IR 05000395/1989001
| ML20235M980 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Hopkins P, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235M952 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-89-01, 50-395-89-1, NUDOCS 8902280523 | |
| Download: ML20235M980 (10) | |
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B rec og UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
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REGION 11 g
j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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'e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-395/89-01
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Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218
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Docket No.:
50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name: V. C. Summer Inspection Conducted: January 1 - February 5,1989
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Inspecto s:.
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_Date' Signed
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Richard L. Prevatte
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I b Zffk wm Perry C. Hopkins Date Signed n
9 Approved by:
DivisionofReactorcPro)jectsFloyd S. Cantrell, 56pt 4n Chief Date Signed
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SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, engineered safety features system walkdown, and action on previous inspection findings.
Results:
Since startup from the fourth refueling outage in late December, the licensee has experienced problems with bearing oil levels in reactor coolant pump "A" and feedwater contamination from bearing lube oil on main feedwater pump "B".
The above resulted in power reduction to correct these deficiencies. This inspection identified deficiencies in areas of system operating procedure valve line-up sheets (paragraph Sa) and control room essential drawings (paragraph 5b).
These deficiencies were identified as additional examples of a violation to be issued in the OSTI report, 88-26.
A licensee identified violation concerning control of scaffolds was also identified (paragraph 4b). The licensee has been very responsive in correcting the above items.
The areas of maintenance and surveillance continue to perform well.
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Within the areas inspected, no violations of deviations were identified.
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0902280523 89021'7 PDR ADOCK 0500037, O
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics
- 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems
- A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services
- D. Moore, General Manager, Engineering Services K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite
- M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
"*G. Soult,. General Manager, Operations and Maintenance l
G. Taylor, Manager, Operations
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D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services
- M. Williams, General Manager, Nuclear Services K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training
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NRC Resident Inspectors P. Hopkins, Resident Inspector
- R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems
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E and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of 13 selected surveillance tests including all aspects of Standby Diesel G.enerator Operability Test, STP 125.002.
The inspectors also verified L
that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating
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the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test-instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test.
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L discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to -
service.
I Good communication existed between operators and the test technicians.
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.The materials, parts, components and test equipment used were found to be correct and properly documented.
procedurer were readily available and followed by test technicians and operations personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS and appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors also determined that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
The inspectors independently verified that equipment was properly tested before being returned to service. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed _ several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given system's performance. The following specific maintenance activities-were observed:
MWR 8900134 Repair RMG 0008 MWR 8900124 Repair flow transmitter on liquid waste pump PMTS P0113777 Calibrate RHR pump "A" header pressure indicator PMTS P0115105 Lubricate "B" diesel generator engine PMTS P0114298 Inspect, test and adjust DG room supply fan AXFN0045A PMTS P0115613 Check and set exhaust valve backlash on
"B" diesel generator engine PMTS P0115104 Inspect and retorque studs on injection pump,
"B" diesel generator engine PMTS P0115103 Lubricate "A" diesel generator engine j
PMTS P0109848 Calibrate heat tracing control panel instruments PMTS P0102773 Calibrate spent fuel pool atmospheric gaseous iodine monitor MWR 8810188 Install fittings and perform operational test of RM pump PMTS P0113933 Replace motor starter coil for diesel fuel transfer pump PMTS P0114296 Replace motor starter on DG fuel pumps PMTS P0113778 Recalibrates RB foundation motion accelerometer MWR 8810045 Repair time mark relay on motion accelerometer PMTS P01140460 Perform scheduled maintenance on RMA 0001 MWR 8801129 Investigate and repair control for AH unit XEP6210 l
MWR 8900030 Replace gauge IPI126054 l
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MWR 8810218 Remove washers from nuclear instrumentation intermediate range drawer MWR 8810636-Investigate and repair RMG 0008 check source MWR 890086-Repair RMA 0011
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I MWR 8900187 Repair RWST level indicator PMTS P0113785 Calibrate area gamma detection instrumentation MWR 8800636 Repair indicator light on control board t
MWR' 8801566 Reset pressure switch on FS system MWR 8900157 Perform periodic surveillance on ATWAS mitigation system No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
The inspectors toured the control room, reviewed plant logs, records and held discussions with plant staff personnel to verify that the plant was being operated safely and in conformance with applicable requirements. Specific items inspected in the control room included:
adequacy of staffing and attentiveness of control room personnel, TS
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and procedural adherence, operability of equipment and indicated control room status, control room logs, tagout books, operating orders, jumper / bypass controls, computer printouts and annunciators.
Tours of other plant areas were conducted to verify equipment operability, control of. ignition sources and combustible materials, the condition of fire detection and extinguishing equipment, the control of maintenance and surveillance activities in progress, the implementation of radiation protective controls and the physical security plan.
Tours were conducted during normal and random i
off-hour periods.
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b.
On January 15, 1989, at approximately 2:50 p.m., with the unit at 100 percent power, the licensee discovered scaffolding installed over
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safety related piping.
This scaffolding had been erected on j
October 3, 1988, to support lead shielding blankets used to limit i
personnel exposure during the recent refueling outage. An initial
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engineering evaluation determined that the scaffolding could l
potentially break a 3-inch line and render both trains of high head'
safety injection inoperable.
Additionally affected by this scaffolding was a 3/8-inch SG sample line, a SG blowdown containment-isolation valve, and a RCP seal water injection line.
After evaluating the impact of this item, the licensee entered the limiting condition prescribed by 3.0.3 of TS, started removal of scaffolding and commenced a power reduction at 3:40 p.m.
The NRC was notified at 4:30 p.m.
All scaffolding was removed at 5:25 p.m. and the unit exited 3.0.3 of TS. During the above period, the plant was searched and existing scaffolding was evaluated to determine if other l
similar conditions existed.
The unit was returned to 100 percent l
power at 5:35 p.m.
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In addition-to the above immediate. corrective action,'the licensee.is
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also evaluating all circumstances associated with. this event.
The event was also the topic of a MRB conducted on January 19, 1989. The MRB assigned a root cause analysis team to assist in the investigation of this event.
The MRB revealed. that when the. scaffolding.was erected, it was assigned a removal'date of December 15, 1988. Established procedures required this data be tracked using daily computer printouts. This was not accomplished as required by CMP 100.009.
It was also determined that the scaffold engineering evaluation was only.'.for mode 5 and 6.
This was ~ not identified and the scaffold was - not tracked as a mode restraint.
The form used to control scaffold erection and removal'was from an outdated procedure (GMP 101.008) that had been superseded when procedure CMP 101.009 was implemented in-1988.
The above items are instances of procedural inadequacy and failure to follow procedures. However, this item was identified by the licensee and prompt action was taken to evaluate,. report and correct the
' deficiency. The' licensee is currently investigating the event for long term corrective action.
This violation meets the criteria specified in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation 'and is therefore, not cited.
The long term corrective action will be tracked under LIV 395/89-01-01.
'On January 29, 1989, with the unit at 100 percent power a problem was c.
experienced with reactor coolant pump "A" lower oil reservoir level.
Reactor power was reduced to 40 percent and an entry was made into the reactor building.
Investigation revealed the oil level to be slightly high.
Approximately 1h gallons of oil was drained from the 25 gallon reservoir and the alarm was cleared. An analysis of the oil indicated no water present.
The licensee attributes this change in level to a. slight building temperature rise due to a climatic warming trend. The unit was returned to 100 percent power on January 30, 1989.
d.
On January 31, 1989, with the unit at 100 percent power, the licensee identified a decrease in level in the main feedwater pump "B" oil
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sump. Subsequent visual and chemical analysis revealed traces of oil
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in the feedwater system.
Unit power was reduced to 8S percent and the main feedwater pump was removed from service. The bearing covers were removed and the seals and drain lines inspected with no
conclusive deficiencies identified.
The feedwater pump was
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reassembled and tested on February 2, 1988, with unsati sf actory
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results.
The pump inside bearing was again disassembled and inspected with vendor assistance.
No conclus1/e defects were identified. At the conclusion of the reporting period, the unit is at 88 percent pcwer and the licensee was still trouble shooting the pump.
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5.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
a.
The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Station and Back Up Instrument Air System. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system line-up procedures essentially matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration. The inspectors looked for l
equipment conditions and items that might degrade performance
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(hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets
' for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc. The inspectors verified that valves, including instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appropriate. The inspectors compared both local and remote position indications.
Discrepancies identified during the above inspection included 6 valves missing identification tags, two valves had incorrect positions listed on the valve line-up sheets, four valves were not listed on the valve line-up sheets and four drawings, which identify valves listed on the line-up sheets, were not listed as references.
These deficiencies were corrected by the licensee immediately after identification.
This system line-up and procedure check list was inspected by an OSTI ccmpleted in December 1988.
Procedural inadequacies similar to the above were identified and will be the subject of violations contained in that report. Therefore, the above deficiencies are provided as an additional example of that violation.
The licensee, in their response to violation 88-26-03, should address a review of operations procedures for similar errors and long term corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
b.
Regional Office Notice 2303 dated, January 3, 1989 identified problems with essential control room drawings at several Region II plants.
It also provided guidance and directed the resident inspectors to verify the adequacy of controls to insure that these drawings are maintained. The instruction also required that a safety system hand-over-hand inspection be performed to verify that the system P&ID represented the plant as-built configuration.
The following licensee procedures which control essential drawings and drawing changes were reviewed to determine the adequacy of established controls.
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Nuclear Operations Procedure, Document Control Procedure DCP-103 Rev.0.
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- Engineering Services Procedure, Review of Drawings and'
Specifications ES-410, Rev.0.
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Engineering Services Procedure, Design Modifications Change Process and Controls ES-416, Rev.0.
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Station Administrative Procedure, Design Control Implementation and Engineering Services SAP-133, Rev.4.
The licensee maintains control copies of all the essential drawings in the control room complex. These P&ID drawings, HVAC' drawings, process control. block diagrams and I&C loop diagrams are maintained on stick racks near the' main control board.
These drawings are not
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distinctly segregated but are mixed with other non-essential drawings on the rack.
The electrical elementary drawings are maintained in file cabinets in the operations administrative office adjacent to the.
main control board. All essential drawings are also available on microfiche in the TSC which is inside the control room complex. A receiver / printer is available at that location if additional copies are needed.
Discussions were held with three licensed operators, the document control supervisor, the general manager, operations and maintenance and : selected. engineering personnel on how essential drawings are maintained current with plant configuration. Present methodology, as prescribed in procedures, is that if a modification or change has been implemented, a hold stamp will be placed on the affected drawings. An in process drawing, showing the change, will be issued
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and placed on the in process stick in the essential drawing stick rack. After the modification is completed, the in process drawing is removed and the "on hold" essential drawing is replaced with an interim as-built drawing. Final as-built drawings are then developed and placed in the control room. This is normally accomplished within 30 days. There is no backlog of revisions since drawings are revised when each modification or change is completed.
The updating and maintenance of essential control room drawings is the responsibility of the document control section.
Quarterly audits, as required by
DCP-103, are conducted by the document control group to insure that drawings are current and available.
The system, as described above, was implemented in procedures in September 1986 but did not appear to be fully understood by all operations personnel.
The operations procedure writing group currently maintains copies of all modifications packages. in the control room complex. Prior to September 1986, operations personnel were required to review these packages to determine the status of drawings with a hold stamp applied.
Some operations personnel were not aware of the above changes and were still referring to the modification packages contained in these files. Since these packages
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were still'being used, they were reviewed. Although these copies are notL procedurally controlled they appeared to be up-to-date and well maintained.
A 'rev.iew of 30' essential drawings in the control room and n
. 30 microfiche drawings in TSC was performed. All drawings with the exception of D302-011,. were legible and all were of the correct revision. It was noted during this inspection that an OSTI conducted in December 1988, had identified several drawings which contained illegible numbers. The deficient drawings were 18 x 24 inch reduced size.B drawings.. As these reduced size drawings are revised and reproduced the clarity tends to decrease. As a result of the OSTI finding, the licensee has committed to replace the essential reduced size drawings with full size D drawings.
A review of the P&ID drawings found 27 drawings with hold stamps applied.
A review of the.in process drawings failed to locate an in process drawing for 14 of these. A review of the outstanding and completed modification computer printout and research by the-licensee's engineering services group revealed that six of the modifications had been cancelled, but the necessary paperwork had not been issued by engineering to remove the hold stamps; three drawings were not affected by the modifications indicated on-the hold stamp;
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two in process drawings had not been issued as required; a hold stamp had been placed on DWG D302-011 vice D302-111 as required; and two modifications had been completed but the hold stamp had not been removed.
The inspectors, accompanied by a licensed operator, performed a walkdown of all portions of the service water system outside the reactor building. The following deficiencies were identified:
1.
IFT 4587 and 4586 installed under MRF 10723 during refueling outage 3 is not shown on DWG D302-221 and no process drawing was available for this MRF.
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XVG 3105A-CKI-SW and XVG 31058-CKI-SW identification tags are swapped.
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XVG 13127-SW, ITW 4507-SW, ITI 4503-SW and ITW 4469-SW identification tags are missing.
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ITI 4502-3W shown on DWG D302-222 is not installed.
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XVT 3153-E not labeled on DWG D302-222.
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On DWG D302-221 at coordinates F-4, the connection for the
3 inch line to XPS-168A-SW and 3/4 inch line to PS 4406 are reversed.
At coordinates E-6 PT 4442 and PT 4443 are in the reverse order in reference to system flow.
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The; deficiencies identified in this,. inspection indicate ' that the l.
controls: to insure correct as-bu_ilt drawings are available i_n the
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l control room is deficient. ItLis evident _ that all personnel are not
. fully aware of' procedural-requirements on the use of hold stamps and established procedures are not being followed.
Drawings are not
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. change.. The quarterly audits conducted.by the document control group are also.not effective in identifying 'long term deficiencies.
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The OSTI conducted a V.C. Summer in November and December 1988, also identified that the licensee was not'following procedures in that L'
several control room drawings were illegible. The above deficiencies are cited a's additional examples of the violation cited in. report L
88-26. -The: licensee' should address actions taken to correct the above deficiencies-in their response to violation 88-26-03.
No violations or' deviations were identified.
6.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)-
(Closed) Inspection ' Followup Item 88-30-02, Establish a buddy system for entri e s' 4 in'to locked high radiation areas. The licensee issued change "B" to HPP-160, Control and Posting of Radiation Control Zones, on August-12, 1988. :This change required that when. the access to,a locked high radiation area is temporarily secured with a chain and padlock with. people-inside, a pe'rson will stay at the locked entry / egress area to. insure that the door.is not inadvertently locked. This item has been discussed with Region -II's Health Physics personnel and they concur that this action is correct and adequate.
(Closed) Violation 88-15-03, Failure to provide adequate procedures to control service water traveling screen.
The licensee provided a written response to this item in a letter to Region II, dated August 26,1988.
The licensee has changed the ' SOP-117 to reflect the correct system alignment.
SI 88-03 has been changed to. require that the auxiliary operator perform a manual wash of the screen once per shift.
These actions adequately address.this concern.
7.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and f. ndings were summarized on February 6,1989, i
with those perso s indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.
The licensee identified violation involving control of scaffolds (paragraph 4a), the errors in system valve line-up sheets (paragraph Sa), and deficiencies involving essential control room drawings (paragraph 5b) were discussed in detail.
The licensee was informed that items 5a and 5b will become additional examples of violation -88-26-03 identified by the OSTI.
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dissenting. comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as' proprietary any of the materials-provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
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Acronyms and Initialisms AH Air Handling ATWAS Anticipated Transient Without a Scram CMP Civil Maintenance Procedure DCP Document Control Procedure DG Diesel Generator DWG Drawing
<ESF Engineered Safety Feature FS Fire Service GMP General Maintenance Procedure HPP Health Physics Procedure HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning I&C Instrumentation and Control LIV Licensee Identified Violation MWR Maintenance Work Request MRB Management Review Board MRF Modification Request Form NA0H Sodium Hydroxide NCN-Non-Conformance Notice NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSTI Operational Safety Team Inspection PMST Preventive Maintenance Task' Sheet
.P & ID Piping and Instrumental Drawings RB Reactor Building RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RM Radiation Monitor RMA Radiation Monitor Atmosphere RMG Radiation Monitor Gas RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SAP Station Administrative Procedure SG Steam Generator SI Special Instruction S0P System Operating Procedure STP Surveillance Test Procedures TSC Technical Support Center TS Technical Specifications
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