IR 05000395/1988014
| ML20207F876 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1988 |
| From: | Dance H, Hopkins P, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207F871 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-88-14, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8808230248 | |
| Download: ML20207F876 (10) | |
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M-UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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R EGION 18 l'
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,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
't ATLANT A, G EORGI A 30323
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' Report No. : 50-395/88-14
' Licensee : South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No. :
50-395 License No. : NPF-12 Facility Name : V. C. Summer Inspection Conducted: June 1 - July 31, 1988 Inspectors: bN G \\6k 86
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ftichar'd) L. Prevatte Date Signed S AMih-8M99,
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erry'. H pkins Date Sig ed Approved by:
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H6ghC./ Dance,SectibnChief Daijle Signed Division of Reactor Projects e
SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine, announced int, Action was conducted by the resident
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monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, engineered safety features system walkdown, onsite followup of events and subsequent written reports, action on previous inspection
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findings, Generic Letter 83-28 followup, and other areas.
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Results: The licensee's maintenance and surveillance programs appear to be strong and controlled by well developed procedures.
Personnel appear to be motivated and possess a good working knowledge of procedures and assigned tasks.
In the area of operations, the licensee has experienced two reactor trips from the same cause in the past two months. Eight reactor trips have occurred in the past eleven months.
This is well above industry average and is indicative of a negative trend that requires additional licensee attention.
Plant tours indicate that additional licensee attention is also required in control room appearance and equipment leakage.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviation 3 were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees l
W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and health Physics K. Beale, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications M. Browne, General Manager, Station Support W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems
- A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services D. Moore, General Manager, Engineering Services
- K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
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- G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance
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G. Taylor, Manager, Operations (
D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services l
M. Williams, General Manager, Nuclear Services K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training l
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NRC Resident Inspectors J. Hayes. NRR Project Manager P. Hopkins, Resident Inspector
- R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph, 2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of 45 selected surveillance tests including all aspects of the DG Operability Test, (STP 125.002).
The inspectors also verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified persor.nel, required test instrumen-tation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test discre-pancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to service.
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The personnel accomplishing the surveillance activities exhibited a good knowicdge of the test procedures, equipment and systems on which they were performing tests and/or calibrations. The procedures were adequate and of sufficient detail to allow the individual to accomplish the assigned task.
The ' operators / technicians followed the procedures in the established sequence and encountered no problem in accomplishing each procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS and appropriate industry codes and standards.
The inspectors also determined that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
The inspectors independently verified that equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and a backlog which might affect its performance was not developing on a given system.
The following specific maintenance activities were observed:
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MWR 87E0221 Replace pole shaft on RTB, RT2 MWR 87E0237 Replace bearing on rod drive motor generator set PMTS P0104207 Reactor building instrument air compressor "B" PMTS P0103993 DG "A" area ventilation air supply fan PMTS P0103630 Main feedwater pusp turbine "A" lube oil pump motor MWR 87E0222 Inspect and repair on RTB, Ri3 MWR 8800898 Investigate and repair trip mechanism on "C" main feedwater pump.
MWR 8800059 Test piping caps on air handling unit for control room in accordance with NCN 2958 and NRC Bulletin 87-02 MWR 88H0060 Change out of RML 9 canister PMTS P0103915 Repair R11R pump "A" seal water flow transmitter MWR 8810147 Replace power supply oscillator (XCP 6210)
MWR 8800066 Install seal per NCN 2995 MWR 8800065 Install fire barrier seal per NCN 2995, disposition 2
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MWR 8800896 Investigate and repair valve PCV 00145 The personnel performing the above maintenance demonstrated a good knowledge.of the equipment on which they were working.
The applicable procedures were available at the work location and contained sufficient detail for the assigned task.
The equipment, as a whole, appeared to be in good condition.and adequately maintained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors toured the control room, reviewed plant logs, records and held discussions with plant staff personnel to verify that the plant was being operated safely and in conformance with applicable requirements.
Specific items inspected in the control room included: adequacy of staffing and attentiveness of control room personnel, TS and procedural adherence, operability of equipment and indicated control room status, control room logs, tagout books, operating orders, jumper / bypass controls, computer printouts and annunciators.
Tours of other plant areas were conducted to verify equipment operability, control of ignition sources and combustible materials, the condition of fire detection and extinguishing equipment, the control of maintenancc and surveillance activities in progress, the implementation of radiation protective controls and the physical security plan. Tours were conducted during normal and random off hour periods. Observations on the above tours indicated that the licensee is allowing the cleanness and overall appearance of some plant areas to slowly deteriorate.
Especially noted was the lack of attention to cleanness at the primary access portal, service and control building stairwells and the control room.
It is evident that plant personnel are discarding trash and used hearing protection aid packages in stairwells.
The control room carpet is in need of extensive cleaning and the walls, desks and equipment in this area require more frequent cleaning if a professional appearance is to be maintained.
The inspectors, in inspection report 88-13, dated June 16, 1988, had identified a problem that the licensee was experiencing with circulating water leakage into the main condenser. The licensee, on May 26, 1988, had
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i reduced power to 90 percent and repaired three tube leaks in the main
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condenser.
After returning to power on May 30, 1988, problems were again
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experienced.
Power was reduced to 40% on May 31, 1988. While attempting i
to locate the source of the inleakage the unit tripped on June 1,1988, i
and the licensee decided to cool down, break vacuum and do a visual inspection inside the main condenser.
The inspection revealed that the
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PATHWAY expansion joint between the "A" low pressure turbine and SA low pressure heater, which is inside the main condenser, had ruptured.
The expansion joint and other components in the general area are covered (wrapped) with heavy grade sheet metal insulation.
This insulation is riveted and banded onto the piping and other components inside the
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condenser.
The steam escaping from the ruptured expansion joint ripped the insulation loose and the loose parts became missiles which sub-sequently damaged 17 tubes inside the main condenser.
The licensee plugged the damaged tubes, replaced the ruptured expansion joint, repaired / replaced the damaged insulation and returned the unit to power on June 10, 1988.
On July 5,1988 at 11:30 a.m., the licensee began a power reduction at 10 percent per hour down to 40 percent.
At 2:30 p.m., the plant was stabilized at 40 percent power.
An entry was made into the reactor building and the "B" RCDT pump was replaced. The unit was returned to 100 percent power on July 6, 1988.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
ESFSystemWalkdown(71710)
The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Service Water System.
The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration. The inspectors looked for equipment conditions and items that might degrade performance (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc.
The inspectors verified that valves, including instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appropriate.
The inspectors compared both local and remote position indications.
The following deficiencies were identified:
missing and/or incorrect labels on components, excessive leakage around SWP "B"; water leaking from the industrial cooling water system onto the intermediate building roof and through a seismic joint and into a safety related cable tray in 1 DA switchgear room; excessive water leaking from industrial cooling water pumps; failure to include all valves in the system operating procedure valve lineup list; oil leaking from the operator of XUG-3107A-SW, XUG-3110A-SW, and XUT-3151B-SW; burned out indicator lamps on switchgear; and change "A" of S0P 117 which changed the electrical lineup position in attachment 11 from 0N to OPEN and from 0FF to CLOSED - this is not consistent with the other listings in this procedure or actual breaker position.
The above deficiencies and specific details were discussed with the manager of operations. He has indicated that they will be corrected. The overall condition of the system was satisfactory.
However, it appears that the licensee is not exhibiting an aggressive approach to excessive pump leakage.
Operations personnel should be more observant of minor system deficiencies during their routine rounds and while making system alignments.
This lack of attention can result in overall system deteriorations and degradatio,
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1 No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Followup of Events and Subsequent Written Reports (92700, 93702)
The inspectors reviewed the following, LER's, and SPR's to ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified event or deficiency was in conformance with regulatory requirements, TS, license conditions, and licensee procedures and controls. Based upon this review the following items are closed.
SPR 88-03 Inoperable reactor building radiation monitor SPR 87-09 Inoperable fire detection instrumentation SPR 88-02 SG tube eddy current examination SPR 88-04 Inoperability of the 61 meter wind direction instrument.
LER 88-04 Two, 2 inch core drills found_ unsealed.
LER 88-05 Failure to establish fire watch for relay room due to personnel error LER 88-01 Three video cameras and various security doors failed unlocked due to system voltage.
(This LER is administrative 1y closed and will be tracked under IFI 88-09-01)
SPR-88-01 Inoperable integrated fire computer systems On June 1, 1988, at 10:04 a.m., the reactor tripped from 40 percent power while personnel were testing the "B train SSPS.
The trip occurred when the control room operator closed the RTB control switch on the MCB. When the MCB switch was rotated to the close position,
"A" RTB and "B" RTB Bypass Breaker opened causing a reactor trip from the "A" train solid state protection channel.
Subsequent investigation and testing by the licensee revealed that the event was caused by the interruption of the 48 volt undervoltage signal to the
"A" RTB and the "B" Bypass Breaker. The interruption of the 48 volt undervoltage signal occurred across a contact located on the reactor trip switch on the MCB.
It was determined that the MCB switch could be rotated to close RTB's without fully closing all contacts, unless the switch was taken to the full travel stop.
This condition initiates a scenario where the contact could remain open and cause a loss of the 48 volt undervoltage signal the next time that the reactor trip switch is rotated to the close position.
Post testing has verified that this condition existed on the switch for only the "A" train position of the switch.
A warning label of this condition was placed on the MCD and a note was placed in the applicable procedures to alert the operators to this condition.
The unit was subsequently returned to power
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on June 10, 1988, after repairs were completed due to other problems on the main condenser. The licensee has submitted LER 88-07 on this event.
On July 26, 1988 at 9:24 a.m., the reactor tripped from 100 percent power while personnel were testing the "B" train SSPS.
The trip occurred when the control room operator closed the RTB control switch on the MCB. When the MCB switch was rotated to the close position
"A" RTB and "B" RTB Bypass Breaker opened, causing a reactor trip from the
"A" train solid state protection channel. This trip is the same as the last previous trip which occurred on June 1,1988 and is described in LER 88-07, dated July 1, 1988.
On this previous trip the licensee determined that the failure was caused by the operator not rotating the switch to the fully closed position and thereby aligning switch internal contacts.
The licensee's corrective action on the previous trip included the addition of steps in G0P-1 and GOP-3, and placing a label at the switch on the MCB board to insure that the switch was operated correctly.
As evidenced by the July 26, 1988 trip, these actions failed to prevent recurrence.
The licensee reviewed the reactor trip package on this event and determined that a problem still exists in the switch and/or operation of the switch.
The licensee interim fix is to add steps in STP 375.074, the test procedure applicable to this evolution, and change the MCB label to prevent operation of the reactor trip /close switch from the MCB.
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Engineering will then review the problem for a long term solution.
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A review of this problem by the inspector indicates that the licensee action on the previous trip may have failed to identify the root cause of the problem. The changes to procedures, G0P-1 and G0P-3, should have been
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l considered an' interim fix.
Discussion with licensee management personnel and a review of corrective actions from the June 1,1988 trip did not
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identify planned long range equipment, design changes or other corrective action to eliminate this problem.
Although not addressed in LER 88-07;
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changes were made to STP 345.074, SSPS actuation logic and master relay l
test for train "B",
to insure that the breaker would be closed locally instead of from the MCB.
These steps were not followed by the personnel
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performing the test.
The inspectors also noted that LER 88-07, which covers the previous event, and issued on July 1, 1988, had not been placed in the licensed operators required reading log in the control room, at the time of this trip.
The plant was restarted on July 20, 1988.
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licensee is currently preparing a LER on this item.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(Closed)
Bulletin 88-06, Actions to be taken for the transportation of Model No. Spec. 2-T radiographic exposure device.
This bulletin was issued to infonn licensees of changes that had been made to the NRC Certificate of Compliance No. 9056 for the above device and to request that licensees who possess or use the above device provide certain information to the NRC regional office.
The licensee has conducted a
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survey and determined that they do not possess this device at their nuclear or other company owned facilities; therefore, this bulletin is not applicable.
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Bulletin 88-01, Defects in Westinghouse circuit breakers. This bulletin provides information on Westinghouse service DS circuit breakers and safety concerns associated with their use.
It provided inspection and acceptance criteria for continued use of these breakers for class IE service.
The licensee performed the required inspections and reported the results to Region II in a letter dated, March 30, 1988. The breakers were acceptable for interim use.
Replacement pole shafts were obtained and installed in all five breakers in use at the V.C. Summer plant, no corrective actions were required for mechanism alignment. The inspectors observed the replacement activities on two of the five breakers and verified that the pole shafts had been replaced on the remaining three.
The licensee provided a final report on this item to Region II, in a letter dated July 12, 1988.
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Violation 88-10-01, Failure to take adequate compensatory action for inoperable fire protection equipment. The licensee providad a written response to this violation in a letter to Region II, dated July 9, 1988.
Corrective actions taken by the licensee to address this deficiency and prevent recurrence included having control room personnel fill out all restoration and removal permits, improve interface between control room personnel and the shift fire protection officer, and additional personnel training.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee response and training documentation and agree that the corrective action is appropriate and adequate.
8.
Other Areas Other activities related to the inspection program are noted:
a.
The senior resident inspector attended the licensee's training on emergency preparedness for county and state government officials conducted on June 10, 1988 at the plant site.
The training covered event classification, notification, use of emergency action lists, communications, new equipment, lessons learned from past drills and events and areas to be covered in future exercises.
An indoctrina-tion tour of selected plant areas was conducted as part of the training.
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The Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, accompanied by his Technical Assistant, the Region II Regional Administrator, the NRC Project Manager and the Reactor Projects Section Chief for the Summer plant visited the V.C. Summer plant on June 30, 1988.
The visit included a presentation on the current status of the plant, a tour of the facility and a meeting with corporate and plant management personne.
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.The senior resident inspector and the NRR project manager attended a licensee sponsored training class on July 19, 1988, for local law enforcement officials.
This training is for the Fairfield County Sheriff's Department, the State Law Enforcement Department, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the South Carolina Highway Patrol personnel that may be required to provide assistance to the plant in an emergency.
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This training is conducted annually to familiarize the above personnel with changes in the site facility and emergency plan.
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The resident inspector assisted NRC headquarters in conducting an operational assessment of the Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station during the period of June 6-17, 1988.
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The NRR project manager visited the Summer plant as a part of the project manager / resident inspector exchange program during the week ending July 22, 1988. The project manager assisted the inspector in conducting an ESF System Walkdown on the SWS, participated in observing shift turnovers, control room observations, routine plant inspection activities and meetings with licensee management personnel.
9.
Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.1 (TI 2515/91)
Item 4.1 of GL 83-28 required licensees to review all vendor-recommended reactor trip breaker modifications to verify that the modifications had been implememnted. TI 2515/64, Near Term Inspection Followup to GL 83-28 and TI 2515/91, Inspection Followup to GL 83-28, Item 4.1 provided guidance for regional verification of licensee's action on vendor
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recommended modifications to the reactor trip breakers.
Regional Inspection Report -No. 50-395/85-03 confirmed that the licensee had installed the automatic shunt trip device on the reactor trip system.
The licensee stated that the shunt trip devices would be replaced on all four reactor trip breakers with seismically qualified shunt devices.
Subsequent to the above inspection, the licensee submitted documentation to RII to verify that all vendor recommended modifications had been implemented.
The following licensee documents were reviewed:
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Westinghouse (W) Letters dated July 25, 1983, November 17, 1983, August 23, 1984, April 30, 1985, and August 5,1986 - Modifications to Reactor Trip Switchgear b.
W Field Change Notices (FCNs) CGE0-405078, 40513, 40521, and 40527 -
Modification of Reactor Trip Switchgear c.
SCE&G Letter No. CGSW-1269 dated August 12, 1986 Confi rming
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Implementation of Field Change Notices d.
V.C. Summer Design Packages for Modification Request Form Nos. 20208 and 20208B dated August 3, 1983, and June 10, 1985, respectively.
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V.C. Summer Work _ Request ' No. 20208 Supplements 1, 2, 3, dated December 7, 1983, and November 12, 1985 Based on the review of the above documents, the inspector verified that the licensee has evaluated and implemented the vendor recommended modifications to the reactor trip breakers. This item is-closed.
10. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 1, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary,any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
11. Acronyms and Initialisms DG Diesel Generator ESF Engineered Safety Feature GL Generic Letter GOP General Operating Procedures IFI Inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report MWR Maintenance Work Request NCN Non Conformance Notice NRC Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation PMTS Preventative Maintenance Task Sheet RCDT Reactor Coolant Drain Tank RHR Residual Heat Removal RTB Reactor Trip Breaker S0P System Operating Procedure SPR Special Procedures Report SSPS Solid State Protection System CTP Surveillance Test Procedures SWP Service Water Pump SWS Service Water System TS Technical Specifications
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