IR 05000528/1986037
| ML20210E985 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1987 |
| From: | Ball J, Bosted C, Fiorelli G, Ivey K, Richards S, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210E973 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-86-37, 50-529-86-37, 50-530-86-31, NUDOCS 8702100417 | |
| Download: ML20210E985 (17) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:E ' _ ' . . U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos: 50-528/86-37, 50-529/86-37, 50-530/86-31 Docket Nos: 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos: NPF-41, NPF-51, CPPR-143 Licensee: ArizonaNuclearPowerProject P. O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 & 3.
Inspection Conducted: November 26, 1986 - January 4, 1987 A e-Inspectors: 6T-C'd J rat / 22 - A'7 R. Zimmerman, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed Qk a - f racL / - 22. - H 1 G. Fiorelli, Resident Inspector Date Signed Af5hN r art /-21-97 C. Bosted, Resident Inspector Date Signed E>}h h VofL / 2 2 -:C1 J. Ball, Resident Inspector Date Signed ex
sq td bd FML / -> 1-9 ~7 , K. Ivey, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved By: 6t~-lEIkd / -2] -R 7 S. Richards, Chief, Engineering Section Date Signed Summary: Inspection on November 26, 1986 - January 4, 1987, (Report Nos.
50-528/86-37, 50-529/86-37, 50-530/86-31) Area; Inspected: Routine, onsite, regular and backshif t inspection by the five resident inspectors.
Areas inspected included: followup of previously identified items; review of plant activities; plant tours; fire protection; engineered safety feature system walkdowns; surveillance testing; plant maintenance; licensee event report fol hwup; startup test results review; preoperational test witnessing and procedure reviews; licensed operator training; emergency lighting; periodic and special report review; and allegation followup.
During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered: 30702, 30703, 37301, 41701, 61700, 61726, 62703, 64704, 70304, 70306, 70315, 70316, 70346, 70446, 71302, 71707, 71710, 72301, 72624, 90711, 90712, 92700, and 93702.
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_ - - - . .. . 2-Results: Of the 14 areas inspected, no violations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted: The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted: Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP) R. Adney, Operations Superintendent, Unit 2
- J. Allen, Operations Manager
- L.
Brown, Radiation Protection and Chemistry Manager R. Buckhalter, Outage Management Superintendent, Unit 3
- J.
R. Bynum, PVNGS Plant Manager B. Cederquist, Chemical Services Manager J. Dennis, Operations Supervisor, Unit 1 W. Ferrow, Training Manager D. Gouge, Operations Superintendent, Unit 3 J. G. Haynes, Vice President, Nuclear Production
- W. E. Ide, Corporate Quality Assurance hanager
- J. Kirby, Project Transition Manager
- R. Nelson, Hafntenance Manager G. Perkins, Radiological Services Manager
- J. Pollard, Operations Superviscr, Unit 2 F. Riedel, Operations Supervisor, Unit 3
- T. Shriver, Compliance Manager L. Souza, Assistant Quality Asaurance Manager
- E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.,
Executive Vice President R. Younger, Operations Superintendent, Unit 1
- 0. Zeringue, Technical Support Manager The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on January 6, 1987.
2.
Previously Identified Items Unit 1 (Closed) Ins)ector Followup Item (528/86-20-02): " Enhancement of Fire Patrol .ogs".
The licensee committed to enhance the Fire Patrol logs by August 1, 1986, to provide detail such that specific areas under patrol could be reviewed to readily verify that Technical Specification required fire watch patrols were accomplished.
Fire patrol logs addressed times of patrol of specific floor deviations but did not address times for patrols of specific rnoms such as pump rooms.
The inspector had stated that enhanced documentation was necessary for the hourly patrol logs to clearly document Technical Specification compliance.
The inspector reviewed the revised logs which included
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. . . t, a specific rooms and equipment on the logs and the time that the fire patrol member observed that equipment or room.
The inspector r considered the revised logs, and additional emphasis of the logs with fire patrol personnel by licensee management to be adequate to ' satisfy the concern.
This item is closed.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
3.
Review of Plant Activities a.
Unit 1 At the start of the report period Unit I was operating at 100% power. On December 19, a reactor cutback occurred following an inadvertant trip of the "A" Main Feedwater Pump.
Reactor after the trip stabilized at 28%, and was returned to 60% power before the "A" Main Feed Pump was restarted.
Licensee investigation concluded that the feed pump tripped when an auxiliary operator erred during testing of the feed pump overspeed trip test.
Power was raised to 100% on December 21, and remained at that level through the end of the reporting period.
b.
Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at 100% power during the period until December 24, at which time the plant tripped from a loss of p'ower to portions of plant protection system channels "A" and B".
In addition to the reactor trip, all engineered safety features except containment spray were activated.
The cause of the "B" channel power failure was associated with the loss of the "B" Inverter which was caused by a DC system ground.
The "A" channel problem was determined to be the result of a malfunctioning power supply unit whose overvoltage protection hadoperatedfromapastovervoltageconditionresultinginan insufficient voltage to carry the A" channel bistable loads.
The problems were corrected and the plant restarted on December 30.
The plant reached 100% power on December 31.
The inspector's post trip review was ongoing at the conclusion of the inspection period and will be completed as part of the routine inspection program, c.
Unit 3 During this report period, the licensee performed integrated testing of engineered safety features including testing of the emergency diesel generators, safety injection actuation system (SIAS), containment isolation actuation system (CIAS), containment spray (AFAS), main steam isolation system (MSIS), actu actuation system control room essential filtration actuation system (CREFAS)}, control room ventilation isolation actuation system (CRVIAS and fuel building essential ventilation actuation system (FBEVAS).
On December 23, 1986, a failure occurred in the
f
- <> Train "B" Diesel Generator during testing.
Additional information concerning the circumstances surrounding the failure of the diesel generator engine and the root cause is described in paragraph 10 of this report.. Construction activities in Unit 3 have been estimated by the licensee to be approximately 99.9% complete with fuel load anticipated in the first quarter of 1987, d.
Plant Tours The following plant areas at Units 1, 2 and 3 were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection: o Fuel Building . o Auxiliary Building o ContainmentBuilding(Unit 3) o Control Building o Diesel Generator Building o Radwaste Building o Technical Support Center o Turbine Building.
o Yard Area and Perimeter The following areas were observed during the tours: 1.
Operating togs and Reco'rds ' Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control pro-cedure requirements.
. 2.
Monitorina Instrumentation ' Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for con-formance with Technical Specification requirements.
3.
Shift Manning Control room and shift manning were observed for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
4.
Equipment Lineups Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and administrative procedures for the appilcable plant mode.
This verification included routino control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
5.
Equipment Tagging Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
6.
General Plant Eculpment Conditions Plant equipment was observed for inc ications of system leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfilling their functional requirements.
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' . 7.
Fire Protection Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
Details are documented in paragraph 7 of this report.
8.
Plant Chemistry Chemical analysis results were reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications a.d admin-istrative control procedures.
9.
Security Activities observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures included vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.
Unit 3 was made part of the protected area on December 6, 1986.
The inspector considered the transition to include Unit 3 to have gone smoothly.
10.
Plant Housekeeping Plant conditions and material /- equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
11.
Radiation Protection Controls Areas observed included control point operation, records of licensee's surveys within t1e radiological controlled areas, posting of radiation and high radiation areas, comp 11ance with radiation exposure permits, personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, and personnel frisking practices.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
4.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walk Down - Units 1 and 2 a.
Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety) were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspector also verified that the system valves were in the required position and locked as appropriate.
The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable, b.
Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated date.
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.. . C Unit 1 System Date 125V DC Electrical Distribution, December.4 Channels "A" and "B" Diesel Generator Systems, December 10 Trains "A" and "B" Chemical Spray Addition System, December 18 Trains "A" and "B" Containment Spray Systems, December 18, 31 Trains "A" and "B" High Pressure Safety Injection, December 18, 31 Trains "A" and B" Low Pressure Safety Injection, December 18, 31 Trains "A" and "B" Essential Cooling Water December 31 Trains "A" and "B" Unit 2 System Date Essential Spray Ponds, December 4 , ,
Trains "A" and "B" Safety Injection Tanks, A, B, C, and 0 December 9 (Control Room indication only) Low Pressure Safety Injection, December 17 Train "A" AuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem, December 22 Train "B No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testing - Units 1 and 2 a.
Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that: 1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2) a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the survelliance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned, b.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector on the dates shown: l . - - - -
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.- , , ,. Unit l' . , Procedure Description ~ Dates Performed.
,, 41ST-1ZZ23 Mode 1 Surveillance December 2
. December 16 ' < 36ST-95802 Plant Protection System Calibration December 15-72ST-95B02 CPC/CEAC Auto Restart Check December 19 73ST-1ZZ10 Section XI Valve Stroke Time December 19' . 36ST-1QK01 Semi-Annual Fire Protection - System Functional: Test December 19 Unit 2 Procedure Description Dates Performed 42ST-2ZZ23 CEA Position Dat'a Log December 3 '36ST-95802 PPSBigtableTrip' Units December 8 73ST-9CLO3 Functional Test Containment Airlock Seal Leak Test" (100 Foot Outer Door) December 9 36ST-ZSE06 Log Power Functional: Test December 12 No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Maintenance - Unit 1 and 2 a.
During the inspection period, the' inspector observed and re-_ viewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem' investigation activities to verify compliance'with regulatory.
requirements, compliance with~ administrative and maintenance procedures, required QA/QC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct, b.
The inspector witnessed portions of the.following maintenance activities: Unit 1 Description Dates Perforrad o Troubleshooting and Repair of Security Headquarters Explosive Detector December 17 o Troubleshooting Fire Detection System December 17 \\
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- , , ' ) . Unit 2-Description Dates Performed o' Containment. Spray Valve Breaker PMs December 9 o Repair of Leaking Fuel Pool ' December 12 . Cooling Valve HV 70 o Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Breaker PMs December 22 No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
' . Fire Protection ' , ' The inspector reviewed the licensee's implementation of the plant fire protection / prevention program. ' Tours of the plant included observations for properly controlled combustible material, work controls associated with welding and' cutting operations, house-keeping, and fire watches posted at locations where fire protection detection systems were inoperable. With minor exceptions which included temporary storage of several partially filled drums of lobe ~ oil left in some outside areas, no fire protection / detection related problems were identified.
The drums were removed to proper storage by the licensee.
At Palo Verde, the fire brigade responsibilities are performed by a " dedicated" fire department staff.
A review of records confirmed that training and drills were performed quarterly as required by the program.
In addition, a check of random Technical Specification surveillance tests revealed that required tests were covered by procedures and that the required test frequencies were met.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
, 8.
Licensed Operator Training - Units 1 and 2 The licensed operator training program was reviewed to evaluate the effectiveness of the program.
Several recent reactor trips from Units 1 and 2 were selected to ascertain if the lessons learned from the events were factored into the training program.
Formal classroom and simulator training was evaluated in addition to the review of routed, required reading material documents.
Annual requalification examinations of licensed reactor operators and senior reactor operators were also reviewed.
The requirements of 10CFR 55, Technical Specification Section 6.4.1, and NUREG 0737 were used for.eference when evaluating the licensed operator training program.
The inspector selected a sample of ten requalification examinations for Reactor Operators (R0s) and Senior Reactor Operators (SR0s) in Units 1 and 2.
Tne questions and answers were reviewed and evaluated.
The annual requalification examination pass rate was 100%. The inspector did not identify any trajor discrepancies.
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,~ , , , ? - ", total of 30ilicense holders' trainingfrecords were' selected:and ' . , . - - 'J$_ .
- compared to the required reading lists, formal classroom: lectures,-
H ~ s-and simulator instruction" schedule. : All 30, individuals had attended ~' _ Tthi required,'-documented training.
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- The selacted events'from Units 1 and 2 were observed by the
. inspector to have had beeniincluded in thelrequalification training ~ . curriculum,:and had'been documented in the training program.- < ' ' ' -Discussionsibetween selected licensed reactor operators and'seniord ' y' reactor operators revealed.that the individuals were aware of recent
- events at the operating units and were aware of the corrective-actions.that were prompted by the events.
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- No violations of NRC requ,irem'ents or'deviat' ions iere' identified.
, ' ' 9.
Emergency Lighting - Unit 1 , . i Paragraphl7.of-theUnitil0peratinglicensestitesinpart'tha't-APS i ' shall maintain in-effect'all provision of the approved. fire protection program as described in the Final Safety. Analysis Report ~ > for the facility through Amendment No. 14,'andsas provided.in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) through Supplement 8.
' -: , - , ~ 'aragraph.9.5.1.4 offSupplement 8 of the SER confirms-that'eight P ,~~ hour battery powered emergency lights are provided in all areas.of ~ the plant necessary for safe shutdown and includes the access ^and
- egress routes to these areas.
' In addition, Section~ 9.5.3.2.2.3 of the.Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station FSAR states.in part that in the event of a loss l; of Class 1E AC power, lighting fixtures in areas needed for the ~ . ope' ration of safe shutdown equipment and access and egress routes - ' >
- thereto are energized by eight hour rated batteries.
L The battery, inverter and charger units associated with emergency _ ! lighting at Unit 1 were tested satisfactorily in May, 1985.
These ! same units were tested in Unit-2 using more restrictive acceptance l: criteria.
Based on Unit 2 test results, which concluded ~that when l' internal losses and a 20% factor for battery aging were considered, L the emergency power supply units did not meet the eight hour discharge-rating required by design.
The engineering recommended resolution 1to the_ Unit 2 Startup Field Report, which was issued to .. ccorrect the problem, was to purchase and add four additional '
batteries,to the emergency power units.
This was done~at Unit 2 and~ ? - the emergency lighting retest was satisfactorily completed in February, 1986.
'
,~ On October'5,1985,. based on the Unit 2 experience, an Engineering o [ Evaluation Report for Unit 1 was issued documenting the conclusion .that the Unit 1 emergency battery units would not meet the eight s hour discharge requirement when internal losses and battery aging
- were taken into consideration.
A design change (DC), 10 E-QD-014 , " Emergency Lighting," was issued February 14, 1986, to install four , . '~
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- additional. batteries 'per' emergency power unit. A work request to
- - implement the design' change was written on February 26, 1986.
O'n June 27, 1986, the work order'was cancelled based on a memorandum from the design change coordinating group.
The memorandum to the maintenance. control' group. listed a series of DCs which the project had determined would not be implemented in 1986. 2 Discussions by the inspector with personnel involved revealed the intent of the memo was to recall unworked'DCs for further coordination of outstanding.
DCs; however,' the message in the memo' indicated quite explicitly - that the work documents should be cancelled.
A second work request authorizing the implementation of the DC was issued on October-1, 1986.
Completion of this' work ~ request was ' deferred until.the next refueling-(Spring of 1988). Discussions with personnel coordinating-the work on this de' cision revealed that the, decision was based on an erroneous judgement.and a, misinterpretation of the information in the plant change package.
A third work request was issued November 18, 1986.
The design change was.
implemented in December, 1986, and the.emorgency lighting units ~were satisfactorily tested following the installation.
Prior to the installation of the modified emergency lighting power-units in Unit 1, a test of the original ' equipment was performed during the week of December 8, 1986.
The test results of three of the four emergency lighting units were unsatisfactory in that , battery voltages decreased below the acceptable voltage values - before the eight hour test duration was achieded.
The APS quality assurance organization became aware of the delays in the implementation of the design change through contacts with an ANPP staff member in October, 1986.
Their review of the matter led to the issuance of a Potentially Reportable Occurrence (PRO) report.
associated.with the Unit 1 emergency lighting for the remote shutdown areas not meeting an FSAR commitment.
Their report ! prompted the testing of the batteries which subsequently failed to meet the acceptance criteria, as well as the expedition of the implementation of the~ design change to install the additional batteries.
L Factors believed to have contributed to the delay in the implementation of the design change were: o Communications / Coordination - The cancellation of the first work request was not communicated to the originator, so proper overview and control could not be maintained over the matter.
^ The cancellation of the DCP should not have occurred without discussions with the originator.
O Priority - While a system for establishing work priorities exists, the proper priority was not implemented.
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~~ control was<not maintained because of.the noted interface .
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- problems.
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' _ ~ e . - f The licensee did acknowledge the potential 4thatTthe' Unit 1-emergency ' , lighting for. safe shutdown operations'was inadequate andlinitiated' ~ ' " ~ steps to correct the condition.
Factors contributing to.the delay . s .
_ in the correction of the problem are discussed above; This matter- , , will remain-unresolved pending further; review:by the inspector.
u , r, ' (528/86-37-01).- ,>- ' ' . - ~ ~ ' ' i 10.
Emergency Diesel Generator Crankcase Failure'- Unit 3 _ -
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At approximately 9:08 AM, MST, December 23, 1986, a. failure in the_ . , Unit 3 Train "B" Diesel Generator.' engine crankcase occurred..;The , licensee had beg'un.'a 24 hour test run of the: diesel gene'rator'at , ~ '6:39 AM, and had raised the diesel generator load to 110% for a two . -- Lr hour run as required by the test procedure,<at 9:00"AM. _There was' ~ no fire or personnel injuries involved.
Exten'sive damage'did' occur- -
' - - to the diesel engine when the No. 9 right and left pistons, piston . ,,., . '
- rods and'end cap broke free of=the' crankshaft and came through the > e ' right side of'the engine.
Fuel _and-air were shut off.to the engine, ' ' .but the engine continued to run fueled by lubricating _ oil vapors'in " the crankcase and air from the hole in the crankcase side., Fire. . Department personnel injected foam and water into the crankcase holel . !
and the' engine stopped at:approximately 10:00.AM.'The licensee.
P subsequently quarantined the area to allow.for a' detailed assessment '~- . .of the damage and to. assure'that data'which could be valuable in .<
- determining the root'cause of the failure.was<not lost.
! ' ' The licensee, after taking both still;and video pictures of the- ' - - debris as it was found in the area of-the diesel, collected al1 the - ~ _ remaining parts'of the broken pistons, piston rods, end cap and; . ,
' bolting and attempted to place them in orde'r in1an effort'to detect i..
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' whe're the failure had occurred.
It'was-found at this point that the L master rod had severed along a line located'in the vicinity of the- ~ L, ._ oil passage hole' between the. master; rod bearing and articulated rod 4 L ' bushing. Metallurgical analyses including scanning electron micro-I' ~ scopy were performed on the area in question.
These analyses!showed . l-the failure to1be:the' result of fatigue cracking which originated'in.
, the vicinity'of the oil passage hole and propa' gated to the edges of v the master rod.
! - (- Research by the vendor, Cooper Energy. Services, determined that the affected rod had been milled out approximately 50-60' mils too much - , ,during the manufacturing process and was subsequently built up by l.
iron electroplating and then remachined.
The metallurgical analyses conducted did confirm the failed rod to have undergone the plating L= > !~ . _ process in the area where the fatigue failure occurred.
The vendor
, ,A also confirmed that a similar problem occurred in 1979 in a machine built for a non-nuclear application and that the problem was L , ' . = directly attributable to the use of the iron plating process.
In ! ' '1981, the= vendor changed the plating process from one using iron to [, one using nickel; the nickel plating process being considered to be n .
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- more redistant tol fatigue cracking.' Thevendoksreviewof. internal 5
' ' , ^ quality, records determined that two additional. rods'on which the - , _ s plating process _was used ~ ere installed at,Palo Verde; one other in w - z . ~' ' ' the Unit 3 diesel which failed'and the'other in the. Train "A" diesel ' . <in Unit 2' diesel.
The licensee. declared the' Unit 2 diesel ' ' (inoperable and performed an inspection of the affected part.
No n; .
-crack indications were' detected during' ultrasonic ~~ examination.' The licensee anticipates repla'cing the ro'd during the upcoming- ' 1 Unit 2 oistage scheduled to begin January 9,1986. At the close'of l, _, ~ ~this: inspection, the licensee was proceeding to; undertake repairs of - < '.
- the damaged engine..This'is expected to. include removal of the
' right engine block, left. heads, pistons, and sleeves, the turbocharger.ana the main baarings for inspection and/or repairs.
~ ' , T,' The. licensee ~will be replacing the three rods which used_the plating - process; that is the failed rod as well.as the other two affected rods. The licensee does not currently believe the crankshaft will-require replacement. The inspector will continue to monitor the . licensee's efforts with regard.to the engine, repairs during sub-- . sequent inspections... ' J No violations of NRC requirements or deviations'were ide'ntified.
~ ~ 11.
Startup Test Results Review - Unit 2 . -The inspector reviewed the following complet'ed. test packages: ~
Procedure Description l ' [ 73PA-2ZZ05 . Unit Load Transient Test - 50% ~ ' < , 73PA-2ZZ07.' Unit load Transient Test - 100% 73PA-2MA01 100% Load Rejection Test ! The inspector verified that the tests were properly 'comple'ted, ~ acceptance criteria met, test exceptions were properly addressed and.
. resolved, and data acquisition was-completed as required.
' The inspector confirmed that_ test'results either had been; submitted ' and reviewed by the Plant Review Board (PRB) Test. Review Group or that the test. packages were being prepared for issuancetto the PRB.
~ review group.
No violations of NRC' requirements or deviations were identified.
< 12..Preoperational' Testing - Unit 3 a.
Test-Procedure Review , - The inspector reviewed the following preoperational test procedure for technical and administrative adequacy: i ' ~. . ..- __ _ _ _. _. -. _.. _, _.. . _ _., .,_ _. _
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"4 ., _. . . ., , ,.. ' 93PE-3SA01 Integrated Test'of Engineered Sa'fety Features ^ '
, ' ~ 73TI-0ZZ05 Inplace. Ab'sorber.. Stage ~ Leak. Test -, - . 73TI-0ZZ06' Inplace HEPA Filter. Leak Test; . ~ ir-aerosol Mixing Uniformity Test , _ 73TI-0ZZ07 A ' , . - m f TheLinspector found the-pr'ocedures provided a clear explanation: e ?^ of the purpose, prerequisites for performance, appropriate > ' - ' > ~ ' sign'off-steps, and quantitative.or. qualitative acceptance.
- criteria.as required.
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' Test ' Wit.nessi ng ~ ' ~ ' i , _ o , - ' - The. inspector witnessed the performance of preoperational ,' 7 testing to verify that the procedure in use.was properly ' ' approved and adequately detailed to assure satisfactory ; . ~ ' ' . performance;. test instrumentation required by the procedure was calibrated,and in use; work was performed by qualified.
personnel; and results satisfied procedural: acceptance l criteria.. ~ - or were properly dispositioned.' . M 'The~ inspector witnessed the performance of-portions of the , l following system testing activities: ' ' ~_ i> - - ,
. Procedure Description.
' " ' * a- ~ Integrated Test of Engirieered: Safety; , . .. 93PE-3SA01- ... . , -Features < . ,. . 73TI-0ZZ05 Inplace. Absorber Stage, Leak Test for Fuel = and Auxiliary-Building ~ Essential Air Filter-
E Unit , _ L LNo violations of NRC requirements or deviations were. identified.
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- 13. Allegations Followup
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r p Allegation RV-86-A-093 ' , Characterization ~
m , After declaring the Unit' l "A" Diesel-Generator-(D/G)' inoperable,=in - October,1985, because of a loss of lube oil, Operations Engineering' ' ' destroyed a surveillance. test-(ST) package associated with'a test , run of the "B" D/G so-that it would not.have to be declared-
inoperable and the plant" shutdown.
. ImpliedSignificancetoPlant' Design, Construction'~orbperations
. _ jp ~ Technical Specification (TS)'3.8.1.1.e requires that with both'DGs inoperable'the unit must be-shutdown (placed in Hot Standby) within , eight hours.
Operation with both DGs inoperable would=have resulted in a loss of all AC power to the unit if'offsite power were lost.
- Although emergency procedures exist for this condition,'the . . .- . t t t e< E s+w.3 r arie- -r -- .,..ee-- --,-yw--,#-er,mr.,.,zw,y.- ,r--- ,,,,,--y ,
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, . -.. , . " associated transient would have'resulted i_n a unnecessary challenge to. plant safety.
Continued plant operation.beyond eight hours could also constitute a significant violation'of the above TS.
- , In addition, the destruction of'a failed ST-to prevent the plant from being shutdown.would raise serious concern with regard to the U - integrity. of the licensee's staff and could result in criminal , proset.'ation.
' ~ ' -Assessment of Saf'ety Significance The loss.of lube oil event, which the inspector was familiar with, . actually occiarred on the "B" D/G on September 5,1985, following the
- removal.of a lube oil temperature monitoring elenent.
The inspector obtained copies of the Unit 1 Control Room, and auxiliary operator logs for September 5, 1985, and'obtained the following information: The "B" D/G was' declared inoperable at 8:45 AM due to low lube oil ~ ' ' level.
Surveillance test 41ST-1ZZ02 was performed on the "A" D/G at ' ~9:09 AM.to ensure-operability in accordance with TSs.
Although the ' ST was completed with satisfactory results, a subsequent fuel oil sample from the "A" D/G was found unacceptable, and the "A" D/G was declared inoperable at 9:45 AM.
At 1:18 PM the "A" D/G was declared operable following an acceptable fuel oil sample and determination .that the original sample was improperly taken and not < representative.
Inspector review ofcthe completed surveillance. test performed on September 5 indicated that the surveillance.was performed at'the time indicated in the Unit 1. logs, and the graphs-included with the test data provided additional support _that the surveillance test was performed correctly.
c - - . , The inspector also reviewed the' Control Room log for the month of October, 1985, and concluded that no similarly D/G problems occurred.
. . > , M " Staff Position x-
. ~ The allegation was not substantiiated.
Although the "B" D/G did experience a loss of lube; oil, records fore the appropriate surveillance testing of ths."A" D/G were reviewed and found acceptable.
No discrepancies were*found between'the Control Room log and the surveillance testing records.
This allegation is.
closed.
. Action Required None.
No violations of NRC requirements'or deviations were identified.
14.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup - Units 1 and 2 a.
The following LERs associated with operating events were reviewed by the inspector at the time of the occurrence.
In addition, the inspector performed an in-office review and based - w--.. r-y g-m- ? --m-r e
q., ---
G , .- . > . - ', . T ' 14 ' 4e - , - - on,theinformation'provid.edinthereportconcludedthat.
. reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions'were' appropriate.
The below - listed LERs are' closed.
, Unit 1 , , LER NUMBER ' DESCRIPTION , , LER 86-03-00 Reactor Trip and ESFAS Actuation Due to Loss of Power.
., , -
, LER'86-51-00-Chemical! Waste' Tank Discharged to Evaporative Pond Without Sampling.
' n: , ' ' LER 86-53-00 Reactor Trip..While1 Performing Maintenance on - s . Circuit Card.
_, - . . . y-e , LER 86-61-00- Reactor Trip. , ' Unit 2 ,'. . x . , ,, ELER NUMBER' '.0ESCRIPTION- .. t ~
- , LER 86-17-5d' Reactor Trip 1InitiIted by Reactor Protection System (Planned Loa'd Rejection Test).
'PersobnelErrorResultedinIncorrectSettingof ? LER 86-21-00 Safety Injection Valve.
, LER86-28-d0 Hourly Fire Watch Not Performed Due To High
Airborne Concentration.
LER 86-31-00 Hourly Fire Watch Not-Perfornied Due To High Airborne' Concentration.
b.
Several recent reportable occurances were reviewed by the inspector dealing with problems with the main steam isolation , ' valves (MSIVs) in Unit 1.
Each steam line has a single MSIV with dual pneumatic / hydraulic actuators.
The following LERs were reviewed: LERs 86-48; 86-50; 86-54, and 86-60.
The cause , of'the malfunctions addressed in the above LERs included 1) lack of proper lubrication to the air side of the air / oil pump, - ? 2) deteriorated elastomers which allowed oil to gradually-return to the oil reservoir, 3) minor leakage in the nitrogen transmitter fittings, and 4) an apparent seating problem with a ball check valve in the air supply line to the air reservoir.
. The licensee's corrective ections were reviewed and found to be 7" adequate.
The inspector 1011 closely monitor future. problems ' with the MSIVs as part of 'the routine inspection program.
N9 violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
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n' ., . -
'. . e s 15.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports - Unit 1
Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical. Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the- . inspector.
This review included the following considerations: the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC require-ments; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the ~ validity of the reported information. Within the scope of the above, the following. report was reviewed by the inspector: Unit 1- , o Monthly Operating Report for November, 1986.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
16.
Unresolved Items , Unresolved items are matters about'which more information is re-quired to determine whether they are acceptable, violations or, deviations. An unresolved item is addressed in.this inspection in paragraph 9 of-this report.
- 17.
Exit Meeting . The inspector met.with licensee managemen representatives' period-t ~ ically during the inspection and held an exit meeting on January 6, 1987.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by.the licensee representatives.
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