IR 05000395/1989017
| ML20248C952 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Hopkins P, Modenos L, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248C939 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-89-17, NUDOCS 8910040078 | |
| Download: ML20248C952 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
REGION 11 o,
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
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ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323 g,
Report No.r ' 50-395/89-17-Licensee:. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Columbia,'SC-29218 Docket No.: 50-395; License No.: NPF-12
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Facility Name:
V. C. Summer Inspection Conducted: August 1 - 31, 1989
' Inspectors :
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R. 't. ' Previitte.
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Datie Sidned
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An Y$5#l P. C.7 Hopkins L/'/
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9/2-/[1
.L. Modenos
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Dat~e. Signed 7M&A4 i
L-Approved by :
F.S.Cantre'll,SectpfnyMef Date Sfgned Division of Reactor Pr ects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine: inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observation,
-operational safety verification, engineered safety features system walkdown, onsite followup of events and subsequent written reports, and OSHA interface activities.
Selected tours were conducted on backshift or weekends.
Backshift or weekend-tours were conducted on August 1, 2, 4, 7, 13, 16, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31, 1989.
Results:
The unit began.the month at 100 percent power.
The unit was manually tripped
from full power on August 25, 1989, due to actuation of pressurizer safety L
valve A.
The unit was placed in cold shutdown and the safety valve was
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_ replaced on August 29,.1989 (paragraph 4c). The unit was preparing for restart
' at the end of the reporting period.
In the areas of surveillance and maintenance (paragraphs 2 and 3), some procedural and work weaknesses were l
l 8910040078 890913 PDR.ADOCK 05000395
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'2 identified.
These were discussed with the appropriate supt.rvisors and are
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being corrected.
In the area of operational safety verification a non-cited violation.for the failure to sample for LLD prior to releasing two WGDTs was
- identified. (paragraph 4b).
The licensee's1 corrective action on this item appears adequate to prevent recurrence.
A walkdown on the spent fuel pool cooling. system (paragraph 5), indicates that this system and the associated procedures were in need of additional management attention. While observing a surveillance test on a battery charger, a personnel safety hazard was identified and reported to the P.egional OSHA coordinator (paragraph 7).-
This item was corrected immediately after identification.
The scheduling, coordination and accomplishment of work activities during the unplanned outage was better organized than other recent outages.
Work groups were better prepared and
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through teamwork accomplished the majority of required activities on time or ahead of the planned schedule.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Person's Contacted
' Licensee' Employees W. Baehr Manager, Chemistry'and Health Physics
'C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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M. Browne,-Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance W.LHiggins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
.S. Hunt, Manager. Quality Systems A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services
- D.: Moore,. General Manager, Engineering Services K. Nettles, General' Manager, Nuclear Safety C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support
.J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations G.' Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance G. Taylor, Manager, Operations D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services M. Williams, General Manager, Administrative & Support Services K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training 0ther licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are. listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of 10 selected surveillance tests including all-aspects of Train A Solid State Protection System Operational Test, STP 345.037.
The inspectors verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required : test instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to service.
While observing the performance of Train A Battery Charger Service Test, STP 501.005, several minor procedural deficiencies were identified. These primarily involved a lack of detail in procedural steps as to why and how to connect test equipment and the lack of explicit restoration steps.
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These and other improvements were discussed with the first line supervisor who committed to revising the procedure.
A personnel safety hazard associated with the portable cable.and load bank used-to perform this test was-also-identified.
This item is discussed.in detail in paragraph 7 of-
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this report.
-No violations or' deviations were identified.
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3;
. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The. inspectors observed maintenance activities 'of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities.were conducted in accordance.with approved -procedures, TS, industry codes and standards.
The inspectors determined that the procedures used were adequate. to
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control the activity, and that. these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.. The inspectors independently verified that the,
equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to-determine that the. licensee was giving priority. to safety related maintenance and not ~ developing a backlog which might affect a given system's performance.- The'following specific maintenance activities were observed:
PMTS P0105224 Install new packing in letdown chiller shell side drain valve XVT17-CW PMTS P0105223 Install new packing in letdown chiller shell side vent valve XVT016-CV MWR 8901476 Investigate and repair cause of reactor trip breaker RT1 failure to close MWR 21611001 Fabricate and install valve XVD 93700, and replace existing valve XVT 9357 in pressurizer sample line per MRF 21611 MWR 8901323 Troubleshoot and repair pressurizer sample valve XVT 9357 While observing the preventive maintenance activities performed under PMTS P0105224 and P0105223, a problem was identified involving controls required to reduce chloride contamination of valve packing material.
It did not appear that the mechanics performing these tasks had been adequately trained in this area.
This item was discussed with the first line supervisor who committed to providing additional training to personnel performing this task.
The results of this will be evaluated on future inspections of this activity.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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- 4.
0perational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other' reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room. operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component (s),
and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performance.
Plant tours included observation ~of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection contrcis, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions /ckanliness, and missile hazards.
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup (s);
and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
Selected tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
Inspections included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, containment, cable penetration areas, service water intake structure, and other general plant areas.
Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required.
On a regular basis, RWP's were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP's.
Selected radiation protection instruments were l
periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verified.
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In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors-included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, puckages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.
b.
On July 23, 1989, WGDT No. 9 was released and No.10 was released on July 24, 1989. The releas2s did not meet the LLD's for two isotopes, Xe-138 and Xe-133M as specified in TS 3/4.11.2, Table 4.11-2.
Due to a misunderstanding of the counting procedure, the count room technician counting the samples, reduced the sample volume to 1 ml in accordance with counting procedure methodology, rather than maintaining the 25 ml volume that is the basis for assuring TS LLD's requirements.
The cause - of this event was personnel error, failure to follow procedure.
This is contrary to TS 3/4.11.2. The licensee has taken interim measures to prevent recurrence by instructing their personnel to confer with the count room supervisor prior to approving releases based on sample volumes of less than 25 ml. For a permanent fix, the licensee will add.a check point to the computer programs to ensure the adequacy of sample volume used. This is scheduled te be completed by September 15, 1989.
In addition, all count room personnel are i'
scheduled to be retrained on how the requirements of the TS LLD's are accomplished by September 29, 1989.
This licensee-identified violation will not be cited because the criteria specified in Section V.G. of the NRC Enforcement Policy was satisfied. This item will be tracked under Failure to Sample For LLD of Gaseous Activity, NCV 89-17-01.
c.
On August 25, 1989, at approximately 9:45 a.m., an alarm was received in the control room indicating that the pressurizer safety valve loop seal temperature of 450 degrees had been exceeded.
This indicated that the loop seal to the pressurizer safety valve had been lost.
In accordance with station order 89-06, a unit shutdown at a rate of 3 percent per minute was started at approximately 10:00 a.m.
At 10:04 a.m. acoustic monitors, safety valve temperature alarms and rapidly decreasing RCS pressure indicated that pressurizer safety valve A had lifted.
The reactor was manually tripped when RCS pressure reached approximately 1950 psig. Safety vah e A immediately reseated and RCS pressure was stabilized at 2000 psig.
A review of
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reactor trip data indicates that minimum RCS pressure was approximately j
1950 psig.
No safety injection occurred and all required equipment j
operated as required.
This is the second occurrence of a pressurizer safety valve lifting
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with the unit at power in the past several months.
The previous event occurred on May 28, 1989.
That ennt and subsequent licensee actions were documented in resident inspection reports 89-09 and
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89-11. As a result of the previous event, safety valves B and C were reworked at the Westinghouse facility in Banning, California and all three safety valves were tested in place during the previous plant startup in June 1989.
As a ' result of this previous occurrence an extensive-investigation for root cause of the failure was conducted by the licensee with
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I assistance from Westinghouse, Crosby and a root cause analysis consultant. This analysis determined that the most probable cause of-the safety valve malfunction was a pressure set point shift from 2485 psi to approximately 2235 psi, a 250 psi change in set point.
This investigation was able to account for the majority of the set point change.
The major contributor identified was -the loss of loop seal that accounted for approximately - 150 psi.
A copy of the documentation from this study was provided to Region II and the NRR Project Manager by the resident inspector.
The above investigation resulted in the licensee installing eight RTDs on each pressurizer safety valve and piping to monitor the valve temperature and to determine if the loop seal was lost during plant operation.
To prevent additional challenges to the safety valves, a decision was made and guidance was provided in station order 89-06 to shut the plant down if pressurizer loop seal temperature exceeds 450 F.
At this temperature it is anticipated that the loop seal will flash, the safety valve will be exposed to a steam atmosphere and the set point would shift down approximately 150 psi.
Due to the abovs event, the plant was placed in cold shutdown to allow replacement of safety valve A.
The valve was replaced on August 29, 1989 and the plant was restarted on September 1,1989.
The scheduling, coordination and accomplishment of work activities during the unplanned outage appeared to be much better organized than in recent outages.
Work groups were better prepared and through teamwork, accomplished the majority of required activities on time and ahead of the planned schedule.
The licensee is currently preparing a LER on this item. As a part of the short term corrective actions, the licensee plans to reduce the safety valve temperature set point at which a plant shutdown will be started from 450 F to 390 F to allow sufficient time for an orderly and controlled plant shutdown.
The A safety valve which was removed from the pressurizer will be sent to the Westinghouse repair facility to attempt to determine the as found set point and failure mode. As a part of the long term corrective action the licensee is also planning or requesting a TS change to allow a set point tolerance of 3 percent instead of the 1 percent tolerance currently in TS. They are currently investigating a design change to delete the loop seal and install steam valve seats.
The inspectors will continue to follow this item and provide updates in subsequent eports.
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No' violations'or deviations were identified.
'5.-
' ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The' inspectors; verified' the operability of an. ESF system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the spent fuel cooling system..The
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- inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system line-up procedures matched plant ~ drawings and the as-built configuration. The inspectors looked-for
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equipment conditions.and items that might degrade performance (hangers and E
supports, housekeeping, etc.) and -inspected the1 nteriors of electrical
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and instrumentation. cabinets for debris, loose' material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc..
The : inspectors - verified that valves, including.
instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper-position, power was available, and. valves were locked as appropriate..The inspectors compared both local and remote' position indications.:
During the above system walkdown the following discrepancies were identified:
a.
No-safety. department checkoff -sheet to show space sampling for. lack of oxygen or hazardous gases. at entry to filter pit area on' elevation 463 of the auxiliary building b.:
No safety' chain on guard rails at access to the above area c..
XVD-6734-SF is listed on line-up checkoff sheet yet valve is on a portable mixing tank
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XVD-6739-SF is actually capped and closed vice closed as shown 'on checkoff sheet e.=
XVD-6738-SF same as item d f.
XV3-6684-SF is actually open and not closed as stated on checkoff sheet g.
XVD-6682-SF same as item d h.
XVD-6717-SF same as item f i.
XVD-6734-SF same as item f j.
XVD-16665-SF same as item d
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'XVT-6742-SF same as item d
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The following valves have leaks that require' repair:
XVD-6668-SF,
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- XVD-6666-SF, XVD-6650-SF, XVD-6648-SF,.XVD-6663-SF, XVD-6667-SF, XYT-6659-SF, XVT-16654-SF, and XVT-6661-SF L
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XVD-6668-SF is listed twice on checkoff sheet and XYD-6688-SF is not listed
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XVT-16654-SF missing cap o.
XVT-16654-SF, IPI-7444-HR-SF, XVT-16652-SF, XVG-6661-SF, XVD-16655-SF and ILT-0990-HR-SF are missing identification tags, p..
Insulation shielding is separating on the RWST at elevation 440 q.
IPI-7444-HR-SF mislabeled on DWG 302-651 as IPT r.
Pumps' XpP-32 a & b have oil and boric acid leaks at packing
.The 32 valves for leak detection on.the spent fuel pool liner located s..
at elevation 412 have no tags and are not listed on the valve line-up sheets..The drain manifold is clogged with boric acid.
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Valve XVT-16687-SF is on DWG 302-651 but is not'11sted on the. valve line-up sheet u.
Several valves listed on the valve line-up sheets are on DWG 304-657.
This drawing is not listed as a reference.
'The above list of discrepancies was provided to the operation group on August 3, 1989. -
They are - currently 'in the process of ' correcting administrative errors in the valve line-up ' sheets.
MWRs' have been submitted to maintenance to correct material deficiencies.
The missing identification tags have been replaced.
The safety department has corrected item a. and a MRF is in process to correct item b.
Item s. has been referred to engineering for resolution.
The above walkdown 6dicates that this system has not received the attention required tu aaintain it above minimum acceptable standards.
It is recommended that operations review other systems for similar administrative and material deficiencies.
00 violations or deviations were identified.
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6.- Onsite Follow-up of Events and Subsequent Written Reports (92700, 93702)
The inspectors reviewed the. following Part 21 Reports LER's and SPR's to ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective action and report of
'the identified event or deficiency was in conformance with regulatory requirements TS, license conditions, and licensee procedures.and
' controls.
(Closed) SPR 89-004, Inoperable fire barriers. This item was reported to L
Region II in a letter dated April 6,1989.
This item. involved two fire doors and a reactor building penetration nozzle that were opened for greater than the seven days permitted by TS...
The doors.were opened to permit maintenance inside the reactor building during an unscheduled plant shutdown.
The doors.were closed and declared operable on March 23, and 27, 1989 prior to plant restart. The inspectors reviewed this report and verified that the above actions had been completed.
(Closed)
SPR 89-01, Inoperable auxiliary building ventilator exhaust system. This item was reported to Region II in a letter dated' January 25, 1989.
This involved the' depletion of the charcoal absorption capability from painting activities while the unit was in a refueling outage.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions on this item and found them to be acceptable.
(Closed)
LER 89-10, Monthly channel checks not performed on sodium hydroxide tank level.
This item was reported to Region II in a letter dated June 23, 1989.
This item was also reported as a NCV in the resident's monthly report for June' of 1989, (item 395-89-11-01).
The inspectors verified that corrective action for this item have been completed.
(Closed)
LER 88-12, Potential inadvertent operation of safety related equipment solenoids due to grounds on DC system.
This item was reported to Region II in a letter dated December 30, 1988.
It involved a condition where a ground on the DC system coupled with the operation of the grocnd detection system could result in leakage current that could prevent correct operation of some safety relay solenoid valves during accident conditions.
Corrective actions on this item included impoved sealing of the electrical connections to the affected solenoid valves and temporary disabling of the installed ground detection system.
During an interim period, manual ground readings have been taken until an improved ground detection system can be installed.
A consequence analysis was completed and revision 1 to the LER was submitted to Region II on March 30, 1989.
MRF 21558 will provide for the installation of a new ground detection system to complete the corrective action on this item. The design and MRF have been approved and are presently scheduled to be accomplished in January 1991.
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(Closeo) LER 89-08, Control room ventilation aligns to recirculation mode (ESF actuation).
An invalid signal to the control room supply air radiation monitor (RM-A1) was the cause of the actuation of this ESF component.
Investigation of the cause revealed that a small amount of oil L
in the detector housing was causing the spurious signals.
The detector housing was cleaned, the detector was observed for a period of time and
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returned to service. The licensee is investigating various problems with plant radiation monitors and is investigating modifications and/or preventive maintenance improvements to improve component reliability.
(Closed)
LER 89-09, Diesel generator fuel oil storage.
The licensee identified a discrepancy in the volume of stored fuel oil between the current design basis calculation and TS.
The licensee has taken interim corrective actions by issuing special instructions to operations personnel to maintain fuel oil volume in accordance with the design basis and had submitted a request for a revision to the TS as a permanent fix for the item.
(Closed)
Part 21 Report 2188-03, Gamma-metrics cable assemblies installed as part of the neutron monitoring system may possibly leak. This item was reported to the NRC in a letter dated May 10, 1989. This report addressed a potential problem with solder connections in the cable assemblies. The repairs recommended by the manufacturer were completed under MWR 88I0230 during the fourth refueling outage that was completed in December 1988.
The inspector reviewed the completed MWR and NCN 2975 which documented the non-conformance and provide disposition for corrective work. This review did not identify any areas of concern; therefore, this item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7..
OSHA Interface Activities (93001)
The inspector, while observing electrical maintenance activities, noted an electrical hazard associated with a service test being conducted on 1A safety related battery charger on August 17, 1989.
Live electrical connections were exposed and presented a potential hazard to per.sonnel where the portable cables were connected to the electrical load bank and to the battery charger.
The equipment was in operation and unattended, and no safety barrier tape or danger signs had been erected to warn personnel of this hazard. The load bank was positioned in a corridor with routine personnel traffic.
After being informed of this item the licensee immediately rotated the load bank to reduce the possibility of personnel contact with the exposeu part and placed barricade tape with warning signs around this hazard.
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 1,1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.
The plant trip,
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shutdown and safety. valve replacement,-including the short and long term
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corrective actions, were discussed in detail. The licensee indicated that H
the weaknesses identified in the area of maintenance and surveillance will be corrected.
The licensee was in agreement with the non-cited violation associated with the failure to sample for LLD in the WGDT's prior to'
release.. They also stated that additional emphasis will be placed on -
correcting procedural and equipment deficiencies associated with the SFPCS.
The licensee ~ was in agreement with the personnel safety hazard observed during. surveillance testing.
No cissenting comments were received from the licensee.. The licensee did act-identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
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Acronyms and Initialisms-DC Direct Current DWG Drawing ESF Engineered Safety Feature F
Fahrenheit l
IPT Instrument Pressure Temperature LER Licensee Event Reports
LLD Lower Limit of Detection MRF-Modification Request Form MWR Maintenance Work Request NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
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OSHA Occupational Safety & Health Administration PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet
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l PSI Pounds Per Square Inch PSIG Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge RCS Reactor Coolant System RTD Resistance Temperature Detector i
RWP Radiation Work Permits RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SPR Special Reports STP Surveillance Test Procedures
SFPCS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System l
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TS Technical Specifications WGDT Waste Gas Decay Tank I
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