IR 05000369/1986006

Insp Repts 50-369/86-06 & 50-370/86-06 on 860128-0228.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Surveillance Testing & Maint Activities

ML20198R797
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	06/03/1986
From:	Brownlee V, William Orders, Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198R739	List: IR 05000369/1986006 ML20198R737
References
50-369-86-06, 50-369-86-6, 50-370-86-06, 50-370-86-6, NUDOCS 8606100211
Download: ML20198R797 (7)

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. :D [8 f[q' UNITED STATES Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION il

[' n 101 MARIETTA STREET, g j

• I C ATLANTA GEORGI A 30323

'+9 . . . . . ,o JUN 0 41986 Report Nos.: 50-369/86-06 and 50-370/86-06

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Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Inspection Conducted: nuary 28 - February 28, 1986

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Inspectors: dA W. Orders, Mh L niorpsidenv{#spector

[/MM Efate/ Signed ki / hM/Au 1J /b/

R.'Pid ~ son,' s ntInspptor ~Dite Signed Approved by: JA/61M W3Yl% [0 Virgil Br6wnlee, Branch Chief Da'e t Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site in the areas of operations, surveillance testing and maintenance activitie Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie However, details of a violation are entailed in paragraph 9. The violation itself is fully covered in Regional Office report 369/86-05, 370/86-0 PDR ADOCK 05000369 G PDR

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e REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees .

• T. McConnell, Plant Manager B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services L. Weaver, Superintendent of Administration M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling E. McCraw, License and Compliance Engineer

• S. McInnis, License and Compliance Engineer D. Marquis, Performance Engineer R. White, IAE Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 3,1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation . 369/83-21-01: Failure to follow procedure leading to over pressurization of containment spray suction header. Adequate measures have been taken, including procedural revision and personnel trainin (Closed) Violation 369/83-21-02: Failure to control documents important to safety. Adequate corrective action has been implemented and all applicable procedures were audited to ensure proper labeling and filin (Closed) Violation 369/83-27-01 and 370/83-34-01: Failure to perform Technical Specification surveillance rendering comtainment spray inoperabl Corrective steps including a licensee review of Unit 1 : ,d 2 instrumentation surveillance procedures were performed to ensure that Technical Specifica-tion requirements were me *

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(Closed) Violation 369/83-28-01 and 370/83-35-01: Failure to follow procedures resulting in a) contaminated spill, b) unit trip, c) missed surveillance requirement Adequate corrective measures have been taken, including procedural revision and personnel training and counseling, which should preclude incidents of this type occurring in the futur (Closed) Violation 369/83-30-01: Failure to follow work request procedure, resulting in charging pump motor failure. A procedure was written to document the requisite steps and requirements. This procedure appears to be adequate to accomplish the intended tas (Closed) Violation 369/83-33-01: Failure to follow surveillance procedure resulting in a loss of feedwater to the B steam generator. This violation was attributed to personnel error. Upper management attention to this type of violation has decreased the likelihood of this type of inciden (Closed) Violation 369/83-36-01: Failure to follow, inadequate, or lack of procedure resulting in unit trip, inaccurate set point reference, or inadequate surveillance. Corrective actions to preclude these types of procedural inadequacies have been incorporated into the deficient procedure Increased awareness should help preclude future violations of this typ (Closed) Violation 369/83-47-01: Failure to follow procedures resulting in a loss of source range instrumentation. The procedures in question were corrected. Training classes were conducted. The corrective measures appear to be adequat (Closed) Open Items 370/83-19-01, 370/83-19-02, 370/83-19-03: Procedures have been revised by the licensee to be applicable to Unit 2 and to be consistent with the FSAR and Technical Specification (Closed) Violation 370/83-29-01: Inadequate procedure resulting in safety injectio Appropriate guidance for re-energization of the solid state protection system (SSPS) was incorporated into the procedur (Closed) Violation 370/83-37-01: Failure to retain calibration records; CPCS modules. Adequate corrective action has been implemented. Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified during this inspection period. Plant Operations The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period, to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room logs, shift supervisors logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely peruse Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personne .

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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement of licensed personnel on each shif t met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specification Plant tours taken during the reporting period included but were not limited to the turbine buildings, auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2 electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected are During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 Operations McGuire Unit 1 began the reporting period operating at 100% power and remained at this power until February 3,1986 when power was reduced to 60%

due to load demand and to maximize refueling outage scheduling. The unit remained at 60% until Wednesday, February 12, 1986 when system load demand necessitated increasing power to 100%. The unit remained at or about 100%

throughout the remainder of the reporting perio Unit 2 Operations McGuire Unit 2 began the reporting period operating at 100% power and remained at or about 100% until 10:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 19, 1986 when power was reduced to approximately 30% to perform the Turbine Valve

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Movement Test. This reduction in power was necessary due to the fact that turbine governor valve GV-4 had been closed earlier in the cycle due to mechanical bindin Following the movement test, the unit was returned to full power where it remained through the end of the report perio . Surveillance Testing The surveillance tests categorized below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to verify procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications. The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system restoration completed and test results were adequat PT/1/A/4252/01B M/D CA Pump 1B Performance Test PT/1/A/4601/03 7300 RPS Channel Functional Test PT/1/A/4350/17A D/G 2A FOT Pump Test PT/2/A/4350/17B D/G 1B FOT Pump Test PT/1/A/4204/018 ND Pump Test 1B

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PT/2/A/4252/01A CA Pump 2A Performance Test PT/2/A/4209/02 NV Valve Stroke Timing Test PT/2/A/4601/03 Protective System Channel III PT/2/A/4206/02 NI Valve Stroke Timing Test PT/2/A/4204/01A ND Pump 2A Performance Test

. Maintenance Observations The maintenance activities categorized below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specification The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, equipment restoration completed and maintenance results were adequat WR 050889 1 CA Pump (PMP)

WR 052254 1 SA 48 Stroke Time Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspectors performed a selective review of licensee event reports to verify that the report details met reporting requirements, identified the cause of the event, described corrective actions appropriate fer the identified cause, and accurately addressed the event and any generic implication The following licensee event reports were reviewed and are herewith closed:

(Closed) 50-369/LER 83-25: Fire detection system inoperable due to the alarns remaining in the alarm conditio Licensee corrected problem (Closed) 50-369/LER 83-30: Procedures were changed to incorporate testing requirements in the combined Technical Specification (Closed) 50-369/LER 83-54: Steam generator water level low-low trip function was out of tolerance due to incorrect circuit card set points on Unit 2. A licensee review of the incident revealed that monthly surveil-lance procedures did not test two " programmed set point" circuit card This was subsequently correcte (Closed) 50-369/LER 83-55: A faulty relay contained in an alarm module failed, preventing the closing of a normally open contact which would have provided a signal to open the valve. The module was replaced, and the valve stroke timing procedure was successfully performe (Closed) 50-369/LER 83-58: An out of tolerance flow transmitter was replaced with a calibrated transmitter and returned to servic . .- __

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(Closed) 50-369/LER 83-108: A faulty universal logic card was replaced and the system was returned to servic (Closed) 50-369/LER 83-110: Following a high flux trip on the startup range, the Source Range and Intermediate Range detector was installed and calibrations were performe Some question remains concerning the timeliness of calibrations performed after SR/IR detector installatio This is being tracked for both units by URI 50-370/85-46-0 (Closed) 50-369/LER 83-111: Both source range instruments were taken out of service simultaneously, due to an inadequate procedur Violation 50-369/83-47-07 was issue (Closed) 50-369/LER 83-114: Load sequencing times for Sequence 18 load groups 1, 5, and 10 failed to meet required loading times due to component malfunction. The components were replaced and the system was successfully teste (Closed) 50-369/LER 83-115: VE Train A was unable to meet required vacuum delay time due to poor sealing provided by the annulus doors. Seals on the four annulus / auxiliary doors were replaced and VE Train A was declared operabl (Closed) 50-370/LER 83-17: Radiation monitor failed high, erroneously indicating high activit Replacement of a power supply coupled with installation of additional cooling fans have corrected this proble (Closed) 50-370/LER 83-46: Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (AFWP)

started and could not be stopped due to an incorrectly installed washe The washer was incorrectly installed on the tachometer for the turbine driven AFWP. The tachometer is non-safety related and provides a signal to gauges in the local control panel and the control room. It has no control function and is not necessary for operation of the pum While disconnecting wires for removal and calibration, the IAE technician shorted the auto-start circuitry to the incorrectly installed washer blowing a fuse and starting the AFW (Closed) 50-370/LER 83-53: Pump 2B recirculation valve was discovered locked open instead of locked closed due to personnel erro A Violation 50-369/83-39-01 was issue (Closed) 50-370/LER 83-57: A fire protection system valve was found closed instead of locked open due to procedural deficiency. This item was included in the enforcement concerning Violation 50-369/83-39-0 (Closed) 50-370/LER 83-70: Low oil level discovered in the auxiliary turbine driven feedpump governor was caused by oil draining in a partially opened petcock. Cause of the open petcock could not be determined but was presumed to be either an accidental opening during work in the pump room or a vibration induced opening during the pump ru This problem has not re-occurre ,

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6 Improper Testing of ECCS Suction Valves On February 7, a Region II inspector detected an apparent discrepancy with respect to the testing of Valves 1NI-184, 1NI-185, 2NI-184 and 2NI-18 These valves are the ECCS pump suction valves from the containment sumps of the two respective unit The inspector noted that the testing, which had been performed on the valves, did not appear to meet the requirements of TS 4.0.5 which, in turn, obligates to the requisites of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel ~ Code. The inspector opened an Unresolved Item (369/86-05-01).

The resident inspector, upon subsequent evaluation and discussions with the licensee, determined that indeed the valves had not been properly teste At . 2 : 10 p . on February 7, both valves on both trains were declared inoperable, placing both units in the exingencies of TS 3. Subsequent negotiations between the licensee, the Region II office and ONRR, resulted in the granting of a 24-hour extension to the TS LCO to allow the licensee the time to properly test and verify the operability of the-component The extension was employed only on Unit Both valves on Unit I were tested and returned to operable status by 4:45 that afternoon. On Unit 2, there was a problem in getting the first of the two valves tested, two NI 184, to fully resea Ultimately, this resulted in an inordinate length of time required to complete the testing. Both valves were operable by 11:56 p.m. that evening. Therefore, approximately two hours and 45 minutes of the 24-hour extension was actually require This item is covered in detail in Regional Office report 369/86-05, 370/86-0 Further, applicable enforcement action is addressed therei .-

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