ML20128K010
| ML20128K010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128J985 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-96-09, 50-395-96-9, NUDOCS 9610100262 | |
| Download: ML20128K010 (23) | |
See also: IR 05000395/1996009
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No.-
50-395
License No..
Report No.
50-395/96-09
Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) Company
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Facility:
V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
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Location:
P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville. SC 29065
Dates:
July 21 - September 7, 1996
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Inspectors:
B. Bonser. Senior Resident Inspector
T. Farnholtz. Resident Inspector
R. Gibbs. Reactor Inspector RII (Section M1.1)
C. Ogle. Senior Resident Inspector. Vogtle (Section E8.1)
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Approved by:
G. Belisle. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
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ENCLOSURE 2
9610100262 961004
ADOcK 05000395
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-395/96-09
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations.
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maintenance, engineering, and plant support.
The report covers a 7 week
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period of resident insaection: in addition. it includes the results of
announced inspections ]y a regional reactor inspector and a senior resident
inspector from Vogtle.
Ooerations
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The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation for failure to establish
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an approved procedure for determining the source of leakage on a power
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operated relief valve tailpipe high temperature alarm (Section 02.2).
The inspectors' review of the operator work around 3rogram concluded
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that appropriate compensatory actions had been esta31ished for each of
the safety significant deficient conditions and that in the aggregate.
they did not pose a significant challenge to operator performance. The
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inspectors considered this program to be useful and effective in
identifying and acting upon deficient conditions (Section 04.1).
A review of two plant transients during the inspection period concluded
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that control room operators had demonstrated good piant awareness and
knowledge.
During normal operations, two examples of poor operator
awareness were identified. A component cooling water pump switch on the
main control board was slightly out of position and not showing the
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proper flag and six status lights on the main control board were not
functioning properly (Section 04.2).
A Non-Cited Violation was identified concerning an operator starting a
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centrifugal charging pump without first establishing the required
component cooling water flow (Section 04.2).
Based on attending two Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) meetings
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during the inspection period, the inspectors concluded that the
requirements of the applicable sections of the Technical Specifications
and the station administrative procedure were met.
The inspectors noted
that the PSRC review of a Licensee Event Report (LER) was done after the
LER had already been issued (Section 07.1).
Maintenance
An overview inspection of the maintenance area provided a favorable
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impression of the overall maintenance program at V. C. Summer.
Personnel appeared to be well qualified for their positions. work areas
were orderly and well maintained. the plant material condition was
excellent. and procedures were clear and concise.
The existence of a
number of health pnysics drip funnels in tne plant indicated a lack of
maintenance action to correct system leakage problems (Section M1.1).
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All observed surveillance activities were conducted in a arofessional
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manner and resulted in a high degree of confidence that t1e tested
components would perform as designed (Section M2.1).
A weakness in the revision process for safety related Instrument &
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Calibration procedures was identified and illustrated by two examples.
Both examples involved a change in the plant that was not correctly
implemented in the appropriate procedure.
The inspectors also concluded
that the licensee was appropriately identifying and documenting problems
in this area (Section M3.1).
The inspectors identified a violation of Technical Specification
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Sutveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1.a. Weekly Battery Surveillance. The
surveillance was performed while the B battery was on an equalize charge
and not on a float charge as specified in the Technical Specification
Surveillance Requirement (Section M3.2).
Enaineerina
The inspectors observed and reviewed the work done on the turbine driven
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emergency feedwater pump to correct a low speed oscillation and
determined that it was adequate.
Post-maintenance testing and
surveillance testing were satisfactory (Section E2.1).
The inspectors did not identify any concerns regarding the calibration
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or operation the post-accident hydrogen analyzers (Section E2.2).
Plant Suocort
The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of
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tours and observation of maintenance activities and found them to be
acceptable (Section R1.1).
The licensee continued to maintain the reauired radiation monitors in an
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operable condition (Section R2.1).
The licensee prepared the emergency response team adequately and readied
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the plant to minimize the risk and potential damage to plant facilities
from potential high winds and rain expected from hurricane Fran. The
inspectors also observed that plant management had fully supported all
emergency preparations (Section Pl.1).
The inspectors observed security and safeguards activities during the
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conduct of tours and observation of maintenance activities and found
them to be good.
Compensatory measures were posted when necessary and
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properly conducted (Section 51.1).
a Non-Cited V olation '..as "dert m d ' r ? e '311ure to ccg ensate for
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inoperable fire barriers in the Intermediate Building (Section F4.1).
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Report Details
Summarv of Plant Status
Unit 1 began this inspection period at 100 percent power.
On August 4. power
was reduced to 70 percent due to the loss of a circulating water pump. The
plant returned to full power on August 11 after repair of the circulating
water pump motor and remained at that level for the remainder of the
inspection period.
I.
Doerations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707 the inspectors conducted frequent
reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general, the conduct of
operations was professional and safety-conscious; specific events and
noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Plant Walkdowns
The inspectors toured accessible plant areas.
Major components were
visually inspected to identify any general conditions that might degrade
system operation.
During plant tours the inspectors checked the
containment isolation lineup by verifying that all penetrations not
capable of being closed by automatic isolation valves and required to be
closed during accident conditions were closed by either valves or blind
02.2 Station Orders
a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
The ins)ectors reviewed the Special Instruction and Station Order (50)
Log Boot maintained in the control room to determine if the intent and
purpose of these dcauments, as stated in the Station Administrative
Procedure (SAP). were being met.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed 50 95-05. Pressurizer Power Operated Relief
Valve (PORV) Tailpipe High Temperature, dated April 1995.
This provided
instructions to operators for responding to a computer generated high
pressurizer PORV tailpipe temperature alarm resulting from PORV seat
leakage.
The alarm provides a warning when pressurizer PORV tailpipe
temperature 's several Me"ree "* *m
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pressurizer safety valve talipipe temperatures.
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The inspectors noted that the S0 provided specific instructions on valve
manipulations to determine the source of potential leakage.
A review of
SAP-204. Operating Logs and Records, revision 6 indicated that the
intent of S0s is to provide a means of disseminating short duration
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information and instructions of a general nature to shift personnel.
This 50 was neither of a short duration (since April 1995) or of a
general nature (contained specific operator actions).
Based on the
review of SAP-204, the inspectors concluded that the 50 represented a
procedere.
As such it required the review and controls specified by
Technical Specification (TS) 6.8. Procedures and Programs.
The inspectors concluded that the safety significance of this failure to
establish approved procedures for these activities was minimal.
Based
on discussions with operations personnel it had not been necessary to
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use the 50 since it was issued.
This failure constitutes a violation of
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minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV).
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consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-395/96009-
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c.
Conclusions
The inspectors identified an NCV for failure to establish an approved
procedure for determining the source of leakage on a PORV tailpipe high
temperature alarm.
04
Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 -Review of Coerator Work Arounds
a.
Insoection Scooe (71707. 40500)
The inspectors reviewed operator work arounds to assess their overall
safety significance and the potential impact of the collective work
arounds on plant performance.
The inspectors also reviewed the level of
licensee support for resolving the work arounds.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The licensee has established an informal operator work around program in
which operator work amunds are identified, documented, periodically
reviewed by plant management and given priority for resolution. The
licensee has defired an operator 30rk around as an equipment, program.
or procedure deficiency that could adversely affect normal, abnormal, or
emergency plant operations and/or could result in an inappropriate
response due to the required compensatory actions being performed.
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The inspectors noted several safety significant operator work arounds in
this review.
The inspectors res iened each of the safety significant
work arounds in more detail and found that appropriate compensatory
actions had been established for each of these conditions.
Corrective
action due dates had been established and appeared reasonable based on
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the deficieny.
The inspectors concluded that in the aggregate, these
work arounds did not pose a significant challenge to operator
performance.
The inspectors concluded that this was a useful and effective program to
identify and act upon those deficiencies that were considered operator
work arounds..
c.
Conclusions
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The inspectors * review of the licensee's operator work around program
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concluded that appropriate compensatory actions had been established for
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each of the safety significant deficiencies and that, in the aggregate,
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they did not pose a significant challenge to operator performance. The
inspectors considered this program to be useful and effective in
identifying and acting upon work arounds.
04.2 Ooerator Performance
a.
Insoection Scooe (71707. 40500)
The inspectors reviewed two unplanned operational transients that
occurred during the inspection period.
Observations were also made
during routine control room tours.
Condition Evaluation Reports (CERs)
were reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findinos
On August 4, with the plant operating at full power. an apparent
lightning strike caused a loss of the B circulating water pump. As
required by procedure, power was reduced to 70 percent at 5 percent a
minute.
On August 16, with the plant operating at full power, a steam
flow instrument failed high causing increased feedwater flow and a Steam
Generator (SG) level deviation.
Both of these transients required operator action to restore the plant
to a_ stable condition.
The inspectors found that during these plant
transients, operators identified the abnormal conditions promptly and
acted correctly to stabilize the plant.
- The inspectors concluded that control room operators demonstrated good
plant awareness and knowledge in responding to these minor plant
However, during normal operations the inspectors observed two instances
of poor operator awareness. On July 24. during a main control board
wal(down the inspectors observed the A Component Cooling Water (CCW)
pump switch cocked slightly towards the STOP position.
Also, the flag
in the swit-h was ont showing 9'ther 3 3reer yF) gr c9d 'O'j)
indication.
At the time of this observation the A CCW pump was in a
standby condition.
The pump was not running but would automatically
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start if required.
The normal after stop position of this switch is
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vertical with a green flag showing in the window. When questioned by
the inspectors, the operator corrected the switch position with a green
flag visible.
The inspectors did not identify any concerns as to the
ability of the A CCW pump to start if required.
On August Q the inspectors pointed out to the Shift Supervisor that
six status
.ghts on the phase A isolation and the safety injection
status panei., did not appear to be functioning properly. These status
lights consisted of two lamps for each component w11ch are either dim or
bright depending on the current condition of the component.
In these
six cases, one of the two lamps did not appear to be lit.
The control
room operators corrected the status lights when it was brought to their
attention.
The inspectors concluded that the control room operators were not always
aware of the status of partially degraded indications on the main
control board.
On August 25. the licensee started the C Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP)
without first establishing CCW flow to support pump operation. The
operators were using SOP-102, Chemical and Volume Control System,
revision 15. The initial conditions of the section used for placing an
idle charging pump in service specify that the CCW system is to be in
service.
CCW flow provides cooling for the lube oil coolers associated
with the CCP.
The operator immediately realized the mistake and shut
off the pump.
Computer records indicated that the pump ran a total of
13 seconds without CCW flow.
B train CCW flow was established and the C
CCP was run to inspect for any possible damage
No damage was
identi fied.
The licensee indicated that SOP-102 would be revised to
make establishing CCW flow a procedural step rather than an initial
condition to increase operator awareness of this requirement.
This
failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being
treated as an NCV. consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement
Policy (50-395/96009-02).
c.
Conclusions
A review of two plant transients during the inspection period concluded
that control room operators had demonstrated good plant awareness and
knowledge.
During normal operations two examples of poor operator
awareness were identified.
A CCW pump switch on the main control board
was slightly out of position and not showing the proper flag and six
status lights on the main control board were not functioning properly.
An NCV was identified concerning an operator starting a CCP without
first establishing the required CCW flow.
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07
Quality Assurance in Operations
07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities
a.
Insoection Scone (40500)
The inspectors attended two Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC)
meetings to verify that they met the requirements of TS 6.5.1 and SAP-
120. Plant Safety Review Committee, revision 7.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors attended two PSRC meetings on August 13 and August 30.
Each meeting was called to order with the required quorum present.
TS 6.5.1.5 specifies the required quorum as the Chairman or his designated
alternate and a majority of the PSRC appointed members including their
alternates. An agenda was distributed to all PSRC members or their
alternates to define the subject matter to be discussed at the meeting.
Off-normal occurrence reports, procedure revisions, safety evaluations.
and non-conformance notices were an.ong the subjects reviewed during the
meetings.
The discussions were open and all members were allowed to
voice questions or concerns.
The August 30 meeting included a review of a Licensee Event Report
(LER).
TS 6.5.1.6.h and SAP-120 specify that the PSRC must review all
reportable events.
The ins)ectors noted that the PSRC review of this
LER was done after the LER 1ad already been issued.
c.
Conclusions
Based on attending two PSRC meetings during the inspection period, the
inspectors concluded that the requirements of the applicable sections of
the TS and the SAP were met.
08
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1
(Closed) Insoection Follow-UD Item 50-395/94028-02:
scaling of steam
flow transmitters.
This item was opened pending review of data taken
during the first operating cycle following the steam generator
replacement.
On January 11, 1995, the licensee performed Surveillance
Test Procedure (STP)-205.002. Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate
Measurement, revision 7
Data taken during this test was used to
determine the actual steam flow from each of the three SGs at 100
percent rated thermal power.
In addition. rack voltage measurements
were taken at the output of each installed steam flow transmitter to
determine the differential pressure across each SG flow restrictor and a
restriction flow constant was calcu 3ted.
Using this data. the steam
flow transmitters were calibratea.
During part of operating cycle nine. one high steam flow protection
system bistable was in a tripped condition at full power.
The licensee
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developed and implemented a process to renormalize the steam flow
bistables to the feedwater flow indication.
No further bistable trip
problems were experienced. The inspectors reviewed the correspondence,
methodology, and data associated with this issue and concluded that the
steam flow transmitters were calibrated using good engineering
judgement.
II.
Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments
a.
Insoection Scooe (62703. 61726)
The inspectors observed the performance of routine maintenance to verify
that applicable aspects of the licensee's maintenance program were being
complied with.
In addition, an overview inspection of the maintenance
area was performed to provide the necessary background to support
future, more detailed inspections in this area.
The inspection included
attendance at the plan of the day meeting. interviews with maintenance
management personnel, tours of work areas and facilities, review of
maintenance performance indicators, review of the maintenance
organization and staffing, and a review of several key maintenance
administrative procedures which define the licensee's maintenance
program.
In addition the inspectors observed preventive maintenance on
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a Motor Control Center (MCC) in accordance with Maintenance Work Order
(MWO) P0199971 and Electrical Maintenance Procedure (EMP) 280.006.
Molded Case Circuit Breaker and Controller Inspection and Preventive
Maintenance, revision 4. change C. vibration analysis on the bearing oil
pump for the A CCP in accordance with procedure EMP 295.005. Vibration
Analysis, revision 6. and surveillance of a pressurizer pressure
instrument in accordance with Surveillance Test Task Sheet (STTS)
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0061661 and STP 302.005. Pressurizer Pressure Instrument IPT 00456
Operational Test. revision 4.
The inspectors also conducted an
extensive plant tour to assess overall plant material conditions.
Review of the following maintenance related documents and activities
were included in this inspection:
SAP 103. Statement of Responsibilities Maintenance Services,
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revision 5. change A
SAP 123. Procedure Use and Adherence. revision 1. change B
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SAP 134. Control of Station Surveillance Activities. revision 8.
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change B
SAP 300. Conduct of Maintenance, revision 7 change E
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SAP 601. Application. Scheduling and Handling of Maintenance
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Activities, revision 9, change B
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SAP 1286. Material System User Procedure. revision 0
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MWR 96E3197 Place A Train Battery on Equalize Charge
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Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet (PMTS) P0200421. RHR Spray Pump
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Roughing Filter Differential Pressure Indicator
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PMTS P0200967. RHR Pump B Flow Switch
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MWR 9603910. Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) Pump -
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Investigate and Repair as Necessary
MWR 96M3147. Correct Loose Linkage on the TDEFW Pump
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PMTS P0201407. ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed that all of the work areas were clean and
orderly.
All calibrated equipment observed by the inspectors in the
work areas was noted to be within the required calibration due date, and
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material stored in maintenance storage areas was properly identified and
protected.
Maintenance personnel performing work were knowledgeable of
plant procedures and equipment, and conducted the work in a professional
manner.
Work was conducted in accordance with plant procedures. and no
deficiencies in the work or documentation of the work were observed.
Plant material condition was excellent.
The inspectors observed a
number of Health Physics (HP) drip funnels under equipment in the plant
indicating lack of maintenance action to correct system leakage
problems.
c.
Conclusions
An overview inspection of the maintenance area during this inspection
provided a favorable impression of the overall maintenance program at
V. C. Summer.
Personnel appeared to be well qualified for their
positions, work areas were orderly and well maintained. the plant
material condition was excellent, and procedures were clear and concise.
The existence of a number of HP drip funnels in the plant indicated a
lack of maintenance action to correct system leakage problems.
M2
Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Surveillance Observation
a.
Insoection Scooe (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities to verify that they were
planned and conducted as required by applicable procedures and
satisfactorily demonstrated equipment operability.
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b.
Observations & Findinas
The inspectors observed all or part of the following surveillance tests:
STP 206.003. Charging / Safety Injection Pump and Valve Test.
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revision 4.
STP 123.003B. Train B Service Water System Valve Operability Test,
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revision 2.
STP 220.002. Turbine Driven Emergoncy Feedwater Pump Test.
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revision 1.
STP 209.002. Incore vs. Excore Axial Offset. revision 8.
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STP 212.001. Reactor Core Flux Mapping, revision 6.
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STP 125.002. DG A Operability Test. revision 17.
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c.
Conclusions
All observed surveillance activities were conducted in a professional
manner and resulted in a high degree of confidence that the tested
components would perform as designed.
M3
Maintenance Procedures and Documenta
.ai
M3.1 Procedural Discreoancies
a.
Insoection Scoce (62703. 62707. 40500)
The insportors routinely reviewed CERs related to maintenance during the
inspection period to determine if the licensee was identifying and
correcting maintenance problems.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors reviewed two safety related procedural problems
identified by the licensee in the Instrumentation & Controls (I&C) area.
The first problem occurred on August 16 when a circuit card failed in
the B SG steam flow instrument loop.1FT00484.
While attempting to
return the loop to service. the licensee identified that a gain setting
for a multiplier / divider card identified in calibration procedure. STP-
395.005. Steam Generator B Steam /Feedwater Flow Instrument
1FT00484/1FT00487 Calibration, revision 8. had not been revised as
expected following the recent refueling outage.
The incorrect gain
setting made the circuit card calibration less accurate.
The gain had
changed en W e o rd due to the nlant ucrate and tho ,rrroasod steam
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flow.
Four other similar procedures had also not been revised. The
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other flow instrument loops were checked and founa to be fully operable.
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The gain settings in the other loops had been set at the new value.
Subsequently, the affected procedures were revised.
A second procedural problem was identified on August 20 when Volume
Control Tank (VCT) purge isolation valve. PCV-1092. closed during the
conduct of VCT pressure transmitter 1PT00117 loop calibration procedure
ICP-130.008. Volume Control Tank Pressure 1PT00117, revision 4.
The
valve trip)ed closed on a low VCT pressure signal from 1PT00117. The
procedure lad been revised to remove the auto closure feature of PCV-
1092.
The licensee had intended to implement a modification to remove
the auto closure of the VCT valve. The modification was not completed
but ICP-130.008 was revised and approved for use.
After this was
identified, the licensee installed the modification.
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Both of these procedure problems were identified and documented by the
licensee in their internal problem reporting program.
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c.
Conclusions
A weakness in the revision 3rocess for safety related I&C procedures was
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identified and illustrated )y two examples.
Both examples involved a
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change in the plant that was not correctly implemented in the
appropriate procedure.
The inspectors also concluded that the licensee
was appropriately identifying and documenting problems in this area.
M3.2 Missed Batterv Surveillance
a.
Insoection Scooe (61726)
The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the safety related
batteries and completion of the weekly battery surveillance test.
b.
Observations and Findings
During plant tours on the week of August 4. the inspectors observed that
the A train battery charger equalize / float switch was in the equalize
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position.
The inspectors questioned the position of the equalize / float
switch when the battery should have been on float charge.
The
inspectors also questioned how the weekly battery surveillance was being
accomplished on the B battery when the B battery was on equalize charge
and the surveillance initial requirements required a battery on float
charge.
The inspectors found that the licensee had identified a problem with the
float / equalize switch on the A train charger.
The inspectors reviewed
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the licensee's evaluation of the problem.
The evaluation provided
justification for leavina the switch in the enualize oosition and
adjusting the equalize potentiometer on the cnarger to the float
voltage. The inspectors had no further questions.
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The inspectors also reviewed performanc
of the weekly battery
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surveillance test. STP-501.001. Batter.) .eekly Test. revision 7.
The
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inspectors found that the B train batte y weekly surveillance test was
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3erformed incorrectly on August 5.
Th( licensee performs the weekly
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)attery surveillance requirement each handay. The surveillance data
recorded on August 5 was taken at an equalize voltage of 138.1 volts
direct current (VDC) instead of a float voltage of 133-135 VDC. The TS
surveillance requirement. 4.8.2.1.a. specifically requires that the
battery be on a float charge when the surveillance test is performed.
Conducting the surveillance at this higher voltage had the Jotential to
mask a degraded DC source.
This failure to perform the weecly battery
surveillance correctly is a violation of TS surveillance requirement 4.8.2.1.a (50-395/96009-03).
When the error was identified the licensee re-performed the weekly
surveillance on the B train battery.
The tests results indicated the
battery was operable.
The inspectors concluded from a review of weekly
surveillance test data taken before and after this problem was
identified that the B train battery had remained operable.
The inspectors reviewed surveillance procedure. STP-501.001. and found
that the initial conditions did not state a requirement for the battery
to be on a float charge before conducting the surveillance procedure.
This surveillance had been performed correctly several times before with
one of the batteries on an equalize charge.
The licensee indicated that
the technicians knew of the float charge requirement before performing
the previous tests and had adjusted the battery voltage.
The inspectors
concluded that an inadequate surveillance procedure was a significant
contributor to this error.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors identified a violation of TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1.a. Weekly Battery Surveillance.
The surveillance was performed
while the B battery was on an eaualize charge and not on a float charge
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as specifieo in the TS surveillance requirement.
III.
Enaineerina
E2
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
Turbine Dr ;cn Emergency Feedwater fTCEF'.0 Pumo Low Sceed Oscillations
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E2.1
a.
Insoection Scoce (37551)
During the performance of the monthly surveillance test of the TDEFW
pump on July 9. a speed oscillation of approximately 300-400 Revolutions
Per Minute OPM) was evoerlenced while the cumo nas coeratina at low
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speed. On August 7. during the performance of the same monthly
surveillance test, a similar low speed oscillation was experienced.
The
inspectors reviewed actions taken by plant engineering personnel to
resolve this problem.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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On July 9. the TDEFW pump speed was reduced from the normal operating
speed of 4150 RPM following the completion of the data taking portion of
STP 220.002. Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test, revision 1.
When the pump speed was reduced to approximately 3000 RPM, a speed
oscillation of about 300-400 RPM was experienced.
The licensee was
unable to reproduce the oscillations during subsequent pump runs.
The
governor was replaced and the pump was run successfully.
A detailed
examination of the governor by the vendor did not reveal the cause of
the oscillations.
On August 7. a similar low speed oscillation occurred after the pump
speed was reduced following surveillance testing.
At that time the
licensee was able to reproduce the oscillations.
The linkage between
the governor and the governor valve appeared to have noticeable
freeplay.
This linkage consists of two arms extending from a pivot pin
with the governor connected at one end and the governor valve connected
at the other end.
The freeplay in the linkage appeared to be
concentrated in the arm to pivot pin connections.
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The licensee documented this condition on CER 96-0056 and generated MWR
96M3147 to correct the loose linkage.
Tapered boles were fashioned
through each of the arms and the pivot pin and two properly sized
tapered pins were installed.
In addition. Non-Conformance Notice (NCN)
960052 was written to fabricate and install a new carbon steel bonnet
spacer in the governor valve. to install a new buf fer spring with a
higher spring constant in the governor, and to grind a bevel in the
governor lever fork to relieve some slight binding.
Post-maintenance
testing of the TDEFW pump was cerformed following this work with no
furtner low speed oscillations.
STP 220.002 was performed
satisfactorily.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors observed and reviewed the work done on the TOEFW pump to
correct a low speed oscillation and determined that it was adequate.
Post-maintenance testing and Lrveillance testing were satisfactory.
E2.2 Post-Accident Hydroaen AnalvZer Status
a.
Insoection Scooe (37551)
The insoectors reviewed the ctatus of the cost-accident hydroaen
analyzers.
The review incluaea tne iatest surveliiance testing data.
the STP. and the 50P.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The purpose of the post-accident hydrogen analyzers is to sample the
atmosphere in the reactor building following an accident to determine
the hydrogen concentration.
This is accomplished using two separate
hydrogen analyzers. train A and train B.
Each of these analyzers is
calibrated every 18 months.
The latest calibration test was performed
on the A train analyzer on November 8. 1995 (STP-301.004 Train A
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Containment Hydrogen Monitor Calibration. revision 2) and on the B train
analyzer on February 12. 1996 (STP-301.005. Train B Containment Hydrogen
Monitor Calibration, revision 2).
The inspectors reviewed the
1
procedures and data sheets for these two tests and verified that all
data points were within the required setpoint band for both the as-found
and the as-left conditions.
,
Operation of the post-accidert hydrogen analyzers is done using SOP-122.
Post Accident Hydrogen Removal System revision 7.
This procedure
covers both the startup and shutdown of the A train and B train
analyzers.
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c.
. Conclusions
The inspectors did not identify any concerns regarding the calibration
or operation of the post-accident hydrogen 6nalyzers.
E7
Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities (37551)
.
E7.1 Review of Uodated Final Safety Analvsis Reoort (UFSAR) Commitments
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner
contrary to the UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special
focused review that compared plant practices. procedures and/or
parameters to the UFSAR description.
While performing the inspections
discussed in this report. the inspectors reviewed the applicable
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portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas insoected.
No
discrepancies were laentified.
E8
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
't
E8.1
(Closed) Insoection Follow-uo Item 50-395/94019-03:
verification of
service water pond temperature and level.
This item was opened pending
further review of potential instrument inaccuracies associated with
measurement ;f service .sater pond temperature and level.
On July 24. 1996. the licensee initiated CER 96-10 in response to
concerns identified during a recent licensee service water self-
assessment.
Specifically at issue was that the TS limit of 95 F for
,
service water pond temperature did not take into account the expected
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temperature rise during a postulated Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) nor
account for instrument error when measuring pond temperature.
This
could potentially conflict with the post-accident design basis service
water pond temperature specified in the UFSAR of 95 F.
In response the
licensee developed calculation DC 00020-196.
The inspectors reviewed
the calculation and noted that it determined a 1.7 F rise in service
water pond temperature may occur after a LOCA.
The same calculation
also analyzed the associated instrument error.s and recommended a reduced
maximum service water pond temperature below 95 F. (The exact
temperature varies with the measurement method).
This recommendation
has been adcated as an administrative limit.
Further. the inspectors
were informed that a historical review of plant logs revealed no cases
where this reduced temperature has been exceeded.
The inspectors
concluded that this calculation and reduced administrative limit
adequately addressed the inspectors' concerns on temperature
measurement.
This Jortion of the Inspection Followup Item (IFI) is
closed.
However tie current design basis and TS limit may be
inconsistent.
This is the subject of an ongoing licensee review.
Pending further NRC review of the resolution of this issue, this is
identified as IFI 50-395/96009-04: Inconsistent TS and Design Basis
Limits For Service Water Pond Temperature.
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR description of the service water pond
and Monticello reservoir inter-connecting pipe, the service water pond
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low level annunciator procedure. and a surveyor's mark located in the
service water bay. The inspectors concluded that these provided
reasonable assurarice that a pond level below the TS minimum will not
occur.
E8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-395/94027-02:
failure to provide correct work
instructions for the secondary hydrostatic test.
STP-249.052. Main
Steam / Steam Generators Hydrostatic Testing. contained errors in required
test pressures and in the designation of a spring can to be pinned for
the hydrostatic test.
The inspectors reviewed changes made to this
orocedure and other hydrostatic test procedures and concluded they were
adequate.
The licensee's response dated February 9, 1995 was reviewed
and found to be acceptable.
IV.
Plant Supoort
R1
Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
R1.1 General Comments
The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of
tours and observation of maintenance activities and found them to be
acceptable.
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R2
Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment
R2.1 Plant Area and Process Radiation Monitors
a.
Insoection Scoce (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the status of the radiation monitoring equipment
which measures radiation levels in specific areas and processes
throughout the plant.
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors reviewed the status of the plants radiation monitoring
system and made the following observations:
RM-G6 (reactor building refueling bridge) was inoperable.
This
.
radiation monitor is only required during refueling operations and
,
will require a reactor building entry to repair prior to the start
of any refueling operations.
RM-L5 (monitor tank discharge) and RM-L9 (licuid waste discharge)
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were in alarm due to a low flow condition. These monitors are in
operation only when a release from the monitor tanks is in
progress.
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RM-L3 (liquid steam generator blowdown) and RM-L10 (steam
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generator blowdown effluent) were in alarm due to a low flow
condition.
The SG blowdown flow was being directed to the main
,
condenser.
These radiation monitors are not in service when in
this conditton.
All other radiation monitors were in service and functioning properly.
c.
Conclusion
,
The licensee continued to maintain the required radiation monitors in an
operable condition.
P1
Conduct of EP Activities
Pl.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed the licensee's preparations on September 4 and 5
for the potential high winds and rain expected from hurricane Fran.
The
inspectors concluded that the licensee had prepared the emergency
response team adequately and had readied the olant to minimize risk and
potential damage to plant facilities.
The inspectors also observed that
olant manaaement had fully succorted all emercency creoarations.
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S1
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 General Comments (71750)
The inspectors observed security and safeguards activities during the
conduct of tours and observation of maintenance activities and found
them to be good.
Compensatory measures were posted when necessary and
properly conducted
F4
Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance
F4.1
Incoerable Fire Detection Eauioment
a.
Insoection Scooe (71750)
On August 24. the licensee identified an area of the plant with
inadequate compensation for inoperable fire barriers.
This condition
was documented on CER 96-0112.
b.
Observations and Findinas
During the inspection period, fire detection system panel XPN-100 was
taken out of service to perform a modification to this system. A roving
fire watch to monitor two areas of the Intermediate Building (IB) 412
foot level (IB 12-02W and IB 12-02E) at least once per hour was
established to compensate for the affected inoperable fire detection
devices.
Also located on the IB 412 level (IB 12-02) were fire barriers
containing Thermo-Lag which had been monitored by an hourly roving fire
watch for several years pending a resolution of issues surrounding the
use of this material.
When XPN-100 was taken out of service. Fire
Protection Procedure (FPP)-025. Fire Containment, revision 0. required
that this area be monitored by a continuous roving fire watch at least
every 20 minutes.
This action was separate from tne roving fire watch
established for IB 12-02W and IB 12-02E.
During a paperwork review on August 24. the licensee identified that IB
12-02 had not been monitored as required following removal of XPN-100
from service.
The continuous roving fire watch log indicated that area
IB 12-02W was monitored every 20 minutes instead of area IB 12-02.
This
left area :312-02 unmonitored on either the 20 minute or hourly
frequency.
These two areas are adjacent to each other and it is
reasonable to assume that smoke or flames in area IB 12-02 would be
noticed by the fire watch in area IB 12-02W.
The licensee promptly
established the proper continuous roving fire watch in area IB 12-02.
TS 6.8.1 f reau1res that written Drocedures be established. imolemented.
ano maintainea covering tne t1re Protection Program.
ine rallure to
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compensate for the inoperable fire barriers in area IB 12-02 was a
violation of TS 6.8.1.f. in that. FPP-025 required that this area be
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monitored at least every 20 minutes.
This licensee-identified and
corrected violation is being treated as an NCV. consistent with Section
VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-395/96009-05).
c.
Conclusion
An NCV was identified for the failure to compensate for inoperable fire
barriers in the Intermediate Building.
F8
Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues (92904)
F8.1
(Closed) Insoection Follow-Uo Item 50-395/94007-05:
correction of fire
protection problems involving low flow to sprinklers and missing
sprinklers.
Extra sprinklers not included in the flow calculation.
Fire main flow tests performed in the Auxiliary and Intermediate
Buildings indicated a low flow condition in some parts of the system.
Several NCN dispositions were generated to clean the obstructed portions
of the system, install additional sprinklers, and to remove sprinklers
that were not required.
These changes were made in accordance with a
newly developed design guide which establishes a design basis for the
preaction sprinkler system and provides criteria for meeting certain
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performance based objectives.
The inspectors considered these changes
to be appropriate.
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V.
Manaaement Meetinas
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
1
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee
i
ruanagement at the conclusion of the inspection on September 11. 1996.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary
information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
F. Bacon, Manager. Chemistry Services
L. Blue. Manager. Health Physics
M. Browne. Manager. Design Engineering
S. Byrne General Manager. Nuclear Plant Operations
M. Fowlkes Manager. Operations
S. Furstenberg. Manager. Maintenance Services
S. Hunt. Manager. Quality Systems
D. Lavigne. General Manager. Nuclear Safety
G. Lippard. Acting Manager. Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience
G. Moffatt. Manager. Planning and Scheduling
K. Nettles. General Manager. Strategic Planning and Development
H. O'Quinn. Manager. Nuclear Protection Services
A. Rice. Manager. Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience
G. Taylor. Vice President. Nuclear Operations
T. Taylor. General Manager. Engineering Services
R. Waselus. Manager. Systems and Component Engineering
R. White. Nuclear Coordinator. South Carolina Public Service Authority
B. Williams. General Man;ger. Engineering Services
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and
Preventing Problems
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62703: Maintenance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support
IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations
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IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support
ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Ooened
50-395/96009-01
NCV failure to establish approved procedures (Section
02.2).
50-395/96009-02
NCV failure to establish component cooling water flow
prior to starting a centrifugal charging pump
(Section 04.2).
50-395/96009-03
VIO failure to correctly perform a weekly battery
surveillance (Section M3.2).
50-395/96009-04
IFI
inconsistent TS and design basis limits for service
water pond temperature (Section E8.1).
50-395/96009-05
NCV failure to compensate for inoperable fire barriers
(Section F4.1).
Closed
50-395/96009-01
NCV failure to establish approved procedures (Section
02.2).
50-395/96009-02
NCV failure to establish component cooling water flow
prior to starting a centrifugal charging pump
(Section 04.2).
50-395/94028-02
IFI
scaling of steam flow transmitters (Section 08.1).
20-395/94019-03
IFI
verification of service water pond temperature and
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level (Section E8.1).
20-a95/ 940i7 -02
viu taliure to provice correct .sorK instructions for tne
secondary hydrostatic test (Section E8.2).
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50-395/96009-05
NCV failure to compensate for inoperable fire barriers
(Section F4.1).
50-395/94007-05
IFI correction of fire protection problems involving low
flow to sprinklers and missing sprinklers.
Extra
sprinklers not included in the flow calculation
(Section F8.1).
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Discussed
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None
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