IR 05000395/1992021
| ML20126D992 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1992 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Haag R, Keller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126D990 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-92-21, NUDOCS 9212280253 | |
| Download: ML20126D992 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES k
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMissl0N
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n HEGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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t ATL ANTA,0(ORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-395/92 21 Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218
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Docket No.:
50 395 License No.:
NPF-12 facility Name: ' Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.
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t inspection Conducted: November 1-30, 1992
Inspectors:.
ACu7 J2/u/*y 1 R.C. Haag, Senior'Res)dentInspector Date'Sitjned
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CA.Kylle, sident)6spector-Date Signed e
Date 'Sf]giel f2/4 W
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Approved by:
If$w'
WW hdloydS.Cantrell, Chief
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Reactor Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident. inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observations, operational safety verification, cold weather preparations, installation and testing of modifications, onsite follow-up of_ written reports of nonroutine
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events at power reactor facilities and action on arevious inspection findings.
Selected tours were conducted on backshift or wee (ends.
These tours were
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conducted on eight occasions, t -
Results:
y One non-cited violation was identified.
A NCV was identified for failure to document:TS required surveillance channel-
-checks-(paragraph 5).. Repeated failures to meet an administrative limit for
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testing S/G blowdown valves have occurred. The limit is associated with water hammer concerns for fast. stroking valves (paragraph 3). An engineering
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evaluation that accepted a temporary condition did not consider the ~ structural aspects _of the. condition-(paragraph 4). Appropriate operator action and; management-involvement were exhibited to atloss of offsite power event._. Post
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-modification-testing requirements failed to recognize and evaluate an extended
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testing time _ period on equipment that was'in service.
9212280253 921214 PDR ADOCK 05000395
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j REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted j
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i licensee Employees j
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- W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics i
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K. Beale, Supervisor, Emergency Services i
- C. Bowman, Manager, Maintenance Services i
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- M. Browne, Manager, Design Engineering
- B. Christiansen, Manager, Technical Services j
- M. Fowlkes, Manager, Nuclear Licensing & Operating Experience
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5. Furstenberg, Associate Manager, Operations
W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance-i D. Lavigne,- General Manager, Nuclear Safety
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- K. Nettles, General Manager, Station Support
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H. O'Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services i
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M. Quinton, General Manager, Engineering Services j
- L. Shealy, Senior Engineer, independent Safety _ Engineering Group
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i J. Skolds, Vice_ President, Nuclear Operations l
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- R. Sweet, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
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G. Taylor, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
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- B. Williams, Manager, Operations
- R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority
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'i Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, j
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel, i
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- Attended exit interview l
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
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j last paragraph.
l 2.
Plant Status I
The plant operated at or near 100 percent power throughout the j
inspection period. On November 11, 1992, the licensee-conducted an
emergency preparedness drill which included. activation of the.
i alternate emergency offsite facility (EOF).
The inspectors observed-different portions of the dril1~, including the manning of the
alternate E0F which is located in the licensee's corporate office
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building,
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3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
a l-The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components listed'below to ascertain-that these activities
were conducted in accordance with license requirements..The -
i-inspectors verified-that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating-the-test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved' test procedure,
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test instrumentation was calibrated,1 and limiting conditions for
operation _were met. Upon completion of the test,- the inspectors
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verified that test results conformed with technical specifications and
procedure requirements, any deficiencies identified during the testing
were properly reviewed and resolved and the systems were properly
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returned to service.
Specifically, the inspectors witnessed / reviewed
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portions of the following test activities:
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Monthly sam)1ing and analysis of fuel oil-in "B" EDG underground
j storage tan ( (STP606.001).
g Train "B" containment hydrogen monitor calibration
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4.6.5.1.
All activities observed were satisfactory.
Quarterly stroke test of the S/G blowdown valves
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(STP 136.001).
The outside containment isolation valves, XVG
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503A, B and C, in the blowdown lines were tested-in both the open j
and close direction.
These valves use air force for opening and i
spring force for closing.
Closing times have been consistently _
below the 20 second maximum limit.
However, the licensee has experienced repeated problems with_ meeting the 120 second minimum
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opening limit.
New air operated actuators were installed on the l
XVG 503 valves in May, 1990.
The minimum opening limitation was i
invoked at this time due to a concern that fast opening times j
could result in water hammer of the downstream piping. -The i
inspector reviewed the test history for XVG 503. valves and noted I
that ten failures of the opening stroke test have occurred since-
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May, 1990. To correct the opening stroke times the, inlet air-flow control valves were either adjusted or replaced. The inspector
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noted only limited engineering involvement in response to these
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opening test failures and that no NCNs were written on these
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repeated _ failures.
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The inspector discussed with engineering the basis for the minimum stroke time and_ consequence of fast opening time. As discussed earlier, the opening time limitation was invoked due to water
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F hammer concerns. The licensee also made changes to operating
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)rocedure involving the blowdown system which would prevent water i
lammer of piping downstream of the XVG-503 valves. With these other changes in place, the licensee stated that a. water hammer i
event would be prevented even if the'XVG 503 valves were to open too fast. After reviewing the data for the open time limits, the inspector concluded that individual test failures do not-i significantly impact system reliability. However, the_large number of test failures that have occurred without corrective action to prevent recurrence or an evaluation which justifies this
4 number of failures indicates the licensee has not recognized overall. scope of _ this problem.
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Monthly test 'of "A" charging /SI _ pump XPP 43A (STP '105.001).
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support running of XPP 43A :"A" VU chiller was started to provide cooling water to XPP 43A. After approximately three minutes'the-
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chiller-tripped-off due to low oil pressure.
The chiller was
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i satisfactorily restarted after manually running the auxiliary oil
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pump.
Several hours later the chiller was started again (without manual use of auxiliary oil pump) to verify normal starting
capacity.
Operations and engineering reviewed this event to
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determine the cause of the chiller tripping off.
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The licensee believes that the single train operation of the VU j
system during the winter months contributed to the event. When SW
temperature is less than 65 degrees Fahrenheit, one train of VU is
operating while the other train is idle in standby condition.
If
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a chiller remains idle for a long period of time, oil in the
compressor oil reservoir tends to absorb _ refrigerant.
The amount
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of absorbed refrigerant is dependent on oil temperature and pressure.- With excessive refrigerant in the oil, low oil preseure
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can occur when the chiller is initially started. The "A" chiller
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had been idle for eight days prior to testing of XPP 43A. As part of the corrective action, the licensee has proposed a rotation
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schedule for running the three chillers which will prevent long-
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idle periods.
System engineering is also developing a checklist to be used during observaticn of the chiller start.
The inspector will continue to monitor chiller performance by review of logs and i
observation of actual chiller starts.
The observed tests were performed in accordance with procedural requirements. A trend of repeated failures to satisfy an i
administrative limit for opening-times on S/G blowdown valves was
noted.
- 4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities for_the safety.-related systems and-components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were -
conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review:
that limiting I
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were-removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to' initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service,-
activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and materials used were properly certified, and radiological and fire prevention controis were implemented. Work requests were reviewed-.to.
determine the status of outstanding jobs and_to ensure ~that priority was assigned-to safety related equipment maintenance that may~ affect.
system performance.
The following maintenance activities.were observed:
Troubleshooting of RBCU 1A fan (MWR 9204328).
Each.RBCU unit has
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two motors per fan. One motor is for normal operations' (fast speed)
and.the other is for emergency / post accident operation (slow speed).
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On November 11, 1992, RBCU 1A fan (XfN0064A) had it's feeder breaker trip due to overcurrent. The fan and motors are inside the reactor building (RB) and inaccessible at power, therefore, the licensee was unable to determine the exact failure cause.
The inspector observed the licensee's subsequent test of the fan using the slow speed motor and noted that the fan was fully operational and unaffected by whatever caused the overcurrent condition for the fast speed motor.
TS 3.6.2.3 requires that the RBCU's have at least one of two cooling units per train operable in slow speed, therefore, they were not required to enter into a TS action statement. Additionally, this should not affect normal operations since only three of the four fans are routinely used to maintain RB temperature below 120 degrees Fahrenheit.
Calibration of the motor driven emergency feedwater pump (MDEFP)
flow indicator (PMTS P0161342).
This flow indicator (IFI13507) was calibrated in accordance with ICP 240.019. No discrepancies were noted.
Inspection, cleaning and lubrication of the emergency feed pump area
air handling unit (PMTS P0157415).
Blowdown of the sensing lines for the "B" steam generator main steam
header pressure transmitter (MWR 9213305).
Troubleshooting power range nuclear instrumentation N1-44 (MWR
9204368). When an operator attempted to adjust indicated reactor power (from N1-44) to actual reactor power (based on secondary plant calorimetric), the output from NI-44 spiked high.
This adjustment is made with the gain potentiometer.
The operator stated that when he unlocked the potentiometer the spike occurred.
During-troubleshooting, 1&C could not reproduce the spike on the N1-44 channel. The adjustment was completed and the licensee plans to (
replace the potentiometer during the upcoming refueling outage.
Replacement of fasteners at flange connection for boric acid flow
element IFE7580 (MWR 92N3098).
While investigating the leakage at the flange joint, the licensee discovered the bolts were grade B-8 in lieu of the required grade B-7 alloy steel per ASME SA193.
The stronger B-7 bolts would allow torquing of the fasteners to 111 foot-pounds versus the 32 foot-pounds of torque that had been l
applied to the B-8 fastener.
NCN 4532 was written to address the incorrect bolting material for the flange joint.
The flow element was installed during the Fall, 1991, outage.
The MRF which installed the flow element did not specify B-7 bolts but did reference Specification SP-220-044461-0000 which does require B-7 bolting material.
The licensee believes the B-8 bolts were
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installed because they were supplied with the flow element.
The NCN provided instructions to replace the bolts, but also stated that the incorrect bolting material did not affect the operability of the flow element.
This was based on the flow element being able l
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to perform it's function.
The bolts were replaced approximately one month after the NCN disposition was provided by engineering. While reviewing the NCN after the work had been completed, the inspector noted that the structural effects of the weaker bolts on the system were not discussed nor evaluated in the NCN disposition.
While this has no effect on the current system configuration (since the correct bolts are installed), the inspector considered this an incomplete engineering evaluation that accepted a nonconformance condition on a temporary basis.
All maintenance activities observed were performed using good work practices and per the required procedures. An engineering evaluation to accept a temporary condition was inadequate in that the structural integrity aspect of the condition was not evaluated.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Plant Tour and Observations The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; oper lor adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections for the operability verification of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component (s), and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performance. The component cooling water system and the emergency borate system were included in these inspections.
Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazards.
Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken if required.
Selected tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
b.
Failure to Document TS Required Channel Checks During an administrative review of _ shift logs conducted on November 24, 1992, the licensee noted that page 11 of the November 22, 1992, Operator At The Controls.(0ATC) TS log had not been filled out for the night shift.
Page 11 of the 0ATC log is used in part to document four channel checks for "C" steam generator, and one main steam line pressure channel check, required by TS.
The licensee also noted that both the Duty Shift Supervisor
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l and Control Room Supervisor had reviewed and signed the log without f
noting this discrepancy.
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The operator responsible for filling out this log stated that a
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contributing factor for-the missed log entries was the distraction
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associated with adverse weather conditions experienced during the-
shift. The operator also stated that those readings which he failed
to record were parameters that were closely monitored throughout the shift due to problems associated with the "B" steam generator feed
regulating valve. The parameters for "A" and "B" steam generators
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had been recorded on the logs.
The operator stated that prior to
recording any of the parameters, he had-observed all the steam generator )arameters and verified they were in the normal range.
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i Based on t11s increased awareness for the parameters involved and
i the recording of logs for "A" and "B" steam generators, the licensee i
concluded that a qualitative assessment of channel behavior as
defined by TS was performed.
Therefore, the failure to fill out the j
log did not constitute a missed surveillance.- Based on a-review of
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plant computer readings for the parameters that were omitted on the
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log, which indicated satisfactory-channel agreement, and interviews
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assessment of channel behavior as required by TS.had occurred.
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Criteria XVII of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requires that operating logs
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and test records be maintained.
The failure to document the TS-
j required channel checks on page.11 of the OATC log for November 22, t
1992, is identified as a non-cited violation-(NCV 92-21-01). This j
violation will not be subject.to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet
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i the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy.
The inspectors concluded that the review of the 0ATC log for
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November 22, 1992, by the Duty Shift Supervisor and the Control Room <
j Supervisor was inadequate. The licensee has re-emphasized the
responsibilities of supervisory reviews and-the need to ensure l
adequate reviews are performed.
No generic or programmatic
weaknesses were noted.
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c.
Loss of One Offsite Power Supply
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On November 14,1992,:a-loss of offsite power to the "B" safeguards -
- bus (IDB) occurred and the "B" EDG started and tied onto the bus.
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The normal power supply for IDB is from the.230-kV station switchyard through emergency auxiliary transformer XTF31.
Due to a fault on one of-the switchyard's transmission lines, buses 2 and 3 in the switchyard were isolated and de-energized. This caused a
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loss of power to XTF31 and. safeguards bus 108.
Plant equipment-
responded ~as required.to the loss of offsite power,- the starting of -
"B" EDG and the sequencing of loads back onto IDB.'
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The isolation of switchyard buses-2 and 3 was attributed to the slow opening of the oil circuit breaker (0CB) which fed the transmission
.line that had the' fault. The OCB should have opened in
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- approximately five cycles, however, the actual opening time was 38 cycles.
A backup protection relay which has a ten cycle time delay sensed that the faulted condition still existed and isolated all feeds for buses 2 and 3.
After the licensee verified that the fault had cleared from the switchyard, buses 2 and 3 were re-energized.
Problems associated with closing one of the switchyard OCBs resulted in some delays in restoring offsite power to IDB.
Approximately five hours after the fault, o fsite power was restored to 108 and
"B" EDG was secured.
The inspector responded to the site event and observed operator actions associated with "D" EDG tied to IDB and the efforts to restore the offsite power supply.
Appropriate operation's actions were taken, and management involvement was provided in response to this event.
The licensee performed subsequent testing on the OCB to determine the cause of the slow stroke time.
When the OCB was cycled after the event the slow opening time was not repeated.
Testing provided no additional information on the initial slow opening of the OCB.
The inspectors observed portions of the OCB testing. While testing of the OCB did not confirm that mechanical binding was the cause of the slow OCB opening, the licensee believes that this was the most probable cause. This OCB had it's last major five year PM performed in 1987.
Functional testing and external lubrication which is performed on a yearly basis was completed in September,1991.
The licensee is investigating the need to increase the frequency of the major PM for 0CBs from five years to three years.
A non-cited violation for failure to document TS required channel checks was identified. The inspectors concluded that the shift oversight and review for this activity was inadequate.
6.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
The inspector noted that the licensee had completed their inspection of heat tracing in September. The inspector verified that the procedure for the heat tracing inspection incorporated all safety-related equipment subject to cold weather.
Additionally, all annunciator panels associated with heat tracing were clear of alarm indications, and there were no open MWR's associated with heat tracing for safety-related equipment. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Special Instruction for freeze protection.
Based on the above reviews and inspections, the inspector concluded that the licensee's cold weather preparations were adequate.
7.
Installation and Testing of Modification (37828)
Two minor modifications were reviewed as part of the ongoing evaluation of plant modification activities.
Included in the review were direct observation-of portions of the installations, post-modification testing and review of the MRF packages.
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a HRF 21783B and D installed new relays on the contact follower card for
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the EDG annunciator system.
The EDG annunciator system is classified as a non nuclear system. The contact follower cards are located in the
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EDG local control panel. These cards receive a signal from field j
instrumentation / component that an alarm condition exists and they q
process these signals to allow the ap)ropriate control room annunciator to be alarmed.
Operators had noted t1at occasionally alarms on the local EDG panel would not be alarmed in the control room as required.
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Corrective action involved replacement of.a relay on the card which had a low ampacity rating with a relay with a high ampacity rating.
The existing contact follower cards were removed and replaced with a a
modified card on a one for one basis.
This was to ensure the i
operability of each card prior to re)1acement of the next card.
The
post modification test involved benc1 testing of the modified cards to ensure the cards functioned properly, then verification that the
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installed cards provided the required alarm response.
j MRF 22516 changed the setpoint of the EDG air start compressor auto i
start /stop switches IPS15425 A and B and IPS15426 A and B.
The
inspector observed the work associated with A EDG, The switch setpoint j
for stopping the air compressors was changed from 425 )sig to 415 psig.
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The starting setpoint was not changed.
The basis of tie MRF was to
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and the setaoint for the air tank relief valves (430 psig). The
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inspector o) served changing the setpoints for switches IPS15425 A and-
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IPS15426 A which included the static verification that the setpoints
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l were correct.
I Post modification testing requirements in the MRF specified-that the air compressor starting and stopping points be monitored for threo
complete cycles.
A chart recorder was used to monitor the pressure
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i cycles.
Initially, the licensee planned to allow air pressure in a tank to bleed down due to existing system leakage. The:first bleed
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down cycle took approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to complete.
The inspector
questioned the rational of extending the testing period for a
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modification after the work had been completed and the equipment.was i
.being used for compliance with TS.
Based on thezinitial pressure bleed j
down it would have taken approximately six days to complete the post modification testing. The testing method was changed to create a.small
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system leak (using a vent valve) and the testing was satisfactorily completed the following day. -The initial post modification testing requirements failed to recognize and evaluate the effects of an-i extended testing time period on equipment that was in service.
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8.
Onsite follow up of' Written Reports _of Nonroutine_ Events at Power Reactor. Facilities (92700)-
(Closed)
LER 91-07, Programmatic Weakness Leads to a Missed
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Surveillance On August 26, 1991,- the licensee noted that the allowed interval-for.
the in-service test of the CCW isolation valves Md been exceeded by
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two days.
The valves were subsequently tested successfully.
The event l
was caused by a weakness in the program for tracking and implementing i
surveillances.
The surveillance procedure coupled the testing of the isolation valves with the testing of the CCW pumps even though the i
valves and pumps had different surveillance interval requirements.
Corrective action included the modification of the CCW surveillance to l
include tracking the valve te:ts as a separate task.
This weakness was j
isolated to the CCW surveillance.
j (Closed)
LER 91 08, Steam Generator Tube Eddy Current Test Results Results from tne sixth inservice eddy current examination indicated
that more than one percent of the inspected tubes were defective.
This met the C-3 inspection category of TS.
Tube degradation was localized in the tubesheet area and was the result of primary water stress corrosion cracking.
Based on the inspection results and other factors,
the licensee has changed the scheduled date for S/G replacement from i
March, 1996, to September, 1994.
Yn addition, the licensee is pursuing TS changes to allow an increase in ellowable percent of plugged tubes and for use of an alternate plugging criteria.
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(Closed)
LER 91-09, Emergency Cors f o "<; System (ECCS) Test flow l
Discrepancies
After receiving informatio' from Westinghouse concerning a lower runout
limit for the charging /P rpt H non <.onservative aspects for SI ed Le existing SI flows.
The
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flow measurements, the 1
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',ut limit of 680 gpm would be results identified that L
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exceeded for all three In;, hot leg recirculation and that "B" g
pump flow was below the vi e.
assumed in the FSAR accident analysis for high flow conditions.
- .. flows were rebalanced to comply with TS requirements. Westinghouse evaluated the flow data for "B" pump and determined that the as-left flow conditions were acceptable to perform
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ECCS safety functions.
The licensee has administrative controls to ensure the manufacturer's recommended runout limit of 675 gpm is maintained.
During the next
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refueling outage, the licensee plans to perform additional testing of the charging /S1 pumps to determine the specific runout limit of the i
pumps.
If the actual runout limits can be increased, then additional flow margin can be established between the rebalanced flows and the TS
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minimum high head ECCS flow requirements.
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9.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)
(Closed) Violation 395/91-05-01, Failure-to periodically test emergency diesel generators (EDG) from ambient conditions.
The licensee had been performing the semi-annual EDG test after completion of the monthly EDG test. This sequencing of tests did not allow the semi-annual test to be performed from ambient conditions as required by the safety evaluation for Amendment No. 50 to TS.
The
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i-licensee has revised the surveillance test program for the EDGs such l
that the monthly and semi-annual test requirements are satisfied by one EDG test run from ambient condition.
Also, the STP for this test has
=
l-an initial condition which requires the EDG to be at ambient conditions i
prior to starting the test.
]
j (Closed) Violation 395/91 05 02, failure to adequately maintain
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equipment control when using the Equipment Misalignment Status Log-l (EML).
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During maintenance on a charging pump, an isolation valve for chill
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water from the pump was closed.
This mispositioned valve was not l
included in repair tagout, but was tracked in-the EML. When the pump.
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was started for.a maintenance run the valve was not opened as required.
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OAP 105.2 prohibits the use of the EML, if the alignment makes the
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equipment TS inoperable. Operations-personnel were provided additional t
training on the limitations and scope of the EML.
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Subsequent to this training, tne inspector had noted several uses of
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j the EML during maintenance activities where the misalignment would have t
made the equipment inoperable.
However, during the activities the
equipment was not being used for TS compliance and other work
i associated with the activities also made the equipment inoperable.
The i
i inspectors were still concerned that the mispositioning was required to-
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be realigned prior to returning the equipment to operable status and
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i was only being tracked by the EML.
The inspectors discussed these uses i
L of the EML with operations management.
Recently, operations-personnel i
were provided additional training on the EML which defined the l
requirement in OAP 105.2 to prohibit the use of the EML for any cases where the misalignment could prevent TS equipment from performing.it's
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l function.
j (Closed)
Inspector-Follow-up Item 395/91-10-04, Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump-(TDEFP) room temperature concerns.
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During the summer months, the inspector had noted high temperatures (above 102 degrees Fahrenheit) in the TDEFP room. The licensee's-
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position was that the TDEFP room was not included in -TS 3'.7.9
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temperature limit of 102 degrees-for the emergency feedwater-pump. area.
The licensee's basis for this position was that the TS temperature
>
limitations are to ensure that safety-related equipment will not be
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subjected to temperatures in excess of their EQ temperatures and-that F
no equipment-in the TDEFP room had any EQ limitations associated with L
the TS requirement._ The inspector _ reviewed TS Bases 3/4.7.9-and_the EQ
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files for equipment located in the TDEFP' room.
Based on this review
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F and the inspector's verification-that the EQ files contained the applicable EQ sensitive equipment in the TDEFP room, the inspector
-,
agreed with the licensee's position regarding TS applicability for the-TDEFP room.
The licensee revised Special: Instruction-92-10 tolinclude instructions
for starting one of the EFW pump area cooling fans during warm weather
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u.
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__m._-_._,.#..
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l
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l periods. During the past summer, the inspectors noted during tours _of l
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the TDEFP room that a cooling fan was running and the room temperatures l
j were comparable with other locations in the plant.
- i l
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
l The inspection scope and findings were summarized-on December 4, 1992,
j with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described
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j the areas inspected-and discussed the inspection findings.
e
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l No _ dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee i
did not identify as proprietary any of the materials.provided to or
reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
l;
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l Item Number Description and Reference l
f 395/92-21-01 NCV - Failure to document the TS required i
channel. checks on page 11 of the 0ATC log-
{
for November 22, 1992, paragraph 5.
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11.
Acronyms and-Initialisms ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CCW Component Cooling Water
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EFW Emergency Feedwater i
EML Equipment Misalignment Status Log i
E0F Emergency Operating Facility
EQ Environmental Qualification ESF Engineered Safety Feature
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FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
GPM Gallons Per Minute
I&C Instrumentation and Control
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ICP Instrumentation Control Procedure
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LER Licensee Event Reports i
MDEFP Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump l-MRF Modification Request Form MWR Maintenance Work Request-
l NCN Nonconformance Notice
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NCV Non-Cited Violation
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NRC-Nuclear Regulatory Commission-
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NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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OAP Operations Administrative Procedure j
0ATC Operator At The Controls j
OCB Oil Circuit Breaker i
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PM Preventive Maintenance
)
PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet
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PSIG Pounds-Per~ Square Inch Gauge:
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-RB Reactor-Building RBCV Reactor Building Cooling Unit
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RCS-Reactor Coolant System
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RWP Radiation Work Permits S/G Steam Generator SI Safety injection SPR Special Reports STP Surveillance Test Procedures SW Service Water TDEFP Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump TS Technical Specifications VU Chill Water
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