IR 05000528/1986029
| ML20215C195 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1986 |
| From: | Brown G, Fish R, Good G, Prendergast K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215C156 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-86-29, 50-529-86-28, NUDOCS 8612150057 | |
| Download: ML20215C195 (9) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-528/86-29 and 50-529/86-28 Docket Nos. 50-528 and 50-529 License Nos. NPF-34 and NPF-51 Licensee: Arizona Nuclear Power Project P. O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site - Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection conducted:
October 27-31, 1986 Inspectors:
MM II G. M Good, Emergen'cy Preparedness Analyst Date Signed Te Leader Y1A
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libflM K.M.Prendergpt,EmergencyPreparedness Date Signed Analyst
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E rown, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Date Signed Team Members:
M. E. Solberg, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRC G. R. Bryan, Jr., Reactor Operations Engineer, Comex Corp.
Approved By:
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. F. Fish, Chief Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Summary:
Inspection on October 27-31, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-528/86-29 and 50-529/86-28)
Areas Inspected:
Announced inspection of the emergency preparedness exercise and associated critiques.
Inspection Procedure 82301 was covered.
Results:
No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified.
8612150057 861126 PDR ADOCK 05000528 G
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s DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted A.
Arizona Nuclear Power Project Personnel T. Barsuk, Supervisor, Onsite Emergency Planning H. Lines, Emergency Planning Coordinator K. Wright, Emergency Planning Coordinator D. Yows, Manager, Emergency Planning and Preparedness (EP&P)
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Other Personnel P. Frascino, HMM Associates J. Lischinsky, HMM Associates C. Losinger, HMM Associater R. Merlino, HMM Associates M. O' Hare, HMM Associates M. Vigliani, HMM Associates 2.
Emergency Preparedness Exercise Planning The EP&P staff has the overall responsibility for developing and conducting the emergency preparedness exercise.
The licensee issued a contract to HMM Associates which provided for scenario development, formulation of the data and an evaluation of the exercise.
A committee, which was composed of people with the appropriate disciplines (including State and County representatives), was established to review the scenario and scenario data.
Persons involved in the scenario development and review were not participants in the exercise.
The EP&P Manager acted as Lead Controller with the responsibilities of establishing the exercise objectives (in concert with the offsite agencies),-developing-the scenario package and directing the exercise.
NRC, Region V and FEMA, Region IX were provided with an opportunity to comment on the objectives and scenario package.
The exercise package included the objectives.and extent of play, exercise scenario, exercise ground rules, messages used during the exercise, initial and subsequent plant parameters, meteorological, chemical and radiological data and guides for the controllers.
The exercise document was tightly controlled before'the exercise.
Advance copies of the scenario package were provided to the NRC observers and other persons having a specific need.
The players did not have access to the exercise document or information on the scenario events.
The exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IV.F.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
Licensee controllers were stationed at each of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) (e.g., Control Room (CR)/ Simulator, Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC), TSC, Operations Support Center (0SC) and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)) to provide messages / data where appropriate.
Controllers were also dispatched with every repair / monitoring team, including the Radiological Emergency Response Vehicle (RERV).
A final l
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briefing of the controllers was conducted on October 28, 1986.
The following subjects were discussed at this briefing:
controller responsibilities, contents of controllers' packages, critiques and the importance of determining whether objectives were met.
All of the NRC evaluators were present for this controllers' briefing.
3.
Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario started with an event classified as an Unusual
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Event (UE) and ultimately escalated to a General Emergency (GE)
condition.
The exercise began at 0800 on October 29, when the Shift Supervisor (SS) was notified of a (simulated) toxic gas release near the site. This. prompted the declaration of the UE.
At 0845, a reactor coolant pump developed a sheared (broken) shaft, but the reactor failed to automatically trip.
The operators manually tripped the plant, however, an alert was declared based on an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS).
A Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared after a steam generator tube leak increased to 200 gallons per minute (gpm).
The SAE was based on the uncontrolled loss of reactor coolant and the ATWS. At 1130, the combination of a lightning strike and a diesel generator failure caused a GE to be declared based on the ATWS, the loss of offsite and onsite power and the primary / secondary leakage.
The scenario included a major offsite release and some participation specific to security personnel.
Emergency response personnel were severely hampered due_to the loss of instrumentation caused by the lack of power.
Both the Emergency Response Facilities Data Acquisition and Display System (ERFDADS) and Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) were lost as a result of the scenario.
4.
Federal Evaluators Five NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response.
Inspectors were stationed in the CR/STSC (simulator), TSC, E0F and two in the OSC.
One of the individuals assigned to the OSC, also observed the operation of the RERV.
The other inspector assigned to the OSC accompanied repair / monitoring teams in order to evaluate their performance.
FEMA, Region IX evaluators were also present during the exercise.
The FEMA team of evaluators (approximately 15) were evaluating those portions of the exercise that involved State and local agencies, as well as the interface occurring at the E0F.
The results of FEMA's evaluation of the State and local participation will be described in a separate report issued by FEMA.
5.
Control Room / Satellite Technical Support Center (Simulator)
The following aspects of CR operations were observed during the exercise:
detection and classification of emergency events, mitigation, notifications and protective action recommendations (PARS).
The following are NRC observations of the CR activities.
These observations are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
a.
The Public Address (PA) announcement of TSC activation occurred before the Plant Manager had assumed Emergency Coordinator (EC)
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It is recommended that the procedural process for TSC activation be revised to ensure that activation and transfer of EC
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responsibilities are clear..The PA announcement should be the last
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b.
The initial notification message to the NRC at the Alert level was not reviewed by the EC, prior to transmission.
Since this could
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provide a path, for potentially erroneous.information to get out, it 4-is recommended that the form be revised to require EC approval.
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c.
The-reactor vessel level, indication system (RVLIS) was not installed in the simulator, however, it is available in each unit's CR.
Since
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the simulator is used for training purposes, it'is suggested that the lack of a RVLIS in the simulator be reviewed to see if it should
be added.~
d.
The licensee should consider what compensatory measures (e.g.
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preformatted forms transmitted at regular intervals, dedicated phone talkers, or augmented use of status boards) would be necessary to transmit data to the ERFs, given the loss of the ERFDADS.
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Technical Support Center The following aspects of TSC operations were observed:
activ'ation,
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accident assessment / classification, dose assessment, PARS-and CR support.
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The "open" item is of sufficient importance to warrant NRC examination J-during a future inspection.
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a.
Habitability and radiological conditions were frequently monitored.
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The perimeter (out of plant) paging system was unintelligible during the exercise.,Since this may be of significant safety concern
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.regarding.the licensee's ability to protect onsite employees, the
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resolution this matter will be tracked as "open" item (86-28-01).
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Operations Support Center
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The following OSC operations were observed:
activation of the facility,
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functional. capabilities and disposition of various inplant/ monitoring
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The following are NRC observations of the OSC activities.
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'.'open"' items are of-sufficient importance to warrant NRC examination
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during a' future inspection.
The other observations are intended to be
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suggestions for improving the program.
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a.
Facility (OSC) management and personnel coordination were hampered
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It is recommended that adjacent areas be utilized for personnel who are waiting to be assigned to repair / monitoring teams.
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'A' radiological control point, to ensure cleanliness of the OSC, was
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Further, habitability surveys did not include routine air sampling or smear surveys.
It is recommended that
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habitability of the 0SC be more closely monitored.
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I c.
Status boards were not consistently updated.
d.
The repair team which was dispatched to the loose parts monitor did not include a Radiation Protection (RP) Technician.
e.
In some cases team briefings did not include information related to plume direction.
f.
Precautions to limit personnel exposure from airborne radioactive materials was not adequate.
None of the teams dispatched from the.
OSC used Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBAs).
Due to a lack of battery powered air samplers and controller intervention that stopped actions which were being taken to obtain a portable generator, no air samples were taken to determine whether the use of SCBAs was appropriate.
Given the absence of this information and the relatively significant release (simulated) which occurred during the exercise, it would have been prudent to use the SCBAs.
Due to the safety significance of this issue, the Region will track this matter as "open" item (86-28-02).
g.
Offsite monitoring teams were dispatched without adequate dosimetry.
Personnel assigned to the offsite monitoring teams wore Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLDs) while they were in the OSC.
Upon exiting the protected area, these TLDs were collected, as usual, by security personnel at the Security Headquarters access point.
Since replacement TLDs were not provided to these team members by way of an emergency kit, there was no mechanism for recording their permanent integrated dose (s).
Region V will track the resolution of this issue as "open" item (86-28-03).
h.
Instrumentation to determine dose rate and proximity to the plume were not used in the RERV.
A frisker was noted to be face down and-in the back of the van.
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Personnel. assigned to offsite monitoring teams were not familiar-with the current -location of air sampling equipment and respirators.
Due to a recent procedure change, these items are now being stored in the RERV, instead of the " snatch-and go kits".
It is recommended that affected personnel be kept informed / trained when changes of this nature occur.
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Some of the personnel assigned to the RERV were.not completely
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If less experienced personnel are to be used to support the RERV, it is
recommended that they be closely supervised.
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The instruments provided to the RERV should be reliable.
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personnel were never able to stabilize the Eberline SAM II.
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Some'of the physical aspects of the RERV operation should be l
evaluated in terms of occupant safety / comfort.
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Exhaust fumes from the vehicle and the generator collected inside the working space of the RERV.
This could be harmful during prolonger operation.
ii. Noise levels from the generator and the vehicle were high
.inside the RERV.
8.
Emergency Operations Facility The following EOF operations were observed:
activation of the facility, functional capabilities, notifications, offsite dose assessment and interface with offsite officials.
The following are NRC observations of the E0F activities.
The second two observations are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
a.
Habitability and radiological conditions were closely monitored.
b.
At the SAE classification, notifications to offsite agencies were completed with an incorrect status of release. The form was noted to indicate that there was no release, when in fact there was a small release in progress.
Two apparent problems contributed to this situation.
i.
Information regarding the release was apparently not clear to all E0F personnel.
ii. The notifications were made using a form that had been completed, but not signed / approved by the Emergency Operations Director (EOD).
c.
It is recommended that the information exchange between the technical staff and the radiological assessment (RA) staff be improved. Weaknesses were noted regarding the release through the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs). The RA staff did not know about the release for 8 minutes, nor did they know when the release actually started.
Further, the technical staff could have assisted the RA staff in their determination of the flow through the ADVs.
9.
Critiques Immediately following the exercise, mini-critiques were held in each of the ERFs. The players, controllers and evaluators participated in these mini-critique sessions.
Subsequent to the mini-critiques, a larger critique session was conducted in the E0F.
Controllers, evaluators and key players from each ERF participated in this critique.
A summary of the licensee's preliminary findings, including proposed recommendations, was compiled at the larger critique session.
During a meeting conducted on October 30, 1986, the EP&P Manager presented a summary of these preliminary findings to several levels of management.
The NRC evaluator team was present during this meeting.
The following represent some of the licensee's exercise findings as presented during the October 30, 1986 meeting.
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a.
There were several deficiencies in the PA portion of the Site Warning Siren /PA System.
Communications were garbled, speakers were misadjusted (too loud) and the system failed altogether during the exercise.
b.
The NRC uses their standard notification form for receiving information.
If the CR had not filled in this form there would have been difficulties in transferring information.
Applicable Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs - 03 and 04) do not require this form to be completed.
c.
A PA announcement was made stating that the TSC was activated when in fact the'EC duties had not yet been transferred to the TSC.
d.
The procedure for site evacuation does not require mandatory evacuation at the GE classification.
e.
Security personnel misunderstood initial UE direction from the Central Alarm Station (CAS) to standby to mean that E0F access control should be initiated.
f.
Performance of dose projections during the loss of RMS data was extremely difficult.
g.
Inplant teams entered areas.without knowing radiological conditions.
This problem was largely due to the lack of battery powered air samplers.
h.
Offsite maps need to be improved.
10.
Exercise Summary FEMA representatives held an open briefing on October 30, 1986 at the Division of Emergency Services' (DES) auditorium.
The purpose of this briefing was to present a general summary of their preliminary findings to the offsite participants.
FEMA will issue their findings in a separate report.
The NRC Team Leader attended this briefing.
Some media representatives were also present.
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Exit Interview An exit interview to discuss the preliminary NRC findings was held on October 31, 1986.
The attachment to this report identifies the licensee's personnel who were present at the meeting.
The NRC was
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represented by the five evaluator team members.
The licensee was informed that no significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspection.
All of the findings / observations described in Detail Sections 5-8 were specifically
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The NRC Team Leader complimented the licensee on the exceptionally professional manner that was exhibited by the players in all of the ERFs.
Additionally, the NRC Team Leader acknowledged that many of the NRC findings were also identified by the licensee's controllers / evaluators.
However, due to the number of weaknesses identified in the area of RP, the licensee was informed that it appeared
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that~they had not demonstrated their exercise objective regarding " proper heaith physics techniques".
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ATTACHMENT
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EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES
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R. Baron,' Supervisor, Compliance T. Barsuk, Supervisor, Onsite Emergency Planning H. Bieling, Supervisor,'Offsite Emergency Planning J. Bynum, Plant Manager D. Canady, Manager, Communications-M..DeMichele,_ President, Arizona Pu'lic Service b
H. Driscoll, Assistant Vice President, ANPP J. Haynes, Vice President, ANPP.
W. Ide, Director, Quality Assurance / Quality Control K. Jesberger, Secretary, Compliance W. Quinn, Manager, Licensing
- T. Shriver, Manager, Compliance E. Van Brunt, Executive Vice President, ANPP D. Yows, Manager, EP&P i
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