ML20217G465
| ML20217G465 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217G436 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-98-01, 50-395-98-1, NUDOCS 9804020359 | |
| Download: ML20217G465 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000395/1998001
Text
..
..
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
. Docket No.: 50-395
License No.: NPF-12
Report No.: 50-395/98-01
Licensee': South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G)
Facility: V. C. Sumer Nuclear Station
Location: P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville. SC 29065
Dates: January 11 - February 21, 1998
Inspectors: B. Bonser. Senior Resident Inspector
T. Farnholtz. Resident Inspector
R. Gibbs. Reactor Inspector. RII-(Sections M8.1, and M8.2)
P. Kellogg. Reactor Inspector. RII (Section E8.1)
W. Miller Reactor Inspector. RII (Sections F2.1.-F2.2. F2.3
F5.1. F8.1, and F8.2)
4
Approved by: R. C. Haag. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 2
L ,
9804020359 980320
0 ADOCK 05000395
.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-395/98-01
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations
maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week-
period of resident ins)ection: in addition, it includes the results of
announced inspections ]y three regional inspectors.
Doerations
- A detailed system walkdown found that the emergency feedwater system was
able to perform its design functions for normal-and accident conditions
(Section 02.1).
- During an emergency drill operators exhibited good control and
communications while implementing emergency operating procedures
(Section 05.1).
Maintenance
e Maintenance activities associated with the B diesel generator, the A
charging pump. the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, and the
train A sequencer were performed in accordance with applicable
procedures. Good maintenance practices and coordination of work
activities were noted (Section M1.1).
- The surveillance test performed to obtain the total reactor coolant
system flow rate was adequate. The test was performed in accordance
with the approved procedure and the results were within the acceptance
criteria (Section M1.2).
- Portions of the feedwater isolation logic circuit that had not been
)reviously tested were adequately incorporated into Solid State
)rotection System (SSPS) testing 3rocedures. An unresolved item was
identified pending a review of SS)S Technical Specification operability
and testing requirements (Section M1.3).
Enaineerina-
- - An unresolved item was identified concerning inconsistencies between
relief valve testing requirements in the valve inservice test program
controlling procedure and the referenced implementing test procedures.
The licensee is reviewing the actual testing that was performed on
relief valves to determine if the applicable ASME Section XI testing
requirements were satisfied (Section E1.1).
.- Licensee's actions concerning a broken fuel injection pump tappet
assembly hold down stud on the B diesel generator were considered
adequate. The engineering evaluation was sufficiently detailed to
L support.the corrective actions (Section E1.2).
-
..
2
- ' A non-cited violation was identified concerning a failure to correctly
translate condensate storage tank design basis information into-
specifications, procedures, and instructions (Section E1.3).
Plant Sucoort
e A violation was identified involving a lack of adecuate )rogrammatic
controls for temporary shielding. Temporary shielcing tlat remained in
place for longer than six months was not evaluated in accordance with
engineering requirements (Section R1.2).
- An emergency drill met its objectives and provided beneficial training
to the site emergency organization (Section P5.1).
.- The licensee's actions following an inadvertent attempted introduction
of a handgun into the protected area were appropriate. Security
personnel demonstrated good knowledge and performance during this event
(Section S4.1).
- The low number of inoperable or degraded fire protection components, in
conjunction with the good material condition of the fire protection
.com)onents and fire brigade equipment, indicated that appro)riate
emplasis was placed on the maintenance and operability of tie fire
protection equipment and components (Section F2.1).
- Ekcellent surveillance inspection and test procedures were provided for
fire barriers and the fire protection water distribution system (Section
F2.2),
e Evaluations to justify the differences between as-built fire barrier
penetration seals and corresponding test reports were not readily
available. Based on the inspector's reviews, no immediate concerns
exist. The licensee has initiated a project to resolve these
differences (Section F2.3).
- The fire brigade organization and training were up-to-date and met the
requirements of the site procedure. The fire brigade demonstrated good
response and fire fighting performance during a simulated fire brigade
drill (Section FS.1).
t
-
.
Reoort Details
Summary of Plant Status
The unit began this inspecticn period at approximately 100 percent power and
remained at that level for the entire inspection period.
I. Doerations
01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general, the conduct of operations was professional and
safety-conscious: specific events and noteworthy observations are
detailed in the sections below.
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71707)
a. Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors conducted a detailed system walkdown of the Emergency
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors conducted a detailed system walkdown of the EFW system to
assess the general condition of system com)onents including labeling, to
verify that system valve positions match tie system drawings and station
operating procedures, and to assess plant housekeeping around system
components. The inspectors considered that the EFW system was able to
perform its design function for both normal and accident conditions. No
misaligned valves were identified and component labeling was adequate.
Several minor discrepancies and questions identified were resolved
promptly by the licensee. The inspectors also reviewed the applicable
sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and identified no
discrepancies,
c. Conclusions
A detailed system walkdown found that the Emergency Feedwater System was
able to perform its design functions for normal-and accident conditions.
05.1 Doerator Trainina and Qualification
a. Insoection Scone-(71707)
The inspectors observed a training drill in the simulator in which
operators responded to and recovered from a loss of all Alternating
Current (AC) power.
l
- ~J
.-
2
b. 0bservations and Findinas
On February 18. during an emergency drill, the~ inspectors observed-
operators in the control room simulator respond to and recover from a
loss of all AC power. The use of several Emergency 0perating Procedures
(EOP)_was observed. The inspectors observed good control and
communication by the control room staff in response to the simulated.
emergency.
^c. Conclusions
During an emergency drill operators exhibited good control and
communications while implementing emergency operating procedures.
II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 -General Comments
a. Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following
work activities:
- Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet (PMTS) 9720546. Diesel Generator
(DG) Area B Ventilation . Air Supply Fan B Motor.
- PMTS 9720906, Operational Check of the B DG 7.2 kV Breaker.
. Work Request (WR) 9800106. Rework Welds on A Charging Pump.
- PMTS 9721556. A Charging Pump Motor Preventative Maintenance.
- PMTS 9720077. Lubrication Check on Turbine Driven Emergency
- PMTS 9714612. Lubrication Check on TDEFW Pump Turbine.
- .. WR 9719148. Add, Adjust, or Repack TDEFW Pump Turbine Steam Supply
Valve.
.- PMTS 9712339. Disassemble. Clean, and Reset TDEFW Pump Turbine
Lube.011. System-Relief Valve,
e WR 9719205, Repair or Replace TDEFW Pump Local Discharge Pressure
Indicator.
= WR 9801886, Troubleshoot. Train A Sequencer
C- __
.
3
b. Observations and Findinas
The observed maintenance activities were performed as required by the
applicable. procedures. Proper tools and equipment were at the job site
and used in an appropriate manner. ~The maintenance technicians were
knowledgeable and demonstrated good maintenance practices. Good
coordination of work activities for different tasks on the same
equipment was noted.
c. Conclusions
Maintenance activities associated with the B diesel generator. the A
and the
charging pump, thewere
train A sequencer turbine driven emergency
performed feedwater
in accordance pump,ble
with applica
procedures. Good maintenance practices and coordination of work
activities ~were noted.
M1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Flow Rate Measurement
a. Insoection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors reviewed and observed the performance of Surveillance
Test Procedure (STP)-205.002, "RCS Flow Rate Measurement." Revision 7.
.The purpose of this test was to determine the total RCS flow rate to
ensure compliance with Technical Specification (TS) surveillance
requirement'4.2.3.5. This test is performed at least once per 18
months.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed the methodology and data gathering performed
during the RCS flow rate measurement test to determine the adequacy of
this effort. The plant was maintained in a steady state condition and
precision data was obtained for feedwater venturi differential pressure,
feedwater temperature, steam pressure. RCS temperature. RCS pressure.
<
and other required parameters. This data was then used to calculate
feedwater flow rate, steam enthalay. Steam Generator (SG) heat rate. RCS
inlet and outlet enthalpy, and otler necessary values for each of the
three loops. Finally, the RCS flow rate in each loop was calculated and
a total RCS flow rate of 303.590 gallons per minute (gpm) was obtained.
The acceptance criteria, specified in Section 9.0 of STP-205.002, was a
minimum of 283.600 gpm and a maximum of 321.300 gpm. The calculated
flow rate was well within the acceptance criteria. The inspectors
-
reviewed the data sheets and the calculations and identified no concerns
with the performance _of this surveillance test.
c. Conclusions
'
The surveillance test performed to obtain the total reactor coolant
system flow rate was adequate. The test was performed in accordance
,,
.
4
with the approved procedure and the results were within the acceptance
criteria.
M1.3 Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Actuation Test
a. Insoection Scooe (61726)
The inspectors observed the >erformance of STP-345.037 " Solid State
Protection System Actuation _ogic and Master Relay Test. Train A."
Revision 14. This procedure was revised on January 23, 1998.-to include
information supplied by Westinghouse in a Technical Bulletin (ESBU-TB-
97-09) dated December 30. 1997.
b. Observations and Findinas
The licensee performed STP-345.037 to functionally verify that the Train
A SSPS and the automatic actuation logic and relays were operable, and
to verify the response time of A reactor trip breaker. The inspectors
observed this test to assess the effectiveness of additional steps
placed in the procedure to test a portion of an SSPS circuit that had
not been previously tested. Westinghouse notified the licensee that the
feedwater isolation memory circuit and the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power
Range Neutron Flux Interlock) source range block memory circuit may not
have been fully tested during previous semi-automatic testing of the
system. The concerns described in the technical bulletin were not plant
specific since there are significant differences in SSPS logic between
Westinghouse plants. This required a detailed review of the V. C.
Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) SSPS drawings. The P-10 circuit problem
did not apply to VCSNS because the source range nuclear instruments
remain energized throughout power operation of the reactor.
The feedwater isolation circuit at VCSNS did require additional testing
to fully verify its proper operation. The feedwater isolation circuit
consists of three inputs: Safety Injection (SI). SG Hi-Hi water level,
and reactor trip (P-4). Of.these inputs. the SI and SG Hi-Hi water
level inputs are further divided on the logic card so as to provide two
identical signals for each input. This results in five input circuits
on the logic card, each being passed through an isolation diode. This
. logic card provides a feedwater isolation signal when two input signals
are present. Previous testing techniques tested only the following
combinations of inputs:
- SI with reactor trip
- SG Hi-Hi water level with reactor trip
Using this testing arrangement, a failed isolation diode in either the
SI or SG Hi-Hi water level. inputs would not be identified. The test
procedure was revised to reset the reactor trip input and to test the SI
input by itself and the SG Hi-Hi water level. input by itself in addition
-
.
5
to the three combinations described above. Each of these inputs would
sup)ly two input signals and should result in a feedwater isolation if
bot 1 circuits were functioning properly. This revised testing technique
effectively tested all five isolation diodes and circuits using existing
test equipment.
The inspectors reviewed the revised test procedure and observed the
performance of the test using the revised procedure on January 30, 1998.
The technicians performing the test were knowledgeable and successfully
completed each ste) as required. No concerns were identified with the
revision or with t1e performance of the test.
This testing issue was originally identified by another utility on
November 11, 1997, and reported to the industry on November 14. 1997.
The Engineered Safety Feature ActLation System (ESFAS) automatic
actuation logic and relays are required to be operable in accordance
with TS 3.3.2 and are required to be demonstrated operable in accordance
with TS 4.3.2.1. The NRC is reviewing this issue to determine if
previous testing satisfied the TS requirements, if the licensee complied
with TS once initially notified of this potential testing inadequacy,
and if 10 CFR 50.73 reporting requirements were followed. The
licensee's position on this issue was that 3revious TS surveillance
testing had satisfied TS requirements and tie SSPS testing changes they
implemented were enhancements to the testing methodology. Pending
completion of this review, this issue is identified as an Unresolved
Item (URI) 50-395/98001-01.
c. Conclusions
Portions of the feedwater isolation logic circuit that had not been
areviously tested were adequately incorporated into Solid State
protection System testing procedures. An unresolved item was identified
pending a review of SSPS Technical Specifications operability and
testing requirements.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (62706)
M8.1 (Closed) IFI 50-395/97002-01: Maintenance Rule scoping of Systems.
Structures and Components (SSCs) used in E0Ps. During the Maintenance
Rule baseline inspection, the inspectors identified several SSCs in the
E0Ps that were not included in the scope of the licensee's Maintenance
Rule arogram. At the time of the Maintenance Rule baseline inspection.
the NRC had recently issued new guidance. Regulatory Guide 1.160.
Revision 2. concerning incorporation of equipment used in E0Ps into
Maintenance Rule programs. Thus at that time, the licensee was in the
process of reviewing this new guidance and incorporating it into their
)rogram. The licensee has now re-scoped the SSCs in their Maintenance
tule program by completing a line-by-line review of the E0PS. Results
of this re-scoping were inspected by reviewing a list of SSCs that were
added to the Maintenance Rule program and reviewing a listing of
. specific SSCs which were not added as a result of the licensee's
. classification of these as "non-significant" during re-scoping. No
_-
.
-
6
deficiencies were noted while reviewing the re-scoping effort. The
inspectors also verified that the specific SSCs discussed in the
baseline ins)ection report had been included in the scope of the
Maintenance Rule program. Additionally, the inspectors verified that
the historical review had been com)leted for these SSCs, that
performance criteria had been estaalished, and that monitoring of the
SSCs was being accomplished. Based on this inspection, the licensee's
corrective actions for re-scoping of E0P SSCs in the Maintenance Rule
program were determined to be adequate.
M8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-395/97002-03: failure to take appropriate corrective
action for an (a)(1) Structure, System, or Component (SSC). During the
Maintenance Rule baseline inspection, the inspectors identified that the
licensee had not taken appropriate corrective action for repetitive
failures of several leak detection switches which had been classified as
(a)(1) under the Maintenance Rule. The licensee's response to the
violation attributed the problem to noncompliance with Station
Administrative Procedure (SAP)-1141. "Nonconformance Control Program,"
and action taken for Nonconformance Control Notice (NCN)-5304. This
procedure required that NCNs be implemented or routed to System and
Component Engineering for re-evaluation within 90 days of issuance.
Corrective action for this deficiency was taken by CER 97-0476 which was
issued during the baseline inspection. Corrective actions included
review and correction of all open NCNs having similar conditions,
revision of SAP-1141 to assign s
compliance with the 90-day rule,pecific responsibility for trackingand replacem
an improved model.
In order to evaluate the corrective actions for this violation, the
inspectors reviewed the actions taken from the licensee's responses,
dated July 17 and December 19. 1997 Additionally the NCN and CER were
reviewed for proper corrective action and closure. The inspectors noted
that the CER provided objective evidence of the licensee's review for
other similar existing conditions. The inspectors verified that the
revision to SAP-1141 assigned tracking responsibility for the 90-day
rule as committed to in the violation response. The inspectors also
reviewed the design change for re)lacement of the level switches. The
inspectors compared the old switc1 design to the new design, and
concluded that the new switches should prove to be more reliable. The
design change addressed a population of 40 switches. Thirty-two of the
switches had already been replaced. Three switches were scheduled to be
deleted due to no emergency core cooling Jiping running through those I
s ) aces. Five switches were scheduled to 3e replaced by June 30, 1998. 1
T1e inspectors reviewed the failure history of these five switches and
determined that they had ex)erienced only one failure since 1993. The
inspectors reviewed the'worc orders that replaced the switches addressed
in the violation, verified they had been replaced with the new switches. 4
and reviewed the plans to replace the remaining switches. Based on this
. inspection, the licensee's corrective actions for the level switches
were determined to be adequate,
i
I
!
a
.
.
7
III. Enaineerina
El Conduct of Engineering-
El.1 Relief Valve Inservice Testina (IST) Proaram
a. Insoection Scooe'(37551)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Inservice Test (IST) program for
valves as described in General Test Procedure (GTP)-302. " Inservice
Testing of Valves., Second Ten Year Interval." Revision 9. The licensee
-identified an apparent difference between the relief valve testing
program and the applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME)Section XI Code requirements. This finding was documented on
Condition Evaluation Report (CER) 98-0075 dated January 22. 1998,
b. Observations and Findinas
- On January 1.1994, the licensee began the second ten year interval for
inservice testing. At that time, the licensee committed to the
requirements contained in the 1989 Edition of the ASME Section XI Code,
no addenda. This edition refers to Operations and Maintenance (0M)-1.
" Requirements for Inservice Performance Testing of Nuclear Power Plant i
Pressure Relief Devices," for the testing of applicable safety and
relief valves. When the second ten year interval began, the licensee
revised GTP-302 to reflect the new requirements contained in the later
edition of the ASME Section XI Code.
The IST requirements for relief valve testing were detailed in GTP-302.
These requirements were consistent with the re
the applicable ASME Section XI Code and OM-1. quirements
In addition. GTP-302 contained in
contained a table listing all valves which were required to be tested in
accordance with this procedure. A total of 86 valves were classified as
safety / relief valves. For each valve included in the IST program an
STP was referenced as the procedure to be used to implement the testing
requirements.
The licensee identified an apparent inconsistency between the
requirements for relief valve testing contained in GTP-302 and the
testing performed in accordance with the applicable STP. As an example,
GTP-302. Section 5.4.4 " Pressure Relief Device Testing." Paragraph D.
" Periodic Testing," Subparagra)h 4.b. states. in part. that the
,
following_ requirements are to 3e met during-testing of Class 2 and 3
pressure relief devices: visual examination. seat tightness testing,
set pressure determination and determination of compliance with seat
tightness criteria. However, the implementing test procedure listed for
many of the relief valves was STP-401.003. " Code Relief Valves ASME XI
Test." Revision 4 which did not address visual inspection, seat
tightness testing, or determination of compliance with seat tightness
criteria. In' addition. Section 1.0 of STP 401.003, states that this
procedure is specific for the letdown flow control header relief valve
'.
-
.
8
(XVR08117-CS): but as stated earlier. this STP is referenced for many of
the relief valves in the IST program.
Another concern documented in CER 98-0075 was that the procedures used
to conduct relief valve testing were not the procedures referenced in
GTP-302. Many relief valves were tested using Mechanical Maintenance
Procedure (MMP)-445.005. " Maintenance. Repair and Testing of Relief
Valves." Revision 13. This procedure contains steps to disassemble.
. rework reassemble, and test relief valves. However, this was not the
procedure that was specified to be used to perform the ASME required IST
testing. Work that was accomplished under MMP-445.005 may satisfy the
ASME test requirements that were not performed by the specific
referenced procedures, however, at the end of the inspection period the
licensee had not completed their review and were not able to make this
determination.
In response to the concerns documented on CER 98-0075. the licensee
initiated a root cause analysis to determine why the ASME Section XI
Code requirements for the second ten year interval were not effectively
translated into implementing procedures. In addition the licensee
initiated a complete valve IST program review to determine if all ASME
. requirements are included in the IST program and that the valves listed
as subject to IST testing is complete and accurate. Pending completion
of these efforts, this issue is identified as URI 50-395/98001-02.
c. Conclusions
An unresolved item was identified concerning inconsistencies between
relief valve testing requirements in the valve inservice test program
controlling procedure and the referenced implementing test procedures.
The licensee is reviewing the actual testing that was performed on
relief valves to determine if the applicable ASME Section XI testing
requirements were satisfied.
El.2 Diesel Fuel In.iection Pumo Stud Insoection
a. Insoection Scooe (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's engineering efforts concerning a
broken B Diesel Generator (DG) fuel injection pump tappet assembly hold
down stud. The broken stud was identified during a routine preventive
maintenance task.
b. Observations'and Findinas
On January 12. 1998. the licensee performed Preventive Maintenance Task
Sheet (PMTS) 9720700 to inspect the fuel injection pump tappet assembly
hold down studs on the B DG. This task is performed every six months on
each DG and consists of inspecting a total of 24 studs per DG (two per
fuel injection Jump). During this inspection, a broken stud was
identified on tie number 2 fuel injection pump. The broken portion of
-
.
9
the stud along with'the attached nut was recovered.
A review of historical records revealed that a broken stud was
identified on the number 1 fuel injection pump on the B DG in January
1986. A second stud broke while adjusting the number 3 fuel injection
pump on the same DG at that same time. As a result of these two events.
the licensee instituted a PMTS to periodically inspect these studs. No
other broken studs were identified until the recent observation in
January 1998. The purpose of the studs was to secure the fuel injection
pump linkage adjustment to prevent movement.
When the broken stud was identified the licensee wrote NCN 98-0043 to
document the event and the corrective actions. The broken stud and nut
were replaced along with the associated intact stud and nut on the
number 2 fuel injection pump. This NCN disposition was discussed with
the DG vendor who concurred with the proposed course of action. The
engineering evaluation was sufficiently detailed to support the
corrective actions. The DG was successfully run following this work.
The inspectors considered the actions taken to be adequate and no
operability concerns were identified,
c. Conclusions
A review of the licensee's actions concerning a broken fuel injection
pump tappet assembly hold down stud on the B DG was considered adequate.
The engineering evaluation was sufficiently detailed to support the
corrective actions.
E1.3 Condensate Storaae Tank Volume
a. Insoection Scooe (37551)
The inspectors reviewed a discrepancy between the TS required Condensate
Storage Tank (CST) volume and the actual volume requirements,
b. Observations and Findinas
On February 12. the licensee identified a discrepancy between the actual
CST inventory requirements and the required TS volume of 172.700 gallons
stated in TS 3.7.1.3 " Condensate Storage Tank." The existing TS value
was based on a sum of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) required volume of
150.000 gallons arid the unusable volume of the tank calculated to be
approximately 22.700 gallons.
The required CST volume is based on sufficient water to cool the plant
to the point where the residual heat removal system can complete the
cooldown. The TS required inventory of 172.700 gallons, however, was
incorrect. Prior to the plant uprate in May 1996 the licensee
identified that the actual EFW required volume in the CST was 155,000
gallons. For the plant uprate, that raised maximum plant authorized
core power level from 2775 Megawatts thermal (Mwt) to 2900 Mwt. a new
CST volume of 158.570 gallons was identified to be. required for EFW.
.
.
l
10
This raised the total CST inventory that should have been specified in
the TS for EFW requirements to approximately 181.270 gallons. The
licensee failed to recognize the impact of the plant uprate and
corresponding increase in CST inventory on the fS and therefore did not
amend the TS or revise the appropriate plant procedures for the correct
required inventory in the CST.
During this review the inspectors identified that a note was incorrect
on the CST figure (Figure VI-12. dated 2/6/87) maintained in the curve
book in the control room. The note stated that volume below the EFW
pump suction is 12.302 gallons. This unusable volume has been
calculated by the licensee to be approximately 22.700 gallons. The
inspectors informed the licensee of this observation.
When this issue was identified the licensee prepared a Station Order
alerting plant operators to the actual required volume in the CST and
set an administrative low limit of 14 feet which corresponds to greater
than 181.270 gallons as measured by the CST level instrumentation. This
low limit ensures that the maximum CST volume for EFW would be
available. The licensee also recognized that the CST low level alarm
setpoint was incorrect and was preparing further action to revise this
setpoint. The licensee also performed a data review and determined that
level in the CST had not been below 19.5 feet since June 1. 1996. The
licensee stated that a TS amendment request would be submitted to
reflect the correct CST volume requirement. The licensee does not
believe the failure to properly translate CST volume requirements into
applicable plant documents is indicative of a problem with their
engineering processes or programs.
This failure to implement adequate design controls for the CST is a
violation. The licensee failed to correctly translate design basis
information into specifications procedures, and instructions. This
non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being
treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section VII.B.1
of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is identified as NCV 50-395/98001-
03.
c. Conclusions
A non-cited violation was identified concerning failures to correctly
translate condensate storage tank design basis information into
specifications, procedures, and instructions.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E8.1 (Ocen) Insoection Follow uo Item 50-395/97013-01: failure of the A DG
during a surveillance test. The A DG failed the monthly surveillance
test on November 11, 1997, due to load instability. The licensee began
troubleshooting the DG to determine if the )roblem was related to the
governor electronic control unit (EGA) or t1e hydraulic actuator (EGB).
Following some indeterminate testing, the licensee replaced both the EGA
and EGB. The licensee made several maintenance starts of the A DG and
l
<
-
.
11
made adjustments to the governor. The A DG was declared operable on
November 14 following a successful retest. The A DG failed the weekly
surveillance test on November 21 due to load instabilities that
prevented the diesel from being fully loaded. Trcubleshooting
identified high resistance across contacts of the Isochronous/ Droop
relay. Additionally, two contacts of the relay did not change state
when the relay was energized. The relay was replaced and the A DG was
declared operable on November 22. following a successful retest.
The A DG failed the weekly surveillance on December 2 due to load
instability. The load swings observed on this occasion were comparable
to those observed on November 11. During troubleshooting, the output of
the EGA was noted to be spiking. The EGA was replaced with a unit from
the warehouse. The licensee performed a maintenance run during which
the governor worked satisfactorily during the initial no load, loading,
and unloading conditions. However, when the output breaker was opened a
frequency swing was observed. Additional adjustments were performed to
attempt to obtain stable operations from the EGA and EGB. Stable
operation could not be achieved. Management decided to replace the
installed EGA with the previously removed EGA which had been refurbished
by the vendor. The A DG was declared operable on December 5. following
successful testing.
On December 30. a weekly surveillance of the A DG was conducted. The
diesel started and loaded properly. However, when the output breaker
was opened, significant frequency (speed) oscillations were observed.
The A DG was declared inoperable and a troubleshooting )lan was
initiated to address the aroblem. Troubleshooting of t1e EGA did not
identify any spiking of tie output. Following several EGB oil changes
oscillations were not observed. The A DG was started for additional
testing on January 1. 1998. After the output breaker was opened large
frequency swings were observed. The vendor service representative
believed that the cause of the problem was binding in the fuel racks or
the yield link. The yield link was replaced and the fuel rack linkages
at each injector pump and the cross connect members were inspected. No
binding was identified. Following a one hour run the diesel again
started to oscillate when its output breaker was opened. After this
occurrence, management decided to replace the EGB. Testing of the
diesel following the EGB replacement was performed and the governor was
adjusted. Three confidence runs were )erformed to assure the
oscillation problems were resolved. T1e data collected during these
runs indicated the A DG was ready for surveillance testing. All testing
was completed satisfactorily on January 5 and the A DG was declared
The ins)ectors reviewed the history of the EGAs and EGB: installed on A
DG and 1 eld discussions with the licensee's staff. The following issues
had been identified and were being addressed by the licensee.
Refurbishment by the vendor of the EGA units consisted of the
replacement of several Mylar and electrolytic ca)acitors. Three
potentiometers on the EGA were also replaced. W111e the aging of
capacitors was well known, problems with aging of the potentiometers was
-
.
t
12
not. The vendor had indicated that while the capacitors were replaced
due to an aging concern, there had been only one failure of an EGA unit
due to capacitor failure. The more frequent failure cause was that of
the potentiometers. One of the EGAs which had been refurbished failed
the licensee's bench test. The licensee returned the unit to the vendor
who then conducted a test similar to the licensee *s. The EGA failed
again. This test failure identified that the vendor did not test as
long as the licensee and that the failure.. spiking of te out
time to develop. The licensee also identified potential she'put.
f life took
concerns with the EGA and EGB units.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had conducted a thorough
review of the EGA and EGB failures. Several issues were still being
evaluated by the licensee, these included aging of components, failure
of an EGB unit, vendor testing methodolcgy, and governor upgrades. This
item remains open pending the completion of the licensee's review of
these. issues.
IV. Plant Suooort
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
RI.1 General Comments
The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of
tours and observation of maintenance activities and found them to be
-acceptable.
R1.2 Temocrary Shieldina Procram
a. Insoection Scooe (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's temporary shielding program. The i
licensee identified temporary shielding packages installed in the plant
for extended periods without the appropriate engineering evaluations.
b. Observations and Findinas
On February 5 the licensee identified in CER 98-129 that Health Physics
-(HP) procedural guidance on temporary shielding did not contain adequate
controls to ensure shielding was removed or received an engineering
review when it was installed longer than six months. Seven Temporary
Shielding Requests (TSRs) were identified that had been installed in the
plant longer than six months and had not received appropriate
' engineering evaluations.
The temporary shielding program is administered by HP through Health
Physics Procedure, (HPP)-819, " Temporary Shielding Evaluation.
Installation, and Removal," Revision 9. As part of the approval process
for temporary shielding. engineering performs a technical evaluation to
identify any special restrictions that may apply. Engineering
evaluations for TSRs are performed in accordance with Engineering
e
.
.
13
Services Procedure '(ES)-409, " Engineering Evaluation of Scaffolding.
-
Temporary Shielding and Designated Storage Area Change Requests."
Revision 3. The evaluations are performed on the basis that the
temporary shielding.will not be installed longer than the job duration
listed on the TSR cover sheet requesting the engineering evaluation.
Procedure ES-409 states, "If.the scaffolding or shielding is to remain
in place for longer than the lesser of the duration of the project or
six months it should be addressed as a ' Change to the facility'
requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to be completed conforming to the
requirements of our license and design basis." Procedure ES-409 states
that this can be accomplished through a permanent )lant modification.or
dispositioning a shielding evaluation with a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.
Two shielding packages installed on September 30, 1994 and October 1,
1994 were originally planned to be in place for one month during an
outage. Both TSRs were installed on safety related or quality related
pi)ing. The other five TSRs were installed in 1996 and early 1997 on
otler equipment in the plant including high dose radioactive waste
storage areas, temporary demineralizers, a waste processing high
integrity container, and the boron concentration measurement system.
The duration of the shielding requests varied from one month to six
months and two listed an " unknown" duration. Engineering evaluations
were performed for each of the TSRs. The engineering evaluations for
the two TSRs of unknown duration had no indication from engineering that
further review would be necessary after six months.
The inspectors concluded that this was a programmatic failure of the
temporary shielding program in that HPP-819 had not adequately
controlled or limited the time temporary shielding was installed or
referenced the engineering requirements that would address the shielding
as a change to the facility after it had remained in place for more than
six months. The inspectors also concluded that the interface between HP
and engineering was weak in that the engineering reviews for the TSRs
had not documented a time limitation on the TSRs although two of the
shielding requests reviewed by engineering had indicated they would be
installed for an unlimited duration. Procedure HPP-819 also requires a
tracking log. The status of temporary shielding was logged, however,
the log was not effective in maintaining the status of installed
shielding, and did not ensure shielding was removed once the job
duration on the TSR was exceeded. The inspectors also observed that
there were no periodic audit requirements of the installed temporary
shielding.
At the close of the inspection period, engineering was reviewing the
seven TSRs that had been installed greater than six months. A
preliminary review identified no concerns. The failure to establish
adequate controls for temporary shielding installed in the plant is
identified as a Violation (VIO) 50-395/98001-04.
_
I
+
.
.
14
c. Conclusions
A violation was identified involving a lack of adequate )rogrammatic
controls for temporary shielding.
place for longer than six monthsaswnotTemporary
evaluatedshielding tlat remained
in accordance with in
engineering requirements.
P5 ' Staff Training and Qualification in EP
P5,1 Observation of Emeroency Drill
, 'a. Insoection Scooe (71750)
The ins)ectors observed a training drill conducted in the simulator and
the Tec1nical Support Center (TSC).
b. . Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed a training emergency drill on February 18 from
the simulator control room and the TSC. The inspectors concluded that
the drill met its objectives and provided beneficial training to the
site emergency organization. The inspectors had one significant
observation. The Shift Supervisor (SS), acting as the interim Emergency
Director (ED), and the ED did not ap) ear to be familiar with the
guidelines for turning over responsi)ilities from the interim ED to the
ED. This turnover normally occurs when the TSC is activated and
staffed. The ED position was turned over before it should have
occurred. This led to confusion as to whom was responsible for
declaration of an emergency classification. The licensee also
recognized this drill discrepancy and is reviewing additional training.
c. Conclusions
An emergency drill met its objectives and provided beneficial training
to the site emergency organization.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed security activities including compensatory
measures during the conduct of plant tours and plant activities and
.found them to be acceptable.
S4 ' Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance
S4,l'. Attemoted Introduction of a Handoun into the Protected Area (PA)
P
gi -. r. -
.i. ........i . .
.
.
, , _ . . _ .
.
~
15
a. Insoection Scoce (71750)
-
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to an event'where an
individual attem)ted to introduce a handgun into the PA. This event was-
documented on CER 98-0078 and Security Incident Report (SIR) 980030.
b. Observations and Findinas
On January 24, a licensee employee attempting to enter the PA through
the access portal search area was found in possession of a handgun.
Requirements when entering the PA include placing all hand carried
articles on an X-Ray machine conveyor belt to allow a security officer
to ins)ect their contents. At 7:03 p.m. the security officer operating
the X-Ray equipment observed the image of a handgun on the monitor. The
officer took control of the bag containing the gun and conducted a
search of its contents. A handgun with ammunition was confiscated at
that time. The individual attempting to enter the PA was detained and
denied access. Central security was notified and the individual's badge
was deactivated to prevent access until an investigation could be
conducted.
An interview was conducted with the individual, the on-duty Shift
Supervisor, and security personnel. The individual stated that he had
inadvertently left the handgun in the bag and that he intended to leave
the gun in his personal vehicle. The gun was placed in the arms room
pending completion of the investigation. At 8:03 3.m. on January 24.
the licensee made a one hour notification to the NRC to describe this
event.
The licensee conducted an investigation to determine the facts
surrounding this event. The individual's work performance was reviewed
and a check with local law enforcement agencies was made to verify that
no recent law enforcement problems had occurred. No evidence of any
problems was discovered that would indicate anything other than an
inadvertent action as stated by the individual. The individuals access
was reinstated following the conclusion.of the investigation. On
January 26 at 11:46 a.m.. the licensee retracted the NRC notification
and classified the event as a security logable event. The inspectors
reviewed this event and did not identify any concerns. The licensee's
actions to identify the handgun, deny access to the individual. and
conduct a thorough investigation was appropriate. Security personnel
demonstrated good knowledge of the requirements for such an event and
performed in accordance with established procedures.
c. Conclusions
'The licensee's actions following an inadvertent attempted introduction
of.a handgun into the protected area were appropriate. Security
personnel demonstrated good knowledge and performance during this event.
i
'
-
.
16
F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment
- F2.1 Doerability of Fire Protection Facilities and Eouioment (64704)
a. Insoection Scooe
The-inspectors reviewed the fire protection impairment log for fire
protection components and the o)en ~ maintenance work requests on fire
protection features to assess t1e licensee's performance for maintaining
fire protection components in service. In addition, walkdown
inspections were made to assess the material condition of fire
protection systems, equipment. features and fire brigade equipment.
b. Observations and Findinos
(1) Ooerability of Fire Protection Eauioment and Comoonents
As of February 13, there were no fire protection components listed
in the impairment log as degraded. There were 19 open maintenance
work requests of which 11 involved components designed to provide
protection for safety-related components. These work requests
were less than one year old, did not result in any component being
inoperable and were to correct minor problems, such as leaking
valves.
The inspectors reviewed the system engineer's monthly assessment
of the fire protection systems. Prior to March 1997, the system
engineer's assessments of the fire protection systems were graded
" Yellow" or considered to be in need of increased management and
maintenance attention due to the number and type of identified
problems. In March 1997, the system engineer's assessment of the
fire protection systems was changed from " Yellow" to " Green"
(good) due to performance improvements. This change was due to
completion of the modifications to the fire detection system,
resolution of corrective maintenance problems affecting several
fire protection components and the lack of any new identified
inoperable or significant maintenance issues on the fire
protection systems. The system engineer's assessment of the fire
protection system's performance has remained good since March
1997.
During tours of the plant, the inspectors noted that the material
condition of the fire protection features was good and the systems
,
were well maintained.
(2) Fire Briaade Eauioment
The turnout gear for the fire brigade members was stored in
lockers on elevation 412 of the control building and on elevation
436 of the turbine building. A sufficient number of turnout gear,
'"
consisting of helmets, coats, pants, boots, gloves, etc.. was
<
provided to equip fire brigade members expected to respond in the
m
'i 4
h,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _
-
,
l
17
cvent of a fire or other emergency. . The equipment was properly
stored and well maintained. ;
c. Conclusions
The low number of inoperable or degraded fire protection components, in
conjunction with the good material condition of the fire protection ,
com)onents and fire brigade equipment, indicated that appro)riate ;
emplasis was placed on the maintenance and operability of t1e fire i
protection equipment and components.
F2.2 Surveillance of Fire Protection Features and Eouioment .
I
a. Insoection Scooe (64704)
The inspectors reviewed STP-728.049, " Intermediate Building Elevations
426'-422' Fire Barrier Inspection." Revision 3, and the following i
'
completed surveillance and test procedures for compliance to the
requirements of the NRC approved commitments in the " Summer Fire ,
Protection Evaluation Report":
-
STP-128.021. " Fire w rvice Three Year Flow Test." Revision 10.
Completed September 26, 1997,
1
- STP-728.038, " Auxiliary Building Elevation 426*-451' Fire Barrier
Inspections." Revision 2. Completed November 6. 1996. l
l
- STP-728.043. " Control Building Elevation 448' Fire Barrier l
Inspection.~ Revision 2. Completed August 27, 1996. I
- STP-728.048. " Intermediate Building Elevation 436' Fire Barrier I
Inspection." Revision 3. Completed November 18, 1997. l
b. Observations and Findinas l
Twenty procedures were developed for the surveillance inspection of fire
barriers. The inspection ~ procedures, acceptance criteria, and data
documentation requirements for these procedures were essentially the
same. The ins for the fire barriers on
elevation 422'pectors
-426' of reviewed STP-728.049
the intermediate building. The procedure I
included a sketch of the walls to be inspected, penetration location,
and data sheets identifying each element to be inspected. The
inspectors considered these surveillance inspection procedures to be of
excellent quality.
The completed fire barrier surveillance procedures reviewed by the
inspectors had been com)leted appropriately and met the acceptance
criteria. Work orders lad been properly submitted for identified
. discrepancies.and the discrepancies had been reinspected following
' completion of the required repairs. The licensee was performing an
-inspection every 18 months of all fire barriers and fire barrier
penetrations. The " Summer Fire Protection Evaluation Report" only
_
..________________.________-__m_.____
..
... .. .. . . . .
. .. .
.
.
-
.
18
required an inspection of 10 percent of the fire barrier penetrations
every 18 months. The inspection of all penetrations each 18 months was
considered a positive feature in the implementation of the fire
- protection program to assure operability.of the fire barriers.
In the early 1990's, portions of the facility's fire protection water
distribution system were found to be partially obstructed due to
interior plaing corrosion. This piping was cleaned and, subsequently.
i flow tests lad been performed annually to evaluate the performance of
the piping system. The inspectors reviewed completed STP-128.021 which
was performed on September 26, 1997. This procedure required
comprehensive flow tests of the fire protection water distribution ;
system and evaluations of the flow test data. The 1997 test data
indicated that a sufficient quantity of water was available to meet the
fire protection demands. In addition, the data did not indicate any.
a)preciable pressure drop or flow reduction from the 1996 test data.
T1e licensee stated that they were planning to continue flow tests and
evaluations to monitor system performance. ,
!
c. Conclusions
Excellent surveillance inspection and test procedures were provided for
the fire barriers and fire protection water distribution system.
F2.3 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals (64704)
a. Insoection Scooe
The ir spectors reviewed a sample of the facility's fire barrier
penetration seal installations to determine if the installed penetration
seals met the design documents and were bound by configurations which i
had satisfactorily passed a fire test that met the requirements of NRC
Generic Letter 86-10 and NRC Information Notices 88-04, 88-56 and 95-24.
b. Observations and Findinas
' The inspectors inspected each of the following fire barrier penetration
seals and reviewed the licensee's design and referenced test report for
each seal:
PEN. LOCATION SIZE SEAL TEST REPORT COMMENTS
TRACE IN CONFIGURATION N0./ Design
NO. INCHES
AB-236 Wall between Control 43x75' 18" silicone without Carborumdum 1/ Engineering -
and Auxiliary 61dgs. damming boards. 9" silicone avaluation I
and Rooms CB 12-03 with damming required. l
and AB 12 17 boards.
_-_ ___ _ -__-_____- _____ - _- ____-__ _ - ____ -_ ____ __ - _ _ - __ - _ -
1
.
.
19
PEN. LOCATION SIZE SEAL TEST REPORT COMMENTS
TRACE IN 'CCNFIGURATION NO./ Design
NO. INCHES
CB 1237 Wall between Rooms CB 30x72 10" Silicone without BISCO . Tested with 1"
12-03 and CB 12-04 daming boards. 1064-10 overlap on each
9 3/4" Silicone side of a wall.
without daming Installed with 2"
boards, overlap on one side
of a wall.
Evaluation
required.
18 206' Wall between Rooms IB 28x27 10" Silicone and 3" PCA-0CT 76 PCA-0CT 76 failed
36-02 and IB 36-03 B1500 elastomer 9" Silicone tha test. Requires
pressure seal without daming evaluation,
without daming boards,
boards18-335 Wall between Rooms IB 10x30 10" Silicone without BISCO Tested with 1"
36-02 and IB 36 04 daming boards. 1064-10 overlap on each
9 3/4" silicone side of a wall.
without daming installed with 2"
boards, overlap on one side
of a wall
Evaluation
required.
IB-471 Floor between Rooms 9" 10" Silicone with 3" BISCO Evaluation
IB 36-03 sleeve elastomer pressure 748-49 required,
and IB 26-02 seal. 12" Silicone.18-472 Floor between Rooms 15x48 10" Silicone with BISCO Evaluation
IB 36-03 and IB 26-02 34" elastomer 748-220 required.
pressure seal. 9" Silicone
with 1" daming
board.
In late 1997, the licensee initiated a project to evaluate all of the
facility's fire barrier penetration seals to determine if the "As Built"
configurations met the design requirements. The evaluation will
determine if the seals are either bound by a tested configuration or
justified by an engineering evaluation. Discrepancies will be corrected
or additional evaluations will be performed. Previously, in 1987.'the
licensee identified a number of fire barrier penetrations which did not
meet the design or test requi>ements. This issue was resolved by
performing engineering evalur.tinns to justify the installation of
approximately 21 seals and upgradng or modifying approximately 15
penetration seals. The current preiect will reevaluate this issue and
provide enhanced documentation on the facility's fire barrier
penetration-seals. This project was scheduled to be completed in April-
1999.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed a sample of the various
types of penetration seals installed at the facility. The design of
penetration seals inspected.did not fully conform to the referenced fire
test for the seals. It appeared that an evaluation was required for the
.
20
seals which were different from an acceptable tested configuration to
justify that these seals would perform their design function. These
penetration seals did not meet the basis of the design due to one or
more of the following:
. Penetration size exceeded the tested penetration size.
- Penetration seals' free space exceeded the free space of the
tested configuration.
. Seal configuration was different from tested configurations i.e.,
tested configurations extended one-inch on both sides of the
barrier whereas the installed configuration was flush on one side
of the barrier and extended two-inches on the other side of the
barrier.
. Seal penetration was of a different configuration (cable trays in
lieu of a pipe) than the tested configuration.
. Installed penetration seals utilized an elastomer pressure seal
material on one side of the seal, whereas the tested i
configuration did not utilize the elastomer material. i
The licensee stated that evaluations for configuration differences were
probably performed; however, these evaluations were difficult to locate
and retrieve. Evaluations previously performed for penetration seals
which did not meet the design and tested configurations were documented
by a number of different means such as vendor work packages,
modification packages, field change requests to installation
modification or design packages, condition reports, engineering change
requests, request for engineering evaluations, engineering information
requests, etc. The licensee's fire barrier penetration seal
revalidation project would locate each of these evaluations and
assimilate and document this information for future retrieveability.
During the plant tours and inspection of the above penetration seals,
the inspectors noted that the penetration seals appeared to be well
maintained. In addition, all penetration seals were being inspected
every 18 months by the licensee's surveillance program. Any identified
discrepancies were repaired. Based on the licensee's efforts to
maintain the as-built configuration for seal barrier seals and the
extent of differences between the test reports and the actual plant
penetrations seals, the inspectors concluded that this issue was not an
immediate concern. The licensee's completed fire barrier penetration
seal revalidation project will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC
inspection and will be tracked as an Inspecticn Followup Item (IFI)
50-395/98001-05.
c. Conclusions
Evaluations to 'iustify the differences between as-built fire barrier
penetrationsealsandcorrespondingtestreportswerenotreadily
.
.
21
available. Based on the inspector's reviews, no immediate concerns
exist. The licensee has initiated a project to: 1) review all fire
barrier penetration seals for conformance to the design requirements and
referenced fire tested configurations: 2) enhance design basis
documentation for the seals; and 3) correct any identified
discrepancies.
F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification
F5.1 Fire Briaade (64704)
a. Insnection Scoce
The inspectors reviewed the fire brigade organization and training
3rogram for compliance with the NRC approved " Summer Fire Protection
Evaluation Report."
b. Observations and Findinas
The site fire brigade organization and training requirements were
implemented by Procedure FPP-026. " Fire /HAZMAT Response." Revision 2.
Each fire brigade member was required to receive initial, quarterly and
annual fire fighting training and to satisfactorily complete an annual
medical evaluation and certification for partici)ation in fire brigade
fire fighting activities. In addition, each memaer was required to
participate in at least one fire brigade drill per year.
At the time of this inspection. 64 operations personnel and 31
maintenance personnel were on the plant's fire brigade. A sufficient
number of personnel was available to meet the staffing requirements for
the facility's operational requirements and the fire brigade complement
of one team leader and at least five members per shift.
The inspectors reviewed the fire brigade organization training and
medical records for the fire brigade members and verified that the
training and medical records were up-to-date. Additional information on
the review of the fire brigade program is located in Section F8.1. l
The inspectors witnessed a fire brigade drill on February 12. 1998.
involving a simulated fire in the Auxiliary Boiler Building east of the
power block com) lex. The response of the fire brigade to the simulated
fire included t1e fire brigade leader, three brigade members from
operations and five brigade members from maintenance. Two security
officers and two maintenance employees also responded to the fire scene.
The fire brigade members responded to the fire in full turnout gear and
with self contained breathing apparatus. The response was timely and
the brigade demonstrated the proper use of fire fighting equipment and
tactics. Comraunications between the brigade leader, the control room
and brigade members were good. The fire brigade leader's direction and
performance were also good. A critique to discuss the brigade
performance and recommendations for future enhancement was held
following the drill.
i
-
.
22
c. Conclusions
'
The fire brigade organization and training were up-to-date and met the
requirements of the site procedure. The fire brigade demonstrated good
response and fire fightirg performance during a simulated fire brigade
drill.
F8 Hiscellaneous Fire Protection Issues (92904)
F8.1 (Closed) URI 50-395/96011-07: fire brigade personnel were not required
to participate in at least two fire brigade drills per year. The
licensee's commitment to comply with the fire brigade organization and
training guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB
9.5-1. " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed
Prior to July 1. 1976. and the 1977 document entitled Nuclear Plant
Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities. Administrative Controls and
Quality Assurance" were reviewed and approved by the NRC in the NRC's
Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1981. These documents required
the fire brigade to participate in drills but did not specify the number
of drills to be performed per year. Procedure FPP-026. " Fire /HAZMAT
Res'onse."
- Revision 2. requires fire brigade drills to be performed once
eac1 quarter for each operating shift and for all brigade members to
participate in at least one drill per year. The inspectors reviewed the
drills performed during 1997 and verified that each operations shift
participated in a fire brigade drill at least once per quarter.
Additional special drills were performed as needed to permit all
operations and maintenance personnel assigned to the fire brigade to
participate in at least one drill per year. The licensee was in
compliance with the fire brigade licensing requirements: therefore, this
unresolved item is closed.
F8.2 (Closed)IFI 50-395/96011-06: resolution of battery failures on 8-hour
Appendix R emergency lighting units. The licensee had enhanced the
)reventive maintenance and surveillance requirements for the 8-hour
)attery-powered emergency lighting units. Also, the Appendix R 8-hour
emergency lighting units had been added to the components covered by the
Maintenance Rule and a 95 percent operability requirement had been
established for these units. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
reliability trending data for these lights and noted that the failure
rate for the past 18 months was 1.9 percent.
The licensee stated that the operability of the battery powered lighting
units was to continue as a part of the Maintenance Rule requirements.
This should assure a high operability level for these lighting units is
maintained and addresses the inspectors' previous concerns.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors aresented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on February 27, 1998.
.
.
23
The licensee acknowledged the findines presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
' Licensee
F. Bacon Manager. Chemistry Services
L. Blue. Manager. Health Physics
S. Byrne. General Manager. Nuclear Plant Operations
R. Clary Manager. Quality Systems
M. Fowlkes. Manager. Operations
S. Furstenberg. Manager. Maintenance Services
D. Lavigne. General Manager Nuclear. Support Services
.G. Moffatt. Manager. Design Engineering
K. Nettles. General Manager. Strategic Planning and Development
H. O'Quinn, Manager. Nuclear Protection Services
A. Rice. Manager. Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience
G. Taylor. Vice President. Nuclear Operations
R. Waselus Manager.-Systems and Component Engineering
R. White. Nuclear Coordinator. South Carolina Public Service Authority
B. Williams General Manager. Engineering Services
G. Williams. Associate Manager. Operations
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
i? 62706: Maintenance Rule
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 64704: Fire Protection Program
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support
ITEMS OPENED CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED i
Ooened
50-395/98001-01 URI review solid state protection system TS operability
and' testing requirements (Section M1.3)
50-395/98001-02 URI relief valve testing requirement inconsistencies in
the valve inservice testing program controlling-
procedure and the referenced implementing test {
procedures (Section E1.1) j
50-395/98001-03 NCV failure to correctly translate condensate storage
tank design basis information into specifications.
-
.
24
procedures, and instructions (Section E1.3)-
50-395/98001-04 VIO failure to establish adequate programmatic controls
for temporary shielding'(Section R1.2)
50-395/98001-05 IFI licensee's completed fire barrier penetration seal-
revalidation project will be reviewed (Section F2.3)
Closed
50-395/97002-01 IFI Maintenance Rule scoping of systems, structures and
components used in emergency operating procedures
(Section M8.1)
'50-395/97002-03 VIO failure to take appropriate corrective action for an
(a)(1) structure, system, or component (Section M8.2)
50-395/98001-03 NCV failure to correctly translate condensate storage
tank design basis information into specifications,
procedures, and instructions-(Section E1.3)
50-395/96011-07 URI fire brigade personnel were not required to
participate in at least two fire brigade drills per
year (Section F8.1)
'50-395/96011-06 IFI resolution of battery failures on 8-hour-Appendix R
emergency lighting units (Section F8.2)
Discussed
50-395/97013-01 IFI failure of the A diesel generator during a
surveillance test (Section E8.1)
c
L