IR 05000528/1993039
| ML20058D066 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1993 |
| From: | Qualls P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D051 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-93-39, 50-529-93-39, 50-530-93-39, NUDOCS 9312030046 | |
| Download: ML20058D066 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/93-39, 50-529/93-39, and 50-530/93-39 License Nos.
NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P. O. Box 53999, Station 9012-Phoenix, Arizona 85837 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1,2, & 3 Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona j
Inspection Dates:
August 23 - 27, 1993 I
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Inspector:
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Date Signed-
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P. M. Quarls, Reactor Inspector Approved By:
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M F f5 Robert J. Pate, Chief, Safeguards, D' ate ' Signed i
Emergency Preparedness, and-I Non-power Reactor Branch
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Summary:
Ar_eas Inspected: Announced inspection to followup open. items in the Emergency Preparedness Program area.
Inspection Procedures 82701 and 92701 were covered.
Results: Overall, the licensee's program is adequate in the area of emergency-preparedness. No violations or deviations were identified.
I 9312030046 931028 "
{DR ADOCK 05000528 PDRg
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DETAILS j
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PERSONS CONTACTED The below listed persons were contacted during the course of the inspection.
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i Licensee
- P. Caudill, Director, Site Services
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H. Bieling, Manager, Emergency Planning
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- T. Barsuk, EP Onsite Supervisor
- J. Napier, Engineer, NuclearL Regulatory Affairs
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- G. Cerkas, EP consultant
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- M. Pioggia, EP Coordinator
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- H. Lines, EP Coordinator
- Attended Exit Meeting on August 27, 1993.
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FOLLOWUP OF OPEN ITEMS (MC 92701)
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91-08-03 (CLOSED) Timely Classification of The Scenario Event During the 1991 annual exercise the licensee failed to classify f
the Alert in a timely manner. The licensee has had several events
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including two Alerts and two evaluated exercises and has -
t classified the events in as soon as possible after event
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occurrences. This item is CLOSED.
91-08-05 (CLOSED) TSC Exercise Performance During the 1991 annual exercise the licensee's staff in the Technical Support Center (TSC) did not make core uncovery time estimates available in time to be useful to the Emergency.
Coordinator (EC).
During the 1993 exercise the TSC technical performance was noted as being a licensee strength. This item is CLOSED.
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91-08-07 (CLOSED) OSC Performance Durina the 1991 Exercise During the 1991 annual exercise the licensee's staff -in the -
Operational Support Center (OSC) did.not appear to respond to the exercise as if the event were real. During.the 1993 exercise the licensee OSC staff response was noted as being appropriate for.the-event. This item is CLOSED.
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92-03-01 (CLOSED) Site Evacuation Criteria Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)-19 contained a prerequisite that a Site Area Emergency (SAE) or General Emergency (GE) would be necessary before the EC called for site evacuation.
The EPIP was revised to add the statement that the EC could also evacuate if it was felt necessary. This item is CLOSED.
92-34-01 (CLOSED) Event Classification Time EPIP-02 Revision 8 contained a note which allowed the classification of an event 30 minutes after the event occurred.
Revision 9 to EPIP-02 changed the note to read that an event should be classified as soon as possible. This item is CLOSED.
92-34-02 (CLOSED) Decay Heat Removal System Relief Lift During an extended outage in December of 1991, a Decay Heat Removal (DHR) relief valve lifted resulting in a loss of RSC inventory. The loss was approximately 180 gpm and a p.
.m'using EPIP-02 without operating mode considerations would have Jsclared a Site Area Emergency (SAE). The issue was resolved with a revision to EPIP-02.
This item is CLOSED.
92-34-03 (CLOSED) Loss of Meteoroloaical Tower In August of 1992 the licensee identified and reported that they failed to declare an event for a loss of the Meteorological Tower as required by EPIP-02.
Recent classifications were correct and Revision 12 to Emergency Plan will make unnecessary classifications less frequent. This item is CLOSED.
93-22-01 (CLOSED) Failure to Follow Procedure During the March Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) the licensee failed to correctly follow EPIP-02 guidance to classify the STGR event. Revision 9.02 to EPIP-02 and training of the operators should be effective in correcting this issue. This item is CLOSED.
93-22-02 (CLOSED) Conservative Classification Procedure In EPIP-02 rev 9.01 guidance, a STGR is a SAE. The NRC guidance given in NUREG-0654 would require classification of this event as an Alert. The procedure was changed to make a SGTR an Alert unless subcooling margin was lost in revision 9.02.
This item is CLOSED.
93-22-03 (CLOSED) ERDS Activation The licensee failed to turn the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) within the 60 minutes specified in 10 CFR 50.72.
This item
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was a Non-Cited Violation and the corrective actions documented during the March AIT inspection report (50-529/93-14) should prevent a recurrence. This item is CLOSED.
93-22-04 (OPEN) ERF Activation Time During the March SGTR the licensee failed to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Onsite Facility (EOF)
within the one hour goal given in their emergency plan. The licensee, at the time of the inspection was evaluating a possible change to the plan. This item is OPEN.
93-22-05 (OPEN) Failure To Conduct Accountability Within Thirty Minutes The licensee failed to accomplish site accountability during the March 1993 SGTR event within the 30 minutes specified in the Emergency Plan. The licensee has clarified the accountability procedures and accountability drills have been conducted that accomplished this goal. At the time of the inspection, however, the licensee had not yet conducted a drill which was initiated with a SAE, which would have involved evacuating nonessential personnel simultaneously with conducting accountability.
Previous drills have always went to an Alert and have taken an hour to remove nonessential personnel before conducting accountability at an SAE. The licensee stated that a drill initiated by a SAE will be conducted in the near future. This item will remain OPEN.
93-22-06 (CLOSED) No Check of Owner Controlled Area (OCA)
During the March 1993 SGTR the licensee failed to conduct a check of the OCA as required by their Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
EPIP-20, Site Accountability, has been clarified and security personnel retrained to correct this issue. This item is CLOSED.
93-22-07 (CLOSED) Protected Area (PA) Lockdown During the March 1993 SGTR the licensee failed to lockdown the PA f
after accountability was called for as required by the Emergency Pl an.
EPIP-20 has been revised to include this requirement. This
item is CLOSED.
j No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
EPIP 02 Revision 10 The licensee revised EPIP-02, Event Classification, in an ongoing effort to improve the procedure. Revision 10 appeared to the inspector to incorporate much of the guidance from the NUMARC Emergency Action Level (EAL) system. The inspector noted that the NRP, Program Office has i
stated that the licensee can make this revision under 10 CFR 50.54(q).
However, since the NUMARC EAL system is new, prior NRC review would be
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preferable. The licensee, during a telephone conversation, on
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September 9,1993, noted to the inspector that as a result of the
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discussions with the inspector, they were not implementing Revision 10 -
to EPIP-02 as stated in previous correspondence. The licensee stated
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that they intended to implement all of the NUMARC guidance and were preparing a full submittal for the NRC to review.
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l No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Facility Observations-
f The inspector toured the EOF, the TSC,.the Backup EOF, and the Offsite Relocations Area at.the Buckeye Airport. 'The facilities appear to be
well maintained and ready to use. The inspector met the construction foreman for the crew doing the work out on I-10. There appears to be a good working relationship between the licensee's' staff and the
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construction personnel. The construction manager displayed a good
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understanding of how to get the construction crew to properly respond to
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a plant emergency.
5.
Exit Meetina
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An exit meeting was held on August 27, 1993, with members of.the i
licensee staff identified in Paragraph I of this report.- The items
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identified in this report were discussed at that time. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed
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by the inspectors during the inspection.
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