IR 05000369/1986027

Insp Repts 50-369/86-27 & 50-370/86-27 on 861014-16.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Evaluation of Licensee Annual Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20214M989
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	11/04/1986
From:	Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214M939	List: IR 05000369/1986027 ML20214M936
References
50-369-86-27, 50-370-86-27, NUDOCS 8612030504
Download: ML20214M989 (16)

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Report Nos.: 50-369/86-27;and 50-370/86-27 , 4 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church . Street '

Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-369-and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9~and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: October 14-16, 1986 Inspector: _ < U // 8 '/

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A. L. Cunninghp Accompanying Personnel: A,. Gooden Approved by: NL d o ////,f//Ad p T. R. Decker, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the licensee's annual radiological emergency preparedness exercis I Results: Of the areas evaluated, no violations or deviations were identifie .

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REPORT DETAILS

. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• R. E. Harris, System Emergency Planner

• Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling

• J. R. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner

• L. F. Firebauch, Assistant Operating Engineer

• E. O. McCraw, Compliance Engineer

• D. J. Rains, Maintenance Supervisor

• Kelley, Administrative Coordinator

• R. B. Travis, Operations Superintendent

• B. McRee, Staff Emergency Planner

• J. V. Almond, Safety Supervisor

• L. E. Haynes, Assistant Health Physicist

• M. D. Kimray, Unit Scheduling Engineer NRC Resident Inspectors

• T. Orders

• S. Guenther

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 16, 1986, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas evaluated, and discussed in detail the inspection findings defined herein. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio , Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters l

No previous enforcement items were identifie . Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion ,

of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and ~

organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.

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The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasion While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercis The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organizatio The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organization. The scenario provided sufficient ,

information to the States, counties, local government and federal agencies consistent with their participation in the exercis The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel through the use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the exercise. The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise. The inspectors observed neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players. The scope and objectives of the exercise were fully satisfie I No violations or deviations were identifie . Drill Scenarios (82301)

The scenarios for the medical emergency and fire drills were reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test specific functions in the licensee's emergency plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section I of NUREG-065 The scenario developed for the medical emergency drill was explicit, and adequately exercised the participating licensee organization and offsite local emergency agencie The scenario provided sufficient information to the local support agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the dril The licensee and offsite support agencies demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the dril The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the drill. Neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players was observe The scenario developed for the fire drill was explicit, and adequately exercised the participating licensee organization and offsite local support agencies. The scenario provided sufficient information to the offsite support organizations consistent with the scope of their participation in the dril Licensee and offsite support organizations demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the drill. The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the drill.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Assignment of Responsibility (82301) .

This. area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-065 The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not require Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review of the site

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Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if neede The inspectors also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC). In accordance with the scope and objectives of the scenario, the Crisis Emergency Center was not activated during this exercise. At the response centers cited above, the required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's offsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),

Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654: (1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interaction The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organizatio Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel. The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Manage . - _ - _ _ - _ _

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Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assiptance resources were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654, namely: (1) accommodation of selected State emergency response representatives at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; and (2) identification of organizations capable of augmenting the planned respons Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope of the exercis Assistance resources from offsite support organizations were limited to fire brigades, ambulance services, and hospital facilitie Response of the subject organizations was prompt, effective, and indicative of effective emergency response training. The scope and objectives of the exercise precluded activation and operation of the Crisis Emergency Cente No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Classification System (83201)

This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance reccmmended in IE Information Notice 83-2 An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify an emergency and escalate it to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated acci. dent sequence progressed. Licensee actions in this area were timely and effectiv Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure The system was observed to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequence The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergenc No violations or deviations were identified.

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10. Notification Methods and Procedures (83201)

This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for ,

notification of State and local response organizations and emergency

< personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established. This area was further observed to assure that means to provide'early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-065 An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizations, if required. Notification of the State of North Carolina, and other designated offsite response organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration of each emergency classificatio Telephone notification of the State of North Carolina, and local response organizations was promptly followed by transmission of hard copies of the respective notificatio Such copies included prevailing meteorological information, average release rate (source terms in uCi/sec) where applicable, site boundary integrated dose projections, and recommended protective actions when necessar The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure EPZ was actuated during this exercise. The licensee, however, informed the inspector that all sirens located within Mecklenburg County, failed to sound following attempted actuation. The inspector was further informed that an investigation of the subject failure was initiated, and this incident would be fully discussed following termination of the exercise. The subject matter was fully discussed by the licensee during the controller / evaluator critique immediately following the exercise, and the Licensee /NRC critique on October 16, 198 The licensee comitted to implement all required corrective actions to render the sirens operable as soon as possible.

Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/86-27-01, 50-370/86-27-01: Restore to operational status and assure continued operation of all sirens located in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina as require No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Communications (82301)

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This area observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654.

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7 The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control ' Room, TSC, OSC), the licensee and offsite response organizations, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the TS The inspectors also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organizatio Emergency communications and communication systems were significantly improved, and consistent with emergency response requirement No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This areas was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated'in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.

The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein. Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (05C), Control Room - To preclude undue interference with operation and control of the plant, an area outside of Unit 1 control console was provided for the exercise shift supervisor and his staff. Required communications equipment, control room procedures and documents were readily availabl The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigatio Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency condition The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authoritie These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classificatio It was observed that data and information provided during the course of the exercise sequence and conditions placed no demands upon the Emergency Director and the Control Room staff in implementing appropriate resporses in a timely manner. The Control Room staff demonstrated the tapability to consistently and effectively assess the

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initial conditions and implement required mitigating action It was noted that a bound log of the facility's activities was maintained by the Shift Supervisor throughout the exercise, m b. . Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classificatio The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilitie Required operation of the facility proceeded in an orderly manner. The TSC was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff. TSC security was promptly established and maintained. Security maintained a log or otherwise acen nted for all personnel entering and exiting the facilit During operation of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as required. Status boards and related visual aids were strategically located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staf Dedicated communicators were assigned to the facility and all required notifications were promptly implemente Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, nanely: (1)

engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into problem solving exercises; (2)

assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent, and consistent with changes in plant status and related emergency conditions; (5)

accountability, including identifying missing personnel, was readily implemented within the accepted time regime and was consistent with the scenario scope; (6) TSC Controllers were effective in identifying minor scenario problems and interacted with players without promptin c. Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was promptly staffed following act$vation of the emergency . plan by the Emergency Coordinator. An inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and dispatched. A health physics technician accompanied each team. The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilitie During operation of thir facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documente The OSC Coordinator demonstrated effective management and control practices. The Coordinator frequently updated his staff regarding plant status, and thoroughly briefed each investigation and repair team prior to their deployment to the accident area It was noted by the NRC evaluators and licensee observers, however, that the OSC

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Coordinator left the facility for several short time periods without announcing and/or identifying to his staff an alternate to act for him during such absence The licensee committed to implement required corrective actio __ _ _-__ - .- - -. - - - . .

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Inspector Identified Item (IFI) 50-369/86-27-02, 50-370/86-29-02:

Assure that OSC Coordinator appoints a cognizant alternate to act during his absence, and to announce same to his staff and the Emergency .

Directo No violations or deviations were identifie . AccidentAssessment(82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-065 '

The accident assessment program included'an' engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment.of radiological' hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing plant status and .providing recommandations to the Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, preventicr,and/or control of radioactive releases, and prompt termination of the emergency condition.'

Radiological assessment activ'ities involved several groups. An inplant group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the pla'nt based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plum Radiological effluent data

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was received in the TSC where dose calculations were computed and factored into the exercis All resultant data were consistent with projected scenario parameters. Offsite monitoring teams were neither observed nor evaluated by NRC during this exercise. License'e evaluators, however, noted that the Field Team Coordinator did not brief the teams on periodic meteorological charges and release data. This finding was documented by the licensee and discussed during the critiqu No violations or deviations were identifie . Protective Response (82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines established for protective actions consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and that protective actions for emergency workers including evacuation of non-essential personnel, are promptly implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-065 Protective measures decision making process was observed by the inspector For each emergency classification defined, appropriate inplant and offsite

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protective measures were reviewed. Protective measures recommendations were consistent with the limited scale and scope of the exercis No violatiors or deviations were identifie . Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-065 .

An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response facilitie Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions. Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection was available for use as ' require ,

Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequat Health Physics Supervisors were observed to thoroughly brief survey, investigative, and repair teams prior to their deployment into radiation controlled area Dosimetry was available and effectively use High range dosimeters were also available in case they were neede No violations or deviations were identifie . Public Education and Information (82301)

Public Education and Information was not evaluated during this exercis . Recovery Planning (82301)

This area was reviewed pursuant to tha requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),

Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-065 The licensee conducted a recovery planning meeting prior to termination of the exercise. Licensee planners discussed and established the following:

administrative and logistical support, manpower and engineering services; radiological surveillance; development and assignment of a recovery organization consistent with the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure A comprehensive review of reentry plans and status was conducte No violations or deviations were identified.

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18. Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-065 The inspectors observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique following termination of the exercise. The subject critique involved a detailed discussion and analysis of required improvements and wea'knesses, identified during the exercise. Twenty-one such items were identifie All findings were documented for review and correction. Positive findings were also discussed and recorded for presentation during the formal NRC/ Licensee critique. The critique was effectively managed, controlled, and directed to identification / documentation of substantive findings and indicated improvements. The conduct and content of the cited critiques were consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited abov No violations or deviations were identifie . Inspector Followup (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/85-33-02, 50-370/85-34-02: No additional access control was established for the Control Room, TSC and OSC during the simulated emergency. Observations during the current exercise disclosed that adequate access control was provided at each of the subject emergency response facilitie (Closed) IFI 50-369/85-43-01, 50-370/85-43-01: Establish a range for iodine-131 increase rate to trigger incident classificatio Inspection disclosed that a specific iodine-131 rate increase regime was established for determining incident classificatio (Closed) IFI 50-369/86-EP-01, 50-370/86-EP-01: Emergency siren test failure on April 4,198 Inspection disclosed that appropriate silent tests were reviewed, corrected, and successfully conducte Attachment:

McGuire Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative Summary l

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CONFIDENTIAL McGuire Nuclear Station 1986 Exercise I. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES Scope The 1986 McGuire Nuclear Station exercise is designed to meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. The exercise will involve full participation by McGuire Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC).

The Crisis Management Center will not participate. Also, the State of North Carolina and the counties within the plume exposure EPZ will not participate except to receive initial notification On October 15, 1986 a simulated radiological accident will be held to test the integrated capabilities and a major portion of the basic elements within the emergency plans and organization This exercise will simulate emergency conditions which would require response by on-site personnel. The exercise will begin between midnight and 6:00 a.m. Exercise objectives are provided in Section On October 14-15, 1986 several limited drills will be hel A medical drill will be held to involve a contaminated, injured individual. A fire drill will be held to involve response by the on-site fire brigade and the off-site fire departmen Post-accident sampling drills will also be hel Each of these drills will be separate from the exercis A formal critique involving Duke Power and NRC will be held on October 16, 1986 at 9:00 This critique will be closed to the public and will be held in the training room of the McGuire

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Administration Buildin Exercise Objectives (Duke Power Company Emergency Organization) Emergency Management a. Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classification in accordance with station procedure b. Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert or Higher emergency clas c. Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a simulated emergency and provide -

accountability for any not present at the assembly location d. Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant extensions and intercom l l

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e. Test off site communications equipment to the counties and state and to NRC including the Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emcrgency Notification Syste f. Evaluate the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment / supplie .

g. Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TS h. Demonstrate proper use of the message format and .

authentication methodology for messages transmitted to state and counties, i. Demonstrate the ability to notify the state and the counties within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency clas j. Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC immediately after notification of the state and counties and not later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the emergency classe k. Demonstrate access control measures to the control room, TSC, and OS . Demonstrate the ability to collect liquid and air samples

, in accordance with station procedures using the post-accident sampling system '

m. Demonstrate proper response to a simulated medical emergency involving a contaminated patient in accordance with station procedure n. Demonstrats response in accordance with station procedures by the on site fire brigade to a simulated fire emergenc Support will be requested of the off-site fire departmen . Accident Assessment a. Demonstrate the ability to transmit data using the Crisis Management Data Transmittal System in accordance with station procedure b. Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment tools: Drawings Status Boards Maps

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c. Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate:

On-site monitoring i Monitoring of off-site radiation levels Off-site dose projections Personnel dose record control Communications (radio) with off-site monitoring teams Soil, water, and vegetation sampling (off-site).

3. Protective Action Recommendations

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, a. Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with station procedure . Plant Operations a. Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigation strategies in accordance with station procedures.

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS McGuire Exercise October 15, 1986

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Time Event 0520 Initial conditions presented to the Control Room:

Units 1 and 2 are at 100% power leve Diesel generator 2A was declared inoperable at 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> for replacement of the lube oil pum It is expected to be in service by 1000 hour0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> Unidentified primary coolant system leakage is about 0.3 gp Pipe leak of about 80 gpm is initiated downstream of Unit 2 valve 2 NI 6 This is an ALERT condition due to primary coolant leak greater than 50 gp Alarms received which result from the lea Controlled shutdown in progres Reactor trips on steam generator lo-lo level during swapover to the upper feedwater nozzle About 0600 Initiate normal cooldow About 0730 Transfer of gaseous waste from Waste Gas Decay Tank WGDT B to Tank A begins. (This is unrelated to other-activities in progress.)

0830 Reactor Coolant (NC) system pressure and temperature are decrease Residual Heat Removal (ND) system is initiate Pipe breaks downstream of valve 2 NI 60.-(Primary check valve on the safety injection line to reactor coolant loop A.)

0838 Safety injection is actuated.. This is a SITE AREA EMERGENCY condition due to primary coolant leak greater than makeup pump capacit Containment Spray (NS) pump 2B starts but the~ discharge isolation valve fails to open due to a problem with'the Containment pressure Control System. (A permissive t ,

allow the valve to open was not provided.) Other systems operate as designe ._

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0845 To ensure the simulated data will be correct, controllers will ensure operators stop all.. Reactor Coolant (NC) pump (Contingency message provides hi-hi vibration alarms.)

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0849 If NS pump 2B is not manually stopped by now, its breaker will trip on overloa When isolating Waste Gas Decay Tank A, a diaphragm valve in the line begins to lea Tank pressure is initially about 100 psi .

About 1100- The waste gas release stops due to reduced tank 1130 pressure.

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1200 The exercise is terminate ,,

\reh\ sequence. con

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