ML20246A534
| ML20246A534 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Hopkins P, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246A526 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-89-13, NUDOCS 8908230003 | |
| Download: ML20246A534 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000395/1989013
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> Report No.':: 50-395/89-13:
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Licensee:. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company ^
Columbia, SC 29218
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Docket No.:":50-395
License No.: NPF-12.
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Facility Name':
V. C. Summer
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Inspection Conducted:.-July;1
.31,<1989
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Inspectors:
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R. 'L.- Prevatte
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Date' Signed
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C'. Hopkins
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Approved by:
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F.1 .~ Cantrell, Secti
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Da,te Signed
' Division of Reactor Pr ects
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SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted.by the resident inspectors onsite in the
areas of' monthly surveillance, observations, monthly maintenance observation,
operational: safety verification, action' on previous inspection findings,' and:
other areas.' Certain tours were conducted'on backshifttor weekends. Backshift
or weekend tours were conducted on July 11, 12, 13, 18, 19. 23,'24, 25 .and 26,
1989.-
Results:
The unit began the month at 100 percent power.
A trip from 100 percent power
occurred.on July 11, 1989, as the result.of a maintenance technician shorting.
' out a power supply- for the generator stator water cooling system.
The unit
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trip and SCE&G grid heavy loading resulted in a loss of offsite power with a
transfer. of the. safety related buses to the emergency diesel generators,
paragraph 4.b.
The unit was restarted and returned to power on July 13, 1989.=
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It ' operated at full ' power for the remainder of the' month.- The areas of
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maintenance and: surveillance continue to' perform satisfactorily.
A violation
for failure to control the temporary installation of portable demineralizers
was identified, paragraph 4.c.
The licensee's evaluation 'of this event
determined that' although a seismic event could effect the operation of safety
equipment, the affected systems would still continue to operate satisfactorily.
8908230003 890804
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REPORT DETAILS
1.-
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics
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C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications
- 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
M. Browne, Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance
W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems
- A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Servic2s
D. Moore, General Manager, Engineering Services
- K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety
C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite
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M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support
J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance
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G. Taylor, Manager, Operations
D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services
- M. Williams, General Manager, Nuclear Services
K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training
Other licensee employees . contacted included engineers, technicians,
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems
and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in
accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of
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35 selected surveillance tests including all aspects of Reactor Building
Closecut Inspection, STP 109.001.
The inspectors verified that required
administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test,
testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test instruments-
tion was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test discrepancies
were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to service.
The
licensee demonstrated good communication between test technicians and
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control room personnel during performance of test procedures.
The
materials, parts, components and test equipment used were found to be
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correct and documented properly.
Technicians had procedures available at
all times and utilized them properly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3. .
Menthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems
and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in
accordance with approved procedures, TS, industry codes and standards.
The inspectors determined that the procedures used were ' adequate to
control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by
qualified personnel.
The inspectors independently verified that the
equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to
determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related
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maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given
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system's performance.
The operational maintenance activities observed by
the inspectors during this report were judged.to be satisfactory.
It
appears that with the installation of control room barriers and a new
tagging desk in the control room, the traffic in the critical areas of the
-control room has been reduced.
This has also resulted in ' smoother
processing of MWR's, STP's and other maintenance activities through. the
control room.
The following specific maintenance activities were
observed:
MWR 87C00it
Replace regulator for demineralized instrument air
supply
MWR 8901080
Repair controller on hydrogen analyzer
MWR 8901211
Calibrate pressurizer control channels 444C & 444D
PMTS 115543
Repair air intake transmitter for SW building
MWR 89G0095
Repair smoke detectors
PMTS 112043
Repair discharge flow transmitter on C FW booster pump
PMTS 116745
Calibrate heater coil temperature controller in
auxiliary building supply plenum
PMTS 118844
Calibrate temperature element on SW building pump room
MWR 88E0125
Repair flexible conduit to smoke analyzer
MWR 88E0108
Test and replace smoke analyzer
PMTS 117045
Calibrate temperature alarm on SW booster pump
MWR 8956808
Remove necessary parts and reinstall torque motor
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PMTS 122056
Perform inspection on open cycle cooling water booster
pump A
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PMTS 122063
Rotate turbine on closed cycle cooling water pump A
PMTS 121916
Verify alignment of 480V breakers
PMTS 121917
Electrical adjustment on 7.2kV switchgear treaker
PMTS 119740
Inspection of FW pump turbine
MWR 8901221
Repair posit.an indication circuitry on pressurizer
sample header isolation valve
MWR 87G0095
Repair sample detection line
PMTS 122395
Vibration analysis check on RHR pump A
PMTS 121729
Vibration analysis check on EFW pump A
PMTS P122139
Audit misalignment log
PMTS P122104
Inspect 7.2kV switchgear breakers
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
The inspectors toured the control room, reviewed plant logs and
records and held discussions with plant staff personnel to verify
that the plant was being operated safely and in conformance with
applicable requirements.
Specific items inspected in the control
room included: adequacy of staffing and attentiveness of control room
personnel, TS and procedural adherence, operability of equipment and
indicated control room status, control room' logs, tagout books,
operating orders, jumper / bypass controls, computer printouts and
Tours of other plant areas were conducted to verify
equipment operability, control of ignition sources and co,mbustible
materials, the condition of fire detection and extinguishing
equipment, the control of maintenance and surveillance cctivities in
progress, the implementation of radiation protective controls and the
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physical security plan.
Tours were conducted during normal and
random off-hour periods.
b.
On July 11,1989, at 2:35
p.m.,
the unit tripped from 100 percent
power.
The trip resulted from an I&C technician shorting a wire
while reconnecting a thermocouple inside the stator water cooling
control cabinet.
The short circuit blew the power supply fuses and
resulted in a low flow signal on stator water cooling.
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protective action would have resulted in a turbine run back.
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circuit did not function correctly and resulted in a turbine trip and
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At the time of.the' reactor trip the utility. grid was' experiencing.a
high load of approximately 3100.MW's.
This loss of-the 900 MW's
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being generated by Summer resulted in allarge voltage oscillation
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which actuated protective relays that 'also ' tripped 4 pumped storage
units at the Fairfield Pumped Storage Facility (approximately 250MW) -
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3 units'~ at the. Saluda Hydro (approximately 135MW), and both fossil
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generating ' units at~ McMeekin Station (approximately 250MW). '.These
losses resulted in the 230kV offsite power source to Summer dropping
-to approximately 203kV and the 115kV source dropping to approximately-
100kV. .This . low voltage condition actuated the undervoltage' relays -
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which automatically separated the 7200 volt ESF buses from offsite
power.
This started the emergency diesel' generators and placed the
safety related buses on the' diesel generator. The non-safety service
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buses remained connected to the degraded offsite power source and
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continued to operate throughout the event. at reduced voltages, . An
unusual event was declared at 3:10 p.m. due to the loss of both
offsite power sources. The system voltage was returned to normal and.
thel safety related buses were reconnected to offsite power at
approximately 5:00 p.m.
The DG's'were' secured and the unusual event
was terminated at 5:11 p.m.
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Further investigation by the licensee revealed that the MVAR loading
of Summer, the, grid MVAR distribution at the time of the unit trip
and lower.than normal setpoints on some generator back-up protection.
relays: may have led to this event.
The licensee has developed
administrative - guidelines to . provide for - improved system MVAR
distribution that should reduce the probability of future similar
occurrences. After completing all necessary repairs and implementing
the'above step, the unit was restarted.on July 12, 1989, and returned
to power operation on July 13,1989.
The licensee is currently
preparing a LER on this event.- The event will also be discussed.
during a meeting scheduled for August 1, 1989. at NRC headquarters.
c.
While. conducting a routine walkdown of the plant on July 6, 1989 -the
inspectors discovered two temporary demineralizers on the 412
elevation of the intermediate building. These units are 24 inches in
diameter and approximately six feet high and are configured to stand
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in an upright position.
The weight of each of the components is
approximately 1750 lbs.
The support for.these units was a 1/2-inch
sisal' rope which attached these units to two EFW line supports and a
SW line support.
A concern with the effects of this installation on
the operability of the SW and EFW system and nearby safety-related
components during a seismic event was immediately discussed with the
operations shift supervisor.
The shift supervisor immediately had
these units removed from the area and documented this in off-normal
occurrence 89-058 and NCN 3386.
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Further investigation into this item revealed that these units had
been installed on June 1, 1989, to permit draining of the SG while the
plant was in Mode 5.
This installation was accomplished without a
MWR as required by the Station Housekeeping and plant Inspection
Program Procedure SAP 142, and Conduct of Maintenance Procedure
The unit was restarted on June 11,-1989 with the units
still in place. This installation had been noted by plant management
and directions had been given to remove the units on or around June 20,
1989.
In this instance personnel were deficient in not performing this work
under the licensee MWR program.
No documentation to require
engineering review of this temporary installation was performed as
required by SAP 142. The above procedure was also inadequate in that
it did not insure that a seismic evaluation of the installation be
performed and that time limits were established to insure removal of
this hazard prior to plant start-up.
This is contrary to the
requirement of TS 6.8.1.a which requires that procedures be
established, implemented and maintained for activities referenced in
Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2
February 1972.
This is 'a violation, " Failure to Control Temporary Installations,"
89-13-01.
The licensee has performed an evaluation which determined that a
seismic event could have resulted in the portable demineralized
becoming mobile and possibly damaging two FW line supports and
shearing off a test connection on a CCW line and a drain line'in the
SW system. The failure of the EFW supports would not have resulted in
the system becoming inoperable and the loss of flow in the SW and CCW
system would not have degraded system flow below the worst case
analyzed values.
The potential flooding from the lines were well
within the capacity of space dewatering equipment.
This analysis
determined that all systems would remain operable.
This event is similar to a licensee identified violation that was
documented in inspection report 89-03.
In that event temporary
scaffolding had been erected for shielding of RHR piping to reduce
personnel radiation exposure while the plant was in a refueling
outage.
Due to procedural deficiencies and personnel errors the
scaffolding was not removed prior to plant start-up.
That
installation had the potential to impact on system operability.
The licensee, in their response to this violation, should address
procedural changes made to insure that temporary installations are
controlled and that dates or mode restraints are established to
insure that temporary installations which are required while the
plant is shutdown are removed prior to unit start-up.
Violations cr deviations were identified.
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5.
Action on Prev ous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(Closed)
TI2513/94, Inspection for verification of licensee changes made
to comply with PWR moderator dilution requirements, multi-plant action
item 13-03.
The inspector reviewed inspection requirements specified.in
this instruction and reviewed the V. C. Summer Safety Evaluation Report and
supplements to determine what requirements had been established.
This
review identified that dilution events and- preventive measures were
discussed and resolved in section 15 of the SER and in supplements 1 and 3
to the SER.
However, multi-plant action item B-03 was not specifically
discussed.
Discussion with Mr. L. Kopp, the NRR lead contact for.this
item, indicates thut this item is not applicable for V. C. Summer.
The
SIMS open item list for V. C. Summer also does not list this item.
Further
discussion with Mr. Kopp revealed that since V.C. Summer was licensed in
1982, this issue would have been resolved in the normal licensing process
for V. C. Summer and all other plants licensed after 1979.
Based on the
above, this item is administratively closed.
6.
Other Areas
The inspectors-toured the licensee's lead dispatch center in Columbia, SC
on July 25, 1989.
Computer control and indication systems and procedures
that are used to operate' and control SCE&G's grid was discussed in detail.
This tour was very beneficial and provided the inspectors with a better
understanding of this tystem.
7.
ExitInterview(30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 31, 1989, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. The plant trip and
the resulting offsite power loss event which occurred on July 11, 1989, was
discussed in detail. This included the short term corrective measures and
the current investigation into root cause and long term corrective action.
The violation which resulted from the failure to control the temporary
installation of portable demineralizers in the intermediate building was
attributed to procedural inadequacies and a failure to follow procedures.
It was also noted that the violation was similar to LIV 89-03-01 when the
plant was restarted without removing scaffolding that contained temporary
shielding.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The
licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to
or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
8.
Acronyms and Initialisms
Component Cooling Water
Diesel Generator
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Emergency Feedwater
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Instrumentation and Control
Megawatt.
- MWR
Maintenance Work Request
Million Volt Amps Reactive
NCN
Non-Conformance Notice
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NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
PMTS
Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet
- QC
Quality Control
Station Administrative Procedure
SCE&G
South Carloina Electric & Gas Company
Safety Evaluation Report
SIMS
Safety Issues Management Systems
Surveillance Test Procedures
TS
Technical Specifications
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