ML20246L264

Insp Rept 50-395/89-02 on 890123-27.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Training,Changes to Emergency Organization,Distribution of Changes to Emergency Plan & Emergency Plan Procedures & Audits Repts

ML20246L264
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	02/23/1989
From:	Gooden A, Rankin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236E371	List: ML20236E369 ML20246L241 ML20246L264
References
50-395-89-02, 50-395-89-2, NUDOCS 8903240127
Download: ML20246L264 (13)

See also: IR 05000395/1989002

Text

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.ll' * -'k UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION 11

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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.

%*+,,,,*[ ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

MAR 0 71989

Report No.: 50-395/89-02

Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company

Columbia, SC 29218

. Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12

Facility Name: Summer

<

Inspection Conducted: January 23-27, 1989

Inspector: O, 0+Nt-~ OZ- 23-69

A. Gooden Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: K. Roughen

Approved by: W. 0 9. - 2. 9 - P1

W. Rankin, Acting Chief. Date Signed

Emergency Preparedness Section

Emergency Preparedness and Radiological

Protection Branch

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the area of

l emergency preparedness. Several areas within the emergency program were

l inspected to determine if the program was being maintained in a state of

l operational readiness for responding to emergencies. This included a review of

training, changes to the emergency organization, distribution of changes to the

Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures (EPPs), audit reports, and the

maintenance of key facilities and selected emergency kits or equipment.

Results: Within the areas inspected, three violations were identified. Two

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violations were licensee-identified: (1) failure to remove superceded copies of

l documents in accordance with Document Control Procedure-101 (Paragraph 2);

(2) failure to provide documentation for completed trainin

Nuclear Services Administrative Procedure-IIC (Paragraph , and5)g (3) in accordance

failure to with

provide seven members of the Offsite Radiological Monitoring Team with training

in accordance with EPP-018 (Paragraph 5). This violation is similar to a

violation discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-395/88-11.

The inspection indicated the following:

Equipment inventories were well documented, and conducted at the

specified procedural frequency.

Administrative controls governing the distribution of changes to the

station Emergency Plan and EPPs appeared to be effective.

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Additional training had been planned for personnel with

responsibility in event recognition, classification, notification,

protective action recommendations, and overall command and control

during emergencies.

The licensee's internal audits of the emergency preparedness program

were detailed and comprehensive.

However, improvements are needed in the licensee's management control system

for ensuring the following:

All personnel assigned to the Emergency Response Organization have '

been trained in accordance with procedures governing emergency

response training.

Administrative controls and/or procedures governing records quality

are fully implemented.

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted j

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Licensee Employees l

1. • K. Beale, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services )

L. Bouknight, Emergency Planning Specialist  !

• 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations 1

1. • C. Counts, Emergency Services Coordinator

• H. Donnelly, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Licensing

S. Furstenburg, Shift Supervisor

D. Goldston, Shift Supervisor

V. Kelley, Supervisor, Licensed Operator Training

R. McCauley, Nuclear Training Coordinator

F. Miller, Training Specialist, Quality Assurance ..

• M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support  !

• J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance ,

• R. Sweet, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance

• G. Taylor, Manager, Operations

B. Thompson, Surveillance Specialist ,

• M. Williams, General Manager, Nuclear Services  !

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,

operators, security office members, and administrative personnel.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission j

• F. Cantrell, Chief, Reactor Projects Section

• P. Hopkins, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview

1. Participated in telephone exit interview on January 30, 1989

2. Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (82701)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16), 10 CFR 50.54(q), and 10 CFR 50,

Appendix E, this area was reviewed to determine whether changes were made i

to the program since the last routine inspection (May 1988), and to assess

the impact of these changes on the overall state of emergency

preparedness. The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures governing ,

the review, approval, and distribution of changes to the Plan and EPPs

(Station Administrative Procedure-139, and Document Control

Procedure-101). The inspector noted that changes were being distributed

to copy holders in a timely manner, as evidenced by the transmittal dates,

and a review of acknowledgement slips for selected changes since the last

routine inspection. The licensee maintains a " file index distribution

card system" which reflects the document number and/or title, revision

number, copy holder number, and the number of copies issued. Further, an

audit was conducted of select controlled copies shown on the distribution

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list. It was noted that EPP Copy #43F, located in the Operational Support t

Center (OSC), contained a superceded copy of EPP-005. Revision 12 to l

EPP-005, dated August 12, 1988, had been superceded by Revision 13, dated l

December 21,1988 (issued December 22,1988). Concurrent with the NRC j

review of documents, the licensee's Quality Assurance Auditor identified i

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Emergency

Facility (Operating

E0F) that wereProcedures

superceded (E0Ps) located

as were in the Emergency

plant drawings. The Operations !

cognizant licens.ee representative, when informed regarding the superceded 1

documents, took immediate action to remove the superceded documents and  !

conducted an . internal . audit of all Plans and procedures in the emergency l

response facilities .for verification that ' current documents were  !

available. Consequently, according to a licensee contact, administrative

. corrective actions were documented and implemented to resolve the

aforementioned findings and prevent recurrence. The licensee was informed

that this matter was considered a Licensee Identified Violation (LIV) that 'j

meets the- criteria specified~ in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy

for not issuing a Notice of Violation.

LIV 50-395/89-02-01: Failure to maintain all documents in accordance with j

Document Control Procedure (DCP)-101. {

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The . inspector reviewed documentation for the Emergency Plan' and  !

implementing procedure changes identified below to verify that submittals '!

were made to NRC within 30 days of the approval date: j

Emergency Plan Revision 24 dated July 29, 1988, mailed to NRC l

July 29, 1988

EPP-001 Revision 14 dated June 15, 1988, mailed to NRC July 29, 1988

EPP-005 Revision 13 dated December 21, 1988, mailed to NRC

January 10, 1989

EPP-007 Revision 5 dated July 15, 1988, mailed to NRC July 25, 1988

i EPP-009 Revision 6 dated June 28, 1988, mailed to NRC July 1,1988

EPP-015 Revision 9 dated October 10, 1988, mailed to NRC October 24,

1988 1

EPP-018 Revision 8 dated October 26, 1988, mailed to NRC  ;

November 11, 1988  !

EPP-019 Revision 13 dated October 4, 1988, mailed to NRC October 12, i

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1988

In addition, the inspector reviewed the timeliness of the Corporate

Emergency Plan changes (Revision Nos. 13, 14, and 15) that were submitted

to NRC. It was noted that all such changes were submitted to NRC within

30 days of the approval date.

The inspector reviewed the following controlled copies:

Control Room (Copy No. 10)

Technical Support Center (Copy Nos. 43B and 43C)

Nuclear Service Training Library (Copy No.178)

Emergency Operations Facility (Copy Nos. 158 and 228)

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No problems were noted with any of the above referenced documents.

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One violation and no deviations were identified.

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3. Emergency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation and Supplies (82701)

Discussions were held with a licensee representative concerning

modifications to facilities, equipment, and instrumentation since the last i

inspection. The inspector was informed that no significant changes had

However, according to a

been

licensee contact,

made to any of the onsite facilities. South Carolina Electric and Gas Compa

management had concurred on a proposal to relocate the Media Center from

the Nuclear Training Center to the Palmetto Center downtown (this . facility

currently' serves as the backup Media Center). The relocation is

anticipated-prior to June 1989. An inspection and operability check was

performed on selected equipment and support . items used for emergency

response in .the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and E0F.

The inspector requested and observed an unannounced communications check

from the Control Room using the Emergency Notification System (NRC

Operations Center). In addition, announced communications checks were

conducted from the TSC using the dedicated ring-down phone system to State

and local warning points, and the two-way radio system with the local law

enforcement agencies (LLEA). No problems were noted; contact was

established via each communications network tested, i

In assessing the operational status of the emergency facilities, the  !

inspector verified that protective equipment and supplies were operational  !

and inventoried on a periodic basis. Emergency kits and/or cabinets from

the - Control Room, TSC, Security Annex Building, E0F, and OSC were

inventoried and randomly selected equipment was checked for operability.

With one exception, the selected equipment operated properly, displayed

current calibration sticker, and successful battery checks were obtained.'

The one exception involved a radiation survey instrument (RM-14, serial

no. 3453) stored inside Emergency Kit No.1, located at the Security Annex

Building. The licensee immediately took action to replace the

The failed

aforementioned instrument with an operable replacement.

instrument, according to documentation, had been calibrated and serviced

on December 29, 1988. A licensee representative informed the inspector

that the survey instrument failed due to a faulty high voltage board. By

There were no further questions or concerns regarding the inventory.

review of applicable procedures and documentation for the period of

January 1988 to December 1988, the inspector determined that emergency

equipment (e.g. communication equipment and emergency kits) was being

checked in accordance with procedures governing such tests (EPP-019 and

EPP-022-).

The inspector also verified that current copies of the EPPs

were available in the emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC,

OSC, and E0F). As stated above in Paragraph 2, superceded documents were

prevent

promptly removed and administrative actions implemented to

recurrence.

The licensee's management control program for the Early Warning Siren

System (EWSS) was reviewed.

According to discussion with a licensee

representative, the current system consists of 107 fixed sirens and tone

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alert radios for schools within the plume exposure pathway. The licensee

provided siren test records for the period January 1988 to January 1989.

The records showed that silent tests, growl test, and full-cycle tests

were being conducted in accordance with EPP-022 and NUREG-0654. An EWSS ,

trouble report form was used for documenting actions taken as a follow-up

l to siren problems.

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In addition to warning signs and public information brochures, the

licensee maintained as an additional capability for providing public ,

information, a public address system. This system included speakers i

located at siren sites Nos. 9 and 45 on the Monticello Reservoir. The

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location of these speakers provide coverage to individuals frequenting the

recreational facilities on Monticello Reservoir. The inspector noted >

during an audit of test records that speakers at siren site No. 9 were '

declared inoperable on August 2, 1988, and were not returned to service  :

until late December 1988. The current test procedure (EPP-022) did not  !

specify the time required for returning speaker equipment to an operable

state; the only time requirement specified was for repairs to the EWSS l

(e.g. sirens and encoders). The licensee acknowledged this finding, and ,

provided details documenting the delay in returning speakers to service.  !

The inspector informed the licensee that failure to take prompt and  !

corrective actions to return speakers to service was considered a

potential violation pending further review by Regional Management.

Following a review of the EWSS inspection details and a discussion with a

Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV (FEMA IV) representative

regarding what constitutes the EWSS at Summer, the licensee was informed ,

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on January 30, 1989, that this matter was considered an inspector

follow-up item (IFI) rather than a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. The

licensee agreed to develop administrative controls for ensuring prompt and

corrective actions are taken on failed equipment. ,

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IFI 50-395/89-02-02: Develop administrative controls to ensure that prompt

and corrective actions are being taken to repair all equipment used for

public notification. Documentation was provided to the inspector to show s

that preventive maintenance was performed on the EWSS during May through

August 1988, and the average annual operability was 92.0 percent (%).

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As part of the emergency communication equipment, the inspector discussed l

with licensee representatives, the maintenance and periodic testing of the i

plant emergency warning system for high noise areas. According to  !

documentation and discussions with licensee representatives, the Summer l

emergency evacuation system consisted of flashing red lights and an alarm j

sounded over the plant public address system. The inspector was provided  !

documentation to show that the evacuation alarm was tested on a weekly l

basis. However, there was no periodic preventative maintenance program in

place for the sirens or lights. In addition, the weekly test did not

include documentation or verification that the lights and speakers were ,

operational. The licensee agreed to review this item for development of a l

surveillance procedure governing the periodic testing of the alarms and 1

lights to ensure system operability. The licensee was informed that this  !

matter is considered an IFI for review during a subsequent inspection.

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l IFI 50-395/89-02-03: Develop and implement, a surveillance procedure for

the emergency warning system which governs the periodic maintenance,

testing, and documentation thereof to ensure system operability and

reliability.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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4. Organization and Management Control (82701) [

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The inspector's discussion with licensee representatives disclosed that .

several administrative changes had been made to both the normal and I

emergency organization as a result of promotions since the May 1988

inspection. These promotions had no impact on the reporting chain for

emergency preparedness. An additional administrative change involved the  !

Manager, Nuclear Protection Services. Previously, security, fire,

industrial safety, and emergency preparedness reported to' .the

aforementioned position. Since the May 1983 inspectio4 responsibility

for security and fire were reassigned; however, emergency preparedness and

industrial safety continue to report to the Manager l Nuclear Protection i

Services. According to a licensee contact, this reassignment of

responsibility should provide increased attention to the emergency

preparedness and industrial safety programs. When training and

qualification records were reviewed for individuals reassigned within the

emergency organization as key assessment personnel (e.g. Emergency

Director, Emergency Control Officer, etc.), no problems were noted.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Training (82701)

Pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(15) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

Section IV.F, this area was inspected to c'etermine whether emergency

response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could

perform their assigned functions. The inspector reviewed Section 8.0 of

the Emergency Plan and EPP-018 for a description of the training program

and training procedures. In addition, selected lesson plans were reviewed

and members of the training staff were interviewed. Based on these

reviews and interviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had

established a formal emergency training program. i

The inspector observed a licensee conducted communications drill in lieu

of conducting walkthrough evaluations. Cognizant licensee representatives

were informed by the inspector that the communications drill would be

considered in the same manner as NRC walkthrough evaluations. The

inspector was informed that the scenario details . for the drill was

confidential and unrehearsed; however, the time for conducting the drill

was provided to onsite and offsite participants. According to discussions

and licensee documentation, included as objectives were:

Test of the dedicated ring-down system to offsite agencies ,

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Accident assessment and classification

Overall management of the accident by the Interim Emergency

Director (IED)

Test Communicator's ability to properly document, record, and

notify State and local authorities

Ensure that response personnel were familiar with their duties

and responsibilities

Participants included a Shift Supervisor, who may be designated as IED and

two individuals who may be designated as Offsite Communicators for the

Control Room. As a further demonstration of familiarity with procedures

and responsibilities, once the communications drill was terminated, the

inspector interviewed the Shift Supervisor in the areas of protective

action recommendations, exposure limits, facility activation, and other

aspects of Plan implementation.

During the communications drill, the Shift Supervisor was given

hypothetical plant conditions and data and asked to respond as if an

emergency actually existed. As IED, the simulated emergency was promptly,

and correctly classified. The interviewee demonstrated familiarity with

the EPPs as well as the role and responsibilities of the IED.

Notifications to offsite agencies were in accordance with the notification

time requirements. One of the communicators (designated as NRC

Communicator) had difficulty in making the NRC notification via the

Emergency Notification System (ENS). When initially deployed, the

individual appeared confused and uncertain regarding the notification role  ;

and system for performing notification. In performing notification, the

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communicator erroneously removed the dedicated ringdown phone for

State / local agencies and pressed the "All Call" button as opposed to the

dedicated circuit for the NRC (ENS). The Shift Supervisor recognized the

mistake and took prompt remedial actions to complete the simulated NRC

notification in a timely manner. A drill critique was held immediately

following the drill. The licensee's critique was both detailed and

effective. Observations were similar to those noted by the NRC observer.

The ENS Communicator, when questioned regarding the attempt to notify NRC

via the State / local dedicated circuit, attributed the mistake to

miscommunication with the Shift Supervisor. During the exit interview

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held on January 27, 1989 (see Paragraph 9), the licensee was informed by

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the inspector that, a preliminary review of the drill details by cognizant

i Regional Management personnel resulted in a potential violation; failure

l to follow notification procedure governing notification to the NRC. The ,

i licensee took exception to this finding and provided more clarifying j

) details on events leading to the subject finding. Further, training

records were provided to show that several individuals with responsibility

as ENS Communicators (including the subject individual) had attended the

required training. The inspector acknowledged the additional details and 4

information, then commented regarding the communicators lack of

aggressiveness in gaining access on the dedicated phone circuit, and the

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appearance of not knowing the exact location for the ENS inside the

Control Room. A detailed review of this matter by Regional Management

following the inspection resulted in the determination that a violation

had not occurred. During the drill, the inspector was not in a position

to state with certainty what directions the Shift Supervisor provided the  ;

ENS Communicator regarding required notifications and/or procedural j

implementation. However. the communicator's tentativeness in gaining i

access on the dedicated ENS is considered an inspector followup item. The i

licensee agreed to conduct nands-on training to ENS Communicators using )

the dedicated notification network. )

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IFI 50-395/89-02-04: Conduct periodic drills and/or communications test

for the ENS Communicators with hands-on experience using the ENS.

T aining records were reviewed for several members of the onsite and

ofisite emergency organization. Selected training records were chosen i

based on the January 1989 Emergency Planning Telephone Directory listing i

key personnel and phone numbers according to emergency response position. l

When personnel training records were compared with position assignments,  !

the inspector noted that seven of the individuals assigned to the offsite .

Radiological Monitoring Team had not completed the required training for  !

Offsite Radiological Monitoring personnel in accordance with EPP-018. ,

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This 1 nding was acknowledged by the licensee, and is identified as a f

violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) which requires the licensee to follow an

Emergency Plan which meets the planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). j

During the May 1988 inspection, a violation was identified in the area of  !

training for onsite plant assessment personnel. A repeat finding in the

area of training appears to warrant increased attention to the current

practices for tracking emerger;./ response training. l

Violation 50-395/89-02-05: Failure to provide seven members of the

Radiological Monitoring Team with training in accordance with EPP-018. ,

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Additionally, the inspector noted :Jring the review of training records

that documentation for completed training was not consistently being  !

completed and transmitted in accordance with the procedures governing i

documentation of training. According to the Nuclear Services 1

Administrative Procedure, if a formal lesson plan has not been submitted,

the back side of the attendance record sheet shall be completed to hclude

information regarding course objectives and an outline of topic > . ie

licensee was informed during the exit interview that this matter t ,eing

considered as a potential violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, l

Criterion XVII, Quality Assurance records. The licensee took exception to

this finding and provided documentation ( A Quality Assurance Audit Report ,

No. II-01-88-B) to support this finding as being licensee identified.

During a Quality Assurance Audit conducted in January 1988 (Q. A. Report

No. II-01-88-B, finding 4), discrepancies sirnilar to the above were noted

in the area of procedure control regrrding the review, approval, and

control of training materials. As a result of the audit, lesson plans

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were developed in accordance with procedural requirements. Further,

selected training records that were reviewed by the inspector covering the

period June through August 1988, contained as an attachment to the ,

attendance record an outline of the Emergency Plan training topics. l

Training documentation prior to June 1988 was not consistent with 4

procedural control requirements. According to quality assurance

documentation, dated January 1989, actions had been completed to resolve

the above finding. In light of the above actions, this potential

violation was discussed with Regional personnel, and since all 3

requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V, were

satisfied, this violation is not cited. The licensee was informed that t

this matter was considered a LIV. ]

LIV 50-395/89-02-06: Failure to provide documentation for completed

training in accordance with the Nuclear Services Administrative Procedure.  !

Two violations and no deviations were identified.

6. Independent Review / Audits (82701) ,

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and (16) and 10 CFR 50.54(t), this area  !

was inspected to determine whether the licensee had performed an

independent review or audit of the emergency preparedness program.

Records of audits of the program were reviewed. According to  !

documentation provided to the inspector, an independent audit of the

program was conducted by the Quality Assurance Group during the period

January 11-27,1988 (documented in Surveillance No. 11-01-88-B), and the

most recent audit was initiated on January 18, 1989, scheduled for

completion on January 27, 1989. The most recent Audit (to be documented I

in Audit Report No. II-6-89-B), conducted concurrent with the NRC  !

inspection, will satisfy the annual frequency requirement for such audits.

Members of the most recent audit team were interviewed regarding areas

audited and the results. Two potential findings with direct applicability

to the NRC inspection results were discussed:

Failure to provide training to a member of the emergency

response organization (Chemistry personnel).

Failure to remove superceded copies of Emergency Operating

Procedures and drawings in the E0F.

A review of the licensee's audit plan or check-list indicated that the

audit was detailed and comprehensive. The results of the aforementioned

audit will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

The licensee's program for follow-up action on audit, drill, and exercise

findings was reviewed. The inspector reviewed a sample of.1987 and 1988 i

exercise items to determine if corrective actions were being taken to

resolve items. The licensee had established a tracking system known as

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l the " Regulatory Tracking Sys' tem" for use as a management tool in following i

up on actions taken in deficient areas. It was noted that items were l

assigned to various individuals with a tentative completion date.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Shift Staffing and Augmentation (82701)

Pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(2) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

Sections IV.A and IV.C, this area was inspected to determine whether shift

staffing .for emergencies was adequate both.in numbers and in functional

capability, and whether administrative and physical means were available

and maintained to augment the emergency organization in a timely manner.

The inspector reviewed Table 5-1 of the Summer Station Emergency Plan to 1

determine if shift staffing was consistent with the goals of Table B-1 of i

NUREG-0654. Shift staffing levels and functional capabilities were  !

reviewed and found to be consistent with the guidance of Table B-1 of

NUREG-0654. The licensee had established a duty roster so that essential

off-shift personnel are available if needed. The licensee uses a

radio-pager system for notification of off-shif t personnel. On a regular

basis, notification tests are conducted on radio-pagers to verify that the

administrative means are in place for contacting the off-shift personnel

if needed.

The inspector discussed staff augmentation times with a licensee

representative, who indicated that drills had confirmed that Table 5-1

augmentation times could be met. The inspector reviewed licensee

documentation dated September 17, 1987, which showed that an augmentation

drill' was held, and that staff augmentation times were consistent with

Table B-1 guidance. According to a member of the licensee's staff, a

drill is planned for the Calendar year 1989 to include as an objective,

the verification of augmentation requirements as reflected in Table 5-1 of

the Summer Emergency Plan.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

(Closed) Violation 50-395/88-11-01: Failure to provide two members of the

onsite emergency organization plant assessment staff with training in

accordance with Emergency Plan Procedure-018. The inspector reviewed the

licensee's response to the violation (dated July 8,1988), and reviewed

training records for the period May 9-13, 1988. The inspector noted that

the licensee had provided training during May 1988 to each of the subject

individuals.

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(0 pen) IFI (50-395/88-11-02): Provide additional training for all

personnel with responsibilities as the Emergency Director or IED. At the

time of the inspection, training had been initiated, but was not complete.

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9. Exit Interview

27,.1989, with

The inspection scope and results were summarized on January

The inspector described the areas

those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.

inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material proviced

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

The licensee took exception with the finding regarding the ENS

Communicator's failure to follow notification procedures (see Paragraph 5)

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based on details provided by drill observers. In response to the potential

violation involving adherence to procedures governing the control of

training records (Paragraph 5), licensee representatives provided

documentation to show this item had been self-identified and corrective

The inspector

actions to resolve this matter had been implemented.

informed the licensee that the Thedocumentation would be

licensee had no comments reviewed

regarding the and the item

considered as a potential LIV.

potential violation for failure to taxe prompt corrective action to

According to repair

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speakers at the Monticello Reservoir- (Paragraph 3).

General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations, the details on this matter will

be reviewed and responded to accordingly. There were no further dissenting

comments. The inspector informed the licensee that findings were

The following

preliminary and subject to Regional Management review.

potential violations were identified:

Failure to follow notification procedure (EPP-002) governing

notification to the NRC.

Failure to provide seven members of the offsite Radiological

Monitoring Team with training in accordance with EPP-018. ,

Failure to take prompt corrective action to repair speakers used

as part of the EWSS for notification.

On January 30, 1989, the inspector informed the Manager, Nuclear

Protection Services, and the Emergency Services Coordinator that, based on

a further review of the inspection details and information provided

following the inspection, the inspection findings in Paragraphs 3 (failure

to take prompt corrective action to repair speakers) and 5 (failure to

follow notification procedures) were determined not to be violations and

The Manager, Nuclear Protection Services,

would be followed as IFIs.

stated the following actions would be taken:

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Develop administrative controls to ensure that prompt corrective

actions are taken to repair all equipment used for public

notification.

Conduct periodic drills and/or communications test for the ENS

Cownunicators with hands-on experience using the ENS.

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Item Number Description

50-395/89-02-01 LIV - Failure to maintair. all documents.in

accordance with DCP-101 (Paragraph 2).

50-395/89-02-02 IFI - Develop administrative controls to

ensure that prompt and corrective actions <

are being taken to repair all equipment used

for public notification (Paragraph 3).

50-395/89-02-03 IFI - Develop and implement, a surveillance

procedure for the emergency warning system

which governs the perodic maintenance,

testing, and documentation thereof to ensure

system operability and reliability

(Paragraph 3).

50-395/89-02-04 IFI - Conduct periodic drills and/or

communications test for the ENS

Communicators with hands-on experience using

the ENS (Paragraph 5).

50-395/89-02-05 Violation - Failure to provide seven

individuals assigned to the Offsite

Radiological Monitoring Team training in

accordance with EPP-018 (Paragraph 5).

[

50-395/89-02-06 LIV - Failure to provide documentation for

completed training in accordance with the

Nuclear Services Administrative Procedure

(Paragraph 5).

Licensee management was informed that two open items were reviewed. One item

was closed (Paragraph 8) and one remains open for additional actions.

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