IR 05000369/1986012
| ML20212A466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1986 |
| From: | Brownlee V, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212A464 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-86-12, 50-370-86-12, NUDOCS 8607290002 | |
| Download: ML20212A466 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES
/g>RffGu NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 18 g
j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
- f ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-369/86-12 and 50-370/86-12
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Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street
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Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Decket Nos.: 50-369.and 50-370 License Nos.:
NPF-9 and NPF-17 Inspection Conducted:
pril 21 through May 20, 1986.
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Inspector:
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W. Ord Ps, Seryi sidettjfns ector OpeSi(ned'
Approved by:
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Vitgil @ownlee, Branch Chief Date Sig'ned Division of Reactor Projects Summary Scope: This routine unannounced inspection was conducted on site in the areas of operations, surveillance testing and maintenance activities.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations were identified in the areas of surveillance testing and maintenance activities.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
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- T. McConnell, Flant Manager B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations D Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services
- L. Weaver, Superintendent of Administration M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
- N. Atherton License and Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 7, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Unresolved Items On May 7, 1986, during a design engineering review conducted at McGuire Nuclear Station pursuant to NRC IE Bulletin No. 85-03, Motor-operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings, valves 1NI 9, 1NI 10, and 2NV 7 were determined to be inoperable.
The NI valves are Centrifugal Charging Pump discharge to the Reactor Coolant System valves and the NV valve is a Letdown Isolation valve outside the reactor building.
This will be carried as an Unresolved Item pending completion of an ongoing inspection. (369/86-12-01)
4.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations during the report period, to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room logt, shif t supervisors logs, shif t turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in
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applicable station. administrative directives. The complement of licensed
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personnel on each. shift met or exceeded the minimum required by technical specifications (TS).
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2-Plant tours taken during the reporting period included but were not limited to the turbine buildings, auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2 electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
Unit 1 Operations Unit 1 operated at reduced power until May 15, to extend the unit core life and facilitate outage scheduling. The unit completed the report period in Mode 5.
Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 continued the refueling outage started March 14. Projected on line date is June 18.
5.
Surveillance Testing The surveillance tests categorized below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to verify procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system restoration completed and test results were adequate.
Procedure Number Title i
PT/2/A/4204/01A Performance Test Residual Heat Removal Pump PT/2/A/4204/01B Performance Test
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PT/2/A/4252/01A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Performance Test PT/2/A/4252/01B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Performance Test PT/1/A/4601/01 Protection System Channel 1 Functional Test 6.
Maintenance Observations Routine maintenance activities were reviewed or witnessed by the resident
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inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance l
with applicable Technical Specifications. The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, equipment restoration completed and maintenance results were adequate.
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7.
Inoperable Boration Flow Path On March 29,1986, at 7:00 A.M. while Unit I was in Mode 6, the licensee discovered that Chemical and Volume Control (NV) charging pump 2B had been racked out of service while NV charging pump 2A had been racked in service without having an emergency power supply.
This resulted in no operable boration flow path or operable NV charging pump as required by Technical Specifications 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.3 for approximately twenty hours.
Upon discovery, NV charging pump 2A was racked out of service, and NV charging pump 28 was racked in.
A review of the circumstances surrounding this event revealed that on March 19,1986, at 3:15 A.M.,
diesel generator 2A was declared inoperable for maintenance repairs. NV charging pump 2A was also declared inoperable since diesel generator 2A could not provide emergency power to the pump. On March 28, at approximately 11:00 A.M.,
a Station Engineer requested the Assistant Shift Supervisor to rack in and operate NV charging pump 2A to facilitate a retest on the pump. The Assistant Shift Supervisor, in turn, instructed Station personnel to rack out NV charging pump 2B and rack in NV charging pump 2A. The Assistant Shift Supervisor did not realize diesel generator 2A was inoperable and that racking out NV charging pump 2B would result in a loss of boration flowpath as defined by Technical Specifications 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.3.
The Assistant Shift Supervisor did not make a Technical Specification Action Item Logbook (TSAIL) entry, as required by procedure, or discuss the change with the designated control room Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) to ensure Technical Specification requirements were met.
The NV system is designed to provide several services to the Reactor Coolant (NC) system.
One service is to control the soluble chemical neutron absorber (boric acid) concentration and make up.
During normal operating conditions, one NV charging pump takes suction from the Volume Control Tank (VCT) which uses an automatic makeup system to maintain its borated water level.
In an event requiring emergency boration and makeup, both NV charging pumps take suction from the VCT or the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). The Boric Acid Tank can also be aligned to supply barated water to the suction of the NV charging pumps.
T.S.3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.3 specify that a minimum of one boron injection flow path must be operable and capable of being powered from an emergency power source, while in Modes 5 and 6.
Of particular concern are the apparent personnel errors associated with this event.
The Assistant Shif t Supervisor was responsible for knowing the status of plant equipment as detailed in the Technical Specification Action Item Logbook (TSAIL). The Assistant Shift Supervisor did not check the TSAIL or make any entries in the TSAIL, as required by procedure, nor did he discuss the equipment status changes with the designated control room SR0 to ensure Technical Specification requirements were me,
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l The reactor operator who performed the actual equipment alignment, who is also knowledgeable of TS requirements, did not detect the problem, nor did he communicate the equipment change to the control room SR0 for logging in the TSAIL.
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Further, the problem was not detected at shift turnover that evening.
A review of the current enforcement history reveals that the licensee currently has pending a violation of very similar circumstance.
In Report 50-369/86-08, 50-370/86-08, it was detailed that Operations Management Procedure (OMP)
2-5, Technical Specification Action Items Logbook, general instruction 6.6 which requires that the operator " ensure j
redundant train is checked operable before removing equipment from service."
had not been followed as detailed below.
On the morning of March 12, 1986, at approximately 9:10 A.M., while performing a routine operations safety verification, the inspector detected in the Unit 1 Technical Specification Action Item Logbook (TSAIL) that the
'B' train containment spray (NS) pump and the ' A' train of the solid state protection system (SSPS) had been taken out of service.
This would have placed the unit, which was operating at 100% power, in the exigencies of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3.
However, the SR0 was able to stop the work on SSPS prior to the personnel actually taking the train out of service.
Violation 369/86-08-02 was subsequently issued.
The NRC's current enforcement policy, operates under the premise that a licensee is not to be cited for a violation of a requirement if the proposed corrective action for a similar violation has not been received and reviewed by NRC staff. For that reason, a notice of violation will not be issued in this case.
It should be noted that this incident is another example of the previously referred to violation, and will be employed as such in future enforcement actions.
8.
Preparation for Refueling The inspector reviewed the licensee's preparation for refueling for Unit 1 in order to ascertain the adequacy of procedures for the conduct of refueling operations as well as other germane administrative requirements for control of plant conditions during refueling.
Selected procedures were reviewed which included, but were not limited to, the following activities:
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Receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel.
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Fuel handling, transfer, and core verification.
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Inspection of fuel to be reused; fuel assembly inspection using underwater video system.
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Handling and inspection of any other core internals.
Selected administration requirements for control of refueling operation were reviewed to ensure that the licensee had established:
Clear definition of lines of supervision.
Shift manning requirements.
Requirements for training and qualification of key personnel.
Radiation monitoring and radiological control requirements.
Requirements for equipment checkout, dry runs of critical operations, and fuel handling.
Casualty procedures.
The adequacy of the licensee's administrative requirements for establishing and monitoring control of plant conditions during refueling were reviewed to ensure that requirements for the following had been established:
Shutdown margin and reactivity monitoring.
Radiation monitoring.
Water level control.
Containment integrity.
No violations of deviations were detected.
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Refueling Activities Selected refueling activities on Unit 2 were reviewed and/or witnessed to verify that:
Periodic testing and verification of the operability of refueling-related equipment and systems were performed as required by TS and licensee administrative procedures.
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Fuel handling operations were performed in accordance with TS and approved procedures.
Plant conditions were maintained as required by TS.
Good housekeeping and loose object control were maintained in the refueling and spent fuel area.
The licensee's staffing was in accordance with TS and approved procedures.
The inspector reviewed and/or witnessed the following selected activities to ascertain that they were being controlled and conducted as required by TS and approved procedures:
Core monitoring during refueling operations.
Fuel accountability methods.
Vessel and spent fuel storage pool water levels.
Boron concentrations and appropriate dilution path valve checks are performed.
Checks of containment penetrations.
Checks of decay heat removal system flowrate.
Operability of the containment purge and exhaust isolation systems.
One problem was detected which will be carried as an open item pending completion of a detailed review.
The item concerns specimen tube plugs being inadvertently left off the vessel flange during refueling.
(369/86-12-02)