IR 05000528/1987006
| ML20211N511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1987 |
| From: | Brown G, Fish R, Tenbrook W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211N425 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-87-06, 50-528-87-6, 50-529-87-07, 50-529-87-7, 50-530-87-01, 50-530-87-1, NUDOCS 8703020092 | |
| Download: ML20211N511 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/87-06-
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50-529/87-07 50-530/87-01 Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529 and 50-530 License Nos. NPF-34, NPF-51 and CPPR-143 Licensee:-Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 21666 Phoenix ~, Arizona 85836 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Unit-3 Inspection at:
Palo Verde' Site - Wintersburg, Arizona
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Inspection Conducted: January _ 5-9, 1987 Inspected by:
.Ms[dat A/9 P7 G. Brown, EmergenEy Preparedness Dat'e Signed Analyst A YYA Ar A}//f'7
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W.- TenBrook, Radiation Specialist Dat'e Signed Team Member:
A. K. Loposer, Reactor Operations Engineer, Comex Corporation Approved By:
R. Fish,~ Chief
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Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Summary:
Areas Inspected:
Announced preoperational inspection of the emergency preparedness program for the Unit 3 facility, including emergency plan training and retraining of Unit 3 emergency response personnel, emergency facilities and equipment and walk-throughs with key Unit 3 personnel. The inspection included follow-up reviews of Units 1 and 2 open items and
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information notices sent to the licensee.
Temporary Instruction Procedure 2513/55, Emergency Plan Implementation Appraisal, and Inspection Procedure 92701 were used.
Results:.No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
- E. VanBrunt, Executive Vice President
- J.- Haynes, Vice President Production
- J. Bynum, Plant Manager
- R.EBaron, Compliance Supervisor
- T.~Barsuk, Supervisor, Site Emergency Planning.
- A. Briese, Shift Technica1' Advisor D. Carnes, Shift Supervisor-B. Cederquist, Chemical Services Manager E. Cesena, Assistent Shift Supervisor
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V. Elish, Training Instructor
.L. Florence, Assistant Shift Supervisor W. Garret, Shift Technical Advisor R. Gouge, Unit 1 Operations Manager.
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M. Grissom, Shift Technical Advisor R. Gulick, Communicator D. Hernandez, Communicator D. Hettick,. Radiation Protection Technician
- W..Ide, Corporate Director, Quality Assurance / Quality Control J. Jarosi, Shift Supervisor J. Kriner, Nuclear Licensing Engineer
- D. Lanier, Licensing Engineer M. Ledoux, Radioactive Materials Control Supervisor R. Lindquist, Shift Technical Advisor P. Lovette, Radiation Protection Technician
- J. Mann, Senior Health Physicist S. McKinney, Shift Supervisor W. McMurry, Radiation Protection Technician J. Minnick, I&C Manager M. Muhs, Shift Technical Advisor R. Oakley, Communicator
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R. Prine, Radiation Protection Technician W. Roberts, Communicator M. Sanchez, Reactor Operator J. Scott,' Unit ~3 Chemistry Supervisor
~*T. Shriver, Compliance Manager D. Smith, Assistant Shift Supervisor W. Sneed,' Unit 3 Radiation Protection Supervisor D. Swann, Shift Supervisor K. Wright. Emergency Coordinator
- D. Yows, Manager, Emergency Planning and Preparedness
Denotes attendance at the' January 9, 1987 exit interview 2.
Follow-Up On Open Items (Closed) 85-34-01 (Unit 1).. Guidance contained in Information Notice 83-29 had not been incorporated into the EPIPs.
EPIP-4 and EPIP-15 now
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contain the required Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) statement for General Emergency. classifications.
This item is closed.
(Closed).86-15-05 (Unit 1). Clarify method for radiation protection technicians to formulate-PARS.
EPIP-11 has been modified to include a i
table which contains simplified' instructions for ' formulating PARS. The table circumvents the need for complicated and time-consuming computations.such as evacuation time estimates and directs the technician toward automatic PARS consistent with those in EPIP-15.
This item is closed.
(Closed) 86-15-06 (Unit 1).-
Provide the E0F with a diesel generator which is capable ~of. operating the HVAC system. The APS Outage Rep' ort for
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Outage AE-NGN-160 documents that a 480-volt, 240-KW generator was installed and satisfactorily. tested on 12/14/86.
The generator is capable of supplying. sufficient power.to operate all lighting as well as the'HVAC.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) 86-15-09 (Unit 1).
Provide a hardcopy recording of meteoro-logical parameters in the Control Rooms.
In the Final Safety Analysis
' Report (FSAR) the licensee is committed to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.23, Revision 0, which does not require hardcopy capability in the Control Room.
Since the issuance of the FSAR there have been two proposed revisions to RG-1.23.
The first proposal required hardcopy capabilities in the Control Room, but the latest omits that requirement.
Since the
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licensee satisfies its FSAR and there appears to be no current regulatory requirements to alter the existing system, this item is closed.
It was noted that the Control Rooms do have redundant' digital capability and also there are hardcopy capabilities available onsite in the instrument building located at the base of the meteorological tower.
.(Closed) 86-28-01 (Unit 2).
The perimeter paging system was unintel-ligible during the emergency preparedness exercise.
The licensee identified a spurious grounding in the public address system and made the necessary repairs.
The system was satisfactorily demonstrated during testing of the emergency alarms for this inspection. This item is closed.
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86-15-02 (Units 1 and 2).
Provide a backup communications system that would survive a loss of the communications room.
Telecommunications Engineering had identified the pairs of wires required to separate the systems, however, these lines belonged to Mountain Bell.
A proposal to purchase these lines from Mountain Bell will be reviewed by the Engineering and Operations (E&O) board during their January 1987 meeting.
If the purchase is approved by the board, the modification to separate the lines should be completed and operable by March 1, 1987.
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86-15-03 (Units 1 and 2).
Complete the ERFDADS and SPDS.
The licensee has verbally resolved with NRR the issue of NRC concern regarding digital isolation devices and is now awaiting their confirmation letter. This item will remain open pending receipt of the confirmation from NRR and final acceptance of the SPDS as fully operational.
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-86-15-04 (Units 1 and 2).
Develop a dose assessment method which meets the 15-minute goal.
A revision to EPIP-14A and EPIP-14B is
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inow in draft form. This revision is intended to significantly shorten the time to calculate the release 1 rate and dose projection.-
The licensee f
' estimated training and~ implementation to be completed by June of 1987.
During the exit interview the licensee committed to a March 1, 1987 corrective' action date for Unit-3.
This item will remain open pending-
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completion of the revision and satisfactory demonstration that the timely
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calculation goal:can be met using the revised procedure.
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86-15-08 (Units 1 and 2).
Continue present efforts to connect the plant vent monitor to a vital bus.
Status of the project at the end
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of this inspection was as follows:
UNIT 1:
Const'ruction was 45% coinpleted, with construction scheduled to be' completed on January 19, 1987.
Connection, testing and termination are planned for the next refueling outage about September 1987.
UNIT 2:
Construction has been completed.
Connection, testing and termination are' scheduled for. completion during the six-week outage commencing January 9, 1987.
UNIT 3: QS&E/QA now has a work package for review. Work is
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expected to commence about January 12, 1987, and to be completed during the week of. January 26, 1987.
Pending completions as described ab'ove, this item remains open.
3.
Follow-up on Information Notices The inspectors verified that the 'following Information Noticos were received by the licensee, reviewed for applicability and distributed to
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cognizant personnel at the corporate and site levels and corrective c
actions were.taken where appropriate.
(Closed) IN-83-28 (Unit 2), Criteria for General Emergency Protective Action Recommendations (Closed) IN-85-44, Monthly' testing of ENS and HPN l
(Closed) IN-85-62 (Unit 1), Backup telephone numbers for NRC Operations
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(Closed) IN-85-77-(Units 1 and 2), Possible loss of Emergency Notification System due to. loss of AC power (Closed) IN-85-78 (Units 1 and 2), Event notification form (Closed) IN-85-80 (Units 1 and 2), Timely emergency classification and notification (Closed) IN-86-10 (Unit 1), SPDS malfunctions i
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(Closed)'IN-86-18 (Unit 1), NRC on-scene response during a major.
emergency
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IN-86-97, Emergency Communications System - ENS and HPN (Licensee has received notice but not yet made distribution)-
4.
EmergencyPreparednessPreoperadionalIns'pection-V' nit 3 a.
Emergency Plan Training and Retraining The contents.of Emergency Plan. training and retraining courses were.
-reviewed.and the; instructors responsible for developing and teaching the courses were'interviewe'd.' The subjects addressed were Emergency Coordinator training, Satellite TSC/OSC training, Radiological Sampling and Surveys-training and Dose Assessment training.
This covered all specific Emergency Plan training.for ti.e onshift emergency response organization.
Some examination and qualification
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improvements for selected emergency plan training courses were suggested.
T.he. Emergency Coordinator,'STSC/OSC and Dose Assessment training would be improved if satisfactory execution of key.EPIP's
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were a requirement for qualification.
It was also:noted that the
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. course examinations for. Emergency, Coo'rdinatorlandLSTSC/0SC would be improved if they contained additional questions lto. test the retained knowledge of, applicable EPIP's;.
The Emergen'cy Plannin' Staffing List ~provides the current training g
status of personnel assigned emergency ~ response. positions.
The
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Emergency Plan Report, prepared by the/ Training Records office, specifies personnel who_have participated in Emergency Plan
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date of retraining. The list is provided to managers of the normal onshift organization for use in' establishing duty rosters for the onshift/onsite ' emergency response organization.
These-documents were compared to lists of Unit 3 personnel responsible for performing emergency duties.
It was determined that each operating shift was staffed with an adequate number of trained personnel to fulfill the staffing requirements of the onshift emergency response organization.
b.
Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) Training and Drills PASS training and the criteria for qualification of personnel designated to operate PASS were reviewed.
Currently, an-initial lecture presentation with a practical inplant demonstration of PASS operation are required for PASS qualification.
No retraining or requalification are required.
Ongoing participatory drills using the PASS are designed for testing system operability only and include the monthly PASS surveillance test and the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
The Chemical Services Manager and the Unit 3' Chemistry Supervisor were interviewed to determine the status of PASS retraining and the specific status of Unit 3 personnel PASS training and qualification.
A commitment to Item II.B.3 of the Safety Evaluation Report,
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Supplement 9, was cited as the impetus for several improvements in
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the PASS training and retraining program.
The improvements include a PASS training simulator, annual rotation of all unit chemistry technicians through the PASS surveillance procedure, and the establishment of a PASS refresher training course.
The Unit 3 PASS is currently involved-in testing and is not considered operable by the applicant.
The Unit 3 PASS must be functional prior to 5% power operation.
Only one Unit 3 chemistry technician was qualified to operate the PASS.
PASS training and qualification must be completed prior to 5%
power operation such that an adequate number of trained chemistry personnel are_available to obtain and analyze post-accident samples within the limits specified by NUREG-0737.
This item will be tracked as Open Item No. 87-01-01.
c.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (1) Control Room and Satellite Technical Support Center The Control Room and Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC)
design, layout and capabilities are identical for Units 1, 2 and 3.
Units 1 and 2 were evaluated during previous emergency preparedness preoperational inspections and discussed in separate reports (50-528/83-14 and 50-529/85-34).
The inspector verified that the Unit 3 Control Room contained current copies of the emergency plan and its implementing procedures.
Communications between units is available via telephone lines and two-way radios.
The Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone has not yet been installed.
The ENS, required by 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1), must be installed and opera-tional by fuel load in order to make the notifications delineated in 50.72.
This item will be tracked as Open Item No. 87-01-02.
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) utilizes the STSC as an interim TSC.
Notifications, dose projections, dispatching of field mon'itoring teams, and onsite
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communications are normally performed at this facility by shift personnel until the site TSC is activated.
Plans, procedures and drawings are shared by the Control Room and STSC.
The following telephone equipment was installed but not functional:
Radiological Assessment Line No. 3107 Environmental Assessment Line No. 3108 STSC Line No. 3120 Emergency Operations Director Line No. 3109 Technical Line No. 3106 This equipment, which is needed to support the STSC activities during an emergency, should be functional prior to fuel load.
These items will be tracked as Open Item No. 87-01-03.
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(2) Operations-Suppost Center
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The Operations Support Center (OSC) is located at the 140-foot level in the auxiliary building lunchroom.. The size of the facility appears sufficient to support an. efficient operation.
The OSC location is convenient to the I&C, maintenance and electrical shops.
The following telephone equipment was
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Maintenance Control Line (#3EQFNT3916)
OSC-E0F Line (#3EQFNT3917)
~0SC-CR Line (#3EQFNT3918)
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05C-TSC Line (#3EQFNT3919)
This. equipment-should be functional prior to fuel load.
These items will be tracked as Open Item No. 87-01-04.
(3) First Aid Facility The location of the first aid facility _is at the 140-foot level of the auxiliary building near the-Access Control office.
At
.the time of the inspection the facility was not. equipped or set up. This facility should be equipped and functioning prior to fuel load.- This item will be tracked as Open Item No. 87-01-05.
(4) Decontamination Facilities The applicant's Unit 3 decontamination facilities were examined
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during the inspection. Two facilities are located near the Access Control office, identified as East and West, and another located outside the containment air lock at the 140-foot level.
The West Decontamination Room was functional and stocked with supplies, however,-the East Decontamination Room was serving-as a storage room and not equipped to perform its functions.
The East Decontamination Room (A-318) should be equipped and functioning prior to reaching five percent power level.
The
' decontamination facility located outside the containment air lock (A-301) needs faucet handles for the decontamination sink.
These items will'be tracked as Open Item No. 87-01-06.
(5)
Emergency Kits and Instrumentation Emergency kits located in the STSC and OSC of Unit 3 were examined and inventories compared with that required by Procedure EP-38.
In general the equipment compared favorably with the items in Procedure EP-38.
All applicable equipment was properly calibrated, serviced and functional, however, there were several items missing from both STSC and OSC emergency kits. These included:
Calculators
First Aid kits Noble Gas sample apparatus
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These items had been previously'identi.fied by the applicant and-
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are currently 'on order.
Upon receipt, these items should be,
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placed in the emergency kits. :This will be tracked as Open
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Item No.~=87-01-07.
(6)
Emergency Alarm System
sThe applicant demonstrate'd the capability of the emergency
. alarm system of Unit 3'by. sounding the assembly alarm and announcing over the public address. system.
The audible alarms, strobe = lights and PA system all functioned satisfactorily.
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Walk Through Observations
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The~ inspectors reviewed..the training and knowledge of 24 personnel assigned to key positions in the Unit 3 emergency response organization.
These' personnel were examined for their familiarity with general. emergency preparedness program requirements and-methods, and were asked specific questions relative to their
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f_ unction in the emergency organization.
All displayed an adequate
' knowledge of their functions and responsibilities. _The below comments for the Control Room crews are considered minor in nature.
(1)
Control Room Crews Of the four crews interviewed, two required a-little prompting to produce all of the major responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator.
It was noted that Procedure EPIP-02, " Emergency Classification"~ (the procedure usually referenced by the
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Control Room crews) lists only some of those major responsibilities. They are, however, all listed in EP-5,
" Emergency Coordinator".
Only one crew was aware of the 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) requirement to notify.the'NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State and local agencies and not later than one hour after declaration of an event.
It was noted that Procedure EPIP-04, " Alert, Site Area and General Emergency Implementing Actions", states only that the NRC is to be
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notified within one hour after declaration of an event.
One scenario provided a general emergency condition with no release greater than technical specification limits.
Two crews had difficulty making PARS with this scenario.
(2)
Satellite Technical Support Center Prior to activation of the regular TSC, the radiation protection technician assigned to the SISC is responsible for performing initial offsite dose projections, assisting in the determination of protective action recommendations, directing the activities of onsite and offsite field monitoring teams and evaluating the need to administer potassium iodide.
Three radiation protection technicians, who would normally be
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STSC.' To more easily compare their. performances,'e'ach
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technician was given.,the same. scenario and identical data:
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i following 'are results of. the walk-throughs:
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(a) Two of the.three technicians failed'to use~EP-11
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until prompted to do so., In,'responsetto a previous
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~NRC-findingf the applicant lhad modified EPIP-11 and-t
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of PARS by the' technicians (see:Open Item 86-15-05-
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' discussion in Section 2 of this.repo'rt).
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(b) All of the participants.had significant' difficulty:
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using the sector map provided in the STSC..Two.
'c-technicians incorrectly' identified the affected'
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sectors. All' had difficulty translating. degrees to. '
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points of the compass.
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(c) Inperformingdosecalculationsthetechnicianswere'
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instructed to.use-the procedure for manual calcula-
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tions and then perform the'same calculations on the-4-
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computer, using current real-time meteorological. data
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for both. 0bservations were as follows:
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(i) Using the' manual procedures each technician <
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Jcalculated different projected doses.
Noble 4 ', _ gas lprojecteddoses' ranged;from3.07remto'319 rem.
Child thyroid _ projected doses ranged from
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1.1 rem to 389' rem.' The three technicians
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, required 30 minutes, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 20 minutes, and
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calculations.
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(ii), Th'e noble < gas an'd child thyroid projected doses
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' calculated <by the technicians'using the computer
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to 5,700 rem, respectively.
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Based on the results of this performance (.it.is questionable
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whetM. there~ is an.onshift capability to provide appropriate dose projections'in attimely manner to support protective-action. recommendations.
This situation.is similar to that found during the May-~1986 appraisal of the emergency response-facilities for Units 1 and'2 (Inspection Report Nos.
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50-528/86-15 and 50-529/86-15).
The licensee's response to this finding will be tracked as Open Item No. 87-01-08.
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Emergency' Plan Implementing Procedures Emergency Plan-Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) applicable to the Unit 3
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The following comments result from this reviewi a.
EPIP-02, " Emergency Classification"
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.The procedure fails to note certain key responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator (NOTE:.These responsibilities are listed-5 in EP-5).
These responsibilities include:
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. responsible for initial classification b)': notifications
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c). making PARS d)
.. authority to approve exceeding the 10 CFR 20 guidelines
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2)
Table 5 of Appendix B to EPIP'-02 (Revision 5) describes a.
turbine failure' causing casing penetration as an " Unusual Event"
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_ while Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654 shows this condition as an " Alert".
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EPIP-03, " Notification of Unusual Event Implementing Actions"
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Appendix F, Section 1.11 does not clearly specify that the NRC is to be notified immediately after notification of State and local agencies and not later than one hour after the declaration of the
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event.
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EPIP-04, Alert, Site Area and General Emergency Implementing Actions (1) Appendix'F, Section 1.13 does not clearly specify that the NRC is to be notified immediately after notification of State and local agencies and not later than one hour after the declaration of the event.
Disposition of these items will be tracked as Open Item No. 87-01-09.
6.
Exit Interview-The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with the applicant's representatives at an exit interview conducted on January 9, 1987. The. applicant's representatives attending this exit interview are denoted in Section 1 of this report.
In addition to the other findings, the applicant was advised of the deficiency in the onshift dose assessment capabilities.
It was noted that similar findings had been identified during the Emergency Response Facilities Appraisal conducted
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in May 1986. The applicant agreed to accelerate its schedule for completion of the corrective actions addressing this concern (see Section 2, Open Item No. 86-15-04 of this report). The applicant committed to completion of a revised and simplified manual dose calculation procedure, implementation and training by March 1, 1987.
The applicant also committed to obtaining a commercial dose assessment computer system which satisfied the NRC's earlier concerns, with installation and training to be completed by June 30, 1987.
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