IR 05000369/1986018

Insp Repts 50-369/86-18 & 50-370/86-18 on 860622-26. Violation Noted:Failure to Follow QA Procedure QCK-1 When Conditions Adverse to Quality,Identified

ML20212Q010
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	08/08/1986
From:	Jape F, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212P982	List: IR 05000369/1986018 ML20212P979 ML20212P993
References
50-369-86-18, 50-370-86-18, NUDOCS 8609030365
Download: ML20212Q010 (7)

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UNITE:3 STATES

/jnMEcoq'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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, REGION ll 3, ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * 's ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 s.,*...*/ *

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Report Nos.: 50-369/86-18 and 50-370/86-18 .

Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street , .

Charlotte, NC 2824 .

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Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 i Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2- ~ .

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Inspection Conducted: June 22-26, 1986 Ins tor- O>0 J. L. Mathis (/ r Date Signed Approved by: AM ##-E [

F. Jape, Section Chief (/ / Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of preparation for refueling, refueling activity, spent fuel pool activity, and startup after refuelin Results: One violation was identifeid - Failure to follow the Quality Assurance Procedure QCK-1 when conditions adverse to quality, such as nonconformances, are identified and resolved in a timely planned manner, paragraph e60903o36gO!j$$b$69 PDR ADOC ppg

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Ccntacted Licensee Employees

• • T. L. McConnell, Station Manager

• B. Travis, Operations Superintendent H. L. Massey, Shift Engineer J. W. Boyle, Shift Engineer

• N. Atheriton, Compliance

• D. S. Marquis, Performance

• M. R. Hatley, Mechanical Maintenance

• D. Lampke, Associate Engineer / Fuel Handling M. Kitland, Startup Engineer

• • B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services

• • B. Gill, Licensing Engineer, McGuire Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engi-neers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspector

• Orders, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview

• • Partipated in the July 29 conference call regarding violation 370/86-18-02 Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 26, 1986, and on July 29, by phone, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspec-tion findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The following new items were identified:

- Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 369, 370/86-18-01, Licensee management comitted to review the overall program for housekeeping to control foreign objects from falling into critical systems, paragraph Violation 370/86-18-02, Failure to follow the Quality Assurance Proce-dure QCK-1 when conditions adverse to quality, such as nonconformances, are identified and resolved in a timely planned manner, paragraph 6.

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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio r

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. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspectio . Preparation for Refueling (60705) Units 1 and 2 During reload for Unit 1, the inspector verified that initial preparations and conditions were satisfied prior to core alteration in accordance with licensee and NRC requirement The inspector reviewed procedure PT/1/A/4550/01, Preparations for Refueling, which provided a functional check of the following equipment prior to refueling to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy:

- Spent fuel pool manipulator crane

- Fuel transfer system

- Reactor building manipulator crane

- Rod cluster control change fixture

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Communications

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Fuel handling tools The inspector verified that prerequisites were satisfactorily met prior to core alteratio . Refueling Activity (60710) Units 1 and 2 The inspector reviewed Periodic Tests (pts) PT/1/A/4500/07, Total Core Reloading, for Unit 1 and PT/2/A/4550/07, for Unit 2. During the inspection period, Unit 1 was in Mode 6 and the licensee was reloading for cycle Unit 2 reload was completed prior to the inspection period and the licensee was preparing Unit 2 for cycle 3 startup. Although reloading was completed for Unit 2, the inspector investigated an incident that occurred during the reload of the core on Unit On April 21, 1986, during the reload of the Unit 2 core with approximately 140 to 160 fuel assemblies in the core, an operations refueling Senior Reactor Operator (SR0) noticed two or three objects lying on the core barrel support ledge. The refueling SR0 pointed the objects out to the Westing-house refueling adviso The reload continued and was completed on April 23,198 The licensee failed to initiate a nonconformance item report when the obiects were first noticed. Mechanical maintenance (MNT),

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on April 24, 1986, installed the upper internals and latched the control rods. MNT personnel set the reactor vessel head in place on April 27. A telephone call on April 29 from the Westinghouse refueling advisor regarding the objects prompted a discussion by Operations, MNT, and Integrated Sched-ulsng personnel and it was determined that they were specimen access hole plug The decision was made by management personnel to remove the reactor vessel head and upper internals to verify the locations of the specimen access hole plugs. After the reactor vessel head and upper internals were removed on May 6 and 7, respectively, all six specimen access hole plugs were deter-mined to be partially or totally out of their hole MNT personnel video-taped the plugs and the access holes to allow Westinghouse personnel to determine if any damage had been done. It was determined that four plugs had been damaged by the weight of the upper internals. It was also deter-mined by trying to insert an undamaged plug into the holes that four access holes were damaged. MNT personnel inspected the upper internals and deter-mined no repairs were required although a small indentation was placed in the bottom of the upper internals by a specimen access hole plu On May 7. Westinghouse personnel began reaming out the damaged access hole Westinghouse personnel replaced four plugs with new plugs obtained from Marble Hill Nuclear Statio The two undamaged access plugs were rein-stalled by Westinghouse personnel and the work was completed on May 14, 198 The cause for the specimen access hole plugs to be dislodged from their proper position could not be determined by the licensee. The licensee failed to follow the Quality Assurance Procedure QCK-1 which is implemented by station directive 2.0.4 when conditions adverse to quality are identified and resolved in a timely planned manner. Instead, the upper internals and the vessel head were installed without followup on the observation made by the refueling SRO. Failure to take corrective actions resulted in damage to the components. Also at the time of this inspection, there were no changes to procedures to correct this event from recurring. Therefore, this item will be identified as violation 50-370/86-18-02, Failure to follow the Quality Assurance Procedure QCK-1 when conditions adverse to quality, such as nonconformances, are identified and resolved in a timely planned manne The inspector witnessed reloading for Unit 1 from the control room, refuel-ing floor and spent fuel pool areas to assure that personnel were properly trained and were following approved procedures. The inspector also verified that adequate housekeeping, radiological, and accountability controls were established and implemented. Staffing during refueling appeared to meet Technical Specification (TS) requirement While observing fuel movement in the containment, the inspector noticed that some of the refueling personnel did not tie off safety glasses, which were required by the RWP for fuel movement.

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As an industry practice, personnel entering the t.ontainment building with the reactor vessel head off are required to tie off safety glasses due to the potential of falling into the open reactor vesse Duke Power Company (DPC), Topical Report Duke-1-A, Quality Assurance Program comits to conform to ANSI N45.2.3-1973 in the area of housekeeping. ANSI N45.2.3-1973 as

.aolemented by Station Directive Section 3.11.0, which requires control of all tools, equipment, materials and supplies that are used in Zones I, II, aad III shall be maintained to prevent the inadvertent inclusion of delete-rious materials or objects in critical systems. Appropriate control mea-sures s. hall be provided through utilization of such items as logbooks and tethered tools. During the exit meeting, licensee management committed to evaluate the overall program. for housekeeping to control foreign objects from falling into critical system The inspector will track this item as Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369, 370/86-18-01, Licensee management l L committed to review the overall program for housekeeping to control foreign objects from falling into critical systems. The licensee's conclusion will be evaluated during a future inspectio Within the areas examined, one violation was identifie * Spent Fuel Activity (86700) Unit 1

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The inspector observed fuel handling operations during fuel movement in the spent fuel pool area and reviewed procedures related to fuel handling to verify that the procedures included the following:

' ~ A limitation on the number of fuel assemblies that can be out of safe

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geometry locations at the same time, Provisions for verifying prior to fuel handling that the spent fuel pit area crane interlocks or physical stops will prevent the crane from passing over fuel storage location Provisions for verifying prior to fuel handling that the spent fuel pool area ventilation system is operabl Provisions for verifying prior to fuel handling that the loaded ship-ping cask is within the weight limit of the spent fuel pool area cran Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel storage area isolation occurs on a high radiation signal.

I Provisions for verifying that minimum water level requirements are monitored during fuel handling operation Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool storage area radia-tion and airborne radioactivity monitors are operable.

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' Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool cooling and clean-up system is operabl .

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No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte . Witnessing of Initial Criticality on Unit 2(72500)

Criticality for Unit 2 was performed in accordance with procedure PT/0/A/4150/28, Criticality Following A Change in Core Nuclear Characteris-tic Criticality was achieved in a safe and orderly manner. While per-forming Zero Power Physics Testing (ZPPT), control rod L-3 would not insert fully. Below is a sequence of events taken from the Shift Technical Advisor (STA)/ Shift Engineer (SE) lo Sequence of Event 06/19/86 (0325) -

Notified that shutdown bank "D" rod L-3, not tepping with its ban /20/86(1930) -

Rod will not step in past 180 steps during an attempt to do two or more traces on rod curren /20/86(2000) - IAE pulled gripper fuses on rod L-3, it would not drop past 186 steps - entered in TS as being untrippabl /20/86(2330) - Started during rods in to shut down per TS from L-3 rod proble Notification of Unusual Event entere /20/86(2335) - Rod L-3 fully inserted during shutdown will exer-cise rod 3 or 4 times then will withdraw rod pull its fuses while hooked up to a recorder to check out prior to declaring it operabl /21/86(2040) - IAE completed rod drop timing on rod L-3, time 1.45 second rod is operabl The licensee stated that the cause of the event was contributed to particles in the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM). The inspector verified that the control rod, L-3, was operable by reviewing rod drop timing trace and procedure in which the licensee use to perform rod measurements and trip The licensee commenced the boron dilution stage of the approach to critical-ity on June 25, 1985. Criticality was achieved at 1143 on Bank D, step 41 at an actual boron concentration of 1228 ppm (b). The Estimated Criticality Position (ECP) calculated by the licensee was Bank 0, step 4 No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte ,

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,..- 6 Zero Power Physics Tests, Unit 2(72572,72302)

This phase of startup testing was guided by PT/0/A/4150/21, " Post Refueling Controlling Procedure for Criticality, Zero Power Physics and Power Escalation Testing." The inspector witnessed portions of the following test: PT/0/A/4150/11, Control Rod Worth Measurement, was witnessed in part by

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the inspector. The purpose of this test is to measure the differential and integral worth of any of the controlling banks or shutdown banks; also, to measure the differential boron worth over the range being tested. The rod worth of the bank measured was within 10% of the predicted rod worth, PT/0/A/4150/11A, Lontrol Rod Worth Measurement: Rod Swap was witnessed in part by the inspecto The purpose of this test is to verify that the reactivity worth of the Refarance RCC bank, as determined through reactivity computer measurement data is consistent with design predic-tions. No anomalies in rod swap measurement were note . _ . _ _ -

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