IR 05000528/1992042

Insp Repts 50-528/92-42,50-529/92-42 & 50-530/92-42 on 921206-11.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Radiological Environ Monitoring program,follow-up of Previously Identified Items & on Site follow-up of Events

ML20034G171
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	01/22/1993
From:	Bocanegra R, Reese J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20034G059	List: IR 05000528/1992042
References
50-528-92-42, 50-529-92-42, 50-530-92-42, NUDOCS 9303090146
Download: ML20034G171 (4)

Text

f.

.

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMISr!0N

REGION V

50-528/92-42,50-529/92-42,50-530/92-42

,

Report Nos.

License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Arizona Public Service Company Licensee: P. O. Box 53999, Sta. 9012 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999 l

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Facility Name:

Inspection at: Wintersburg, Arizona i

December 6-11, 1992 Inspection Conducted:

/ 4/- T 3

/ M hWo(14

~

Date Signed j

Inspected by:

R.Boeinegra,Radyt Specialist thc2h3 jhh h-Date Signed Approved by:

eme's(,T Reese, Chief / Facilities Radiological Protection Branc

!

Summary:

Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and follow-up of prev Areas Inspected:

Inspection identified items, and on-site follow-up of non-rcutine events.

84750, 92701, and 92700 were used.

Procedures Data in the licensee's 1991 Radiological Environmental Monitoring

.

!

One Report showed no impact on the environment from Palo Verde operat Results:

Licensee Event Report and a special report involving radiation inoperability were reviewed.

No violations were identified.

following a reactor trip were also reviewed.

i i

,

t

i 93030901 %

I

-

g p

.-

!

I x. -

.

,

'

.~

f DETAILS

.

.

'

1.

Persons Contacted

!

Licensee

e

• K. Akers, Technical Speciclist, Quality Auditing and Monitoring j

• K. Albers, Sr. Technical Specialist, Quality Assurance and Monitoring

'

• R. Fullmer, Manager, Quality Assurance & Monitoring

• J. Gaffney, Supervisor, Radiation Protection Outage Planning Group

• F. Gowens, Site Representative, El Paso Electric l

• T. Haggard, Supervisor, Radiation Protection Support Services

• W. Hoey, Manager, Radiation Protection Technical Services l

l

• M. Lantz, Supervisor, Dosimetry

• S. Lantz, Acting Supervisor, Unit 1 Radiation Protection

)

• T. Murphy, Supervisor, RMS Effluents

• R. Roehler, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

- t

• M. Shea, Manager, Unit t Radiation Protection

• W. Sneed, Manager, Unit 3 Radiation Protection

!

• C. Spell, ALARA Supervisor, Rcdiation Protection

• B. Wattson, System Engineer, GC.S/RMS

(*) Denotes the individuals that attended the exit meeting held December 11, 1992. The inspector also held discussions with other l

I personnel during the inspection.

2.

Follow-up (IP 92701)

(Closed) LER 50-530/92-002:

Reactor Coolant System Leakage Monitor

- i Inoperable. The licensee discovered a cracked gasket in Containment l

Atmosphere Monitor RU-1.

The defective gasket affected the monitor's

.

operation at low containment pressure. The inspector reviewed the i

licensee's evaluation and corrective ~ actions documented in the Licensee

- ;

t Event Report (LER) and Condition Report / Disposition Request (CRDR) No. 3-2-0265.

Based on the document review and verification of corrective

,

I actions, the inspector concluded that the actions taken were appropriate.

!

The inspector had no further questions regarding this item.

LClosed) IFI 50-530/92-42-01: The licensee issued Special Report 3-SR-

'

,92-003 when, on May 27, 1992, they discovered that the Unit 3 Fuel Building radiation monitor RU-146 was inoperable. CRDR No. 3-2-0199 was issued to document the licensee's investigation of the event. The root l

cause was determined to be personnel error on the part of a control room.

!

a.,sistant shift supervisor.

The inspector reviewed the document and

!

verified that corrective actions had been implemented. This item is

closed.

(0 pen) UNRI 50-528/91-53-01 : Calibration Method for Containment High Range Monitors.

Region V had requested technical assistance from the ~

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) regarding the licensee's i

method of calibtating the containment high range monitor using a " keep

.

alive" source.

NRR concluded that the licensee's method of calibrating

>

the containment high range monitor did not meet NUREG-0737 requirement

-

NRR's position was stated in a letter (Docket Nos.. 50-528, 529,'and-S.

!

l

.

,-.

- -. - -.

.

,~a-r--**

.

.

.

.

i

.

'

i dated November 3, 1992, from Martin J. Virgilio to Rosc A. Scarano.

The t

inspector discussed NRR's position with licensee represe coatives during this inspection.

Based on NRR's response, the licensee prepared an

,

!

Engineering Evaluation (EER No. 92-SQ-007) where they presented more

,

information and clarified other points. This unresolved item will remain open pending NRR's reevaluation of the new information presented.

(Closed) UNRI 50-529/92-31-01 : This unresolved item involved a work control planner stepping outside the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA)

boundary prior to frisking himself for contamination. The inspector reviewed the circumstances regarding this incident and interviewed the worker. The root cause appeared to be a training deficiency. The licensee's corrective actions included barring the individual from the RCA, retraining the individual, surveying the worker's office space, and disciplining the worker under provisions of the Positive Discipline Program.

The inspector determined that the licensee's actions after the incident were in accordance with their procedures. This i tem is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3.

On-Site Follow-up of Non-Routine Events (IP 92700)

Hot Particle Contamination Found During Whole Body Count a.

The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding a radioactive Co-60 particle found on a worker's underwear during a routine termination whole body count (WBC). The licensee was unable to establish with certainty when or where the contamination occurred.

The Co-60 particle was isolated and a skin dose evaluation was performed.

Based on conservative assumptions, a calculated dose of 1.3 Rem to the skin of the whole body was assigned to the worker.

Due to the particle's low activity (8.6 nCi) the particle would not have been detected by the personnel contamination monitors (PCMs)

upon exiting the radiological controlled area (RCA). The licensee demonstrated to the inspector the shielding effect that clothing had on the low-energy beta component of the Co-60 particle by placing the particle under clothing and then frisking with a Geiger-Mueller type hand held survey instrument. The licensee also demonstrated that the same shielding effect prevented the PCMs from detecting the particle.

Based on discussions with licensee representatives and the inspector's review of Contamination Report 3-92-077, the inspector concluded that the licensee had followed procedures and no

.'

regulatory exposuro limits were exceeded.

b.

Hot Particle Found in Cooling Tower Sludge Sample

,

The licensee reported finding a hot particle in a routine Unit 3 cooling tower sludge sample. The particle, a 2.8 nCi Co-60 l

fra pnt, was initially believed to be general contamination in the

'

sluye. The licensee, however, separated and isolated the minute

!

\\

F.

b

-

.

.

particle. The licensee stated that its physical size and low activity made it difficult to determine how the particle migrated to the cooling tower sludge. Sludge samples in the past have shown no measurable activity, and this is considered to be an isolated and rare occurrence.

Unit One Post-Trip Chemistry Evaluation c.

Unit I tripped at 2:30 p.m. on December 8, 1992 while the inspector was on-site. The inspector observed that the licensee was closely monitoring chemistry parameters and that, due to Steam Generator No.

I tube leak concerns and failed fuel pins, licensee management were sensitive to potential chemistry transients.

Steam generator tube leakage rate data indicated that primary-to-secondary system leakage was minimal, and there appeared to have been no new fuel failures as a result of the transient.

Currently, i

the estimated number of failed fuel pins is between four and eight I

pins. After restarting the unit on December 10, 1992, the inspector

!

verified that three charging pumps were placed in operation to

'

maintain dose equivalent iodine as low as possible in accordance with Reactor Engineering Department restart recommendations.

!

No violation or deviations were identified.

4.

Environmental Monitoring Program (IP 84750)

,

a.

Annual Report The inspector reviewed the licensee's 1991 Annual Radiological Environmental Report. The report concluded that there was no observed impact on the environment due to Palo Verde operations.

.

Based on the informaticn provided in the report, the inspector

!

'

concluded that the licensee's assessment was vali'd.

No violations or deviations were identified.

,

5.

Exit Interview

The inspector met with the individuals denoted in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on December 11, 1992. The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments. At the conclusion of the meeting, the licensee did not identify as proprietary any material provided to or examined by the inspector.

i