IR 05000528/1986038
| ML20212R448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1987 |
| From: | Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212R171 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-86-38-MM, 50-529-86-38, 50-530-86-32, NUDOCS 8702020661 | |
| Download: ML20212R448 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/86-38 50-529/86-38 50-530/86-32 Docket Nos.
50-528 50-529 50-530 License Nos.
NPF-41 NPF-51 CPPR-143 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P. O. Box 52034
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Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and 3 Meeting Location:
NRC Region V Office, Walnut Creek, California Meeting Conducted:
December 17, 1986 Approved by:
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/ - 9 - [7 5. A. Richards, Chief Date Signed Engineering Section 0702020661 870113 PDR ADOCK 05000520
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.t DETAILS 1.
Meeting Participants Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. Martin, Regional Administrator D. Kirsch, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects R. Scarano, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards S. Richards, Chief Engineering Section R. Zimmerman, Senior Resident Inspector, Palo Verde Site Arizona Public Service Company E. Van Brunt, Jr., Executive Vice President J. Haynes, Vice President, Nuclear Production J. Bynum, PVNGS Plant Manager R. Putler, Director, Technical Services W. Ide, Manager, Corporate QA/QC T. Shriver, Manager, Compliance 2.
Management Discussion A management meeting was held on December 17, 1986, at the NRC Region V offices in Walnut Creek, California.
The meeting agenda.is presented in enclosure (2). Mr. Martin opened the meeting by stating that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the licensee's response to several recent events at the Palo Verde facility. Mr. Martin encouraged all participants to be forthright in their discussions of the issues.
Mr. Haynes then opened the discussion of plant performance indicators at Palo Verde.
Specific indicators appear to show an improving trend in the licensee's performance.
The issue of personnel errors was discussed in detail.
The licensee contributed their improved performance, in part, to their Inter-Department Event Investigation (IEI) program.
This program is directed specifically at the investigation of personnel errors.
The licensee stated that the IEI program was originally implemented to address personnel errors in the Instrument and Control (I&C) area, and then expanded to encompass all work groups onsite.
A discussion of the
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importanco of communicating management's expectations regarding work i
performance to the working level was then held.
The licensee i
representatives acknowledged the necessity of establishing the proper working atmosphere at this early stage in the operation of their facility.
The licensee then addressed methods through which they ensure
j their expectations reach the working level.
Mr. Bynum presented the circumstances surrounding a November 19, 1986
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i Unit I trip.
The event was initiated by a blown fuse associated with the steam generator water level control system.
The operator placed the
feedwater control system in the manual mode of operation and brought the
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plant to a relatively stable state, however the operator then returned the feedwater control system to the automatic mode prior to understanding
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what had failed.
The system had malfunctioned due to the blown fuse and the plant ultimately tripped due to low steam generator water level.
Mr.
Martin observed that a significant error occurred when the operator returned the feedwater control system to automatic without ascertaining the cause of the problem. Mr. Haynes concurred in this assessment.
The licensee then discussed their corporate engineering department's effort to review the feedwater control system design for opportunities to improve the performance of the system. With regard to the specific event, the cause of the blown fuse had not been identified at the time of the meeting.
This led to a discussion of the licensee's capability to trend repeat component failures over the life of the plant.
The licensee stated that they would review their capability in this area and would be prepared to discussion the area during a future meeting.
A Unit 1 plant trip, which occurred on October 6, 1986, was reviewed.
The trip resulted from the rapid opening of a steam generator economizer valve, which admitted an excessive amount of cold feedwater to the steam generator, causing a low CNBR trip.
Mr. Bynum described efforts to monitor the valve performance and to simulate the event with the facility simulator.
Mr. Bynum described a Unit 2 reactor power cutback, which occurred on November 19.
This event occurred, in part, due to failed or out-of-calibration suction pressure switches.
The licensee's review and evaluation of the event was discussed.
The need to communicate the high failure rate of the pressure switches involved, via industry programs established for this purpose,.was noted.
On November 17, 1986, an event occurred where radioactive resin from an ion exchanger was blown into a ventilation duct due to purging the ion exchanger with the purge air pressure set too high.
The root cause of this event was personnel error, in that the three work groups involved (operations, maintenance, and radiological controls) worked beyond the work instructions provided for the job rather than stopping the work and obtaining additional instructions when the need to purge the ion exchanger became apparent.
Mr. Bynum stated that, while this event did not cause a major plant problem, the event did cause significant management concern due to the failure of all three work groups to recognize the need to obtain additional work instructions.
The licensee's followup actions for this event were discussed.
A gas release from a Unit 2 gas analyzer, which occurred during the performance of a test, was then discussed.
Mr. Bynum described the root cause of this event as being the use of an inadequate procedure and poor communication between the test personnel and radiological controls personnel.
A discussion of the licensee's followup to this event and the procedure review process followed.
Mr. Ide then opened a discussion regarding the improper use of commercial grade wire in certain applications due to an ineffective program for implementing equipment change evaluations (ECE).
The licensee's corrective actions were then considered.
This led to a discussion of the need to maintain positive control over all materials issued for use with environmentally qualified (EQ) equipment.
The licensee stated that they
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would review their control of work on EQ equipment and be prepared to discuss this area in more detail at a future meeting.
Mr. Bynum discussed the failure of a Unit 2 steam generator containment isolation valve to close fully following a containment isolation signal.
This failure was reported to the NRC in Unit 2 LER 86-46.
Mr. Richards stated that the LER left many questions unanswered.
Further, this event appeared to be an instance where the licensee did not carry through on a root cause analysis in a timely manner.
Mr. Bynum stated that the craft personnel who repaired the valve did not fully document their observations and that this appeared to contribute to the event not initially getting a sufficient level of management attention.
Mr. Bynum stated that their root cause evaluation procedure has been revised to require all failures of safety related equipment to be reviewed, whereas the procedure previously only required significant failures to be reviewed.
Mr. Martin then led a discussion of the importance of instilling in personnel the basic concept of stopping when problems are identified and determining and correcting the cause.
I Mr.'Bynum described a recently identified deficiency with emergency lighting at Unit 1.
This deficiency relates to the ability of the emergency lighting to provide eight hour service when powered from batteries.
Apparently, because of age degradation of battery performance, the units may not be able to meet the licensee's surveillance testing acceptance criteria.
Emergency lighting performance was a Unit 1 license condition, however it is not addressed in the Technical Specifications, and therefore there is no defined action statement to enter or compensatory measures to take.
Mr. Bynum stated that apparently the licensee's engineering organization knew of the potential problem following a Unit 2 test in late 1985, however due to administrative problems, the issue was not promptly addressed.
The license'e. stated that the batteries have been recharged in the interim and that replacement of the batteries is being expedited.
Mr. Haynes opened a discussion of the status of Unit 3 and stated that the licensee intends to request issuance of a license approximately March 1, 1987.
Mr. Martin led a discussion concerning the failure of a nozzle on the Unit 3 letdown heat exchanger. Mr. Martin stated that the failure of the nozzle appeared unusual and that the concern warranted more attention than it appeared to be receiving.
Mr. Martin requested to be personally informed of the resolution of this concern.
Mr. Haynes stated that the issue was receiving significant management attention and agreed to inform Mr. Martin of the results of the licensee's resolution of the issue.
Mr. Kirsch then led a discussion of the importance of planning troubleshooting activities.
Mr. Bynum described the licensee's efforts to reduce the number of continuously lit control room annunciators.
The licensee's effort has shown progress and they expect Unit 1 to have approximately twenty continuously lit annunciators following the first Unit I refueling outage.
All participants agreed that minimizing the number of continuously lit annunciators was beneficial from both a human factors standpoint and in establishing a working atmosphere reflecting prompt correction of deficiencie. - _.
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The number and priority of outstanding work orders was discussed.
Mr.
Byn'um described licensee initiatives to reduce the total numbereof work orders, such as mini outages and elimination of duplicate work orders.
Mr. Bynum pointed out titat while no priority 1 work orders were outstanding, the licensee felt that a reduction in,the total number of outstanding work orders was desirable in that a reduced number would
- reflect more prompt correction of lower priority items.
Mr. Bynum then led a discussion of the system engineer. program at Palo Verde.
Mr. Kirsch noted that the system engineers did not appear to be as deeply involved in routine surveillance and maintenance activities as system engineers at other Region V facilities.. Mr. Kirsch questioned how the licensee intends to monitor the integrated performance of systems over extended periods. Mr. Bynum stated that their program was still developing.
He agreed that a mechanism for assessing system performance is necessary.
He also stated that Palo Verde personnel are visiting other facilities to discuss their system engineer programs, prior to finalizing the Palo Verde format.
This topic will be further discussed at a future NRC/ANP Management meeting.
Mr. Martin closed the meeting by reemphasizing that the Palo Verde facility is presently in the formative stages, and therefore that the need to establish a questioning attitude in station personnel is of the utmost importance.
Mr. Martin observed that an important step in establishing this attitude is made by insisting that the-root cause of
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, problems be determined. Mr. Martin and Mr. Van Brunt agreid to meet again in late January to further discuss issues at Palo Verde.
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AGENDA
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ANP/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING Walnut Creek, California December 17, 1986 1.
Update on Plant Performance Indicators II.
Event Review (Cause, Evaluation, Corrective Action)
A.
Unit 1 trip on November 19 due to loss of S/G level indication.
B.
Unit 2 reactor power cutback on November 19 due to loss of a MFP during surveillance testing.
C.
Purge of letdown Ion exchanger on November 17, resulting in contamination of a ventilation duct and an airborne release.
D.
Gas release from Unit 2 combustible gas analyzer.
E.
Quick opening of S/G economizer valve (LER 86-56).
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Installation of Non-EQ wire in MSSS (DER 86-30).
G.
Unit 2 S/G blowdown containment isolation valve failure (LER 86-46).
III. Unit 1 Emergency Lighting
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Annunciator Improvement Program
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Maintenance Backlog
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Role of System Engineers.
VII. Status of Unit 3.
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