ML20205M510
See also: IR 05000528/1986007
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The informatiori c'n thi page is considered to b'e appropriate
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for public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/86-07 and 50-529/86-06 (IE-V-737)
Docket Nos.
50-528 and 50-529
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License Nos.
Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project
P. O. Box 52034
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Inspection at:
Wintersburg, Arizona
Inspection conducted:
February 11 through March 13, 1986
Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: November 11-14 and 27, 1985
Type of Inspection:
Unannounced, Routine Physical Security
Inspectors:
t w . ((.
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2-
Y
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D. Schaefer, Physical 'ecurity Inspector
Date $igned
$1
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L. Nbrderh'aug, 3r. ~ Mat
ol Analyst
Date Signed
@ O M,.E
SMW.
Approved By:
M. D. Schuster, Chief, Safeguards Section
Date Signed
Inspection Summary:
Areas Inspected:
Information Notice 85-79; Security Event Reports; Management
Effectiveness-Security Program; Security Organization; Records and Reports;
Physical Barriers - Protected Area; Physical Barrier - Vital Areas; Lighting;
Access Control - Personnel; Detection Aids - Vital Areas; Alarm Stations;
Communication; Personnel Training and Qualification Plan; and Follow-up items
from previous security inspections. During this inspection, Inspection
Procedures 30703, 81020, 81022, 81038, 81052, 81054, 81062, 81070, 81080,
81084, 81088, 81501, 92700, 92701, 92702 and 92703 were covered.
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8704020416 870327
THOMP86-A-175
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Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements
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within the areas examined during the inspection, except for the following
items: Failure to limit vital area access to only authorized individuals;
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Failure to respond to vital area alarms; Failure to maintain adequate vital
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area barriers; Failure to account for identification badges on a daily basis;
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Failure to maintain minimum illumination level inside the protected area; and
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Failure to report security events to the NRC.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Key Persons Contacted
- J. Ball, Resident Inspector, USNRC
- S. Brown, Corporate Security ANPP
- J. Bynum, Plant Manager, PVNGS
M. Deblo, Security Operations Supervisor, PVNGS
- T. Delnoce, Compliance Specialist, Operations Security, PVNGS
- W. Fernow, Plant Services Manager, ANPP
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K. Gross, Compliance Supervisor, PVNCS
- J. Haynes, Vice President, Nuclear Production, ANPP
R. Hans, Director of Personnel, ANPP
K. Helman, Labor Relations Specialist, ANPP
- G. Hernande=, Resident Inspector, USNRC
- W. Ide, Director, Corporate Quality Assurance / Quality Control, ANPP
- C. Kelley, Security Training Support Services Supervisor, PVNGS
B. Knighton, Supervisor, Construction Security, PVNGS
- D. Lanier, Licensing Engineer, ANPP
- E. Lumley, Sr., Compliance Specialist, Operations Security, PVNGS
- L. Miller, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2, Region V, USNRC
M. Menten, Communications Engineer, ANPP
- D. Nelson, Manager, Operations Security, PVNGS
- S. Penick, Quality Monitoring Supervisor, ANPP
- C, Russo, Manager, Quality Assurance Auditor and Monitoring, ANPP
P. Ruth, Access Control / Badging Supervisor, PVNGS
- M. Schuster, Chief, Safeguards Section, Region V, USNRC
- T. Shriver, Manager, Compliance, PVNGS
J. Thompson,' Compliance Engineer, PVNGS
- E. Van Brunt Jr., Executive Vice President, ANPP
D. Webb, Quality Assurance Engineer, ANPP
- R. Zimmerman, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC
The inspect. ors also interviewed members of the licensee's security staff
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during the course of this inspection.
- Denotes those individuals that attended the February 14, 1986 exit
interview.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings
) Follow-u Items 85-15-03 and 85-41-04):
In
rative
Although
identified on
e previous security 2nspection ad been re ired
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. (Closed) Follow-up Item (85-24-01): Contract for security guard
services.
During a previous security inspection, the inspector observed
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that the Arizona Public Service (APS) contracts for security guard
services did not contain the four part provisions required by 10 CFR 73.55(b)(1).
During this inspection, the inspector verified that
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these security guard contracts had been amended to include the required
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provisions.
(Closed) Violation, Unit-1 (85-30-01): Failure to telephonically notify
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NRC within required time limitations of loss of physical security
effectiveness. During a previous security inspection, the inspector
determined that the licensee failed to telephonically notify NRC within
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a licensee identified deficiency in their perimeter M
This identified deficiency, classed as a Moderate Loss of
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ysical Security Effectiveness, allowed undetected access into the
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licensee's protected area. During this inspection, the inspectors again
determined that the licensee failed on numerous occasions to
telephonically notify NRC within the required time limitations of a loss
of physical security effectiveness. See paragraph 7 of this report for
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details.
(Note: This previous violation is administratively closed,
however, it serves as the basis for issuance of the repeat violation
discussed in paragraph 7 of this report.)
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.(Closed) Violation, Unit-1 (85-30-02): Failure to compensate for
parimeter alarm deficiency. During a previous security inspection it was
determined through observations of the inspector that no compensatory
measures had been taken
the licensee for an inadequate segment of the
perimeter
A portion of the alarm system was
proven deficient on eptember
, 1985, and the compensatory measure was
not posted until the morning of September 25, 1985. During this
inspection the inspectors observed that the security officer compensatory
posts were consistent with the licensee's approved Securit
with
the security procedures. The ins ectors randomly tested
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and determined t at t e
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sensitivity and operation of these zones were adequate.
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(Closed) Follow-up Item (85-30-01): Revision of Security Procedure.
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During a previous security inspection, the licensee indicated their
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intention of revising Security Procedure 20AC-0ZZ07 pertaining to
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unescorted access screening. During this inspection, the inspectors
verified that Revision 1 of this procedure had been approved on
January 9,1986 and distributed for use.
(Open) Follow-up Item (85-30-02): Security Alarm Rate. The alarm rate
during the period of the inspection visit appeared manageable although
the level of activity, particularly at Unit 1, was also minimal. This
item will remain open for additional review during the upcoming Unit 1
outage.
(Open) Follow-up Item (85-30-03): Detection Aids. During a revious
securit ins
tion it was observed
the ins ctors tha
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(0 pen) Follow-up Item (85-30-13): Central Alarm Station (CAS). During a
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previous security inspection, it was determined that the CAS had high
activity and a high noise level. During this inspection it was noted
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(0 pen) Follow-up Item (85-30-14): Radio Communication.
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revious securit ins
it was detenmined that
Durin this ins etion it was
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etermine
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imited interviews with secur~
o acers disclosed that -
some were un er the impression that they
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The licensee noted that shift briefings would include a
c arification to assure that all securit officers are aware of their
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full access to the
See paragraph 13 of this
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inspection report for a discussion concerning the licensee's status of
the required improvements and upgrade of their radio communication
system.
(Open) Follow-up Item (85-30-15): Safeguards Information. The licensee
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policies, procedures for the protection of safeguards infomation, and
practices at corporate offices and contractor facilities will be
inspected during subsequent security inspections.
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(Closed) Violation, Unit-1 (85-38-01): Failure to evaluate screening
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records for contract employees. During a previous security inspection,
Bechtel screening records had not been evaluated in accordance with the
criteria used for the licensee's Personal Reliability Program.
Subsequent security inspections determined that Bechtel Construction had
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revised their background screening procedure and had reviewed the
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screening records of all employees recommended for unescorted access.
During this inspection, the inspector also verified that Bechtel was
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reviewing the results of all background investigations prior to
requesting unescorted access to the protected area.
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(Closed) Violation, Unit-1 (85-38-02): Failure to maintain complete
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screening records for contract em
ees.
Durin a revious s
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inspection, it was determined
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Subsequent to the
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i ntificar. ion of this violation, the ins ector verified that
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(Closed) Violation, Unit-1 (85-38-04): Failure of protected area (PA)
detection aids to detect
rsonnel. Durin a r
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inspection
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During a subsequent
security inspection, tne inspectors verified through testing that the
ui ment associated with these perimeter
secu
performed as required and detected all personne
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attempting to avoid detection.
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(Closed) Follow-up-Item _(85-41-01):
ANPP evaluation of extended work
schedule for security personnel. See paragraph 5 of this report for
details.
(Open) Follow-up Item (85-41-02):
Inpsection of vital area barriers.
During a previous security inspection, the inspectors
Wapprovedwor
The icensee indicated that completion of an
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(Closed) Follow-up Item (85-41-03):
Inspection of vital area barriers.
Durin a
revious security inspection the ins ectors determined that the
were not properly
secured. During this ins ection, it was noted by the ins a
s that the
e arrier opening.
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3.
Licensee Actions on Open Items Since Last Security Inspection
(Closed) 73.71(c) Report Item (10-29-85):
Vital area (VA) Door Assigned
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Improper Access Level. See paragraph 11A of this report for details.
_(Closed) 73.71(c) Report Item (11-23-85):
Security key-card issued to a
wrong employee. The licensee reported that approximately 7:04 a.m.,
November 23, 1985, a contract employee (1st employee) had been issued a
assigned to another contract employee (2nd employee).
At 7:30 a.m., November 23, 1985, upon being searched and. requesting his
to enter the protected area (PA), it was determined that the
assigned
for the second employee was not available for issuance.
A check wit
entral Alarm Station (CAS) determined that this
@loyee at 7:04 a.m.,
and that the first employee was inside the PA.for the second em
emp
A roximately 7:55 a.m.,' the
assigned to the second e
e was
Later in the morning, when the first emp oyee posessing the
of the second employee) attempted to exit the PA, and caused an
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Security Department responded and questioned his activity while
ins
determined, through interview and a review of
that he had entered the PA
car ter an the morning an
no en ere any vital areas. The licensee
notified the NRC Operations Center within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and submitted a
written report of this event to Region V, NRC. The licen:.ee classified
this event as a Moderate Loss of Security Effectiveness, uncompensated.
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The licensees corrective action (s) included a critical task retraining of
the security officer prior to being returned to duty.
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(Closed) 73.71(c) Event Report (01-26-86):
Vital entrance security post
mistakenly removed. See paragraph 11.D of this report for details of
this event and a summary of licensee's corrective actions.
(Closed) 73.71(c) Report Item (01-29-86):
Vital area door found unlocked
and unalarmed during a planned security computer outage. See
paragraph 8.C of this report for details of this event and a summary of -
licensee's corrective actions.
4.
MC-30703 - Exit Meeting
On February 14, 1986, the inspectors met with the licensee
representatives noted in paragraph I to summarize the scope and results
of this inspection. Also present at the exit meeting was M. D. Schuster,
Chief, Safeguards Section, Region V, US NRC. Following comments by the
two NRC inspectors (D. Schaefer and L. Norderhaug), M. Schuster expressed
his concerns that the demonstrated overall performance of the licensee's
security program was " marginal at best".
The licensee indicated that they would forward to Re ion V an engineering
description of a possible substandard barrier at
(see
paragraph 8A(2)). The inspectors noted that further review of security
incident reports and potentially reportable occurrences may identify
additional problem areas.
5.
MC-81022 - Security Organization
No violations were identified.
A.
As discussed during the telephone conversation between
Messrs. C. Kelley, ANPP and D. Schaefer of this office on March 13,
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1986, this inspection identified an inconsistency in the approved
Security Plan. The first paragraph of Section 5.2.1 of the Security
Plan states in part that,
This portion of the Security Plan satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) which requires in part, that unoccupied vital areas
be locked and protected by an active intrusion alarm system.
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The second part of Section 5.2.1 of the Security Plan states in
part:
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This second part of Section 5.2.1 does og require that the vital
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portals be alarmed as required by 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7).
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During the above telephone conversation
e licensee indicated that
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the second part of Section 5.2.
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(50-528/86-07-01)
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B.
Also identified during this inspection was a portion of a Security
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Procedure which did not totally support the requirements in the
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approved Security Plan. Section 11.0 of the Security Plan states in
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part:
Paragraph 7.6.1 of the CAS/SAS Operations Procedure (20SP-0ZZ07)
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(emphasis added)
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The above referenced pe: tion of Procedure 20SP-0ZZ07 does not agree
with Section 11.0 of the a
roved Securit Plan in that the
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Mc-81022 Security Organization
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One apparent violation was identified.
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A.
During the previous security inspection it was determined through
interview of security officers that
ANPP was requeste to consider all (safety related
work factors and evaluate the need for continuing this extended work
schedule for their security personnel.
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During'this inspection, the licensee stated that as a result of
their evaluation,.they intended to use as " guidance" the
requirements contained in Station Procedure 10AC-0ZZ07 titled:
Overtime Limitations, and to apply the work limitations to the
Security Department,
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-B.
The licensee's approved Security Plan dated October 1979, in
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Section 11.0 states in part that,
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Contrary to this requirement, on February 25, 1986, the licensee
forwarded a 73.71(c) report describing an event which occurred at
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Unit 2.
Additionally, on March 13, 1986, Messrs. C. Kelley, ANPP
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and D. Schaefer of this office discussed this event in detail. The
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licensee reported that on February 20, 1986, on three separate
occasions, a' contract employee from Combustion E ineerin
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authorized to enter the
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The em
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occasions
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additional alarms an the security a arm
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stations -- a total of six alarms. The UER alarms caused by this
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contract employee were as follows.
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Time In-Vital Area
Time Out-Vital Area
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9:53 a.m.
10:04 a.m.
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11:47 a.m.
12:15 p.m.
3:38 p.m.
3:42 p.m.
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Upon questioning, this cont
ovee advised the licensee that
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he had apparent 1
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The failure by the licensee to respond to the security a arms at
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9:53 a.m.,
10:04 a.m., 11:47 a.m., 12:15 p.m., and 3:38 pm.,
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represent an apparent Violation.
(50-529/86-06-01)
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7.
MC-81038 Records and Reports
One apparent violation was identified.
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During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed licensee's Security
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Incident Reports, Potentially Reportable Occurrence (PRO) Reports and
(10 CFR 73.71c) Security Event Reports. The inspectors review of these
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reports revealed situations at Units 1 and 2 which were
NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71( M reported to
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c).
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10 CFR 73.71(c) requires in part, that each licensee notify the NRC
Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System, within a
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specified time, of any event which threatens or lessens the effectiveness
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of a required physical security system. The time period begins upon
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discovery of the event by any member of the security organization or any
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. other licensee employce.
Additionally, the licensee is required to
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submit a written report to NRC describing the event in detail within
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five days of the time of discovery.
Specifically, the Table in this
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paragraph requires that an uncompensated Major Loss of Physical Security
Effectiveness be telephonically reported to NRC within one hour.
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Additionally, this Table requires that a compensated Major or an
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uncompensated Moderate Loss of Physical Security Effectiveness be
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telephonically reported to NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Footnote 2 to this
paragraph indicates in part, that a Major Loss occurs when security
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features break down without proper compensation allowing unauthorized or
undetected access to vital areas. Further, Footnote 4 to this paragraph
indicates in part, that the term properly compensated, means measures as
specified in the security or contingency plans, or if the event is not
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specified in either of these plans, it means measures implemented within
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10 minutes of an events occurrence that provides a level of security
equivalent to that existing before the event.
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Footnote 5 to Paragraph 73.71(c) indicates that a moderate loss of
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physical security effectiveness occurs when a major loss of effectiveness
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is properly compensated,
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A review of the licensee's Security Incident Reports determined that on
several occasions listed in the following table, security component
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failures, which provided an avenue for unauthorized access, were properly
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compensated for when discovered by the licensee but were not reported to
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the NRC.
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DATE
NATURE
09/24/85
09/30/85
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10/30/85
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11/26/85
12/21/85
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The failure to report these events represents a repeat violation.
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(50-528/86-07-03)
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NOTE: On September 23, 1985, the licensee failed to notif the NRC of a
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specific deficiency in the perimeter
(See NRC
Inspection Report 50-528/85-30).
8.
MC-81054 - Physical Barriers - Vital Areas
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Two apparent violations were identified.
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A.
The licensee's approved Security Plan dated
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Section 5.2.1 states in art t
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(1) Contrary to the above requirement, a review of licensee security
incident reports determined that on S
ember
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vital area barrier inst
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dditionally, on November 26,
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1985, the vital area
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The licensee ident
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ese violations to the NRC.
(Note: Paragraph 7 of this
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inspection report identifies these two events as not being
reported to the NRC).
(50-528/86-07-04)
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(2) Contrary to the above requirement, on February 13, 1986, the
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inspectors identified an
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in a vital area barrier in the
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The failure to rovide an ade uate barrier
represents t ree examp es of an apparent violation.
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B.
The licensee's approved Security Plan dated October 1979,
(1) Contrary to the above requiremen
n Februa
inspectors identified a
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(2) Contrary to the above requirements, a review of licensee
Security Incident Reports determined that on Sepember 24, 1985,
an inad
ate vital area barrier existed ad acent
e licensee
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identified but did not report this violation to the NRC.
(Note: Paragraph 7 of this inspection report identifies this
event as not being reported to the NRC).
(50-528/86-07-05)
The failure to provide an adequate barrier at
represents an apparent violation.
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C.
A review of licensee Security Event Reports determined that
approximately 2:36 a.m., January 29, 1986,
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a security o icer
con ucting a vital area tour discovere
at vital area 6
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was unlocked and unalarmed. The security officer immediately
secured the door and notified his shift Captain, who in turn
initiated a search of the lower levels of the auxiliary building.
No unauthorized persons or an d radation was found. The licensee
investigation determined tha
was initiated at 11:12 p.m.,
anuary
th and lasted until 3:00 a.m.,
January 29, 1986. At
roximately 2:12 a.m., a security officer opened vital area S .
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to allow a fire watch to complete his tour. This was the
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last recorded transaction at this door until it was discovered
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unlocked 24 minutes later, by a security officer on vital area tour.
During the
compensatory security posts were in place
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at the time o t is eve
The eriodic line-of-sight monitoring of
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all vital area doors during
enhanced the potential to
detect the presence of unauthorized personnel. The 1
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completed an evaluation of the locking device on
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determined that during this event this mechanism
owe removal of
the key with the door either locked or unlocked. The licensee is
seeking a new mechanism which will allow removal of the key only
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after the door has been locked.
(50-528/86-07-07)
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9.
MC-81062 - Lighting
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One apparent violation was identified.
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The licensee's approved Security Plan
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Section 3.1.4 states in part that,
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At approximately 9:30
.m. on Februa
11, 1986
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he failure to provide adequate illumination
'at these two areas represents an apparent violation.
(50-529/86-06-03)
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10.
MC-81064 - Compensatory Measures
No violations were identified.
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NUREG-1045 dated January 1984 titled: " Guidance on the Application of
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Compensatory Safeguards Measures for Power Reactor Licensees" addresses
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examples of appropriate safeguards compensatory measures. On page 3, the
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appropriate compensatory measure for a component failure in the case of
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doors, walls, roofs and floors of buildings containing vital equipment is
specified as " armed guards with appropriate communications to alarm
stations."
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The licensee's approved Security P1
dated October 1979, in
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Section 3.1.2 states in art th
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The licensee's approved Security Procedu're 20SP-0ZZO8 discusses the
compensatory measures provided utilizing members of the security force
,
recedur
in Section 5.5.3 (on page 10) states in art:
,
'
_
d
During this inspection, it was observed by the'irspectors and verified
'
th
Mrou h interviews wit
s ervisors that
I
,
This issue will be
addressed to Headquarters NRC by Region V.
(50-528/86-07-0P.)
i
l
11.
MC-81070 Access Control-Personnel
,
I
Two apparent violations were identified.
The licensee's approved Security Plan dated October 1979 in
'
Section 5.2.2 states in part that
i
Further, Section 1.6.6 of the a roved Securit Plan stItes in part that,
Identification pictu
l
.
2
A.
Contrary to the above requirements, between Se tember 30 and
October 29, 1985, vital area
dditional
on November 1, 1985,
for approximate
ours, this vital
-
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-
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-
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-
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Further
30, 1985, for a period of a roximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />,
mvitalarea
!
Icensee 1
ations,
but did not report the October 30, 1985, incident to the NRC.
(Note: Paragraph 7 of this inspection report identifies this event
as not being reported to the NRC.)
Each time the licensee di
vital area door had been
,
!
!
-
!
ollowin each of these events, the licensee
for these vital areas and,
with one excep lon,
ermine
at no unauthorized person (s) had
)
entered these vital areas without having a proper level of vital
area access authorization.
This one exception occurred on October 29, 1985, when one of seven
j
NRC inspectors entered this vital area door. This newly assigned
l
regional inspector had only been authorized unescorted access to
plant protected areas and his
'
Subsequent vital area entries were
provided to this NRC Inspector through an assigned escort.
,
~
Thefailuretokimitvitalareaaccesstoonlythoseindiv'uals
authorized access to vital areas represents an apparentt
(50-528/86-07-09)
,
,
B.
Contrary to the above requirements, a review of licensee Security
Incident R orts determined that on January 17 and 24
i
Whendiscovered,thelicenseeinvalidatedthebadge$
upon determining that they had last been used for exit from the
protected area. The licensee identified but did not report this
',
violation to the NRC.
(Note: Paragraph 7 of this inspection report
identifies these events as not being reported to the NRC).
-
The failure to account for these
represents an apparent violation.
(50-528/86-07-10)
-
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.
D.
The licensee reported tha
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The inspectors determined that
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Additional y, t e inspec
rs etermine
j
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.
During this event,
j
As a result of this ever.t, the licensee retrained the acting
"
security sergeant and also issued Training Bulletin #35 title: Vital
Area Post Mistakenly Removed. This bulletin rovides a
i
check-and-balance system
i
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.
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12.
MC-81084 - Alarm Stations
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-
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.
-
.
No violations were identified.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's security
incident reports and determined that on Jul 2
8
Janua
31 and
February 7 1986
ious
, the licensee was of the opinion that a loss of
was a moderate rather than a major los
,
security effectiveness. The inspectors noted that si
_
hould be -
In1
y const ere as
jor oss
Iveness.
I
13.
MC-81088 - Communications
No violations were identified.
As stated in the Unit 2 Operating License, Attachment I dated
t
December 9, 1985, and also inlcuded in an ANPP letter from
E. E. Van Brunt Jr. , to J. B. Martin, Region V, U.S. NRC, dated
i
November 14, 1985, ANPP will make the following upgrades to the radio
communication system by February 15, 1986.
1.
Replace coaxial wiring to the radio antennas in the Radwaste and
Auxiliary Buildings.
2.
Relocate the base stations from the 160 foot level of the Corridor
Building to a more central location.
.
3.
Install and evaluate a passive antenna system on the 74 foot level
of the Control Building.
~
All three of these actions have been completed. The licensee advised the
inspectors that in referring to Item 3 above, that an active antenna
system was installed rather than a passive antenna system. At the time
of evaluation, it was evident to the licensee that a mere passive antenna
system could never perform adequately at their multi-unit site. For this
reason, the active antenna system was installed and evaluated.
.
The licensee is also required to complete, prior to initial criticality,
an evaluation of the effectiveness of the above changes and, if
significant communications deficiencies remain, to establish an action
plan to provide for adequate security communications and report same to
Region V.
(Note:
Initial criticality for Unit 2 is anticipated on/about
!
April 10, 1986).
-Initial discussions with licensee security personnel
nd direct
-
observations by the inspectors confirmed that
i
_
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_ -
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_-_ -__________
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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14.
MC-81501 - Personnel Training and Qualification Plan
No violations were identified.
On February 12 1
a
ted by the inspectors,
_ fired the weapons qualification course
wit
etr assigned revolvers. Each officer qualified with a minimum
score of 70% (210 out of 300 points), with the qualifying scores ranging
from 210 points to 299 points. Two security officers were then selected
by the inspectors to fire the
alification course. Both
officers also qualified with the
2
15. MC-92703 IE Bulletin, Information Notice, Confirmatory Action Letter,
and Generic Letter Follow-up
No violations were identified.
The licensee had received Information Notice 85-79 titled:
Inadequate
Communication between Maintenance, Operations and Security Personnel. To
_
preclude events occurring at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
similar to the events described in this Information Notice, the licensee
conducts Plant Security System Scheduling Meetings. These daily
meetings, hosted each morning by the Security Department are attended by
station representatives from: Station Computer Group, I&C Department,
Foley Maintenance Company, Maintenance Scheduling, Power Block
Scheduling, and specific engineering support for security lighting,
security screening equipment, CCTV equipment, vital area door / barrier,
and perimeter alarm equipment. Additienally, both the on-coming and
off-going Security Shift Captains attend this 7:15 a.m. Monday through
Friday meeting.
16.
During this routine security inspection, the following additional areas
were inspected and no violations or deviations were observed by NRC
inspectors.
-
Management Effectiveness - Security Program
a.
b.
Physical Barriers - Protected Area
c.
Detection Aids - Vital Areas
-
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Arizona Nuclear Power Project
ANPM-00466-DMN/CLK-95.32
T,':::,.' $li - kA
'
DATE.
February 10, 1986
same, Ext./Sta.
Chris Kelley 7739/62#3
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ro;
Security Operations Personnel
n.vi...o ar
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Nam / Ext./Sta.
Mi[ce Deblo 7740/6237
Ext.
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Name/ExuSta. Doeg Nelson 6342/6135
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SUBJECT. Training Bulletin #35
(Vital Area Post Mistakenly Removed)
i
File: 86-001-762
i
'
Recently, a major loss of Security effectiveness was reported to the NRC
'
Operations Center.
The result of this report could be a Level III vio-
,
lation, the most ser
ve incurred to date.
'
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i
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I
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1
i
In an effort to prevent future losses, the followin
check and balance
.
!
system shall be instituted by 28F.eb86.
This check and balance system is a part of the corrective action submitted
~
to the NRC by plant management.
DN/MD/CK/djh
cc:
W.F. Fernow
6130
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K.
Cross
6088
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UNITED ' STATES"
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.p
REGION V
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145c MARIA LANE.SulTE 210
,e'*
WALNUT CREEK. CALIFORNIA 94596
.
- * " *
APR 3 01986
,
-
Docket Nos. 50-528 and 50-529
_
.
- ..
-
,
Arizona Nuclear. , Power Project
P. O. Box 52034 '
,
.
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
'
-
Attention: Mr. E.,E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
'
Centle$ien:
Subject:
NRC Enforceme t Conference, Palo Verde. Units 1 and 2
~s.
'J; bis letter refers to the enforcement conference held with you and members of
your staff at the Palo Verde Nuclear Cenerating Station (PVNGS) on April 10,
1986.
The conference was related to activities conducted under the NRC
license listed above.
the report which is enclosed for your information. Subjects discussed during tha
No response to this letter is required.
If you have any
this report, please contact J. L. Montgomery at telephone, questions concerning
. . . ' * *
415 943-3778.
.
In accordance with Section 2.790(d) of the NRC's " Rules of Practic
-
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, documentation
,
.
the enclosed 1 report will not be placed in the Public Document Room and will
receive limited distribution.
,
We have determined that the enclosure so designated contains Safeguards
Information and therefore is subject to the controls of 10 CFR 73.21
.
Sin erely.
/sf'
-
-
.
Ross A. Scarano, Director
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
.
.
Enclosure:
Report No. 50-528/86-1/
50-529/86-lh (IE-V-744)
cc w/ enc:
J. Bynun, ANPP
W. F. Quinn, ANPP
T. D. Shriver, ANPP
W. E. Ide, ANPP
- - -
C. N. Russo, ANPP
'
cc w/o ene:
Ms. Jill Morrison; Lynne Bernabel; Duke Railaback; Arthur C. Gehr
66OT&76w3-ty
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
REGION V
-
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'
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WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596
.....
'
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4 1926
.
Docket Nos.:5.-50-528 and 50-529
Arizona Nuclear Power Project
P. O. Box 52034
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
Attention:
Mr.. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Exec 6tive Vice President
Subject:
NRC Enforcement Conference
This will confirm the telephone conversation between Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
of your staff and Mr. M. D. Schuster of this office on April 2,1986, concerning
the scheduling of an enforcement conference to be held at the Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station between NRC management and the management of A!GP.
It is our understanding that the conference v111 convene at approximately
11:00 a.m., April 10, 1986. The following matters will be discussed:
.; ; *
1.
The violations identified during the last security inspection on
February 11 through 14, 1986.
' ' . .
2.
NRC enforcement options.
.
"m .
e
3.
NRC concerns.
4.
lic5nsee management responsibilities.
We anticipate that the entire meeting should take no longer than one hour.
Sincerely,
J ff
-
.
Ross A. Scarano, Director
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
-
.
,
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UNITED STATES
8
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
REGION V
- Y I o#[
145o MARIA LANE, SUITE 21o
' WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596
.
'
APR >31986
NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT MEETING
-
..
Name of Licensee: Arizona Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP)
Name of Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS),
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos.: 50-528 and 50-529
Date and Time of seeing: April 10, 1986, 11:00 a.m.
Location of Meeting: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,
Wintersburg, Arizona
.
!
Purpose of Meeting:
Enforcement conference to discuss violations noted
during an unannounced routine security inspection
-
at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
NRC Attendees:
John B. Martin, Regional Administrator
"-
James L. Montgomery, Chief
Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch
A. D. Johnson, Enforcement Officer
'l u
R. Zimmerman, Senior Resident Inspector
.
D. W. Schaefer, Physical Security Inspector
%
Licensee Attendees:
E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., Executive Vice President
J. G. Haynes, VJce President Nuclear Production
.y
J. R. Bynum, Plant Manager
W. Hayden, Project Counsel
C. Kelley, Supervisor, Security Training and Support
D. Nelson, Manager, Operations Security
'
W. Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
T. Shriver, Manager, Compliance
L. Souza, Assistant Director, Corporate QA/AC
NOTE: Attendance at this meeting by NRC personnel other than those listed
above should be made known by April 9, 1986, 12:00 noon via a telephone
call to M. D. Schuster, FTS 463-3780.
_
D1stribution:
Acting DEDROGR - J. H. Sniczek
Director, IE - J. M. Taylor
-
.
Director, Division of Inspection Programs, IE - J. G. Partlow
Director, Enforcement Staff, IE - J. A. Axc1 rad
Director and Chief Counsel, Regional Operations and Enforcement, ELD - J. Liebernan
Director, Division of Safeguards, NMSS - R. F. Burnett
Division of Safeguards, HMSS - G. W. McCorkel, Chief, SGPR
.
Division of PWR Licensjng, NRR - G. Knighton, Project Director
Regional Administrator - John B. Martin
Division Director, NRC Region - Ross A. Scarano
Branch Chief, NRC Region - James L. Montgomery
-
-
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- - - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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APR 021986
.
.
Docket Nos. 50-528 and 50-529
.
-
i
Arizona Nuclear Power Project
P. O. Box 52034
"
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
Attention: Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
Gentlemen:
Subject: NRC Security Inspection, Palo Verde, Units 1 and 2
!
This letter refers to the routine safeguards inspection of your activity at
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), Units 1 and 2 authorized under
NRC License Nos. NPF-41 and NPF-46, respectively. The inspection was
conducted by Messrs. D. Schaefer and L. Norderhaug of this office on
I
February 11 through March 13, 1986.
It also refers to the discussion of our
inspection findings held by the inspectors with Mr. E. Van Brunt Jr.,
Executive Vice President of the Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP), and
members of his staff on February 14, 1986. Further this letter refers to the
telephone discussion between Messrs. C. Kelley, ANPP and D. Schaefer of this
office on March 13, 1986.
During this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in violation
with NRC requirements. You will be notified by separate correspondence of our
decision regarding enforcement actions based on the findings of this
inspection.
Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed inspection
report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective
examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with
-
facility and contract personnel and observations by the inspectors.
In accordance with Section 2.790(d) of NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, documentation of the findings of your
safeguards and security procedures are exempt from public disclosure;
therefore, the enclosed inspection report will not be placed in the Public
Document Room and will receive limited distribution.
.
.
e
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e,
._
--
.
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- -
-
- -
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APR 021986
Arizona Nuclear Power Project
-2-
'
We have determined that the enclosure to this letter contain Safeguards
Information and must be protected against unauthorized disclosure in
accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.21.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to
discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
$cLL
Ross A. Scarano, Director
Division of Radiation Safety and
'
Safeguards
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
Nos. 50-528/86-07
50-529/86-06 (IE-V-737)
cc w/ enclosure:
J. Bynum, ANPP
W. F. Quinn, ANPP
T. D. Shriver, ANPP
W. E. Ide, ANPP
C. N. Russo, ANPP
,
,
l
cc w/o enclosure:
Ms. Mill Morrison, PVIF
Lynne Bernabei, GAP
Duke Railsback, ACC
.
Arthur C. Gehr, Esq., Snell and Wilmer
. .
.
.
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