ML20056E972

Insp Rept 50-395/93-20 on 930712-16.Weaknesses Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20056E972
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	08/11/1993
From:	Barr K, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20056E970	List: ML20056E969 ML20056E972
References
50-395-93-20, NUDOCS 9308250360
Download: ML20056E972 (25)

See also: IR 05000395/1993020

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. . UNITED STATES [. p nroho, ' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y" 1 74 REGION 11 j

3 g- 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 j E ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303234199 i % . e o i '

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AUG I I 1993 Report Nos.: 50-395/93-20 Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket Nos.: 50-395 License Nos.: NFP-12 Facility Name: V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: July 12-16,1993 Inspector: [[ h7!93 F. N. Wright, Tearii Leaderg - Date $igned Team Members: G. Arthur K. Clark W. Orders G.SYgprs // f'M Approved by: x, K. P. Barr,~Cfiief Date/ Sf gned Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activities and responses were selectively observed in the licensee's Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. The inspection also included a review of the exercise objectives scenario details and observation of the licensee's post-exercise i critique activities. This announced exercise was conducted on July 14, 1993, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. j Results: In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. Two exercise weaknesses were identified concerning: 1) Command and control in the ' Emergency Operations Facility (Paragraph 4); and 2) The content of Emergency Notification messages provided to offsite agencies (Paragraph 7). The exercise weakness concerning Emergency Notification messages was similar to one identified during the previous NRC evaluated exercise. An Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) was also identified when a significant portion of the sirens in the Early Warning Siren System failed to function as required. The 9308250360 930811 9 PDR ADOCK 05000395 b G PDR ,k l _ - . - .

! , , . . ' 'Ill was established to review the licensee's assessment and corrective actions for the siren failures. Command and control in the Simulator Control Room and the Technical Support Center was a program strength. Overall, the licensee , demonstrated capability to implement the Emergency Plan in the event of a radiological emergency. 1 i 1 l i 1 1 I i

- .._. . . . _ _ i . . REPORT DETAILS i i , 1. Persons Contacted , Licensee Employees i

• B. Baehr, Manager, Technical Services
• R. Bender, Senior Instructor
• M. Browne, Manager, Design / Engineering
• G. Caudill, Supervisor, Maihtenance Projects and Procedures
• B. Christiansen, Manager, Technical Services

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• M. Counts, Coordinator, Emergency Services

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• T. Curtin, Supervisor, Design / Engineering
• J. Dinkins, Corporate Health Physics
• G. Gowdy, Staff Health Physicist

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• J. Knox, Nuclear Instructor

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• A. Koon, Project Coordinator

D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Safety

• R. Myers, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
• K. Nettles, General Manager, Station Support

, H. O'Quinn, Nuclear Protection Services ' '

• B. Schwartz, Coordinator, Emergency Services

J. Skolds, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• G. Taylor, General P tager, Nuclear Plant Operations
• R. White, South Carolina Power Service Authority

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• B. Williams, Manager, Operations

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• B. Wright, Acting Resident Inspector
• Attended Exit Meeting

Abbreviations used throughout this report are defined in the last paragraph. z. Ixercise Scenario (82302) The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine , l whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG- 0654, Section II.N. , f - - - ,, -e = r

_ _. - . . . l - i . , . 2 - ' The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was discussed i . with licensee representatives. The final exercise scenario was detailed ! and adequate to exercise the participants. The control of the exercise and sequence of events was very good and it appeared that there was an 1 adequate number of controllers to facilitate proper exercise play. l- No violations or deviations were identified. 3. Assignment of Responsibility (82301) i The area of assignment of responsibility was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee i had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available ., I to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, l i Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654, ! Section II.A. l . During pre-exercise reviews of the licensee's Emergency P'an and ) implementing procedures; the inspector- concluded that the onsite and ' offsite emergency organizations were adequately described, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations had been i l. specifically established and key emergency response organization positions were clearly defined in' approved plans and implementing procedures. The. inspector observed that adequate personnel.was ) available to respond to the simulated emergency. No violations or deviations were identified. 4. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301) i l Implementation of the licensee's onsite emergency organization was j observed to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided . to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at I ' all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by l 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.B. The inspector concluded that the initial onsite emergency organization -was adequately defined; the responsibility and authority for directing actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear, that staff were available to fill key functional positions within the organization, and that onsite and offsite interactions and responsibilities were cletely defined. The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize licensee response personnel during the exercise. Augmantation of the initial onsite emergency response organizations was accomplished through activations of the ERFs. The inspector observed the activation, . staffing, and-operation of the emergency organizations in the SCR, TSC, ! OSC, News Media Center, and the EOF. The inspector determined that the l licensee was able to staff and activate the facilities in a timely ! !

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. . , ' 3 manner. The required staffing and assignment of responsibility was effective and consistent with the licensee'< approved procedures. Because of the scenario scopa and conditiu long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organizat non was not required. Command and control was adequate in the OSC and very good in the TSC and SCR. However, command and control in the E0F was weak. In accordance with the licensee's Emergency Plan and implementing procedures, the Offsite Emergency Coordinator had the primary responsibility for managing the EOF. During the exercise, the inspector observed the following: E0F activation, turnover, and assumption of emergency

responsibilities were not clearly announced or specified to the staff. The Offsite Emergency Coordinator approved several incomplete

Emergency Notification messages provided to offsite agencies. Status boards were not diligently maintained.

The attention of staff was not demanded or maintained during

briefings or announcements. Briefings were minimal and were not as frequent as required by

licensee procedures. Senior licensee management recognized that the comniand and control was weak in the E0F and pointed out that the individual in the role of the Offsite Emergency Coordinator was inexperienced in that particular emergency response position. Licensee management discussed the need to develop depth in the Offsite Emergency Coordinator position. The inspector acknowledged the advantages and logic of developing depth in key emergency response positions and complemented the staff's , development objectives. However, the inspector pointed out that procedures and checklist were not widely utilized by the EOF staff, ) including the Offsite Emergency Coordinator, during the exercise. The ' inspector discussed the advantages of deta. M procedures and checklist for personnel conducting infrequent duties ao activities under abnormal l and stressful conditions. Licensee Objective General Number 8 was " Demonstrate procedural compliance by emergency personnel." Emergency Plan Procedure EPP-051, " Emergency Operation Facility Conduct Of Operations," Rev. 1, dated April 21, 1993, provided guidance for the interaction of principal EOF positions during an emergency at the Summer Nuclear Station. Attachments to EPP-051 provided expectations for key EOF positions. Attachment 1-A "Offsite Emergency Coardinator Expectations," described the expectations for the Offsite Emergency Coordinator. Specific actions following EOF activation included, in part, the following: Ensure status boards are updated.

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_ . i , - . 4 Provide periodic briefings to the E0F on the status of emergency - support operations (at least hourly) to include the following information: EAL, Priorities, Plant Status, Releases, PARS, and Offsite Interface. The inspector observed that a emergency status briefing was not made between the hours of 10:12 a.m. and 11:51 a.m. in the EOF. Additionally, when briefings were made they did not include some

l pertinent and available information on topics suggested by procedure EPP-051. The inspector stated that failure of the Operations Emergency Coordinator to provide periodic briefings in accordance with licensee procedures was an apparent Exercise Weakness. Additional NRC review l concluded that the weakness was associated with the adequacy of command and control of the E0F. Exercise Weakness 50-395/93-20-01: Failure to exercise adequate command l and control as evidenced by inaccurate status boards and the conduct EOF l briefings in accordance with licensee procedures. l The inyector also noted that Offsite Emergency Coordinator responsibilities for reviewing Emergency Notification messages were not included in Attachment 1-A of EPP-051. Problems identified with information provided to offsite agencies via Emergency Notification l messages are discussed in Paragraph 7 of the report. l One Exercise Weakness was identified. l ! 5. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301) The area of Emergency Response Support and Resources was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using l assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate l State and local staff at the licensee's onsite Emergency Operations l Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of ' augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.C. i l State and Local Agency participation in the exercise included receiving l Emergency Notification messages from the licensee, activation of local ' emergency facilities, and deployment of environmental monitoring teams. The licensee simulated other communications to those agencies. No violations or deviations were identified. 6. Emergency Classification System (82301) The emergency classification system was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG- 0654, Section II.D. ! ! l .._ _ , ,, ,

. . . 5 Licensee general objective 1 was " Demonstrate an understanding of the station's emergency classification levels (EAls) and their initiating conditions by the staff's ability to classify simulated emergency conditions." The licensee's Emergency Plan and implementing procedures, provided for off-normal events to be classified into one of the four emergency classification categories. Section 4 of the Emergency Plan listed various events and tha corresponding emergency classifications per existing conditions. The Shift Supervisor in the control room, the Emergency Director in the TSC, and the Offsite Emergency Coordinator in the EOF effectively evaluated existing conditions and declared appropriate emergency classifications in accordance with emergency procedures. All classifications were made in a timely manner and exercise objectives were met. The following classifications were made during the exercise: The conditions for declaring an NOUE were met when staff was aware - of an earthquake and start of the seismic recorder at about 8:02 a.m. The Shift Supervisor in the SCR declared the NOVE 8 minutes later at 8:10 a.m. The conditions for declaring sa Alert were met when staff was - aware of an earthquake and Reactor Building Foundation Seismic Switch 2/3 OBE exceeded at about 8:18 a.m. The Shift Supervisor in the SCR declared the Alert about 5 minutes later at 8:23 a.m. The conditions for declaring a Site Area Emergency were met at the - discretion of the Emergency Director due to additional Earthquake at about 9:29 a.m. and degrading plant conditions. The Emergenc/ , Director in the TSC declared the SAE at 9:34 a.m. The conditions for declaring a General Emergency were met when - staff was aware of a sudden drop cf pressure in the A steam generator indicating loss of two fission product barriers and a potential for loss of third at about 11:00 a.m. The offsite Emergency Coordinator in the EOF declared the General Emergency classification 13 minutes later at 11:13 a.m. No violations or deviations were identified. 7. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301) The Notification Methods and Procedures area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response i organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations was established. This area was further observed to assure that means to ! provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure l pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654. i . , .-

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! , 6 Licensee general objective 3 was ":'emonstrate the staff's ability to , make accurate and timely notifications to station personnel as well as j to local, stete, and federal governments." The inspector observed that notification mathods and procedures were used to provide information ' concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. i The inspector observed notifications to the State of South Carolina and to local offsite agencies were promptly transmitted following their completion and approval . Initial emergency notifications were promptly transmitted to the State of South Carolina and local offsite agencies, within 15 minutes, following the NOVE, Alert, and General emergency declarations. However, the 15 minute notification requirement was exceeded, by 1 minute, j following the declaration of the SAE which was declared at 9:34 a.m. and

transmission started at 9:50 a.m. Follow-up notifications were made , within the one hour period. ' l In the previous NRC graded exercise, the inspector identified an i ' exercise weakness concerning the lack of information provided on follow- up notification messages. During the exercise, the inspector observed > . continuing problems with reporting emergency conditions and descriptions ' on notification messages. The inspector observed the following problems , with notifications messages. l ! While the first release start time was indicated as 8:40 a.m., i - there was no release information reported on any Emergency Notification message until 11:47 a.m. (message number 8). NM-5 (Transmitted at 9:50 a.m.), NM-6 (Transmitted at 10:32 a.m.), and NM-7 (Transmitted at 11:23): Sections 11, 12, and 13 describing Type of Release, Release Magnitude, and Estimate of Projected i I Offsite Dose were left blank when Section 10 was marked indicating a release was occurring. The licensee had generated at least one i l dose projection at 9:41 a.m. prior to transmitting NMs-5, 6, and 7 and another at 11:07 a.m., prior to transmitting NM-7. NM-5, Section 7, Emergency Description did not indicate a transfer - of notification responsibilities had occurred at 9:25 a.m.; as required by licensee procedure EPP-002, Communication and Notification, Rev. 29A, dated February 11, 1993. Note 5.4.3 of EPP-002 required "All transfers of notification responsibilities shall be documented in the " Comments" section of the notification forms." NM-5, Section 16, indicated the message was signed at 8:39 a.m., - which was 55 minutes before the SAE declaration was made at 9:34 a.m. NM-8, Section 2, name of person transmitting the message was not - indicated. I i

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, l l l 7 The inspector stated that failure to indicate appropriate information required by procedures and timely radiological release information on Emergency Notification messages appeared to be an exercise weakness. ) The weakness was similar to exercise weakness 50-395/92-11-01, identified during the 1992 exercise. The 1992 exercise weakness actually concerned two issues. One concerning request for offsite assistance in accordance with procedures and another concerning inadequate information on follow-up Emergency Notification messages. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for the 1992 exercise weakness and verified, by a review of records, that the ! corrective actions had been completed. However, the continued identification of Emergency Notification message problems indicated the i previous corrective actions for that issue had not been adequate. The inspector stated that the 1992 exercise weakness woul/ be closed since

corrective actions for one portion of the weakness ("equesting offsite assistance) appeared to be completed. The inspector reported to Senior Plant Management that a thorough review of the Emers ancy Notification process was needed to improve accuracy and adequacy of Emergency Notification messages provided to offsite agencies. Senior licensee management committed to evaluate the notification processes. Exercise Weakness 50-395/93-20-02: Failure to provide radiological releases information and other appropriate information on Emergency Notification messages. 1 The Early Warning Siren System for alerting the public within the plume j exposure pathway was actuated during the exercise. Residents within the 10 mile EPZ were notified in advance that a test of sirens would occur ' sometime during the day of the exercise. Upon activation of the system, approximately 17 percent of the sirens failed to operate as required. In 1992 the licensee installed and tested a new siren control system, following poor siren availability in previous years. During a full cycle test, following the installatien of that system, a significant number (approximately 16 percent) of sirens failed to perform as required. Siren failures were attributed to various problems including mechanical problems with siren motors, rotation sensors and loss of AC power. Subsequent test data reviewed by an inspector during a 1993 Emergency Preparedness program review indicated significant improvements in operability / availability of the siren system were made in 1992. However, many of the problems experienced with the sirens during the . ' 1993 exercise appeared to be similar to those previously identified in 1992. At the time of the exit, the licensee was in the process of determining the various causes of failure. Preliminary information indicating some sirens had blown fuses and some siren sensors had not responded properly. The inspector stated that a review of the licensee's siren failure assessments and associated corrective actions would be reviewed in a future inspection as an IFI. . - - . -. -

. ' , l 8 IFl 50-395/93-20-03: Review licensee's assessment of Early Warning Siren System failures, corrective actions to prevent recurrence, and follow-up test in a future inspection. One Exercise Weakness was identified. 8. Emergency Communications (82301) The Emergency Communications area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG- 0654, Section II.F. The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee's emergency organizations. Communications between the TSC and the SCR were very good. There were some communication issues such as ) maintenance of status boards and adequacy of periodic briefings that , l were identified by the inspector and the licensee during the critique ' process. There were also some communication equipment problems that were identified. Examples included; inabilit." of a phone to ring at the < 1 Emergency Control Officer's desk and a phone was missing from the Field Team Communicator's desk. There was also a problem with message codes received with activation of emergency response personnel beepers. None , of these problems had any serious consequences during the exercise. However, these issues were appropriately identified in the licensee's critique process for corrective action. With the exception of a request to activate the fire brigade, exercise participants did a good job of transmitting drill messages and properly identifying them as drill-related. Licensee personnel requesting activation of the fire brigade failed to identify the request as a drill ' message initially. However, the exercise participants quickly i recognized the error and re-announced the request as a drill message. No violations or deviations were identified. 9. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301) The Emergency Facilities and Equipment area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipmer to support an emergency response'were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.H. Licensee procedures required activation of the emergency facilities upon declaration of an Alert emergency classification. An Alert classification was made at 8:23 a.m. and an announcement was made over ! ! ! l - -- . _ .

. . . 9 the PA system to activated the TSC, OSC and E0F at 8:24 a.m. The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key ERFs, including the SCR, TSC, OSC, News Media Area, and E0F. a. Simulator Control Room l The Shift Supervisor and operations staff properly analyzed plant conditions and developed appropriate strategies to combat the equipment failures. The staff's actions throughout the exercise were timely and appropriate to the circumstances. The Shift Supervisor demonstrated a thorough knowledge of plant systems, equipment and emergency procedures which enabled him to quickly ! assess the reported system and equipment damages and make correct emergency classifications. This was demonstrated when the Shift , l Supervisor promptly identified and made the emergency

classification upgrade from a NOUE to an Alert classification. i The Shift Supervisor demonstrated good communicator skills in ! clear and logical commands and requests during the exercise. Priorities were periodically assessed and reported to the SCR staff. Following activation of the TSC, The Shift Supervisor and staff kept management well informed of changing plant conditions. l No violations or deviations were identified. b. Technical Support Center l The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon request of the Emergency Director in the SCR. The Emergency Organization's l response to staff the TSC was adequate, with nost of the TSC staff in the facility by 8:30 a.m. The TSC was ful!y staffed at i 8:44 a.m. and operational at 9:01 a.m. The Emergency Director demonstrated a thorough knowledge of plant operations. Throughout the exercise, the Emergency Director quickly assessed plant conditions, implemented applicable emergency procedures in a timely manner, and set priorities for the emergency response organization. Priorities were reviewed and revised throughout the exercise. The Emergency Director demonstrated good communication skills and provided excellent briefings at appropriate frequencies. No violations or deviations were identified. c. Operational Support Center The inspector observed the initial activation and personnel response in the staffing of the OSC. The OSC was activated, staffed, and functional in a timely manner. The OSC was declared operational at 8:36 a.m. The command and control was adequate. Adequate communications between the OSC, TSC, and emergency repair tesns was demonstrated . _ _-

. _ i - 10 and communication equipment functioned properly. A clever priority-task board, permitted prompt priority reorganization and was effectively utilized in the OSC to monitor and direct emergency response actions. A similar board was used in the TSC and E0F in setting emergency response priorities. The inspector noted good agreement with the boards throughout the exercise. No violations or deviations were identified. ' d. Emergency Operations Facility The licensee's goal was to activate the E0F within 60 minutes of declaration of any Emergency Classification greater than a Notification of an Unusual Event. The E0F was promptly staffed , and activated with qualificd personnel at 9:25 a.m. Command and J control issues in the EOF are discussed in Paragraph 4. ' The EOF and supporting equipment were very go::d and utilized accordingly. However, the licensee did experience some equipment problems during the exercise that are discussed in Paragraph 8. The licensee identified the equipment problems in the critique process for corrective action. , ! 1 l No violations or deviations were identified. ) e. News Media Area l Overall, the news releases from licensee were timely and informative, as were the media briefings. Coordination with l participating State and county personnel was good and those ' participants appeared to understand their responsibilities and were able to adequately perform assigned functions. Players were well informed and enthusiastic about doing their jobs. Personnel conducting meFa briefings for the licensee were properly qualified, able to answer media questions, or able to get answers in a very short time. Information provided by the licensee to the l public was not too technical and appeared to be understandable to i the public. The inspector noted that maintenance of event status l boards in the News Media Area could have been better. For l example, while a General Emergency declaratior had been declared ( at 11:13 a.m. it was not posted on the plant status board in the News Media Area until 12:10 p.m.

There was an adeauate number of telephones (40) available in the News Media Area. All appeared to be functional and working

! properly. No violations or deviations were identified. !

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. . i 11 10. Accident Assessment (82301) The Accident Assessment area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.I. l The accident assessment personnel in the TSC and E0F facilities analyzed plant conditions and developed appropriate strategies for combating equipment failures. I No violations or deviations were identified. 11. Protective Responses (82301) The Protective Responses area was observed to determine that guidelines , for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.J. General exercise objective 6 was " Demonstrate the ability to evaluate plant parameters and radiological conditions in order to formulate and provide protective action recommendations to state and local governments , l for the protection of the health and safety of the general public and l station personnel." Following the declaration of a General Emergency, the Offsite Emergency Coordinator recommended the minimum PARS, shelter around the facility and downwind, without referring to the emergency procedures. At that time the licensee had projected significant offsite dose rates and conditions existed that would make evacuations ! j surrounding the plant and sectors downwind appropriate. The Emergency Control Officer in the EOF recognized the need for more stringent . protective actions and appropriately suggested evacuations for those l affective areas and sheltering for remaining sectors in the EPZ. The Offsite Emergency Coordinator made the decision to evacuate appropriate ! sectors in the EPZ. The need to utilize emergency procedures was discussed with Senior Management prior to the formal exit. l General exercise objective 7 was " Demonstrate the station's capability to warn, account for and evacuate station personnel." Protective actions were initiated for onsite personnel following the Alert declaration by conducting a personnel accountability of those personnel inside the protected area. The site accountability process was achieved

' and reported within 30 minutes. An evacuation of non-essential personnel was simulated. No violations or deviations were identified. b

' , l . 12 12. Exercise Critique (82301) The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings in the performance.of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.N. , The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players immediately following the exercise termination. Licensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal critique to management on July 16, 1993. Issues identified during the , exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the critique. ' The licensee's critique process was good and addressed both substantive deficiencies and improvement areas. The conduct of the critique was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above. Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent NRC inspections. No violations or deviations were identified. j 13. FEMA Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee , ' and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence. 14. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) j a. (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-395/92-11-01: Request for offsite assistance were not made in accordance with procedures and some follow-up notification information was incorrect. The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation of corrective actions taken in response to the issue and verified that the corrective action had been taken through review of records and interviews. The first part of the corrective action concerning request for offsite assistance appeared to be completed. However, the licensee experienced continuing problems with Emergency Notification messages. The inspector stated that this item would be closed with the issuance of a separate Exercise Weakness for l Emergency Notifications. ! b. (Closed) Non-Cited Violation 50-395/92-11-02: Failure to adequately train emergency communicators for group-page call-in responsibilities. The inspector reviewed the licensee corrective actions for the violation and determined that the licensee's proposed corrective action had been completed. No additional problems concerning the ! !

4 . 13 training and ability of emergency response communicators was observed during the exercise. The inspector stated that the item would be closed. c. (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-395/92-11-03: Detailed flow of information between emergency response personnel resulted in SAE declaration 16 minutes after EAL was met. There was a communication flow problem that was, in part, due to simulated conditions. The licensee tasked the Emergency Planning organization with providing updates to the Emergency Director, via controllers, of changes in plant conditions which would normally be recognized by the TSC staff or provided through communications from the adjacent control room in an actual emergency. The inspector did not detect a similar problem during the graded exercise and reported that the item would be closed. 15. Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on July 16, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below. Propriety information was not reviewed during the inspection. , l Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. Licensee management was informed that three previous open items (listed in , Paragraph 14) were reviewed and considered closed. ! ' Item Number Description and Reference 50-395/93-20-01 Exercise Weakness - An exercise weakness was identified concerning the adequacy of command and control in the EOF (Paragraph 4). 50-395/93-20-02 Exercise Weakness - An exercise weakness was identified when the licensee failed to provide radiological releases information and other appropriate information on Emergency Notification messages (Paragraph 7). 50-395/93-20-03 IFI - An IFI was identified to review the licensee's assessment of Early Warning Siren System failures, corrective action to prevent recurrence, and follow-up test in a future inspection (Paragraph 7). i 16. Index of Abbreviations Used in this Report CFR Code of Federal Regulations EAL Emergency Action Level E0F Emergency Operations Facility EPP Emergency Plan Procedures EPZ Emergency Planning Zone i

. . . - . I i . l 14 l l ERF Emergency Response Facility i FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency j IFI Inspector Follow-up Item j NM Notification Message NOUE Notification Of Unusual Event i NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OBE Operation Basis Earthquake -! OSC Operations Support Center Rev. Revision SAE Site Area Emergency SCR Simulator Control Room TSC Technical Support Center i ! ! Attachments: l Exercise Objectives, Narrative l Summary, and Time Line ! , 1 i < - , , . . . . .

. . a Attachment to Mr. William E. Cline Letter RC-93-0110, ANN 4500 Page 1 of 4 l VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION i 1993 ANNUAL EXERCISE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES On July 14,1993, the annual radiological emergency exercise will be conducted at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS). Tlie pr'imarv function of this exercise wilibe to test the integrated capabilities of the associated emergency organizations ~ and a major portion of the VCSNS Radiation Emergency Plan. The exercise will require the participation oflocal government emergency personnel to effectively verify their capabilities to respond to an actual emergency at VCSNS. Governmental agencies will conduct a MS-1 drill involving the hospital in Newberry County. The specific elements of the VCSNS Radiation Emergency Plan which will be exercised will include: Accident assessment and emergency classification

Managerial direction and control

Technical Support Center operations

Operations Support Center operations - Emergency Operations Facility operations

News Media Center operations

Site evacuation, personnel accountability and access control

Public alerting and notification procedures

Radiological monitoring

Dose assessment - This exercise will constitute the annual communications drill, biannual health physics drill, annual radiological monitoring drill, the annual radiation emergency exercise and the biennial exercise involving local governments. The general objectives of the radiological emergency exercise for South Carolina Electric and Gas (SCE&G) personnel are: 1. Demonstrate an understanding of the station's emergency classification levels (EAL's) and their initiating conditions by the staff's ability to classify simulated emergency conditions. 2. Demonstrate the staff's ability to initiate the station's radiation emergency plan and its implementing procedures. 1 . 3. Demonstrate the staff's ability to make accurate and timely notifications to l station personnel as well as to local, state and federal governments. ! 4. Demonstrate the ability to activate emergency response facilities in an effective and timely manner. ! 5. Demonstrate the adequacy, effectiveness, and utilization of the emergency response facilities and associated equipment. l I l l ( l 2 - - -

- - _ _ _ ~ , Attachment to Mr. William E. Cline Letter RC-93 0110. ANN 4500 Page 2 of 4 l ! 6. Demonstrate the ability to evaluate plant parameters and radiological ' conditions in order to formulate and provide protective action recommendations to state and local governments for the protection of the health and safety of the j general public and station personnel. 7. Demonstrate the station's capability to warn, account for and evacuate station l personnel. (Personnel will be evacuated and assembled outside the protected area.) l S. Demonstrate procedural compliance by emergency personnel. l The specific objectives of the radiological emergency exercise are: I CONTROL ROOM (Simulator) l 1. Demonstrate the ability of the control room staff to evaluate plant conditions l and to correctly classify the simulated emergency. ) 2. Demonstrate the ability of the control room staff to activate the station ! emergency plan making the appropriate notifications activating emergency response personnel in response to an emergency situation. 3. Demonstrate the ability of shift personnel to notify local, state, and federal governments in accordance with procedures. 4. Demonstrate the ability to communicate technical information to both the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center. 5. Demonstrate the control room staff's ability to interpret symptoms and parameters indicative of degrading plant conditions. 6. Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Supervisor (Interim Emergency Director) ! to make timely and effective decisions to mitigate the consequences of the event and to clearly demonstrate control of initial response efforts. 4 l l Demonstrate the ability of the control room staff to adequately brief and , 4. ! _ relinquish command of'the event to the Technical Support Center upon its activation. ' TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 1. Demonstrate the appropriate staff's ability to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC) at an Alert or greater emergency classification in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Director (ED) to receive an effective briefing of the event and to assume control from the lnterim Emergency Director (IED). 3. Demonstrate the ED's ability to make timely, effective decisions and to , ' demonstrate clear control of emergency response efforts. l l 3 L

.__ _ . _ _ . Attachment to Mr. William E. Cline Letter .RC-93-0110, ANN 4500 Page 3 of 4 4. Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to communicate technicalinformation to the Control Room, O'perations Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. 5. Demonstrate the TSC's ability to conduct and maintain personnel accountability, as necessary. 6. Demonstrate the TSC staff's ability to operate TSC equipment and to demonstrate the adequacy of that equipment. 7. Demonstrate the effectiveness of emergency communication systems among TSC, federal, state and local governments, and field monitoring teams. OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER 1. Demonstrate the ability of the appropriate staff to activate the Operations Support Center (OSC) at a classified emergency of an Alert or greater in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate the ability of the OSC Supervisor to make timely and effective decisions and to demonstrate clear control of the OSC and response teams. 3. Demonstrate the abilities of the OSC Supervisor and Discipline Supervisors to effectively organize, brief, dispatch, track, and de-brief repair teams. 4. Demonstrate the ability of Health Physics staff to maintain appropriate radiological controls throughout the course of the event. 5. Demonstrate the capability of the OSC to communicate technicalinformation to the TSC. 6. Demonstrate the capability to conduct and maintain personnel accountability, as necessary. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY i 1. Demonstrate the ability of the appropriate staff to activate the Emergency Operations Facility (EDF) at an Alert or greater emergency classification in a timely manner. l 2. Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to notify local, state, and federal l governments in accordance with established procedures. 3. Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to effectively communicate and ' disseminate technical information among the TSC, foint Information Center, NRC, and participating off-site agencies. l 4. Demonstrate the OEC's ability to make timely, effective decisions and to i demonstrate clear control of emergency response efforts. t i 4 I - - < _- y - ,. ..-.. _ v . _ - , _- ~.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ J ! l - l i ~ l l I Attachment to Mr. William E. Cline Letter { RC.93-0110, ANN 4500 ! Page 4 of 4 l 5. ~ Demonstrate the EOF staffs ability to operate EOF equipment and to l demonstrate the adequacy of that equipment. i SECURITY

1. Demonstrate the ability of the security organization to control station access. 1 ' 2. Demonstrate the ability of the security force to perform timely accountability and evacuation of station personnel, as directed. NEWS MEDIA CENTER 1. Demonstrate the ability to disseminate timely and accurate information to the public through the news media. 2. Demonstrate the capability to convev correct information in non-technical ~ terms to enhance media and public comprehension of the emergency situation. 3. Demonstrate the interface between the utility's staff and the government's Public Information Officers within the Joint Information Center. EXERCISE CONTROL AND EVALUATION 1. Demonstrate the ability of exercise controllers to implement the prescribed scenario. l 2. Demonstrate the ability of exercise controllers to disseminate information to l exercise players without prompting specific players' responses. PAST DRILL / EXERCISE WEAKNESSES t ! 1. Demonstrate the coordination of the Joint Information Center and its ability to dissenunate timely, accurate, and comprehendible information. l 2. Dematrate the smooth flow of timely and accurate information among all l emergency facilities. 3. Demonstrate the ability to adhere to procedural requirements by completing all l forms with the required information. 4. Demonstrate the timeliness of proper event classification through correct coordination and interpretation of technical data. l 5. Demonstrate the ability to activate the emergency response organization by j using the appropriate callout system notification.

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i . - . . AhTUAL EXERCISE JULY 14.1993 NARRATIVE SUMMARY Prior to the start of this exercise, a radwaste shipment will depart the station at 1 t = -30 (0730). The Control Room will be given shipping papers to reflect this

radwaste shipment. At t =-15 (0745), the operators will start releasing Waste Monitor Tank #2. "B" Diesel Generator is awaiting a post-maintenance test. At t = 0 (0800), a seismic level 2 event occurs providing the Control Room with ! ! indications of a 2/3 OBE. The Control Room Operators should implement EPP-015, Natural Emergency. The 2/3 OBE earthquake results in a Waste Gas Recombiner trip, "B" Motor Driven Emergency Feed Pump (MDEFP) outboard pump bearing oil ! bubbler break, #5 Feedwater Heater develops a 25 gallons per minute (GPM) leak to the TB iloor, Fairfield Pump Hydro will trip causing the Waste Monitor Tank release to isolate, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) will develop a 1 foot crack at the 75% level, resulting in a 430 gpm leak and RML-1 radiation levels will gradually increase,indicatmg some possible failed fuel. The Shift Supervisor should declare an Alert condition. At about t = 10 (0810), the Control Room Operators should request Chemistry to sample the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).

At t = 30 (0830), a Steam Generator tube rupture will occur with a 400 gpm primary to secondary leak. The Control Room should receive a RWST low level alarm at ~ approximately this time. , At approximately t = 35 (0835), a safety injection should occur.

! At approximately t = 40 (0840), if a RCS normal sample, (not a PASS sample) was obtained by the Chemist, results should be reported to the Control Room. If"B" MDEFP started during the safety injection, it will seize due to the bearing oiler problem which occurred at t= 0. "A" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump will develop a 50 gpm shaft sealleak. At t = 50, the turbine driven emergency feed pump (TDEFP) will auto start due to a LoLo steam generator condition in 2 of 3 steam generators. This will be a small i unmonitored release to the environment. At t = 65, the TDEFP is secured by the operator. The release is terminated. At t = 90 (0930), a seismic event greater than OBE for 30 seconds will occur. The Shift Supervisor should declare a Site Area Emergency. Security will experience a j loss of their zone 20 microwave, requiring a Security Officer to be stationed, ' i monitoring the fence near the Auxiliary Access Portal. The meteorological tower will lose the 10 meter wind speed indication. A fire will develop in "A" MDEFP. At approximately t = 110 (0950), the Fire Brigade should be dispatched to investigate . l the * A" MDEFP. At approximately t = 120 (1000), confirmation on a fire in the "A" MDEFP should be , l reported. ! { ! 6 , t y , . ~ - . , , - -

~- . - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - c . . i At approximately t = 135 (1015), "the fire is out" should be reported by the Fire Brigade. "A" MDEFP has extensive damage. The TDEFP will be restarted by the MCB operators. This will be a small release to the environment. At approximately t = 150(1030), the meteorological tower 10 meter wind speed indications should be repaired. l At t = 180 (1100), "A" main steam header will develop a steam break at a safety valve l flange. The Shift Supervisor should declare a General Emergency. This results in a , monitored release path to the environment via the west penetration ventilation system. At approximately t = 195, Operations will secure the TDEFP. At approximately t = 200 (1120), a Security Officer entering the Operations Support Center (OSC) is determined to be contaminated. If the officer does not/is not monitored for contamination prior to his entering the OSC, the floor in the OSC will be contaminated by the ofricer. l At t = 210, the plant will enter mode 4, Reactor Coolant System will be less than ! 350 F. At t = 240, when the operators attempt to open the RHR Loop Suction valves, valve XVG08701B will not open. ! At t = 270, the breaker overloads should be reset for XVG08701B and the valve will be operable from the MCB. At t = 300, "B" RHR should be aligned and commence plant cooldown. At approximately t= 360, the Drill Coordinator will terminate the exercise. . i ! ! t i . -. . . .. ~

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i 1 a 4 . Small release to environment l TDEFP Small release Seismic secured TDEFP to damage environment started , General Site Area Emergency 9"" AU START XVG8701B Commence 1 will not open plant cooldown from MCB with "B" RHR ' "A"5/G Seismic Steam Break Tube Event > OBE "A" main Rupture 30 seconds steam header l , . l l l ! l l l . ' . t::0 t= 30 t:=60 t = 90 t = 120 t= 150 t= 180 t= 21 C t = 240 t=:!70 t = 300 t=330 t=3E0 ' 4 i Seismic Safety Fire Contaminated i event injection "A" MDEFP Officer at FP j 2/3 OBE the OSC I se ured Breaker overload "A" RHR for XVG87018

ALERT pump Reset ' shaft sealleak Resultant Terminate Plant

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5* da e RCS Temp ' < 3 50-

, 5 -- a- c.. . - - - - .---- . - ., - - - - - - - - -- -- .

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, - j. - ' ! i i - 1 i CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF MAJOR EVENTS ! l i EXERCISE EAL i TIME TIE EVENT CLASSIFICATION i i Pre-drill

Wind speed 4 mph i Info

Wind speed direction from 35*

"B" Diesel Generator. awaiting post-

maintenance test 0730 T=-30

Radwaste shipment departs station j 0745 T=-15

• Commence release waste monitor tank #2

) 0800 T=0

Level 2 seismic event (2/3 OBE) ALERT , (Implement EPP-015, Natural Emergency 1

Waste Gas Recombiner trips RML-1 rad levels start gradually increasing

'B' Motor Drive Emergency Feed Pump (MDEFP)

outboard pump bearing oil bubbler broken

1. 5 Feedwater heater develops a 25 gpm leak

Fairfield Pump Hydro trips. Waste Monitor

tank release isolates

Refueling Water Storage. Tank (RWST) develops a 1 foot crack at the 75% level of the tank. Leak is hidden by tank insulation and water issues from bottom of insulation.. Results in loss of 5% levol per hour. (430gpm) 0810 T=10

• Control Room requests Chemistry to sample

- the RCS 0830 T=30

• Steam Generator tube rupture

(400 gpm primary to secondary leak rate) RWST Lo Level Alarm in the Control Room

0835 T=35'

Safety Injection 0840 T=40

RCS sample results reported to Control Room (If nomal sample obtained and not a PASS sample)

'B' MDEFP seizes (if started)

'A' RHR pump develops a 50 gpm shaft seal leak 0850 T=50

Turbine Driven Emergency Feed Pump (TDEFP) will start due to a Lolo Steam Generator (S/G) condition in 2 of.3 S/G's. This will be a small rele ke to the environment. _ . , . . . ~ . - . . . _ _ ..... ._ ._ -.. _ _._... _ _ - _ _ .- _ _ _ _ .- -._ _ - _ . _ .__ . _ . _ _ _ _ . - . _ . _ . -

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EXERCISE EAL l TIME TIME EVENT CLASSIFICATION TDEFP is secured - by the operators. Release T=65

is terminated. j 0930 T=90

• Level

3 seismic event (> OBE for 30 SITE AREA i seconds) EMERGENCY !

Loss'of Security's. Zone 20 Microwave 4 Meteorological tower problem (loss 'of 10

meter wind speed indication) 'A' MDEFP Motor Fire

Starting the TDEFP must be evaluated 0950 T=110

Fire Brigade dispatched from OSC 1015 T=135

• Fire

out and extensive motor damage reported

Operators start the TDEFP to feed S/G's. - This is a small release to the environment. 1030 T=150

Meteorological tower 10 meter wind speed repaired ' 1100 T=180

Steam break, safety valve flange, ' A' Main GENERAL Steam Header-(west penn) EMERGENCY 1120 T=200

• A Security Officer is ' determined to be

contaminated while entering the OSC. 1130 T=210

Plant is in mode 4 (RCS Temp 350) 1200 T=240

• Meals arrive on station
• When attempting

to open the RHR Loop Suction Valve 8701B, the valve will not open from the MCB, 1230 T=270

Breaker overload has been reset and valve 8701B is operable form the MCB. 1300 T=300

• Commence cooldown with "B" RHR

1400 T=360

• Terminate exercise.

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