IR 05000395/1989012
| ML20247R633 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1989 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Schin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247R608 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-89-12, NUDOCS 8908080072 | |
| Download: ML20247R633 (14) | |
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ONITED STATES
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. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-
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Report No.: 50-395/89-12
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Licensee: South Carolina Electric.8 Gas Company?
Columbia', SC 29218 Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name:
V. C. Summer Inspection-Conducted: June 26-30, 1989
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j Inspectors: _ 41. Schin, Team Leader Dite Signed Team Members:
R. Gibbs G. Salyers Approved by:
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P/'g aa"' E r.L.. ru e1 D~ ate / Signed Operatio%i[ProgramsSection Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
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This routine, announced inspection'was conducted in the areassof follow-up of the OSTI inspection completed in December,1988.
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Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. The licensee's. progress in accomplishment of corrective, actions for violations identified during the OSTI inspection was' good. Corrective' actions were
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comprehensive and for the most part were completed. However, the licensee's.".
progress on weaknesses identified during the OSTI. inspection that were not
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assigned IFI numbers was poor. Most were not entered into' Commitment Tracking System and had no corrective action being accomplished. Weaknesses.in the.
Commitment' Tracking System are identified in this reporti.(paragraph 2..);
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- 0. Bradham, Vice President Nuclear Operations
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- R. Campbell, Senior Engineer, ISEG l
- R. Clary, Manager, Design Engineering j
- E. Evans, Senior Engineer, Licensing
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- M. Fowlkes, Associate Manager, Shift Engineering j
U. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
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- A. Koon, Jr., Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- F. Lamphere, Associate Manager, Administrative Services
- G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services l
- D. Moore, General Manager,' Engineering Services
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- K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety
- J. Proper, Associate Manager, Quality Assurance j
- J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
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- A. Smith, Manager, Facilities and Administration
- G. Taylor, Manager, Operations
- M. Williams, General Manager, Nuclear Services j
- K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Education and Training
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- F. Zander, Manager, Nuclear Technical Education and Training Other l#censee employees contacted included Operations personnel, l
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Training personnel, and Office personnel.
NRC Representatives
- P. Hopkins, Resident Inspector l
L. Modenos, Project Engineer
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- Attended exit interview Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in Attachment 1.
2.
Commitment Tracking System (92701)
During this OSTI Followup 1nspection, the NRC team found that some OSTI identified weaknesses, licensee commitments, and NRC concerns had not been j
entered into the licensee's commitment tracking system. One ommitment that t,ad been entered into the CTS had iot been assigned to anyone for action. As a result, no licensee action was planned or taking olace for some of these items. These items are so identified in paragraph 3. of this report, and IFI numbers are assigned.
In response to this weakness in the CTS, the licensee committed to revise their procedures so that in the future:
licensee commitments to the NRC, l
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NRC identified weaknesses, and NRC concerns important to safety will be entered into the CTS, assigned for action, and followed up to assure that action is taken.
The procedure revision will include a guideline as to what items from NRC inspection reports are to be entered into the CTS.
This is identified as inspector followup item 395/89-12-01.
A few days after the completion of this inspection, the licensee provided the team a copy of NL-102, Distribution, Review and Processing of Various Regulatory and Industry Documents, Revision 13, dated July 5, 1989.
The procedure revision satisfies this NRC concern.
This item is closed.
3.
Action on Previous Inspectinn Findings (92701, 92702)
a.
(0 pen) Violation 395/88-26-01, Inadequate Procedure or Failure to Follow Procedures Part one of this violation cited an occurrance of excessive fire loading in the Auxiliary Building without compensatory fire protection measures. This had been caused by maintermice plannen s failing to follow procedures for temporary storage of approximately 9000 lbs. of charcoal filter material. The licensee response dated March 30,1989, was considered acceptable by Region II. The licensee stated that training of maintenance personnel had been completed, and that review of procedures for any needed revisions would be done.
The team reviewed records of training for mechanical maintenance planners and technicians on this subject.
In addition to completing this training, the licensee is revising maintenance procedures to l
include a specific block for transient combustibles (yes/no) on the maintenance planning form.
This violation remains open pending review of the procedure revision, which should complete the licensee's corrective action. The procedure revision is scheduled to be completed by August 31, 1989.
Part two of this violation identified a situation where no approved Annunciator Response Procedure was available for use in the "A" Diesel Generator Room during a 15 day period when the diesel was operable. This had been caused by procedural requirements for two year review of procedures, which stated that any procedure that was overdue for this review should be placed on " hold", removed from the plant, and was no longer authorized for use. The licensee response dated March 30, 1989, was considered acceptable by Region II. The team reviewed Revision 12, Change C, dated May 25, 1989, to procedure SAP-139, Procedure Development, Review, and Control. This revision exempts procedures for emergency, abnormal, and normal operation of the units from the two year review " hold" requirement. Part two of this violation is closed.
b.
(Closed) Violation 395/88-26-02, Inadequate 50.59 Evaluation of Fire Protection Valves This violation identified a situation where ten fire system manual isolation valves for deltge of charcoal filters had been caution
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changes to the FSAR and annunciator response procedures. The cause of this condition was an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation.
The licensee response dated March 30, 1989, was considered acceptable by Region II. The team reviewed procedure ARP-016-XCP-6210, Annun-j ciator Response Procedure for the HVAC Board, Revision 0 Change
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D, dated January 27, 1989. This procedure change added the require-
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ment for opening of each of the ten manual isolation valves. The
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licensee has also revised applicable plant drawings and system j
operating procedures to show the manual isolation valves in the j
closed position.
In addition, the team reviewed SAP-202, Caution
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Tagging, Revision 2, Change A, dated June 28, 1989, which requires audits of caution tags to determine whether procedure changes or design changes are needed. The licenses has initiated an FSAR
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Change Notice and has scheduled for notification of the NRC to be
made in the next annual report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2).
I c.
(Closed) Violation 395/88-26-03, Inadequate Review of Procedures and Drawings
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Part one of this violation found that 29 safety related drawings in the control room were partially illegible. The cause of this condi-tion was inadequate review of drawings priw to issuance. The licensee response dated March 30, 1989, was considered acceptable by Region-II.
i The team verified that the 29 drawings in question had been replaced J
with fully legible ones. The team also reviewed records of training j
of document control personnel on review of drawings prior to issuance.
j In addition, the team reviewed DCP-103, drawing Control, Revision 1, dated April 28,1989, and ES-416, Design Modification Change Process and Control, Revision 1, dated May 22, 1989. These procedure revisions provide a specific legibility definition and additional controls on review of drawings.
The licensee also plans to upgrade the drawin; reproduction process through the purchase of more advanced reproduc-tion equipment.
Part two of this violation identified that procedures for the operation and surveillance of safety related systems had been issued for use with significant typing errors, including incorrect valve positions and incorre t acceptance criteria. The cause of this condition was inadequate review of procedures prior to issuance. These errors had been identified in the field, and corrected, by. alert operators and technicians who were using the procedures. The licensee response dated March 30, 1989, was considered acceptable by Region II. The team verified that the operations procedure writing group had received l
training in attention to detail with respect to procedure reviews.
Also, they are now conducting two independent reviews of each retyped procedure to check for typing errors.
Operations management stated that no recent instances have been found of procedures being issued with safety significant typing errors.
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(0 pen) IFl 35/88-26-04, Revise R&R Log so Action LCOs Stand Out The licentt plans to revise the R&R Log format by March, 1990, so that it r.ll be completed prior to the next outage.
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(0 pen) IFI 395/88-26-05, The PMTS Report of Overdue Preventive Maintenance Items Needs to be Reviewed Following the Outage The licensee plans to revise procedures for the evaluation of overdue PMs and to train schedulers, planners, supervisors, and maintenance personnel in these procedures and also in the requirements of due dates, end dates, and mandatory items.
In addition, the licensee plans to change the computerized system to better identify PMs which are incomplete.
These actions are scheduled to be completed by July 14, 1989, after which a more accurate monthly trending and evaluation of overdue PMs can be accomplished.
f.
(0 pen) IFI 395/88-26-06, Review of the E0Ps by In-Plant and Control Room Walkdowns (
An NRC review of E0Ps by in plant and control room walkdowns had identified a number of labelling and human factors discrepancies, which are lis.cd in Attachment 7 tt,
's OSTI inspection report. On May 15, 1989, the licensee commenced a total rewrite of the PGP and the E0Ps.
The licensee's corrective action for each cf the discrep-ancies in Attachment 7 should be included in inis CDP rewrite. All new E0Ps are scheduled to be in place and the training completed by January 2, 1990.
The licensee has already addressed some of the items in Attachment 7, as described below:
2.a. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-2.1, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev. 2 NOTE 15 was out of date with current plant operations.
The licensee deleted the note from the procedure. The team concurs with the removal of the note.
l 2.b. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-2.1, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev. 2 Step 32 provided guidance to the operator concerning actions to be taken with the RHR system during certain RCS pressure and temperature conditions. The directions were not specific.
In procedure step 32, the licensee changed the "and" statement to an "or" statement, and also added a "go to" statement. The team reviewed the step change and concurs with the procedure change.
4.a. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-3.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Rev. 2 When compared to similar steps in other E0Ps, inconsistent guidance is provided to the operator in step 6 for filling the Condensate Storage Tank with Demineralized Water. The licensee
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reworded step 6 and stated that the wording in E0P-3.0 step 6 i
will be-the standard for similar steps in other E0Ps during the rewrite process. The team accepts the rewording cf the step.
4.b. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-3.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Rev. 2
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The Team noted a typographical error in step 6.b for
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"XVG-668-CG".
The licensee changed the step to read l
"XVG-643-C0".
The team agrees with this procedural
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step change.
5.a. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-4.0, Stear. Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 3 Caution 21 contained two parts with contradicting information.
Caution 21 (1) stated that a steam bubble should be maintained in the pressurizer.
Caution 21 (2) stated that pressurizer i
level may increase beyond indicator scale range. The licensee removed Caution 21 from this procedure. The team reviewed the procedure and accepts this change.
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7.a. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-6.0, Loss of All AC Power, Rev. 2 The procedure did not reference the use of Attachment 2 "KW Rating for Engineered Safeguard Features Equipment". The licensee added CAUTION 26-33 to the procedure whi;h references Attachment 2.
The team reviewed the caution and accepts this procedural change.
7.b. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-6.0, Loss of All AC Power, Rev. 2 The procedure did not instruct the operator to attempt restoration of offsite power.
The licensee changed step 5 alternative action to read "If DG will not start, and if offsite power is uvailable, then restore offsite power to at least one ESF bus.
Refer to A0P-304.1, Loss of One ESF Bus With The Diesel Not Available". The team reviewed the procedure and determined the change acceptable.
7.c. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-6.0, Loss of All AC Power, Rev. 2 If one ESF bus is restored during performance of steps 1-5 the operator was directed to step 26.
Going to step 26 would have bypassed the step resetting Safety Injection and would not have allowed the completion of step 27 " Reset of ESF loading logic".
The licensee changed step 5.e to read " return to the procedure in affect" instead of "go to step 26".
The team reviewed the procedure and accepts this change.
7.d. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-6.0, Loss of All AC Power, Rev. 2 The setpoint listed in step 35.a for subcooling was not
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supported by any technical justification. The licensee changed step 35.a setpoint to 30 degrees subcooling per the setpoint document. The team accepts this cheage.
10.d. (Closed) VCSNS E0P-13.0, Response to Abnormal Nuclear Power Generation, Rev. 2 Step 12.a.2 (alternative action) instructs-the operator to
"Perfonn actions of other procedures in effect which do not cooldown or otherwise add positive reactivity' to the core".
This would be the opposite of the desired effect IF the plant was operating with a posit 1ve MIC. The licensee-added the statement "if nuclear power _is not decreasing, then allow'the RCS to cool down to add negative reactivity to the core" to step 12.a.3.
The team accepts this procedural change.
g.
(0 pen)IFI 88-26-07, Correct E0P Procedural Problems The licensee has attached the comments on procedural problems identified in paragraph 11.c to the rewrite package for.the E0P.
These comments should be resolved in the' rewrite.
h.
0ther weaknesses identified in inspection report 395/88-26 were reviewed by the team, with the following results:
1)
(Closed) Licensee Response to Grounds on the de Bus and Design Problem in the Ground Detection Circuit A modification has been accomplished to correct the' problem in the ground detection circuit by disabling the installed ground detector. The installation of a better ground detector is being evaluated. The licensee has purchased portable ground locating equipment, which should aid in improved response to grounds on the de bus.
2)
(0 pen) Configuration Control Procedural Weaknesses The licensee had committed to revise the tagout_ procedure and to write a new procedure on independent verification. The team reviewed the new procedures and foun'd that they corrected the identified weaknesses, with two exceptions. The team found that two attributes of a good independent verification program are not in the licensee's new procedure SAP-153, Independent'
Verification, Revision 0, dated April 26, 1989. These are:
a)
Both verifiers should be separate and independent from each other. SAP-153 does not require'the two verifiers to be separate, but instead allows both to go together. This reduces the independence of the two people.
b)
At least one of the verifiers should look at the valve or breaker.
SAP-153 does not require one of the verifiers to look at the valve or breaker, but instead allows both'to
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use remote position indication. This eliminates one.last L
i visual check for operability - an opportunity to detect such conditions as aL leaking air actuator', damaged.
electrical. connection, missing valve handwheel, or scaffolding over the equipment.
Review of the licensee's' response to these two exceptions is
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identified as inspector followup ' item 395/89-12-02.
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3)
(0 pen) Deficiency Identification and Correction Process
To improve the maintenance deficiency identification.and
correction process, the licensee' committed to revise the MWR l
procedure to require that MWR tags be hung on equipment, with j
limited exceptions. This item had been entered into the licensee's CTS, but had not been' assigned to'anyone for action.-
As a result, no action was being done. This;is identified as i
inspector followup item 395/89-12-03.
4)
(0 pen) Lack of Formalized Training Program for Maintenance Planners-The OSTI team observed that, unlike operators and maintenance technicians,' maintenance planners had no qualification cards or minimum training requirements to be completed prior to performing work related to safety systems. Although each planner had prior maintenance work experience, they had not necessarily been exposed
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to all of the safety related knowledge needed by a planner, such as:
security, fire protection, environmental qualification, component safety classifications, and post maintenance testing requirements. This item had not been entered into the licensee's CTS, and as a result no action was being done. This is identi-fied as inspector followup item 395/89-12-04.
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5)
(0 pen)ExcessiveOvertimeDuringOutages Several instances had been noted where, during the outage, mechan-
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ical maintenance technicians worked 12-hour days continuously for
three to six weeks, without a day off.
The licensee was using blanket departmental overtime authorizations during the outage,
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which may have contributed to these instances of excessive l
overtime. The licensee committed to review controls for overtime i
during outages. This item had not been entered into the licensee's
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CTS, and as a result no action was being done. This is identified as inspector followup item 395/89-12-05.
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(Closed) IFI S0-395/87-32-01, Delinquent Istructors Required Reading and Revision of Operations Required Reading Check List
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This IFI identified a deficiency concerning instructors performing their required reading in a timely manner.
It also identified the l
fact that instructors were listed on the operators required reading list. Follow up to this item determined that there is now a reading list which covers instructors and other inactive licensed personnel
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which is separate from the operator required reading list.
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of this list determined that personnel were reading and signing off-l
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the required reading in a timely fashion.
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(Closed) IFI 50-395/87-32-02,' Insuring Completeness of Requalification Records This IFI. identified that records. reflecting the type and duration of remedial training for licensed personnel were not being developed and maintained. Additionally, letters removing personnel from licensed.
duties due to inadequate performance in training were not being filed in personnel training records.
Follow up of this item determined that these records are now available for review.
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Inspection report 50-395/87-32lalso included a number of NRC concerns that had not been assigned an IFI number by the training inspection -
team. Those concerns were reviewed during this inspection, with the following results:
1)
(Closed) One concern was related to a long delay in implementing a revised requalification training program. The revised which was to be included in Adrainistrative Procedure (AP)programII.B.4, Requalification Program for USNRC Licensed Operators and Senior Operators, Rev. O, had been under development since April,1987 and as of November 20, 1987, had not been approved. Additionally, NRC review of the old program (Training Procedure III.A.4)
Requalification Program for USNRC licensed Operators and Senior Operators, Rev. 4, identified some areas where'the existing procedure did not fully implement NRC requirements. _ Follow up of this concern during this inspection determined that the original issue of AP II.B.4 was 'on December 10, 1987.
Additionally, the specific omissions of NRC requirements addressed in 50-395/87-32 were verified to be in the current revision of AP'II.B.4 (Revision 1 of June 2, 1988).
2)
(Closed) A second concern was that Training Procedure III.A.4, Rev. 4, did not include the upgraded license mair,tenance requirements of 10.CFR'55.53(e). However, the requirements were included in the unapproved version of AP II.B.4. Follow up
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of this concern detemined that the 10 CFR 55.53(e) requirements are included in the current revision of AP II.B.4 and in' Station Administrative Procedure SAP-200, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 5.
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3)
(Closed) The team had identified two concerns in the active license maintenance area;
a)
Training procedure III.A.4, revir. ion 4 required that the Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training was -
responsible for tracking operator on-shift time. However,.
q he was not cognizant of licensed personnel status in this -
i area. Follow up of this item determined that training procedure III.A.4 was canceled (and therefore this requirement was deleted) when administrative procedure II..B.4 was issued on December 10, 1987.
Since that time operations has been tracking on-shift time on an informal basis.
Currently a new procedure is being developed (Operations Administrative Procedure 101.4, Quarterly.
Report of Licensed Watch-Standing), which will formalize
'this process, b)
At the time of the inspection,- seven licensed senior -
operators had allowed their. licenses to lapse. These individuals were not performing.their required on-shi.ft license duties, making their-licenses inactive, and were also not attending any requalification training. Addition-ally, the-licensee had not notified the NRC that these licenses were no longer needed.
Follow up of this item determined that the liccnsee subsequently notified the NRC that these licenses were no longer needed.- Current site policy is to have all licensed personnel in an active or inactive status.
Personnel in an inactive status maintain all requirements for an active license with the exception of on-shift time.
4)
(Closed) The team had identified a concern that procedure I.B.8, Instructor Certification, allowed licensee waivers of instructor training in training techniques without any subsequent perfor-mance evaluation to verify adequacy of skills in this area.
Follow up of this item determined that there is currently only one instructor waived in this area.
This waiver is based on
adequate previous experience. Additionally, prior to teaching
any courses, this instructor received three evaluations by.
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personnel in the training department which evaluated his teaching
skills as excellent. The practice of evaluation of teaching
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skills for all new instructors is currently required in NTCI 503,
Certification of Temporary Instructors,. Rev.1, regardless of
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whether or not the instructor has been waived.
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5)
(0 pen) The team had identified a concern regarding the apparent shortage of operations instructors which were available to train and qualify licensed personnel.
Follow.up of this item deter-
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mined that no staffing increase has been approved since the l
previous inspection to alleviate this problem. As a result,.
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instructors now have less time in the plant to maintain famil-j iarity with actual conditions and also have less preparation
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time for classroom instruction. Quality of operator training is reduced. The NRC concern in this area is that all required operator training continues to be adequately' completed and recorded.
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1 This concern is identified as inspector' followup item 395/89-12-06.
6)
(Closed) Another concern was that an instructor was teaching a
l class with an out of date lesson plan. ' This was based on a team
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review of a QA audit.
Follow up of this concern did not j
determine which QA audit reported this finding and tracked l
corrective action completion. Although this practice would-be unacceptable and is the subject of all routine inspections of training, no evidence could.be found to support existence of a deficiency in this area.
Future NRC inspections-in the training area will evaluate this type issue.
j 7)
(Closed) The team had identified a' concern that the licensee was not following site procedures concerning color codirg of original grading and regrading of exams.
Follow up of. this
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item included a review of two exams which had been regraded.
Instructors had followed site procedures for the color coding of grading / regrading.
8)
(Closed) An additional concern was that make up examinations included as much as 90% repeat questions from the original exam.
l Follow up of this item noted that the licensee had included a
requirement in NTCI 103, Examination Control and Administration, Rev. 3, that requires that a minimum of 75% of the make up exam
be new questions. Additionally, the make up' exams and original
exams for three licensed personnel were reviewed by the inspectors i
during this inspection to verify compliance with this requirement.
9)
(Closed) The team had identified a concern that simulator modeling U
was based on a cycle 3 core while the plant was operating with a cycle 4 core. At the time of the inspection this discrepancy.
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and it's affect on operator training had not been evaluated by -
j the licensee.
Follow up during this inspection determined that j
an evaluation of this condition has been done by the licensee
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with the conclusion that there was no affect on operator. training.
This evaluation is documented on South Carolina Gas and Electric Company memortodum CGSS-13-2120-NO. Discussion of the current-sin'ulator core modeling vs. the actual. plant core with training
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personnel determined that the simulator is modeling the same core that is currently in the plant.
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10)
(Closed) Another concern was that QC/QA personnel were being
H given qualification based on previous training or experience-without any subsequent evaluation of employee performance in-
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the area.
Follow up of this item determined that the QC/QA1
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training program has been completely revised since the
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inspection and current procedures require this evaluation.
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11) (Closed) The team had identified a concern that one of the five shift books for maintaining practical factors was not being maintained current with respect to the status of completion of these practical factors by the operators.
Follow up of this u
item determined that practical. factors are no longer being j
maintained by the operations staff. The performance of the i
practical factors is currently being tracked by the' training
-department under a program revision using a system approach to j
training which was begun in March of this year. Preliminary.
review of this area determined that the program appears to be an
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efficient and improved method of evaluating practical factors.
Future NRC inspections will review this area in greater detail, l
12)
(Closed) Another concern was that nonlicensed operators were not reviewing the operators required reading book as required by station administrative procedure. SAP-200.
Follow up of this item during this inspection revealed that SAP-200 has been revised to create a required reading book for nonlicensed operators.
Further review determined that this-book was in
_ place and review cf the material in this book was being
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performed by tht nonlicensed operators in a timely manner.
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13)
(Closed) The team had identified a concern that nonlicensed-i operators were not being allowed to attend their regularly I
scheduled training. Discussion of this issue with training personnel during this follow up inspection determined that this is not currently a problem.
14)
(Closed) The team had identified a concern that initial training of nonlicensed operators required 75% as the passing score on examinations while 80% was required for requalification examina-tions.
Follow up of this item determined that current' site require-
ments in NTCI-301, Anxiliary Operator Training Program,.Rev. 2 j
and NTCI-302, Auxiliary Operator Requalification (A0R) Program, A0R 89, Rev. 2, require identical scores for both initial and requalification training for nonlicensed operators.
15)
(Closed) The team had identified a concerr. that maintenance personnel were not accomplishing their required reading in a timely manner. This tollow up inspection reviewed the required reading material for the different disciplines and determined
that the majority of the groups'were maintaining the required
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reading with only minor exceptions, i
16) (Closed) The team had identified a concern that instructors were not being evaluated at least semiannually durino classroom training to verify their current level of performance as required by procedure I.B.8, Rev. 2.
Review of this area during the follow up inspection verified compliance with the I.8.8 requirements.
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4.
Exit Intr view The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 30, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The teain described the areas l
inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed above.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the team during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number Status Description Reference Paragraph 395/89-12-01 Closed IFI - Weakness in Commitment Tracking System, paragrarn 2.
395/89-12-02 Open IFI - Weakness in Independent Verification Procedure, paragraph 3.
395/89-12-03 Open IFI - Weakness in Deficiency Identification and Correction, paragraph 3.
395/89-12-04 Open IFI - Weakness in Training Program for Maintenance Planners, paragraph 3.
395/89-12-05 Open IFI - Weakness in Control of Overtime During Outages, paragraph 3.
395/89-12-05 Open IFI - Shortage of Operations Instructors, paragraph 3.
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ATTACHMENT 1 ACRONYMF AC Alternating Current i
AP Administrative Procedure
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CTS Commitment Tracking System j
DG Diesel Generator i
E0P Emergency Operatirg Procedure ESF Emergency Shutdown Facility FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report IFI Inspector Followup Item LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MWR Maintenance Work Request NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSTI Operational Safety Team Inspection
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PGP Procedure Generation Package PM Preventive Maintenance PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet i
QA Quality Assurance l
QC Quality Control
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R&R Removal and Restoration
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