IR 05000528/1978001

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Insp Repts 50-528/78-01,50-529/78-01 & 50-530/78-01 on 780116-20.Violations Noted:Acceptance of out-of-spec Conditions in Area of Linear Plate Insp
ML20134B591
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Palo Verde
Issue date: 02/09/1978
From: Bishop T, Hernandez G, Spencer G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML17198A269 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-84-293 50-528-78-01, 50-528-78-1, 50-529-78-01, 50-529-78-1, 50-530-78-01, 50-530-78-1, NUDOCS 8508150682
Download: ML20134B591 (8)
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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REGION Y Report No. 50-528, 529, 530/78-01 CPPR-141, 142 Docket No. 50-528,529,530 License No.

& -143 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Arizona Public Service Company

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P. O. Box 21666

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Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name: Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 '

Inspection at: Palo Verde Site, Maricopa County, Arizona.

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' Inspection conducted:

January 16-20, 1978

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lfD 3/9/78 Inspectors I

T. W. Bishop, Reactb Inspector-

/ Datt Signed G.. hlennlo.

2/9 hs

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G. Herhandez, Reactor Inspector -(Intern)

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NM Approved by:

e.u u G. S. Spencer, Chief, Reactor Construction Date Signed

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and Engineering Support Branch

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Inspection on January k6-20,19fb (Reporf No. 50-528,529,530/78-01)

Areas Inspectedi ' Routine, unannounced inspection of. construction operations including: Reactor containment liner plate fabrication guidance docuit.ents;'-

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work observations, and quality records; weld rod control procedures., work operations, and quality records; safety related concreting work operations, >

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and quality records; rejection of major component hold down bolts; ifcensee

.l audits, quality reports, and training records; and follow-up on previous

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inspection items. The inspection involved 37 inspector-hours on-site by one i

NRC inspector.

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Results: Of the 10 areas inspected, no, items of noncompliance or deviations -

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were found in 9 areas; one item of noncompliance was identified in the. area./

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of liner plate inspection (infraction - acceptance of out-of-specification

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conditions,-Paragraph 4).

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B500150602 850703

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PDR FOIA LEIGHT004-293 PDR

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IE:V Form 219 (2)

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Enployees

  • E. E. Van Brunt, Vice President, Construction Projects and ANPP t

Director

  • J. A. Roedel, Quality Assurance Manager
  • R. L. Robb, ANPP Nuclear Services Manager W. M. Petro, ANPP Construction Manager
  • R. L. Hand, ANPP Site Quality Assurance Manager R. D. Forrester, Quality Assurance Engineer D. D. Webster, Quality Assurance Engineer G. Pankonin, Quality Assurance Engineer W. E. Ide. Quality Systems Engineer Other Personnel

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Bechtel Power Corporation

  • L. G. Hinkelman, Vice President
  • W. G. Henry, Construction Division Manager
  • W. H. Wilson, Project Manager
  • W. G. Bingham, Project Engineering Manager
  • J. A. Packard, Field Construction Manager
  • C. Betzhold, Project QA Engineer
  • C. F. Gaither, Assist. Project Field Engineer S. R. Abraham, Resident Engineer M. E. Rosen, Lead QC Engineer V. E. Matson, Lead Welding QC Engineer J. Beers, Lead Civil Engineer W. F. Sturm, QC Engineer Champion, Inc.

B. Canavan, QC Engineer P. Malott, QC Engineer

  • Denotes those present at the. exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.

(Closed) Noncompliance (50-528, 529, 530/77-04): Concrete reinforcing bars were not properly cleaned prior to cadweld splicing.

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Licensees action specified in APS letter ANPP-9553 of October 17, 1977 was examined. This action included reclean-

ing of the identified improperly cleaned bars and retraining

of cognizant cadweld personnel. The records of retrainirg were q

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reviewed and found satisfactory.

In-process reinforcing bar g

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cleaning operations. were observed and were noted to be in com-pliance with cleaning requirements.

It appears the corrective

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action taken is sufficient to control cadweld cleaning ;

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operations.

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b.

(Closed) Noncompliance (50-528. 529, 530/77-04): Supplementary >

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water addition to concrete was not properly documented.

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Specification 13-CM-101 has been revised (Rev. 5) to clearly

_i indicate that no water additions.are to be made to the concrete

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after initial mixing at the batch plant. Obsarvations of.

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concrete activities during the current inspection did nat i

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reveal any deviations from this new requirement. The action

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taken appears satisfactory.

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c.

(0 pen) Deviation (50-528, 529 530/77-02, -03, -04): Contractor weld filler material control procedure did not allow for the control of low hydrogen covered weld filler material in accord-i ance with AWS D.1 requirements.

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A review of the revised procedures for,the control of low hydrogen covered welding electrodes established that those,

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procedures now invoke all pertinent AWS D1.1 weld rod B

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i control requirements for low hydrogen electrodes used for AWS welding an~d containment liner plate welding. - He' ever,i w

similar requirements have not been sinvoked for the use of low hydrogen covered welding electrodes used for, ASME cogni-

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zant welding (except the liner plate). This matter was discussed with licensee and construction manager representa-

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tives who stated that additional discussions on this subject are being requested with the NRC. This item remains open.,

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(Closed) Open item (50-528, 529, 530/77-04): Hot weather

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concrete activities may not be in accordance with the require-

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ments of ACI-305.

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The contractor has reviewed.the specification and ACI-305 requirement and has concitded that hot weather concrete activities wil-1 be in accordance with ACI-305, without

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exception. The inspector has no' further questions on this

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item.

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(Closed) Open item (50-528, 529, 530/77-04): Concrete delivery truck drum revolution counters were not being used

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i si Quality Control Instruction 51 has been revised (Rev. 2) to

'specify the requirements for the use and monitoring of drum revolution counters.

Proper use of the counters was verified

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3 during the current inspection.

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(Closed) Open item (50-528, 529, 530/77-04): Computer generated concrete delivery tickets indicate a mixing time less than the

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required minimum of 45, seconds.

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.The erroneous mix times recorded on the delivery tickets have N

been attributed to equipment malfunction. The malfunction was

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subsequently corrected. A sampling of approximately 50 delivery

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tickets during the current inspection indicated that the action taken is adequate to assure proper mixing time is maintained.

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c g.4 (Closed) Open item (50-528, 529, 530/77-04): Computer generated concrete delivery tickets reflect the wrong units for the quantities of admixture added to the mix.

The delivery ticket form has been revised to indicate the

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correct units (ounces vs 1/10 ounce). The inspector has no p

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(Closed)Openitem(50-528,529,530/77-04):

Inconsistencies and omissions were noted in the reactor containment liner

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plate alignment procedures.

Change notices have been issued to procedure WPP/0CI 61.0 :nd

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a specification 13-CM-370 to correct the identified discrepancies.

In addition, a change notice has been issued to procedure WPP/QCI

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101 to correct the omission noted in WPP/QCI 61.1. This item

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is considered closed.

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(Closed) Unresolved item (50-528, 529, 530/77-04):

It was not apparent that post welding plate misalignment inspections had been performed for the reactor pit liner.

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Licensee representatives reported that post welding misalignment inspection for. liner plate was performed and documented on the

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weldinginspectionrecords(FormsWR-5AandSB),ratherthanthe Construction Inspection Procedure 61.1. The alignment inspections were performed visually. Test samples and actual installed liner plate samples were analyzed by the construction manager's staff to L

confirm the adequacy of the visual check. This documentation,

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as well as selected WR-5A and 5B Forms were examined and found satisfactory. The inspector has no further question; on this item.

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Construction Status The licensee reported that Unit 1 was 22%, Unit 2 was 5%, and

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Unit 3 was 0.06% complete as of December 31, 1977.

4.

Reactor Containment Liner Place Fabrication

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Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures

A review of the appliccble sections of the PSAR addressing liner plate fabricatfon revealed an inconsistency between two sections of the PSAR. Section 3.8.1.1.3 of the PSAR states that the liner plate anchorage details are shown in BC-TOP-5A, Figure 6-24.

This figure, plus Figure 38.1-1 of the PSAR show the vertical liner plate anchors to be 5" x 3" x 1/4" angle iron.

This information conflicts with information elsewhere in the PSAR (Sections 38.1.5.3 and 38.1.5.5) which depicts the anchors as 3" x 2" x 1/4" angle iron. The inconsistency was discussed with representatives of the A/E who advised that all pertinent calculations were based upon 3" x 2" x 1/4" angles. Licensee represer.tatives

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stated that the inconsistency would be corrected in a future.

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change to the PSAR. This item will remain open pending elim-

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ination of the inconsistency.

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0,bservation of Work and Work Activities

In-process containment liner plate fabrication activities were observed. These activities included welding of liner plate anchors to the plate; welding of adjacent plate sections; fit-up of plate sections; and examination of com-pleted liner plate welds. During the observations of anchor

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place welding and inspection of completed liner plate welds, the NRC inspectors were accompanied by the cognizant field

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welding engineers. During this period, the field welding

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engineers were asked about liner plate gap tolerances; rein-

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forcenent limits, and weld lengths.

It is noted that the

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engineers provided answers that were incorrect regarding

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these requirements, specifically one engineer reported that

the wall liner plate gap.may be as much as 3/4", whereas, l

the specified maximum is 3/8"; one engineer reported that

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anchors were to be welded with 3" welds at 6" centers,

whereas, plans call for 6" welds on 12" centers; one engineer

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reported the maximum allowable amount of reinforcement was

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1/32", whereas, the specified maximum is 3/32" except for sharp discontinuities, when it is then limited to 1/32".

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noted also that the actual welds of the anchors to the liner

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plate were being performed as 3" welds on 6" centers,

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contrary to plan requirements.

It is apparent that the.

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training of the field welding engineers has not been

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totally effective in assuring adequate control of weld-ing operations. This item is open and will be re-examined

during a subsequent inspection.

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During the inspection of completed liner plate welds, it

was noted that several areas had reinforcement in excess ofthespecifiedallowable(3/32"),asindicatedbelow:

Weld Joint Amount of Reinforcement

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H5-10 5/32"

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HS-11 5/32" l

H5-1 5/32"

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H1-7 7/32" H1-10 3/16"'

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l H1-11 7/32" Biscussions with the cognizant quality control engineer

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established that the inspection technique used in deter-

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mining the excess reinforcement was ineffective. However,

with reinforcement in some areas over twice the amount

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specified, it is not clear how such a large excess was not detected.

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c.

Review of Quality Records The completed inspection records for liner plate welding,

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NDE, and inspection were sampled.. It was noted that each

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of the weld, joints listed in item 4.b above, had been

accepted by quality control personnel. No other anomalies were observed during the review, i.

5.

Control of Low Hydrogen Covered, Arc Welding Electrodes i

The implementation of the revised welding filler material control

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procedures (WPP/QCI100.0Rev.5,PCN1and2)wasexamined. The examination included inspectigns of each rod issue room, discus-

sions with rod room attendants, observation of issuance of rod, and control of rod in the field.

It was noted that the require-

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ments for control of oven temperatures was not clearly understood L

i by some rod room attendants. Attendants in Rod Room No. I during

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both day shift and swing shift reported to the NRC inspector that

the minimum allowable red oven temperature was 200 F.

In support

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of this statement, the attendants referenced Paragraph 5.0 of

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L Bechtel Welding Standard WFMC-1, which requires ovens to be held

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0 between 200 F and 350 F.

PCN l to WPP/QCI 100.0, however, requires the ovens to be at 250g minimum, as does the AWS 01.1.

Observed oven temperatures in Rod Room No.1 included two ovens

durfngdayshiftat240 F and one oven during swing shift at 165 F.

It was not clear, however, whether recent red additions oropeningoftheoven,doorshadcausedthetemperaturestodrop below 250 F.

The 165 Fswingshifgovenwasreinspectedthe following day and found to be at 230 F.

A review of rod issue records verified that no rod had been issued from the low tempera-ture ovens. During the inspection, additional instructions were provided to the rod room attendants to clearly establish the temperature limits of the ovens.

The control of rod oven tempera-ture remains open and will be re-examined during a subsequent inspection.

During the inspections of each rod room, it was noted that three of four quarantined rod containers were not equipped with locks to prevent the unauthorized use of the quarantined rod. To correct this situation, padiccks were added to all quarantine <i rod containers.

No other anomalies were observed.

6.

Structural Concrete (Safety Related Structures)

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Observation of Work and Work Activities Concrete placement activities were observed for the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building walls (placements No. 2A020-1/2A016-2).

The activities inspected consisted of placement preparation, concrete mixing, transporting, placement, consolidation,

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field testing, and QC inspection. No items of nonconformance were identified during the inspection.

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Review of Quality Records The quality records concerning placement preparation, concrete mixing, and concrete delivery for placements Nos. 2A020-1 and 2A016-2 were examined. No anomalies were identified as a result of the examination.

7.

Rejection of Major Component Hold Down Bolts On January 11, 1978, the licensee reported by telephone that several large size hold down bolts (3", 31/2", 51/2", and 6" diameter) had been rejected t,/ the bolt supplier because of gouges and flat spots on the bolts. The records available at the site

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addressing this problem were examined. The records revealed that bolt rejections began on November ll,1977 and as of December 27, 1977, 17 bolts had been rejected. Fifty-four additional defective bolts have been accepted based on individual bolt calculations per-formed by the A/E. The records did not clearly state the method used in the calculations, nor the acceptance criteria.

In addition, it has been established that the supplier of the defective bolts has also provided material to other nuclear facilities under construc-tion. The licensee determined that the problem was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e), but agreed, susbequent to the inspection, to submit a report consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)

due to the possible generic impact of the deficiency. The report will include information on the method and criteria used in estab-lishing bolt acceptability.

8.

Licensee Internal Audits and Training Records i

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The audit schedule for 1977 audits conducted by APS Quality l

Assurance was reviewed. The implementation of the audit schedule appeared to be satisfactory, b.

The records of audits conducted by APS during the past year j

(1977)wereexamined. The audit planning, scope, and required l

corrective actions appeared to be adequate.

c.

In reviewing records of quality assurance training sessions,

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it was noted that the QA manager had not documented the results of the semi-annual training meetings for QA personnel, as e

specified in OAD 2.2, Section 4.1.4.

This condition had been

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previously identified by the licensee in an internal ApS memo dated January 13, 1978. Licensee action in this area will be

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re-examined in a subsequent inspection.

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9.

Exit Interview

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The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 20, 1978. The inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings. The items of possible enforcement action were

itemized. Licensee representatives stated that action would be

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initiated on the findings identified.

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