IR 05000529/1985036

Insp Rept 50-529/85-36 on 850930-1004.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Implementation of TMI Action Plan Items & Followup of 50.55(e) Repts

ML20198B478
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	10/18/1985
From:	Ivey K, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198B469	List: IR 05000529/1985036 ML20198B465
References
TASK-1.A.2.1, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-TM 50-529-85-36, NUDOCS 8511060503
Download: ML20198B478 (7)

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a U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

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Report No. 85-36

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Construction Permit No. CPPR-142 Licensee: Arizona Nuclear Power Project

Post Office Box 52034

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Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name:

Palo Verde - Unit 2

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Inspection at: Wintersburg, Arizona

Inspection Conducte1:

Sept mber 30 - Octob r 4,198

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Inspectors:

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_Ivey, deactorf h >ectorf Date Signed

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Approved by:

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ef, Engi epngSection Date Signed i

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. Young, Jr., C

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Summary:

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i Inspection During the Period September 30 - October 4, 1985 (Report No.

50-529/85-36)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's implementation of TMI Action Plan Items and followup of 50.55(e) reports. The

inspection involved 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> by one regional based inspector on module nos.

l 30703, 92061B, and 25401B.

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Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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8511060503 851021 PD1 ADOCK 05000529

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted a.

Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP)

• W.

E. Ide, Director, Corporate Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC)

• C. M. Russo, Quality Audits and Monitoring Manager

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• S.

Penick, Quality Monitoring Superviser

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Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC)

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• D. Hawkinson, Project QA Hanager

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D. Leboeuf, QA/QC~ Engineer W. Kerrigan, QA/QC Engineer, DER Group

" Denotes those attending the exit meeting on October 3, 1985.

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Licensee Action on 10:CFR 50.55(e) Construction Deficiencies (DERs)

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'The following potential 50.55(e) items were reviewed by the inspector to

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determine the thoron,ghn, judged by the licensee to be reportable under the ess of the licensee's corrective actions. All of the DERs reviewed were'

10 CFR 50.55(e) criteria.

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(Closed) DER 85-04 Type "A" Fire Damper Installation a.

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During a walkdown of the Unit 3 Type "A" fire dampers, it was

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discovered that the dampers were not installed in accordance with

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the manufacturer's installation instructions. This c.ndition was

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common to the Type "A" dampers in Units 1, 2, and 3.

The subject dampers were manufactured by Ruskin Manufacturing Company and supplied and installed by the Waldinger Corporation.

Inadequate

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damper installation could result in the uncontrolled spread of fire through safety-related areas.

Proper installation is required to

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comply with Underwriters Laboratory safety standards,

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The inspector reviewed the final DER report and associated documents with the following findings:

The root cause of the condition was attributed to Waldinger's failure to follow certified installation instructions issued by Ruskin and Bechtel's approval of a Subcontractor Change Request

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I (SCCR FW-121) without adequate technical justification. The

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SCCR which was inadequate for Type "A" dampers was followed for

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installation.

• A Non:onformance Report (NCR SM-5558) was issued to reinstall the dampers in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

Since this was a generic problem to Type "A" danpers, all were inspected for deficiencies. Thirty-six (36) dampers required

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w rework; which was performed. All other types of fire dampers are installed using a different method and are not subject to this kind of deficiency.

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QA Surveillance Report No. 85-9-45 provided verification that

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the corrective actions were completed. The report included a l

visual verification that nine (9'; of the dampers were properly

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reworked.

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This item is closed.

b.

(Closed) DER 85-05 Improper Installation of Non-Segregated Phase Bus Fire Stops

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During an investigation of non-segregated phase bus fire stops, it was discovered that the vendors approved fire seal design had not been properly implemented for phase buses supplied by the Calvert Company.

Subsequent inspection of six (6) of the nineteen (19) fire stops in Unit 2 revealed that five (5) were not installed properly.

Inadequate fire seal installation could impair the ability to limit l

fire damage to one train of the safety-related systems.

1-The inspector reviewed the final DER report and associated documents and discussed the DER with the cognizant QA/QC Engineer with the

following findings:

The root cause was that the vendor's installation drawings were not followed during field installation of the fire stops.

Calvert bus conductors require a high voltage tape to be

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applied before installation of the silicone foam fire seals.

Taping of the bus conductors which is required to meet phase to phase and phase to ground voltage clearance requirements was

not performed. Other cable penetration fire seals do not j

require the additional preparation and therefore are not

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subject to this problem.

NCR SE-5574 was written to inspect all of the Calvert non-segregated phase buses for compliance to the specification

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drawings and to repair where necessary. Since the systems were

turned over to operations, Engineering Evaluation Request (EER)

No. 85-NA-011 superceded NCR SE-5574 to perform the same task.

• All nineteen (19) buses in Unit 2 were inspected. Two (2) were found to be acceptable. Construction Work Order (CWO) Nos.

94486, 94487, and 94488 were utilized to perform the rework to i

install the fire stops in accordance with the Calvert i

installation specification drawing (no. E015-103-3) on the

seventeen (17) unacceptable buses.

This item is closed.

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(Closed) DER 85-22 Color Coded Visual Indicators Breaking Off of c.

Control Relays and Preventing Travel Unit 2 NCR SE-5774 described a situation during generic testing of the Auxiliary Relay Cabinet in which the Normally Open/Normally

Closed color coded visual indicators on the type ARD Westinghouse Industrial Control Relays had broken off. One broken indicator fell into a relay and restricted the movement of the armature / crossbar assembly precluding proper operation of the relay and associated Class IE control. circuit. The ARD relays are widely used in many Class IE control schemes. Malfunction of the relay could result in malfunction of safety-related equipment.

The inspector reviewed the final DER report and associated documentation with the following findings:

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The licensee determined that the indicator was broken during

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panel rewiring due to extensive rewiring on the Auxiliary Relay panels during the past year and the fact that the condition was not identified during receiving inspection and earlier startup or construction activities. This condition does not apply to other cabinets at the plant as the arrangement of the ARD relays in the Auxiliary Relay Cabinets is unique. Differences in the ARD relay arrangement from other relays include:

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They are mounted horizontally such that debris can fall into them, and 2)

The terminal blocks for field connections are located above the relays - making the relays more susceptible to debris from normal field wiring.

• The root cause of this deficiency was the craf tsman's failure to properly follow specified work practices during panel rewiring. The relays were not properly protected from debris during rework and testing. WPP/QCI No. 255.0 Paragraph 5.2 includes provisions for visual inspection for damage to nearby equipment prior to and after cable termination.

• NCR SE-5774 was written to inspect all Auxiliary Relay panels containing ARD relays and clean them where necessary. The work was completed by various Startup Work Authorizations (SWAs).

• The licensee issued a Construction Quality Talk (memorandum to construction and QC personnel) which addressed this DER. The Quality Talk stressed the importance of good cleanliness and housekeeping practices and that the internal components must be adequately protected during construction and startup activities.

• A Specification Change Notice (SCN 3994) was issued to revise the Installation Specifiction for Cable Splicing, Termination, and Supports (13-EM-306) to add precautionary notes concerning terminations on ARD relays in the Auxiliary Relay Cabinet __-

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QA Surveillance Report No. 85-9-40 provided verification that

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the NCR and SWAs were complete, the Quality Talk was issued, and Specification 13-EM-306 had been changed.

This item is closed.

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l No violations or deviations were identified.

3.

TMI Action Plan Items I

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a.

(Closed) I.A.2.1 Immediate Upgrading of R0 and SRO Training and Qualifications

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Requirements I

1)

Applicants for SRO license shall have four (4) years of

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responsible power plant experience, of which at least two (2)

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years shall be nuclear power plant experience (including six

(6) months at the specific plant) and no more than two (2',

years shall be academic or related technical training.

2)

Certifications that operator license applicants have learned to operate the controls shall be signed by the highest level of corporate management for plant operation.

3)

Revise training programs to include training in heat transfer, fluid flow, thermodynamics, and plant transients.

Inspector Findings The revised training programs were found to meet the requirements of this item in previous NRC inspectf.;.s'(IR 50-528/8i-47 and 84-54).

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The inspector examined training records for SR0s and R0s to verify the licensee's compliance with the remainder of this item.

The inspector verified that:

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SR0s had the required experience 2)

Certifications for operation of controls were signed by the

Executive Vice President

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All SR0s and R0s' had received training in heat transfer, fluid

flow, thermodynamics, and plant transients.

The inspector concluded that the requirements of this item were i

being implemented.

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This item is closed.

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b.

(Closed) II.E.4.2 Containment Isolation Dependability Requirements 1)

Containment isolation system designs shall comply with the recommendations of Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.4 (i.e.,

that there be diversity in the parameters sensed for the initiation of containment isolation).

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2)

All plant personnel shall give careful consideration to the definition of essential and nonessential systems, identify each i

system determined to be essential, identify each system determined to be nonessential, describe the basis for selection I

of each essential system, modify their containment isolation designs accordingly, and report the results of the reevaluation to the NRC.

3)

All nonessential systems shall be automatically isolated by the containment isolation signal.

4)

The design of control systems for automatic containment isolation valves shall be such that resetting the isolation signal will not result in the automatic reopening of containment isolation valves. Reopening of containment

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j isolation valves shall require deliberate operator action.

5)

The containment setpoint pressure that initiates containment

l isolation for nonessential penetrations must be reduced to the minimum compatible with normal operating conditions.

6)

Containment purge valves that do not satisfy the operability

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criteria set forth in Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 or the Staff Interim Position of October 23, 1979 must be sealed closed as defined in SRP 6.2.4, item II.3.f during operational conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Furthermore, these valves must be j

verified to be closed at least every 31 days.

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7)

Containment purge and vent isolation valves must close on a j

high radiation signal.

Inspector Findings

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The inspector verified that a Containment Isolation Actuation i

Signal (CIAS) is diversely generated from either a high containment pressure or a low pressurizer pressure signal.

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2)

The licensee's definition of essential and non-essential systems has been found acceptable. However, in the Palo Verde SER, NRC has required that Class IE electrical power be

provided to the isolati.on valves for seal injection and for the i

normal charging path to the plant, since these non-essential

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systems do not isolate on a CIAS. The inspector reviewed i

electrical. schematics and verified that Class IE power has been

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supplied to valves in the RCP seal injection and charging paths (CH-HV255 and CH-HV524).

3)

The inspector verified that all systems identified as non-essential and isolating on a CIAS are, in fact, designed to isolate on a CIAS.

4)

The inspector verified that resetting the CIAS does not result in the automatic reopening of containment isolation valves and that emergency procedures are in place that require deliberate operator action to re-open the valves.

5)

The inspector 've'rified that the containment pressure setpoint is'3 psig, which is consistent with the licensee's proposed Technical Specifications.

6)

The 8-inch Power Access Purge Valves have been demonstrated operable per BTP CSB 6-4 as documented in Supplement 5 to the Palo Verde SER. This allows limited time for the valves to be

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- open in Modes 1-4.

However, the 42-inch Refueling Mode Purge Valves have not been demonstrated operable and therefore must be sealed closed in Modes 1-4.

The inspector verified that a surveillance procedure is in place to check that the Refueling Purge Valves are, closed, every 31 days, and to record the

. accumulated time that,the Power Access Purge Valves are open, once weekly.

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The inspector verified -that the Containment Power Access Purge Valves and Refueling Purge Valves are designed to close on a high radiation, signal. Radiation monitors RU-37 and RU-38

- monitor both streams' and generate a closing signal upon detection above the high radiation setpoint.

This item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Exit Meeting On October 3, 1985, an exit meeting was held with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1.

The scope and findings of the inspection, as noted in this report, were discussed.