IR 05000528/1993008

Insp Repts 50-528/93-08,50-529/93-08 & 50-530/93-08 on 930510-13.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Followup on Open Items Identified During Previous Emergency Preparedness Insp

ML20045C614
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	06/10/1993
From:	Pate R, Qualls P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20045C591	List: IR 05000528/1993008 ML20045C590
References
50-528-93-08, 50-528-93-8, 50-529-93-08, 50-529-93-8, 50-530-93-08, 50-530-93-8, NUDOCS 9306240072
Download: ML20045C614 (8)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION V

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i Report Nos.

50-528/93-08, 50-529/93-08, and 50-530/93-08 i

License Nos.

NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74 Licensee:

Arizona Public Service Company P. O. Box 53999, Station 9082 Phoenix, Arizona 85837 Facility Name:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3.

Inspection at:

Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection Dates: May 10 - May 13, 1993 O /,44 27,9.3 Lead Inspector:

P. Qualls,' Reactor Inspector Dats Signed

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Other Inspectors: A. McQueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst L. Carson, Reactor Radiation Specialist L. Cohen, Sr. EP Specialist, NRR/PEPB L. Sherfey, Technical Group Leader, Operator Licensing Section, PNL (o,[/o/f3

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Approved by:

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u R: J. Pate,' CKief, Safeguards, Datt Sitned Emergency Preparedness, and Non-Power Reactor Branch Summary:

Areas Inspected:

Announced inspection to examine the following portions of

the licensee's emergency preparedness program:

follow-up on open items

identified during previous emergency preparedness inspections; observe the 1993 annual emergency preparedness exercise and associated critiques; and inspector identified Items. During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 82301 and 92701 were used.

Results: Overall, the licensee's program demonstrated that it will adequately protect the health and safety of the public during an emergency.

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9306240072 930610

PDR ADOCK 05000528

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DETAILS 1.

PERSONS CONTACTED

The below listed persons were contacted during the course of the

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inspection.

• W. Conway, Executive Vice-President-

• J. Levine, Vice-President, Nuclear Production f

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• P. Caudill, Director, Site Services

• G. Overbeck, Director, Nuclear Engineering

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• R. Adney, Plant Manager, Unit 1

• D. Gouge, Director, Plant Support

• H. Bieling, Manager, Emergency Planning

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• T. Barsuk, Supervisor, Onsite Emergency Planning -

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• A. Ogurek, Consultant / Nuclear Oversight

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• D. Elkinton, Sr. QA Technical Specialist

• C. McClain, Manager, Nuclear Training

• R. Fountain, Supervisor, QA&M

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• G. Cerkas, EP Consultant

• B. Grabo, Supervisor, NRA

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• J. Napier, NRA Sr. Engineer

• F. Casella, Consultant, HMM Associates

• R. Henry, SRP Site Representative

• J. Draper, SCE Site Representative

• S. Gowers, El Paso Electric Engineer

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R. Bouquot, Supervisor, QA&M D. Carnes, Shift Supervisor, Unit 3 P. Hughes, General Manager, Radiation Protection J. Austin, APS Deputy Fire Chief L. Leavitt, Sr. Analyst,. Security J. Knuth, Sr. Analyst, Security M. Koudelka, Coordinator, Emergency Planning D. Branson, Security supervisor

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D. Crozier, Supervisor, Fire Department Administration l

M. Czarnylias, Supervisor, Fire Department Operations

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L. Fitzrandolph, Coordinator, Emergency Planning E. Encimas, Fire Department Instructor.

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R. Kerwin, Maintenance Manager, Unit 3 F. Buckingham, Work Control, Unit 3 P. Guay, Chemistry Manager, Unit 3

The above individuals denoted with an asterisk were present during the exit meeting. The inspectors also contacted other members of the j

licensee's emergency preparedness, administrative, and technical staff

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and management during the course of the inspection.

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2.

Exercise Planning (responsibility, scenario / objectives, l

development, control of scenario)

The Manager, Emergency Planning (EP) has the overall responsibility for developing, conducting and evaluating the annual emergency preparedness exercise. The EP staff developed the scenario with the assistance of

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licensee staff from other organizations possessing appropriate expertise (e.g., reactor operations, health physics, maintenance, etc.).

In an

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effort to maintain strict security over the scenario, individuals who had been involved in the exercise scenario development were not i

participants in the exercise. NRC Region V was provided an opportunity

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to comment on the proposed scenario and cbjectives.

The complete.

exercise document included objectives and guidelines, exercise scenario and necessary messages and data (plant parameters and radiological-i information). The exercise document was tightly controlled before the

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exercise.

Advance copies of the exercise document were provided to the NRC evaluators and other persons having a specific need.

The players did not have access to the exercise document or information on scenario

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events.

This exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IV.F.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

3.

Exercise Scenario The exercise objectives and scenario were evaluated by the NRC and e

considered appropriate as a method to demonstrate the Arizona Public Service Company capabilities to respond to an emergency in accordance with their Emergency Plan and implementing procedures.

The exercise

scenario started with an event classified as an Unusual Event and ultimately escalated to a General Emergency (GE) classification.

The opening event in the exercise involved a steam leak in the Unit 3 Turbine Building. An Alert was declared about one-half hour later when a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak of 70 GPM occurs. The leak worsened until it exceeded charging pump capacity and was properly classified as

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a Site Area Emergency. Later voiding in the reactor meets the criteria for a General Emergency.

The exercise was terminated when exercise objectives had been demonstrated to the licensee and when the plant was ready to be placed in shutdown cooling.

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4.

Federal Observers Five NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response to the scenario.

Inspectors were stationed in the Control Room / Simulator (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and in the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).

The inspector in the OSC also accompanied a repair / monitoring team.

5.

Exercise Observations (82301)

The following observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the emergency preparedness program. An exercise weakness is a finding identified as needing corrective action in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F.5.

All exercise times and other times indicated in this report are Mountain Standard Time (MST).

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6.

Control Room / Simulator (CR)

The following aspects of CR operations were observed during the

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exercise: detection and classification of emergency events, notification, frequent use of emergency procedures, and innovative attempts to mitigate the accident.

Specific Observations by the NRC Inspector Two instances were observed in which the Shift Supervisor (SS) and

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Control Room Supervisor (CRS) had not communicated adequately resulting in the CRS ordering procedures done contrary to priorities established by the SS. The SS redirected the CRS and crew according to his prioritization.

At least one instance was observed in which an. operator had

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difficulty working through the procedure assigned to him. Again, r

the SS corrected the situation.

Briefings were infrequent.

It was fifty minutes into the event a

before the first briefing was held by the CRS.

At one point a Reactor Operator (RO) specifically asked for a staff-briefing.

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was another 15 minutes until the next was held.

Again, the total

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time elapsed between briefings was approximately fifty minutes.

Crew briefings should include all staff in the control room. :The

Shift Technical Advisors (STAS) and communicators were excluded l

from some briefings.

Briefings, for the most part, covered a single aspect of the drill

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(equipment status or plant status) and did not contain a definite beginning and end. The briefings did not always recap evolutions in progress, evolutions planned, equipment status, and overall plant status.

The Control Room was not kept informed as to the location of the

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contaminated injured party.

The SS provided appropriate oversight of control room activities.

• The crew informally discussed the event and provided unexpected

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solutions to plant problems.

Potential problems were also identified and actions considered which would have mitigated future events.

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The R0 in charge of assigning outside operators to tasks did a

good job of considering resources available and established priorities.

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7.

Technical Support Center (TSC)

The following aspects of TSC operations were observed:

activation,

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accident assessment / classification, notification, and interactions between the various emergency response facilities.

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Specific Observations by the NRC Inspector

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There appeared to be good problem solving and brain storming by

the Operations Technical Staff during the exercise.

The TSC radio did not work, but the players had it repaired during

the drill, using available resources.

TSC outer office areas were loaded with a large volume of

materials from the nonemergency use of the facility.

The SAE was declared at 0917 but not announced over the PA system

until 0932.

Status boards were not consistently kept up-to-date.

• No TSC control point was established until after the release had

started (approximately two hours after the General Emergency was declared).

i The Engineering / Technical Staff work area was not large enough to

support the number of staff.

The TSC airlock doors were observed to be opened simultaneously,

vice one at a time.

8.

Doerational Support Center (0SC)

The following aspects of OSC operations were observed:

activation of

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the facility, functional capabilities, and the disposition and i

management of various in-plant repair / monitoring teams, Specific Observations by the NRC Inspector i

Procedure EPIP-26, Potassium Iodine (KI) Administration, is not

clear about when to administer KI.

l The space outside the OSC (i.e. hallways & rooms) during an

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emergency could be better organized and controlled to support OSC operations.

i OSC repair and rescue teams either conducted their briefings in I

the hallways or in the OSC.

OSC support personnel were in i

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various locations throughout the Unit 3140' Radiological Controlled Area (RCA) access; including sitting on the floors.

Radios were not being used effectively by the OSC teams; there was

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a strong tendency to seek out and use plant telephones.

Airborne activity sampling analysis was not completed in a timely

By he time the analysis was completed, plant conditions manner.

had degraded such that the results were of minimal value.

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9.

Emeraency Goerations Facility (EOF)

The following E0F operations were observed:

staffing and activation,

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functional capabilities, facility management and control, accident assessment and classification recommendations, interface with offsite

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officials, dose assessment, and the formulation of and making protective action recommendations.

Specific Observations by Two NRC Inspectors

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The EOF was declared activated within 29 minutes after declaration

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of an Alert. The activation was orderly and effectively implemented.

Procedural guidance was utilized and personnel appeared knowledgeable in their duties and responsibilities.

Initial notifications of offsite agencies were completed in a

timely manner. The shift communicator effectively used established procedures and communication equipment.

Information was presented in a clear and concise manner.

Protective action recommendations (PARS) were developed following i

discussion and consideration of existing plant conditions as well as previously implemented offsite protective actions.

Discussions

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were held between the licensee and offsite officials to ensure the bases and logic for PARS were understood.

j The status of protective actions implemented by offsite agencies

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was reported to the licensee through offsite liaisons.

Licensee officials remained cognizant of the status of offsite protective action implementations.

The technique of having a stenographer document with a personal i

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computer a chronological log of activities and telephone conversations of the Emergency Operations Director (E0D) and alternate appeared effective.

Status boards were not maintained in the main room. The Plant

Status Board was not kept updated.

In two instances, changes were made in plant parameters, but the time was not updated.

In several instances, the board was partially revised with data bits and pieces instead of updating the full board.

This observation-j

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was also made by a licensee player in the facility after-exercise critique.

PARS were not shown on any status boards in the main room of the

EOF

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With two exceptions, EOF update briefings by the E0D and his

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alternate were frequent and comprehensive.

Elevated radiation levels in containment were not provided in an early briefing to

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the EOF staff and the early announcement of an injured worker was not provided in a briefing to the EOF staff.

The licensee performed anticipatory dose assessment which provided l

the E0D with supporting radiological scenarios to assist him in making PARS.

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The licensee promptly deployed two environmental monitoring teams

within 18 minutes of the declaration of the SAE.

There was good coordination in the E0F between the licensee and

the State of Arizona field teams.

The Licensee did not back calculate source terms based upon actual

field measurements.

Followup of Open Items (92701)

a.

(50-528/92-09-01) Failure of the OSC to Provide HP Monitorina (CLOSED)

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In the 1992 annual exercise the licensee failed to provide HP technician support to some of the repair teams sent out by the OSC. No cases of this failure were documented during the 1993 exercise. This item is CLOSED.

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b.

(50-528/92-09-02) Enaineerina Support (CLOSED)

In the 1992 exercise the inspectors noted that engineering support from the TSC, the corporate staff, and other resources appeared _to t

be lacking.

In the 1993 exercise, the inspectors noted that there was good participation by the technical staff.

This item is CLOSED.

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Critioues A series of exercise critiques was conducted by the licensee upon completion of the exercise.

First, a facility critique was conducted at each emergency response facility with players and controllers immediately following the exercise.

Upon conclusion of these critiques, a player and controller critique was conducted by the licensee on May 12, 1993, to review the items surfaced at the facility critiques.

The licensee also noted several of the items identified by the NRC

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observers, as well as other exercise strengths and problems for improvement.

12.

Exit Interview On May 13, 1993, at the conclusion of the site visit, the inspectors met with the licensee representatives identified in Paragraph I to summarize the scope and the preliminary results of.this inspection.

The items identified in this report were discussed at that time.

The-licensee-did-not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.

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