ML20134A616

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Testimony of DM Milan on 820914 Before Committee on Interior & Insular Affairs,Subcommittee on Energy & Environ Re Boiler & Pressure Violations at Plant
ML20134A616
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Zimmer
Issue date: 09/14/1982
From: Milan D
OHIO, STATE OF
To:
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ML17198A269 List: ... further results
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FOIA-84-293 NUDOCS 8508150360
Download: ML20134A616 (5)
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.o September 13, 1982 U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Subconstittee on Energy and Environment Hearing on Quality Assurance for The Zinuner Nuclear Power Station on Tuesday, September 14, 1982 Testimony By: Donald M. Milan Chief Inspector, State of Ohio Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee.

It is once again my pleasure and privilege to be permitted to appear before this distinguished constittee.

I would like to thank you on behalf of the citizens of Ohio for allowing our views on this vital subject to be expressed at a forum of such a high level.

The reports that I receive on a regular basis from the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, along with my personal visits have lead me to the following conclusions:

1.

The work being performed by The National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors Audit Team is vital to providing the State of Ohio the necessary assurances that the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station is being constructed in a safe manner and in accordance with our laws and regulations.

2.

The work being performed by The Nuclear Regulat6ry Commission Inspectors under the present N.R.C. program appears to be effective and extremely important.

3.

I have seen evidence that the N.R.C. and The National Board are working in close cooperation with each other to the mutual benefit of all concerned. I believe it is extremely important that these two organizations work together as they are doing at Zimmer.

If we would have had both organiza-tions auditing in close liaison with each other as we now have, the problems we are faced with at this plant could have been averted.

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Page (2) l This could have saved the owners of this plant huge amounts of money, time and frustrations.

I am of the opinion that i

The National Board Audit Team activity should be written into f

the federal Regulations, since it would enhance assurances of safety and compliance with all regulations in each and every Nuclear Power Plant in this great country.

4.

One of the problems of the past relates to the number of N.R.C. personnel on site to the number of workmen or craf t personnel. Many of these sites have over 2,000 construction workers on site. The size, scope, and magnitude of this activity is such that three or four inspectors regardless of how highly trained or capable they might be, they cannot keep pace with the activity.

I hasten to point out that this is no reflection upon the quality or dedication of all N.R.C. personnel, because I can assure you these people are truly professionals performing their duties in a highly commendable manner. There is just a need for more personnel, and we fully comprehend the budgetary restrictions which prevent more inspectors or auditors from being assigned to every nuclear site.

5.

At Zimmer, by utilizing a National Board Audit Team, we have increased the number of audit personnel on site from three to six since we presently have three National Board Auditors on site. Whenever you double the number of personnel it only stands to reason that you will have a greater opportunity to achieve the necessary levels of safety.

6.

The second Interim Report sent to me by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors identifies many additional violations.

Listed below are a few of thess violations listed in the second Interim Report dated July 1,1982.

2.0 CINCINNATI GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 2.1 The National Board Audit Team in reviewing CG&E generated NCR's, noted that at least two (2) portions of piping systems had b

.n overstressed during hydrostatic tests.

Involved were Low Pressure Core Spray (LP) and the Residual Heat Removal (RH)

Systems.

2.1.1 The LP piping system involved was 12 inch diameter designed for 475 psi at 202 F and includes lines 1LP17A3, ILPO2A12 between valves 1E21F005 and 1E21F309, ILP14A2, ILPOSA12 to valve 1E21F012; lines 1LPO303A3 and ILPO902 between valves 1E21F034 and 1E21FOO4 and 1LP32AA314, ILP32AB314, ILP30A314 and ILP31A314. The maximum hydrostatic test pressure permissible was 629 psi (475 x 1.25 x 1.0601. The actuel test

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' pressure applied was 1200 psi according to a nonconformance report. issued (Re: NR-7247 R-1).

The system is classified as ASME Section III, Class 2.

2.1.2 The RH piping overstressed was a section of 8 inch diameter piping having a design pressure of 1125 psi at 575 F.

The maximum hydrostatic test pressure permissable (based on DP x (1.25 x 1.06) was 1490 psi. The actual test pressure applied was 2700 psi according to a Nonconformance Report (Re: NR-7258). The system is classified ASME Section III, Class 2.

1 2.1.3 The above-referenced NR's (NR-7247, R-1 and NR-7258) i were reviewed by the Owner's A.E., Sargent and Lundy Engineers, and dispositioned by the S&L engineer " Accept-As-Is". This disposition was based on the A.E.'s reviewing the yields as shown on the CMTR's for the material used, using the actual thickness of the material as determined by UT and recalculating the design pressure using actual thickness as measured and actual yield strength as indicated on the CMTR's and not using i

the stress values as listed in Table 1.7.1, Appendix I, ASME Section III. The piping material used in both systems is SA-106 Grado B.

2.1.4 It is the National Board Audit Team's opinion that 4

disposition of the alove overpressurization and " Accept-As-Is" is not permitted by the rules of ASME Section III since maximum allowable stress values for material are established in the Appendix I tables; and in NC-3600 the definition of "S" states "the value of "S" shall not exceed that given in Tables 1.7.1, 1.7.2 and 1.7.3".

NATIONAL BOARD FINDINGS 2.3 In the National Board Audit Team's Interim Report No. 1, concern was expressed regarding the scope of the work that was to be performed by Catalytic, Inc. (Item 2.6)

The National Board Audit Team has been advised that Catalytic, Inc. has been assigned by CC&E the implementation of ECR-623, which involves the cutting out and replacing of Code piping installed by Henry J. Kaiser that has not been Code symbol stamped or covered on a N-5 Data Report.

I 2.3.1 Again the National Board Audit Team is of the opinion that such construction shall be in accordance with Code requirements and shall be acceptable to all parties involved; CGsE (Owner), the Authorized Inspection Agency (A.I.A.), and the State of Ohio.

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NATIONAL BOARD FINDING 2.4 A letter dated February 22, 1979, by S. A. Zych and D. D.

Crisp of Sargent and Lundy Engineers contains " Notes of Inspection -

February 5, 1979, regarding a Steam-Jet Air Ejector Condenser, William H. Zimmer Unit 1".

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Apparently this steam jet air ejector condenser failed due to overpressure causing cracks on the shell side to the tube sheet and the pulling of some tubes in the outer two (2) rows of tubes.

A reference in the report was made to " poor penetration" (Weld),

and the National Board Audit Team became interested in a possible Code violation by the manufacturer of the pressure vessel.

In addition, the Team wished to confirm that the vessel was replaced as recommended in the above-referenced " Notes of Inspection".

i 2.4.1 The National Board Audit Team examined externally the pressure vessel ICDO3AALIA and noted a Westinghouse nameplate with information as follows:

Westinghouse 1-8A 2679-1 Steam Pressure -200 Cooling Water -7600 There was a tag as follows:

HJK P.O.# CG&E 2043 MR #10247 Received 7/1/74 ID ICD-03AA Location - Compound 2.4.2 There was no evidence externally on the pressure vessel that it had been constructed and stamped in accordance with the ASME Code (a State of Ohio requirement for pressure vessels designed for 15 or more psi).

It was also noted that the pressure vessel had apparently been repaired in the field.

2.4.3 The National Board Audit Team has attempted to obtain documentation from the CGEE vault and the Henry J. Kaiser vault for this pressure vessel and any repairs that have been made to it, and none has been made available to date.

2.4.4 It is the opinion of the National Board Audit Team that documentation shall be presented to the National Board Audit Team assuring the pressure vessel (s) in this condensate system and repairs to pressure vessels in the system are in accordance with the requirements of the State of Ohio.

7.

There are many conformance programs in effect to correct these violations at the Zinsner site. The National Board is Monitoring and will continue to monitor these programs.

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'We are getting good cooperation from the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company at this time.

8.

With a joinc effort by the N.R.C. and The National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors and The Jurisdiction, I believe we can bring this plant into conformance with the code and State of Ohio rules and standards or the equivalent.

M M

By:

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_s Boiler Div. Chief, State of Ohio O

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