IR 05000395/1990024
| ML20058B527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Haag R, Modenos L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058B524 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-90-24, GL-89-04, GL-89-4, NUDOCS 9010300250 | |
| Download: ML20058B527 (10) | |
Text
_
_
-,
i
-
,
,
e
.
,
i
p hte UNIT ED STATES
/
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON
[
REGloN li
!
j 101 MARIETTA sTRE ET.N.W.
- a ATLANTA.OEoRGI A 30323
- s.,...../
,
.
Report No.:
50-395/90-24 Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company l
Columbia, SC 29218
'
Docket No.:
50-395 License No.: NPF-12
'
Facility Name:
V. C. Summer Inspection Conducted:
September 1 - 30, 1990 Inspectors:
4t4<
XOd.2/94 Robert C. Haag
/
Datt Signed
/
A JAhll98 Leo Pr Modenos g[
Date Slgned
'
t Approved by:
M [d N
/d>/9d Floyd S. Cantrell, Sec Chief Dat'e Si'gned
,
Division of Reactor Pr ects l
,
SUMMARY Scope:
,
'
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations', monthly maintenance observation.
- operational. safety verification,. onsite follow-up of written reports of nonroutine events at power reactor facilities, onsite follow-up of events at operating power. reactors,.and action on previous inspection findings.
Selected-i tours were conducted on backshift'or weekends.
Backshift or weekend tours were i
conducted on te.n occasions.
Results:
,
The plant operated.at or near 100' percent power throughout the inspection period. - Operator errors involving the' failure. to recognize and verify -
compliance with the acceptance criteria for check valve testing were identified
'
by the licensee'(paragraph-6).
Observations of the valve control program
,
indicated that' operators a'e-fully aware of management's expectation concerning r
cvalve manipulations and independent verification.
The licensee's efforts
.
involving the shipment of;five fuel pins:and the resolution to associated
,
problems was viewed as good.
,
9010300250 901012 ADOCK 0500 5,
gDR
,
Y
.
'
.
.
.
REPORT DETAILS
'
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics
- C. Bowman, Manager, Maintenance Services
- M. Browne, Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance
- R. Campbell, Senior Engineer, ISEG B. Christinsen, Manager, Technical Services
- H. Donnelly, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Licensing S. Furstenberg, Associate Manager, Operations
- G. Gibson, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services D. Goldston, Supervisor, Test Unit G. Guy, Supervisor, Radwaste Process Control W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
- A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- D. Moore, General Manager, Station Support
- C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite
- J. Proper, Associate Manager, Quality Assurance
- M. Quinton, General Manager, Engineering Services
- J. Skolds, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- G. Soult, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- G. Taylor, Manager, Operations
- R. Waselus, Manager Design Engineering
- H. Williams, General Manager, Administrative & Support Services K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, techniciant, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
~ Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph, 2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61796)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordcnce with license requirements.- The inspectors observed portions of four selected surveillance tests including all aspects of STP-115.033, Reactor Building Airlock Door Seal Leak Test, which involved LLRT of the escape airlock inner and outer door seals.
The inspectors verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to servic.
,
' '
,, -
.
l During the valve manipulations for the escape airlock seal test, the inspector noted a high degree of sensitivity exhibited by the operators while verifying valve alignment.
Particular attention was given to the independent verification process and the need to ensure that the second verification is truely independent from the initial valve alignment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications (TS),
industry codes, and standards.
T!e inspectors determined that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
The inspectors independently verified that the equipment was prnperly tested before being returned to service.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affeet a given system's performance.
The following specific maintenance activities were observed:
Disassembly and inspection of "C" component cooling water booster pump (Procedure MMP 0320.002, PMTS P0136530).
- Replacement of pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-444 (NCN 4037, MWR 9001440).
Due to the obsolescence of the original Barton style transmitter, a new Rosemount transmitter was installed.
To minimize the installation time in the reactor building, an additional mechanical joint was added during replacement of the transmitter.
The licensee has designated this work as a temporary installation and plans to replace the tubing with a one piece tube during the next
refueling outage.
- Inspection and cleaning of the instrument air dryer inlet and outlet four-way valves (PMTS P013b181 and P0135182).
,
Replacement of the desiccant in the instrument air dryer XDR-4 (PMTS P0135094).
- Inspection of "A" emergency diesel generator air receiver inlet check valve XVC-10978A (Procedure HMSI SOER 86-03, MWR 90T0358).
The inspection was performed on this' style valve to gain data for use in the establishment of a periodic inspection program for check valves as suggested by INPO SOER 86-03. While reviewing the procedure the inspector noted an asterisk adjacent to two steps involving reassembly torquing.
When questioned, the mechanic stated that he was unaware of the meaning or significance of the asterisk.
After a review of the issue, licensee management informed the inspector that
.
.
.. '
the asterisk is used to denote a critical step signoff that must be performed satisfactorily in order to meet the procedural acceptance criteria.
The licensee also stated that future maintenance training
'
would emphasize the purpose of an asterisk.
- Investigation and repair of the containment high range area radiation monitor RM-G7 (MWR 9001828)
Repair of a body to bonnet leak on the spent fuel pool cooling valve XVD06708 (MWR 9000662).
While torquing the bonnet fasteners the inspector noted the use of a "crowsfoot" adapter which extended the point of applied torque.
The torque wrench had been previously calibrated with the "crowsfoot" adapter to compensate for the change in location of applied torque.
The mechanics were very knowledgeable i
I of various torquing principles and of the torquing program at VCSNS.
- Investigation and repair the "A" train circuit breaker for charging pump XPP0043C (MWR 9001710).
Earlier operators had attempted to start XPP0043C, however each time the breaker was closed, it would trip open.
When the pump was aligned to "B" train elec >ical power the pump operated satisfactorily.
While troubleshooting ti.* control I
circuitry for the "A" electrical train breaker, the licensee identified contact between wire lugs for the pump indicating lights
,
on the main control board.
A wire lug on the positive D.C. terminal for the amber light was in contact with the wire lug on the negative terminal for the red light.
This condition caused the breaker trip coil to be energized as soon as the breaker was closed.
Further review identified that the amber light socket had rotated from its'
original position and allowed contact with the red light lug.
The cause of the socket rotation was attributed to loosening of the socket mounting on the main control board and a subsequent replace-ment of the light.
A check of other indicating lights did not identify any additional loose socket mountings.
Operations personnel were informed via a training memorandum of the need for caution while replacing indicating lights, and that any abnormal conditions, i.e.,
looseness or rotation of the light socket should be reported for corrective action.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
.
i
.
.
.
,
..
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component (s), and operabilit;,
of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performance.
Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant
'
housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazards.
During a tour of the auxiliary building, the inspector noted the poor lighting and housekeeping conditions of room 3616.
The room serves as a valve gallery for various CVCS seal injection and return valves, and for spent fuel pool cooling valves.
The licensee initiated action to replace l
a defective light fixture and to increase the wattage of the remaining light bulbs.
Miscellaneous debris was removed from the room, and a MWR was initiated to repaint the floor during the next refueling outage.
The licensee stated that repainting of the floor will aid in a long term housekeeping upgrade.
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment t
isolation lineup (s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
'
Selected tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
Inspections included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, containment, cable penetration areas, service water.
intake structure, and other general plant areas.
Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required.
On a regular basis, RWP's were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP's.
Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency
"
were verified, In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shif ts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were identifie i
)
,o
.
.
.
-
..
i i
5.
Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
'
Facilities (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the following Part 21 Reports and SPR's to
!
ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified event or deficie wy was in conformance with regulatory requirements, TS, license conditio.a and licensee procedures and controls.
(Closed) 10 CFR 21 Report (90-06), Part 21 report from Anchor Darling on incorrect material for backup o-rings.
The o-rings were furnished in
'
rebuild kits for Teledyne-Republic four-way valves which are part of the actuators for main steam isolation valves and feedwater isolation valves.
The defective material involved the supply of Buna-N o-rings in lieu of the required Viton 0-rings.
The use of Buna-N parts could adversely affect the safety related function of the valves.
SCE&G inspected and tested all their four-way valve repair kits in stock.
Some Buna-N backup ringswerediscoveredduringtestingandwererejected.
The licensee has a material and procurement program that will ensure that no Buna-N parts
are used in applicable Anchor Darling valves.
(Closed) Special Reports90-005 and 90-008, Valid failures of the "B" emergency diesel generator during surveillance testing.
The diesel testing was performed after completion of the 18 month scheduled maintenance.
The first failure involved a high crankcase pressure trip that was caused by a higher than normal lube oil level.
After correction of the oil level and several minor adjustments, the surveillance test was reperformed.
The second and third failures occurred during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
!
surveillance run.
In both events the diesel was stopped during the 24
' hour run due to unusual noises from the engine.
However it was not until the second event when the licensee discovered the origin of the noise was
.
a worn camshaft bearing.
After re)lacement of the bearing and an inspec-
tion of other camshaft bearings, tie 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> surveillance run was satisfactorily performed.
Based on these failures the test frequency per TS 4.8.1.1.2 was increased to once every seven days.
No additional failures of the "B" EDG have
-
occurred since the last failure on May 12, 1990.
The licensee has
'
'
satisfied the EDG test schedule criteria in TS Table 4.8-1 and is currently on a 31 test frequency for both EDG's.
6.-
Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
,
a..
On September 24, 1990, while performing STP 122.002, Component Cooling Pump' Test, the pump discharge check valve XVC096820 was declared inoperable due to inadequate flow through-the valve.
The acceptance criteria in section 8.0 of the STP require a flow between
'
5328 and 5888 gpm to-demonstrate that the check valve will fully open. While performing his review of the STP, the SS identified that the recorded flow (5280 gpm) was less than the minimum flow rate.
A subsequent review of previous CCW pump tests identified that the STP
,
l
.
...,
,
for "B" pump which was performed on July 26, 1990, had a recorded flow of 5160 gpm.
Based on these test results, both the "B" and "C" CCW pumps were declared inoperable and the applicable 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TS LCO was entered.
The licensee's immediate corrective action involved recalibration of the flow instrumentation and reperformance of the STP for all three CCW pumps.
The as-found flow rates during these subsequent pump tests verified adequate flow through each train of CCW and through the corresponding check valves.
Based on a review of the flow instrumentation, the previous test results and the three recent pump STP's the licensee considers that adequate flow (as required for a des w.. basis accident) has been maintained in the CCW system since the flow rates were established at the end of last refueling outage.
After reviewing this information, the inspector is also in agreement with this conclusion.
The licensee has attributed the low flow rates to personnel error in that the optimal or highest flow rates were not recorded nor were all operators aware of the minimum flow rate.
Additional action that was initiated as a result of this event involved:
Reemphasizing to each operctions crew the need for attention to detail while performing a STP and that all the acceptance criteria should be understood when the test parameters are being verified.
- Revise STP 122.002 to include the acceptance criteria in the step that is gathering the data and also on the data sheet.
This will make STP 122.002 more consistent with the majority of STP's in the placement of acceptance criteria.
- Review other STP's to ensure that ac.eptance criteria is consistently presented to personnel performing the test.
The licensee's actions appear responsive to ensure proper implementa-tion of acceptance criteria for surveillance tests.
The issue of personnel errors and accountability by operations personnel is 'an r
area that the licensee believes.can be improved.
The inspector will review any additional licensee action for improvement in this area.
!
b.~
The licensee is participating with Westinghouse in a program to perform destructive testing on spent fuel pins.
Five fuel pins-from-spent VANTAGE 5 fuel assemblies were shipped from VCSNS to Chalk-River Nuclear Laboratories in Ontario, Canada for testing.
Four fuel pins were from one assembly that had been in the core for three cycles. Westinghouse.had previously performed non-destructive testing on this assembly and chose these pins based on the cladding-oxide film thickness.
The fifth fuel pin was chosen for testing due
,
.
'
,, -
to through cladding defects that were discovered during the last refueling outage.
The inspector reviewed the procedures for movement
'
of the fuel pins including placement of the pins in the shipping cask.
Nuclear engineering personnel effectively coordinated the overall effort which involved several plant organizations and vendor groups.
When the shipping cask arrived on site, the licensee performed contamination surveys on the cask exterior.
The contamination levels which ranged up to 400,000 DPM/100 cm2, exceeded the liinits stated in 10 CFR Part 20.205.
The licensee made the appropriate notifications.
The licensee believes that leaching of contaminants from the cask stainless exterior was the cause of the high contamination levels.
After placement of the fuel pins in the cask and removal of the cask from the pool, the licensee made a significant effort to decontaminate the cask prior to shipment.
Based on the preliminary results received from Chalk River, the licensee was successful in maintaining contamination levels below the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 during shipment of fuel pins.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (c'L1)
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 89-06-01, Ability to perform a channel check on the oxygen product gas m'.ter for the catalytic hydrogen recombiners.
The inspectar nad questioned the capability to perform the check since the meters will read less than zero during normal operations or if the equipment is de-energized.
New oxygen analyzers were installed which provide a zero or greater reading while energized and allow performance of a valid channel check.
The licensee review of other required channel checks and meter readings did not identify any similar conditions.
8.
Other Areas a.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's current position in regard to Generic Letter No. 89-04, " Guidance on Developing Acceptable
Inservice Testing Programs".
The licensee is designated as a Table 1 plant in the GL and is currently waiting for the issuance of an SER from the NRC.
The inspector's initial concern was that the licensee had taken no action in response to the GL.
However, the inspector was informed that the licensee is nearing completion of a review to determine how well the VCSNS IST program complies with GL 89-04, The licensee also stated that several minor changes to IST procedures have been completed to better comply with i.ne GL.
ihe inspector encouraged the licensee to continue their review and tt, make the applicable changes to their IST prop.am that will satisfy the positions in GL 89-04, but still be in compliance with the current ASME code of recor __
.
-
i
- *
=
,,
b.
The Regional Section Chief Floyd Cantrell, visited the site on September 5 and 6, 1990.
He toured the plant and met with the plant management and the resident inspectors, c.
Two regional inspectors also visited the Summer Plant during this inspection period.
The first inspection involved follow-up of a security event, while the second inspection dealt with the transport of the spent fuel pins.
9.
Exit Interview (30703)
!
1he inspection scope and findings were summarized on Octorber 2,1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.
j The operator errors involving testing of the CCW pump discharge check valve were discussed with the licensee.
The licensee stated that personnel error trends indicate the overall number of errors are i
decreasing, however, they are also concerned with the errors involving the
,
check valve testing and other previously identified errors.
The inspector discussed the review of Generic Letter 89-04 and encouraged the licensee to continue ef forts to comply with the GL.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection, 10.
Acronyms and Initialisms CCW Component Coolic.g Water CM Centimeter CVCS Charging and Volume Control System DPM Disintegrations Per Minute EDG Emergency Diesel Generator ESF Engineered Safety Feature GL Generic Letter GPM Gallons Per Minute INPO-Institute of Nuclear Power Operators IST Inservice Testing LCO Limiting Conditions for Operations LER Licensee Event Reports LLRT Local Leak Rate Test MMP Mechanical Maintenance Procedure MSI Mechanical Maintenance Special Instruction MWR Maintenance Work Request NCN Nonconformance Notice NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation
[!
.
,
1: ;
'
s
.. +- *~
,
-.. -
i l;:
!?
l l.;.,
PMTS.
Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet RCS Reactor Coolant System RWP.
Radiation Work Permits SCE&G South Carolina Electric & Gas SOER Significant Operators Event Retort SPR Special Reports
. 55 Shift Supervisor STP Surveillance Test Procedures TS Technical Specifications VCSNS V. C. Summer Nuclear Station f
,
.!-
-,,
.
ty l?'
i
. -.,
<
L
!
g
!
'
,
.2 s
'- h:-
(~>'
.i
,]
-
+
'
-]
a i
.]
'
. 3., 7 4
,
s u
"
,,..
m
,
L
'
s e
i
,
<
j