by a door at the back of the cabinet.
This event occurred when auxiliary operators were completing an equipment tagout which required an exhaust fan breaker (XSWIDB1 058)
to be opened and racked out. This breaker is located in the cubical
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directly below the SWBP feeder breaker. When the operators went to open the exhaust fan control power breakers, they inadvertently opened the control power breakers for the SWBP.
- The inspector discussed with the licensee the preliminary results of their root cause analysis of this event. The relative location of the 120 VDC breakers was considered one of the main contributors for the wrong breaker being opened.
For most applications the 120 VDC
.I breakers are located at the same height in the cubical as the corresponding feeder breaker. However, the 120 VDC breakers for the l
SWBP breaker are located at the same height as the exhaust fan breaker.
Labeling for the 120 VDC breakers was also identified as a possible contributor to the event. These breakers have labels that correspond to feeder breaker cubical location i.e., 05A but do not identify the equipment being fed by that breaker.
During the review of this event, the inspector identified the following problem areas that related to the event:
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The 120 VDC control power breakers that were manipulated as part of the equipment tagout were not listed on the " Danger Tag Log".
The operators stated that whenever a breaker is racked out they have been trained to open the corresponding 120 VDC control power breakers. However, without the control power breakers being listed on the tagout, the equipment controls
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related to the danger tagging program are not programmatically applied to the 120 VDC breaker.
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The danger tag log requires an independent verification for both the initial tagout and the equipment restoration.
Yet for the 120 VDC breakers, that were not included on the tagout, the extent of independent verification usage was unknown since it was not controlled.
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In section B of S0P-313, " Local Switchgear Breaker Operation",
instructions are provided for racking out breakers. The sequence requires that the control power breakers be opened prior to racking the breaker out. This allows visual verification that the control power breakers are opened by observing that the red / green indicating lights on the front of the feeder breaker go out. When the exhaust fan breaker was racked out, the control power breakers were opened at the same time.
The failure to follow the proper sequence when racking out the breaker contributed to the open control power breakers for the SWBP breaker being inadvertently opened and left open.
This is identified as Violation 395/93-17-02.
The inspector questioned several operators on the usage of SOP-313 when racking out breakers. All the responses indicated that while they are aware of the guidance in S0P-313, they do not routinely refer to the S0P when racking out a breaker.
This practice appears to conflict with the procedural usage guidance for section "B" which states, " Reference Use:
Procedure Segments May Be Performed From Memory. Must Verify Work Following Each Segment". Racking breakers out without the use of procedural guidance is another example of " skill of the
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'hile the labeling for the control power breakers was not mcorrect, the referencing of breaker cubicals on the breaker labels versus the actual equipment description / tag number does not provide a clear indication of the. breaker function.
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The preliminary results of the licensee's root cause analysis did not appear to address the issue of control power breakers not being included on the danger tag log. However, in later conversations with licensee management the inspector was informed that this aspect of the event would be thoroughly reviewed.
The licensee indicated to the inspector that some of the changes / program improvements currently being reviewed include the addition of control power breakers to tagouts, how the instructions in S0P-313 should be used and additional training on those instructions, and relabeling of the control power breakers. One violation (395/93-17-62) was identified.
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7.
Information Meetings with Local Officials (94600)
On May 12, 1993, local government representatives from Lexington County, Richland County, Fairfield County, Newberry County, and the State of South Carolina attended the SALP presentation given by the NRC to SCE&G.
Following the SALP presentation, NRC representatives met with the local government representatives to discuss any items of concern and describe the mission of the NRC.
Based on these discussions, cooperation between the licensee and the local officials appeared to be very good. A listing of meeting attendees is attached to the inspection report (attachment 3).
8.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702) (Closed) Violation 395/91-10-03, failure to replace the CST diaphragm prior to its failure.
The violation involved a failure to replace the Condensate Storage Tank'
(CST) diaphragm despite the diaphragm being past its recommended service life, and failures of the other three tank diaphragms. The diaphragm subsequently failed presenting a potential clogging hazard for the emergency feedwater system.
The failed CST diaphragm was removed in June 1991, and will not be replaced. All other tank diaphragms have been placed on a regular inspection and replacement schedule.
(Closed) Violation 395/92-17-01, Inadequate acceptance criteria for MDEFW pump operability test.
The violation involved failure to change the MDEFW pump discharge acceptance criteria in the pump's operability test procedure, despite longstanding information that the acceptance criteria was non-conservative. The applicable test procedure (STP 220.001A) was revised to change the minimum discharge pressure to 1,600 psig. Additional training of engineering and licensing personnel was performed to reinforce programmatic requirements.
(Closed) Violation 395/93-09-02, Inadequate selection and review for suitability of safety-related relays, and drawing errors associated with these relays.
This violation involved the selection, and installation in the field, of incorrect relays for the particular application and discrepancies with drawings associated with these relays. The incorrect relays were replaced with the appropriate type. The personnel involved were counselled and the event was discussed with other Design Engineering personnel. Most of the drawing discrepancies were corrected. However, one of the discrepancies identified as a drawing error was, in fact, a problem with labeling of sub-panels behind the main control board (MCB).
Specifically, drawing B-208-032-EF30A indicated that the location of relay 62EFSB was panel XCP-6111, while the plant label above this sub-panel identifies it as XCP-6112. Upon reviewing this issue the licensee determined that this label was in error. The licensee is investigating the basis for the labels on the MCB sub-panels, and stated they will make changes as necessary.
The inspector noted that E0P-15.0,
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Attachment 1, step 3, states " Pull fuse FU-FW64 in XCP-6112 (inside the Main Control Beard)". The licensee indicated that this E0P reference to XCP-6112 would also be changed. The resolution of the MCB sub-panel labeling will be followed by the inspectors. This matter 1s identified as IFI-395/93-17-03, MCB sub-panel labeling discrepancies, t
9.
Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 15, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described i
the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.
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The licensee indicated that they were still evaluating the adequacy of
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their procedures associated with proposed violation 93-17-01,(example l
1); and that based on their conclusions, they might not agree with the
violation. No other dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
During the exit interview, violations 93-17-01, (example 2) and 93-17-02 were identified as one violation with two examples.
Subsequent to the exit, the licensee was notified that the violation involving an inadequate procedure for chaniging oil in the MDEFW pump and the failure-l to following procedure during PM on the B EFW pump motor was changed to one violation with two examples.
Failure to follow procedure during a j
tag out of a breaker is a separate violation.
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Item Number Description and Reference 395/93-17-01 Violation - (example 1) Inadequate procedure for changing oil in the MDEFW pumps.
Violation - (example 2) Failure to follow procedural instruction during PM on "B" EFW j
pump motor.
395/93-17-02 Violation - Failure to follow procedural instruction during a tagout of a breaker.
395/93-17-03 IFI - MCB sub-panel labeling discrepancies.
10.
Acronyms and Initialisms AC Alternating Current CST Condensate Storage Tank EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EFW Emergency feedwater EHC Electric Hydraulic Control EMP Electrical Maintenance Procedure E0P Emergency Operating Procedure j
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ESF Engineered Safety Feature IFI Inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report MCB Main Control Board MDEFW Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater MMP Mechanical Maintenance Procedure MWR Maintenance Work Request NCN Nonconformance Notice NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation ONO Off Normal Occurrence PM Preventive Maintenance PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet PSIG Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System RWP Radiation Work Permit SALP Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance SFP Spent Fuel Pool 50P System Operating Procedure STP Surveillance Test Procedure SW Service Water SWBP Service Water Booster Pump TDEFW Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump TS Technical Specification VDC Volts Direct Current
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Attendees of Meeting with Local Officials Following SALP Presentation on May 12, 1993 Local Officials Mr. Bob Duggleby, SC Emergency Preparedness Division Mr. Dusty Owens, SC Emergency Preparedness Division Mr. Heyward G. Shealy, Department of Health & Environmental Control Ms. Sandra Threatt, Department of Health & Environmental Control Mr. Neil Ellis, Lexington County Emergency Preparedness Division Mr. Thomas P. Barber, Newberry County Disaster Preparedness Agency
Mr. Bill Reavis, Richland County Emergency Preparedness Agency
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Mr. Michael Kirkland, Fairfield County Emergency Preparedness Agency i
Mr. Avary Frick, Fairfield County Administrator I
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Ms. Callie S. Bell, Fairfield County Public Information Officer l
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NRC Officials
Mr. Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. Ken Clark, Public Affairs Officer Mr. J. Philip Stohr, Division Director for DRSS Mr. Floyd Cantrell, Section Chief
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Mr. Lee Keller, Resident Inspector Mr. Gus C. Lainas, Assistant Director for Region II Reactors
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Mr. George Wunder, Project Manager
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R. J. White, Nuclear Coordinator A. C. Gossett, Chairman of Nuclear Oversight Committee
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